ESCALATE TO DE-ESCALATE: SPECULATION ON RUSSIAN NUCLEAR STRATEGY

Abstract

This thesis contributes to the debate regarding the Department of Defense's assessment that the Russian Federation possesses an "escalate to de-escalate" strategy. This research approaches the question through analysis of official doctrine, statements, nuclear capabilities and military exercises of the Russian Federation following the Cold War. The Russian Federation develops weapons for the employment of nonstrategic nuclear weapons and exercises the use of nonstrategic nuclear weapons during major exercises. Its official military doctrine is conducive to an "escalate to de-escalate" strategy. This research concludes that the Russian Federation assigns both an "escalate to de-escalate" and operational role for nonstrategic nuclear weapons. The Department of Defense is correct in its assessment of Russian nuclear strategy and should pursue initiatives that avoid legitimizing the use of nonstrategic nuclear weapons, contribute to strategic miscalculations, or set the conditions for a security dilemma between the United States and the Russian Federation.