Use of Evaluation Criteria in Security Education
Nguyen, Thuy D.
Irvine, Cynthia E.
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Success in information warfare will depend on resilient, reconstitutable cyber assets and the ability to assess and respond to attacks. A cornerstone of this success will be the ability of Information Assurance professionals to develop sound security requirements and determine the suitability of evaluated security products for mission-specific systems. Recognizing the pedagogical value of applying security evaluation criteria such as the Common Criteria (CC) to information security education, we recently introduced a graduate-level Computer Science course focusing on methodical security requirements engineering based on the CC. This course aims to provide students with an understanding of how security evaluation criteria can be used to specify system security objectives, derive security requirements from security objectives, establish life cycle and development processes, and provide an organizational framework for research and development. Although imperfect, the paradigmatic process of the CC provides a usable framework for in-depth study of various tasks relating to system requirements derivation and verification activities: system requirements elicitation, threat analysis, security objectives definition and security requirements expression. In-class discussions address fundamental security design principles and disciplines for information and software assurance (e.g., formal methods and life cycle management) as applied to security requirements derivation. Coverage of advanced CC topics includes high assurance evaluation, international and U.S. scheme interpretation processes, guidance for Protection Profile development, CC evaluation methodology, and composite evaluation. This paper describes the scope and design of a pilot course offering. Laboratory projects focus on the differences between security functional and assurance requirements, mock evaluation of a draft Protection Profile, examination of the interpretation process in the U.S. scheme, and development of a preliminary sketch of a Composed Assurance Package for a hypothetical composed target system that is suitable for use in operational environments requiring medium robustness. Lessons learned and planned refinements of course material and focus are also discussed.
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Gross, Michael E. (Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School, 2004-03);Configuration Management (CM) plays a vital role in the development of trusted computing systems. The Common Criteria (CC) provides a framework for performing Information Technology (IT) security evaluations of these systems ...
Irvine, Cynthia E.; Levin, Timothy; Wilson, Jeffery D.; Shifflett, David; Pereira, Bereira (2001);Requirements specifications for high assurance secure systems are rare in the open literature. This paper presents a case study in the development of a requirements document for a multilevel secure system that must meet ...
Irvine, Cynthia E.; Levin, Timothy E.; Wilson, J. D.; Shifflett, D.; Pereira, B. (Requirements Engineering Journal, 2002-07-02);Requirements specifications for high assurance secure systems are rare in the open literature. This paper examines the development of a requirements document for a multilevel secure system that must meet stringent assurance ...