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dc.contributor.advisorFreeman, Michael E.
dc.contributor.advisorDahl, Erik J.
dc.contributor.authorSow, Brehima
dc.date.accessioned2019-02-13T22:47:19Z
dc.date.available2019-02-13T22:47:19Z
dc.date.issued2018
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10945/61275
dc.description.abstractSince the 1960s, Mali has faced several insurgencies from groups seeking more autonomy, particularly in the northern parts of the country. Each insurgency has been marked by regional, ethnic, religious, and racial divisions, leading to the formation and subsequent disintegration of short-lived alliances that have made negotiations between Malian insurgent groups and the government complex. Although leadership pursued negotiations, the resulting agreements never became a lasting solution. Most recently, in 2012, insurgent and jihadist groups in the north unified and sparked an unprecedented crisis that has spilled into central Mali. The crisis pushed the French to intervene with Chadian troops, at the request of Mali’s government, which also requested a European Union training mission to improve the capacity of the Malian security forces. Furthermore, the United Nations authorized an African-led mission, which soon became a UN-led mission, to resolve the conflict. All these initiatives, however, have failed to bring peace. Based on a review of scholarly research and relevant documents, including the peace agreements that followed the prior crises in Mali, this thesis analyzes the underlying causes of the ongoing violence and the factors that have contributed to the failure of the resolution efforts. The thesis builds on those findings to recommend ways in which the government of Mali and international partners can avoid such missteps going forward.en_US
dc.description.urihttp://archive.org/details/theriseofterrori1094561275
dc.publisherMonterey, CA; Naval Postgraduate Schoolen_US
dc.rightsCopyright is reserved by the copyright owner.en_US
dc.titleTHE RISE OF TERRORISM IN MALI: A REVIEW OF THE HISTORICAL CAUSES AND THE FAILURES OF BOTH MALIAN AND INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS.en_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.contributor.departmentNational Security Affairs (NSA)
dc.subject.authorterrorismen_US
dc.subject.authorinsurgencyen_US
dc.subject.authordemocracyen_US
dc.subject.authorallianceen_US
dc.subject.authormilitiasen_US
dc.subject.authordemobilizationen_US
dc.subject.authorcommunityen_US
dc.subject.authormovementen_US
dc.subject.authorexternal partnersen_US
dc.subject.authordisarmamenten_US
dc.description.serviceLieutenant Colonel, National Guard, Malien_US
etd.thesisdegree.nameMaster of Arts in Security Studies (Combating Terrorism: Policy and Strategy)en_US
etd.thesisdegree.levelMastersen_US
etd.thesisdegree.disciplineSecurity Studies (Combating Terrorism: Policy and Strategy)en_US
etd.thesisdegree.grantorNaval Postgraduate Schoolen_US
dc.identifier.thesisid30310
dc.description.distributionstatementApproved for public release; distribution is unlimited.


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