Arms transfers to Venezuela: a comparative and critical analysis of the acquisition process (1980-1996)

Abstract

Certain aspects of the Venezuelan acquisition process for arms from 1980-1996 may have contributed to bribery and corruption, thus making both Congress and the Venezuelan populace highly skeptical of requests for weapon acquisitions. This thesis, a comparative and critical analysis, examines the Venezuelan acquisition process from 1980 to 1996, using the highly structured U. S. acquisition model as a benchmark for comparison. The analysis traces the complex acquisition process in both countries from the initial requests for materiel until the acquisition is made and the product is employed. This thesis further describes the Venezuelan and the U.S. processes by using four frameworks: institutional, regulatory, organizational and the process itself. This description also entails economic, social, and political factors that influence the procurement process. Many differences in the processes, such as the country's resources and the size of its Armed Forces, are described. Other important differences are the facts that, unlike the U.S. Congress, the Venezuelan Congress has a limited role in the procurement process, and unlike the U.S., the Venezuelan President exerts supreme control, including economic control, over the Armed Forces. The thesis proposes that Venezuela would benefit by adopting the practices of the U.S