ASSESSING EFFECTS OF U.S. SANCTIONS ON HEZBOLLAH'S JIHAD AL-BINA'

Abstract

In the wake of the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war, the United States designated the Jihad al-Bina’ organization in 2007 and its postwar recovery project Wa’ad in 2009 for its relationship with, and activities supporting, Lebanese Hezbollah. Because of this designation, Jihad al-Bina’ and Wa’ad became subject to sanctions which, in theory, should have undermined their ability to support Hezbollah’s strategic objectives by denying Jihad al-Bina’ access to necessary resources and funding to execute projects. This thesis examines Jihad al-Bina’s projects from 1988–2018 to determine how Jihad al-Bina’ contributed to Hezbollah’s strategic objectives. It also examines how U.S. sanctions against Jihad al-Bina’ in 2007 and its Wa’ad project in 2009 affected their ability to carry out that work. In detailing Jihad al-Bina’s activities and projects during this time period, this thesis compares the number, nature and scale of projects executed by Jihad al-Bina’ prior to and following U.S. sanctions against Jihad al-Bina’ in 2007 and 2009, respectively. This thesis found that these 2007 and 2009 sanctions were ineffective in the near- and long-term. The sanctions failed to deny Jihad al-Bina’ resources necessary to conduct immediate postwar reconstruction and recovery. Moreover, Jihad al-Bina’ expanded the size and scope of projects, and grew in size and legitimacy in the postwar era between 2009 and the present.