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dc.contributor.advisorSepp, Kalev I.
dc.contributor.authorDamron, David J.
dc.date.accessioned2019-02-07T22:50:38Z
dc.date.available2019-02-07T22:50:38Z
dc.date.issued2017-12
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10945/61187
dc.description.abstractAssault airlift can contribute to a higher degree of direct-action mission success for special operations forces, independent of mission objective achievement, by bolstering the likelihood that assault forces can return home safely. As America's domestic social and political sensitivity to casualties continues to rise, mission success has become principally contingent upon a nation’s perceived ability to ensure the survival and return of the assault force in addition to achievement of mission objectives. The concept of force survival as a prerequisite to mission success in all but the most in extremis cases is validated through historical case studies, including Operation KINGPIN. President Barack Obama acknowledged the ability to safely extract the assault force as a primary consideration in the “go-ahead” for Operation NEPTUNE’S SPEAR; Operation EAGLE CLAW and Operation ANACONDA bear this same characteristic. Yet the current “theory of special operations” overly focuses on actioning mission objectives and insufficiently addresses extraction—a critical component necessary today for overall mission success along with survival of the mission force. The demand for a “two-way mission” can be satisfied through the use of assault airlift to capitalize on Admiral William McRaven’s theory of relative superiority via the principles of simplicity, speed, and surprise.en_US
dc.description.urihttp://archive.org/details/assaultairliftac1094561187
dc.publisherMonterey, CA; Naval Postgraduate Schoolen_US
dc.rightsThis publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States.en_US
dc.titleAssault Airlift: Achieving Relative Superiority and Survivability in SOF Direct-Actionen_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.contributor.secondreaderHammond, Jesse R.
dc.contributor.departmentDefense Analysis (DA)
dc.subject.authoraircraften_US
dc.subject.authorairplaneen_US
dc.subject.authorAir Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC)en_US
dc.subject.authorair mobilityen_US
dc.subject.authorassault airliften_US
dc.subject.authorassault forceen_US
dc.subject.authorhelicopteren_US
dc.subject.authorhelicopter assault forceen_US
dc.subject.authorjointen_US
dc.subject.authorMcRavenen_US
dc.subject.authormilitaryen_US
dc.subject.authorraidsen_US
dc.subject.authorrelative superiorityen_US
dc.subject.authorspecial operations forces (SOF)en_US
dc.subject.authortheory of assault airliften_US
dc.subject.authortheory of special operationsen_US
dc.subject.authorUnited States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM)en_US
dc.description.recognitionOutstanding Thesisen_US
dc.description.serviceMajor, United States Air Forceen_US
etd.thesisdegree.nameMaster of Science in Defense Analysis (Irregular Warfare)en_US
etd.thesisdegree.levelMastersen_US
etd.thesisdegree.disciplineDefense Analysis (Irregular Warfare)en_US
etd.thesisdegree.grantorNaval Postgraduate Schoolen_US
dc.identifier.thesisid29560


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