Nuclear stability at low numbers: the perspective from Beijing
Twomey, Christopher P.
MetadataShow full item record
Chinese writings on the workings of nuclear stability, deterrence, and coercion are thin and politicized. Nevertheless, it is possible to glean, from direct and inferential evidence, rather pessimistic conclusions regarding Chinese views of nuclear stability at low numbers. While China has been living with low numbers in its own arsenal for decades, today it views missile defense and advanced conventional weapons as the primary threat to nuclear stability. More generally, China views nuclear stability as wedded to political amity. Because none of these would be directly addressed through further US and Russian arsenal reductions, China is unlikely to view such reductions as particularly stabilizing. While there is little in Chinese writing to suggest lower US and Russian numbers would encourage a "race to parity," there are grounds to worry about China becoming more assertive as it gains confidence in Beijing’s own increasingly secure second-strike forces.
The article of record as published may be found at http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2013.799832
RightsThis publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States.
Showing items related by title, author, creator and subject.
Yost, David (2013-07);This article offers a survey of risks that might arise for strategic stability (defined as a situation with a low probability of major-power war) with the reduction of US and Russian nuclear arsenals to "low numbers" ...
Cummings, Kevin P. (Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School, 1982-10);The British Government announced its intention in July 19 80 to modernize its strategic nuclear deterrent with the deployment of the Trident I (C4) submarine- launched ballistic missile. The MIRVed Trident missile will ...
Barretta, Michael A. (Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School, 1995-06);This thesis tests the theory that nuclear proliferation might enhance strategic stability by making the use of military force between possessors of nuclear weapons unlikely. It discusses the existing literature on deterrence ...