ALLIANCE THEORY: UNDERSTANDING TURKEY'S CHANGING ALLIANCE BEHAVIOR WITHIN NATO

Abstract

The current multipolar international system is fraught with uncertainty for states seeking security assurances. Alliances are tools of statecraft used to enhance the security of their members. Over the past seventy years, NATO has successfully achieved its raison d’être—collective defense. Yet, Turkey, a NATO ally since 1952, has increasingly diverged from its traditional alliance behavior. This has called into question Turkey’s future role in NATO. Why would Ankara forge an informal alliance with Moscow and purchase Russia’s S-400, knowing that it would jeopardize NATO’s security and undermine the Alliance’s cohesion? This thesis merges two complementary alliance theories with Turkish identity politics to explore the factors driving Turkey’s perplexing behavior. Turkey’s shifting alliance behavior is the result of increasing distrust between Turkey and the Alliance, structural changes to the international system, differing threat perceptions, and the Justice and Development Party's Ottoman Islamist ideology. These factors collided during the Syrian War as Turkey’s and the rest of the Alliance’s security interests misaligned. Consequently, NATO’s internal threat level surpassed its shared external threat level—severely eroding the Alliance’s cohesion and compelling Turkey to change its alliance behavior. Despite Ankara’s worrisome behavior, Turkey remains a vital NATO ally. Thus, the Alliance should seek to mend the rift, lest Turkey continue its divergent course.