DETERRENCE IN THE DANGER ZONE: HOW THE UNITED STATES CAN DETER RUSSIAN GRAY ZONE CONFLICT

Abstract

In recent years, adversaries of the United States have become increasingly more adept at operating in the gray zone, which sits above normal statecraft and below armed conflict. In 2016, Russia used cyber-espionage and covert influence operations to sow discord among the American population and interfere in the democratic process of the U.S. presidential election. This attempt was but one part of a broader Russian gray zone strategy in which it uses non-military means to achieve its national objectives and gain influence while avoiding a powerful response from either the United States or NATO. In this sphere, non-democratic adversaries of the United States are at an advantage as they are often more agile and expeditious at integrating all elements of state power, especially economic power and informational warfare. This thesis draws on interviews with subject matter experts to explore how the United States can best deter these gray zone actions and strategies in the future. In doing so, it provides a strategic assessment of Russia as a state actor, U.S.–Russian relations, and Russia’s use of the gray zone. Additionally, it analyzes the transposition of deterrence to the sub-conventional level. Finally, it illustrates ways in which the United States can deter parts of Russia’s gray zone strategy. Overall, this research finds that it is difficult but possible to deter Russian gray zone conflict.