Characterizing sailor and command enlisted placement and assignment preferences
Molina, Valerie A.
Butler, Virginia L.
Gates, William R.
MetadataShow full item record
This paper will report on the results to date in developing a sailor/command database for redesigning the enlisted placement and assignment process. DON currently matches sailors to billets using a labor-intensive detailing process. With evolving information technology, the assignment process could be accomplished using intelligent agents and web-based markets. This integrated agent/market process was tested using representative sailors and jobs in a "laboratory setting," to examine actual versus predicted matching performance for human detailers, the two-sided matching markets and optimization algorithms. Economics experiments tested quality of fit in assignments made by both human detailers and the two-sided matching algorithm. Experimental results to date have been promising, but they have used sailors and commands with hypothetical characteristics and preferences. As such, experimental and simulation results may not reflect how assignment algorithms would perform in the Navy's enlisted detailing environment. Meaningful comparisons across detailing approaches must use a realistic database of sailor and command preferences and characteristics. This research investigates sailor and command preferences for a particular enlisted community, identifying the characteristics of both sailors' preferences over jobs and commands' preferences over sailors. Data concerning both the number and type of characteristics considered important by both sailors and commands represent important important design features of any revised assignment process.
RightsThis publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States.
Showing items related by title, author, creator and subject.
Two-sided matching for the US Navy's enlisted detailing process a comparison of deferred acceptance and linear programming via simulation Low, Eng Hwee; Ho, Joshua H. (Monterey, California, Naval Postgraduate School, 2002-12);Recent studies of 2-sided matching mechanisms have suggested potential benefits for implementation into the Navy enlisted assignment process. The proposed matching process improves the chance of commands and sailors being ...
Stitt, Ryan D. (Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School, 2009-12);There is growing research that explores using an array of non-monetary incentives (NMIs) to attract and retain quality Sailors. Non-monetary incentives used in this paper are: homeport choice, billet choice, platform ...
Ricard, Christopher J.; Neuer, Richard A. (Monterey, CA; Naval Postgraduate School, 2020-03);There is a disproportionate distribution of Sailors throughout the naval aviation enterprise, as the Navy is unable to solicit Sailors to voluntarily serve in specific geographically remote locations. The topography and ...