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dc.contributor.authorVolpano, Dennis
dc.contributor.authorIrvine, Cynthia E.
dc.date.accessioned2012-07-11T15:49:40Z
dc.date.available2012-07-11T15:49:40Z
dc.date.issued1997-00-00
dc.identifier.citationProceedings of the 25th ACM Symposium on Principles of Programming Languages, San Diego, CA, pp. 355-364, January 1998
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10945/7183
dc.descriptionThe article of record as published may be located at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0167-4048(97)00002-3en_US
dc.description.abstractSome of the most promising work in the area of enforcing secure information flow in programs is based on static analyses of source code. However, as yet, these efforts have not had much impact in practice. We present a new approach to analyzing programs statically for secrecy and integrity flow violations. The analysis is characterized as a form of type inference in a secure flow type system. The type system provides a uniform frame work for traditional type checking of programs and information flow control Type correct programs have principal types that characterize how they can be called securely. Applications of the type system include flow analysis of legacy code as well as code written in newly emerging Web languages like Java (tm).en_US
dc.publisherACMen_US
dc.rightsThis publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States.en_US
dc.titleSecure Flow Typingen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.contributor.schoolFlorida International University
dc.contributor.departmentComputer Science (CS)
dc.subject.authorsecure information flowen_US
dc.subject.authortype systemsen_US
dc.subject.authorWeb programmingen_US
dc.subject.authorcertificationen_US
dc.description.distributionstatementApproved for public release; distribution is unlimited.


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