Publication:
Creating Effective Industrial-Control-System Honeypots

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Authors
Rowe, Neil C.
Nguyen, Thuy D.
Kendrick, Marian M.
Rucker, Zaki A.
Hyun, Dahae
Brown, Justin C.
Subjects
Advisors
Date of Issue
2020
Date
2020
Publisher
HICSS
Language
Abstract
Cyberattacks on industrial control systems (ICSs) can be especially damaging since they often target critical infrastructure. Honeypots are valuable network-defense tools, but they are difficult to implement for ICSs because they must then simulate more than familiar protocols. This research compared the performance of the Conpot and GridPot honeypot tools for simulating nodes on an electric grid for live (not recorded) traffic. We evaluated the success of their deceptions by observing their activity types and by scanning them. GridPot received a higher rate of traffic than Conpot, and many visitors to both were deceived as to whether they were dealing with a honeypot. We also tested Shodan’ s Honeyscore for finding honeypots, and found it was fooled by our honeypots as well as others when, like most users, it did not take site history into account. This is good news for collecting useful attack intelligence with ICS honeypots.
Type
Conference Paper
Description
Proceedings of the 53rd Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences | 2020
The article of record at published may be found at https://hdl.handle.net/10125/63967
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Organization
Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.)
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Format
10 p.
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Distribution Statement
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This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States.
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