THE EFFICACY OF U.S. SECURITY COOPERATION IN THE GULF

Abstract

This thesis investigates the efficacy of U.S. security cooperation for advancing peace and stability in the Persian Gulf. It asks why the ongoing regional instability is disproportionate to the United States' investment. The thesis examines the U.S. relationships with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates in the post-9/11 environment through two case studies and posits that dysfunctional partnerships have prevented the United States from achieving its foreign policy goals. The case studies reveal that although the U.S. partnerships were nominally functional, U.S. policy increasingly focused on two activities working at cross-purposes to regional stability. First, security cooperation efforts emphasized transferring the burden of security to regional actors. Second, U.S. security cooperation prioritized optimizing the benefits from arming those same regional actors. Thus, the post-9/11 paradigm represents a shift from pursuing regional policy goals towards realizing benefits. The ongoing state of regional instability in the Persian Gulf appears to be partially explained by the unintended consequences of the United States' post-9/11 regional security paradigm. Consequently, U.S. security cooperation may need to conform to a goals-centered approach, thereby sacrificing benefits, if the United States intends to make regional peace and stability a policy priority.