INSTABILITY IN MALI: FORMULATING EFFECTIVE RESPONSES TO INSURGENCY, TERRORISM, AND ORGANIZED CRIME

Abstract

Security in Mali has worsened in recent decades due to the escalation of the Tuareg insurgency, its connection to terrorist groups, and the military coup in 2012. The crisis in the north of Mali, as the Tuareg insurgency is also known, began in the 1960s, after Mali independence from France. From 1962 to 2012, a series of rebellions occurred in the north of Mali. The 2012 rebellion was the most complex and lethal because it involved foreign combatants and resulted in the invasion of the northern regions by the coalition of Tuareg and terrorist groups following the rout of the Malian army. The crisis has not yet being solved despite the national and international responses, including the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) peacekeeping mission. This thesis seeks to formulate effective responses to the Malian crisis by examining the Tuareg rebellions and Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria as case studies. To formulate recommendations responding to the crisis, the thesis analyzes the involved groups and their funding and evaluates the effectiveness and inadequacy of local and international responses applied to the cases. It concludes that the mix of military, political, and economic responses to the crisis reinforced by good governance will produce effective results.