U.S. HOSTAGE POLICY: THE EFFECTIVENESS OF RANSOM PAYMENTS ON THE DURATION IN CAPTIVITY FOR AMERICAN HOSTAGES

Abstract

The question of whether the U.S. government should negotiate for hostages and make concessions to hostage takers has been extensively discussed by policymakers and scholars. The issue of ransom has received less attention. This thesis assesses the impact of ransom on duration in captivity for American hostages through qualitative and quantitative research. Using a set of historical cases since 1801, the qualitative portion assesses the effectiveness of ransom in relation to objectives and motivation of hostage takers based on their phase within the hostage-taking cycle. The quantitative portion of this research correlates ransom and other forms of concessions with duration in captivity. It finds that Americans represent less than 2% of the hostage population worldwide, yet their duration in captivity is twice that of hostages from other countries when ransom is a condition of their release and four times the duration when concessions are utilized. When hostages of other nationalities are released through concessions, their duration in captivity is less that of American citizens released through ransom. This research concludes that, compared to concessions, ransom is effective in decreasing the duration in captivity for American hostages. However, American hostages hold value to hostage-takers as leverage in driving up ransom amounts and encouraging other countries to pay as well as for political gains and propaganda purposes, therefore, increasing their duration in captivity.