The forgotten insurgency: is there hope for Colombia?

Abstract

Colombia's four decades-old insurgency has been largely forgotten by the United States. With U.S. attention diverted towards Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Middle East, Colombia has undertaken a new strategy to deal with problems of the insurgents, paramilitaries, and narco-terrorists which have plagued the country since 1948. The current administration of Colombian President Alvaro Uribe has shifted strategy from one of negotiation and concessions to an active campaign to restore security and state control throughout Colombia. Under the Democratic Security and Defense Policy, the Uribe administration has made great strides against the insurgents and their supporters. This thesis analyzes President Uribe's efforts to end the insurgency and those of his predecessor Andres Pastrana. It also analyzes U.S. aid in the form of Plan Colombia which is largely tied to counternarcotics efforts. The highest U.S. priority is to stem the flow of illegal narcotics from Colombia into the U.S. Colombia's priority is to restore security and state control first, thereby providing a stable foundation to battle the narcotraffickers. Uribe has shown there is hope for Colombia to end the insurgency through his efforts. The U.S. should shift its priorities to mirror Colombia's and thereby earn a valuable, peaceful, and stable partner in the Western hemisphere.