Show simple item record

dc.contributor.advisorMcCormick, Gordon H.
dc.contributor.advisorMansager, Bard K.
dc.contributor.authorWilberding, David J.
dc.dateDecember 1998
dc.date.accessioned2012-08-09T19:17:57Z
dc.date.available2012-08-09T19:17:57Z
dc.date.issued1998-12-01
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10945/7989
dc.description.abstractTo improve its declining combat readiness the Army is requesting a significant budget increase. The Army plans to use the increase for primarily improving quality of. life issues. This thesis argues that this plan is inadequate and will result in only marginal readiness gains. The purpose of this thesis is to explore the underlying causes of the readiness crisis and to offer an alternative framework for reversing the decline. This thesis begins by defining readiness from the perspectives of operational and structural readiness. It then explores the critical readiness questions of: What should be ready? What should it be ready for? and When should it be ready? The thesis also examines the impact of the drawdown and commitments to peace operations (POs) on Army readiness. To illustrate the influence of these variables on readiness, this thesis develops a readiness threshold model that measures the capacity of a given force to participate in POs before its readiness deteriorates. By using the model to analyze the current size of the force in relation to its PO commitments, this thesis finds that the cost of doing too much with too little is a reduction in the Army's combat readiness. The thesis concludes by examining both policy implications and prescriptions derived from this study.en_US
dc.description.urihttp://archive.org/details/thearmysreadines109457989
dc.format.extentxvi, 83 p.en_US
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherMonterey, California. Naval Postgraduate Schoolen_US
dc.rightsThis publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States.en_US
dc.titleThe Army's readiness crisis: the cost of doing too much with too littleen_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.contributor.corporateNaval Postgraduate School
dc.contributor.departmentSpecial Operations Curriculum Committee
dc.subject.authorReadinessen_US
dc.subject.authorPeace operationsen_US
dc.subject.authorDrawdownen_US
dc.subject.authorMajor theater waren_US
dc.subject.authorBudget increaseen_US
dc.subject.authorLater deploying divisionen_US
dc.subject.authorContingency divisionen_US
dc.description.serviceCaptain, United States Armyen_US
etd.thesisdegree.nameM.S. in Defense Analysisen_US
etd.thesisdegree.levelMastersen_US
etd.thesisdegree.disciplineDefense Analysisen_US
etd.thesisdegree.grantorNaval Postgraduate Schoolen_US
dc.description.distributionstatementApproved for public release; distribution is unlimited.


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record