Security assistance in the Persian Gulf and the roots of the Nixon Doctrine

Abstract

This thesis examines the origins and consequences of U.S. security assistance in the Persian Gulf. I argue that the American policy of creating regional superpowers' in the Gulf has failed to adequately secure U.S. interests. It has had the unintended consequence of increasing instability. The failure of the twin pillars' policy - as the Nixon Doctrine became known in the Gulf - is evidenced by the fall of one pillar (the Shah's Iran), serious domestic troubles in the second pillar (Saudi Arabia), and, most important, the advent of a large, continuous and direct U.S. military presence in the Gulf. Such a U.S. presence is what the policy was designed to prevent. Further, I offer an original interpretation of the origins of the Nixon Doctrine. Only tangentially related to Vietnam, the Nixon Doctrine was centrally concerned with the Gulf, and in particular with providing securityresources to Iran and Saudi Arabia to safeguard U.S. interests. The doctrine was driven as much by domestic political pressures as it was by geostrategic concerns. In order to implement the Nixon Doctrine, the U.S. privately advocated raising international oil prices in the early l970s in order to allow Iran and Saudi Arabia to purchase advanced weapons systems