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dc.contributor.authorGarcia, J.B.
dc.contributor.authorvon Winterfeldt, Detlof
dc.date.accessioned2018-12-07T21:54:41Z
dc.date.available2018-12-07T21:54:41Z
dc.date.issued2016-04
dc.identifier.citationGarcia, Ryan JB, and Detlof von Winterfeldt. "Defender–attacker decision tree analysis to combat terrorism." Risk Analysis 36.12 (2016): 2258-2271.en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10945/60770
dc.descriptionThe article of record as published may be found at http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/risa.12574en_US
dc.description.abstractWe propose a methodology, called defender–attacker decision tree analysis, to evaluate defensive actions against terrorist attacks in a dynamic and hostile environment. Like most game‐theoretic formulations of this problem, we assume that the defenders act rationally by maximizing their expected utility or minimizing their expected costs. However, we do not assume that attackers maximize their expected utilities. Instead, we encode the defender's limited knowledge about the attacker's motivations and capabilities as a conditional probability distribution over the attacker's decisions. We apply this methodology to the problem of defending against possible terrorist attacks on commercial airplanes, using one of three weapons: infrared‐guided MANPADS (man‐portable air defense systems), laser‐guided MANPADS, or visually targeted RPGs (rocket propelled grenades). We also evaluate three countermeasures against these weapons: DIRCMs (directional infrared countermeasures), perimeter control around the airport, and hardening airplanes. The model includes deterrence effects, the effectiveness of the countermeasures, and the substitution of weapons and targets once a specific countermeasure is selected. It also includes a second stage of defensive decisions after an attack occurs. Key findings are: (1) due to the high cost of the countermeasures, not implementing countermeasures is the preferred defensive alternative for a large range of parameters; (2) if the probability of an attack and the associated consequences are large, a combination of DIRCMs and ground perimeter control are preferred over any single countermeasure.en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipU.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS)en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipNational Science Foundationen_US
dc.format.extent14 p.en_US
dc.rightsThis publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States.en_US
dc.titleDefender - Attacker Decision Tree Analysis to Combat Terrorismen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.contributor.corporateNaval Postgraduate School (U.S.)en_US
dc.subject.authorDecision theoryen_US
dc.subject.authordefender–attacker decisionsen_US
dc.subject.authorgame theoryen_US
dc.description.funderNational Science Foundation SES-1314644en_US
dc.description.funderUniversity of Southern California (USC) 2010-ST- 061-RE0001en_US


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