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**NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL  
Monterey, California**



**THESIS**

**ANALYSIS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
HOMELAND SECURITY SUPPORT  
ORGANIZATION**

by

Michael P. Cavil

December 2002

Thesis Advisor: Joseph G. San Miguel  
Associate Advisor: Donald E. Summers

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**ANALYSIS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
HOMELAND SECURITY SUPPORT  
ORGANIZATION**

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the  
requirements for the degree of

**MASTER OF SCIENCE IN MANAGEMENT**

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## **ABSTRACT**

Implementing U.S. Homeland Security Strategy is probably the most difficult challenge facing the U.S. today. As a result of the Strategy, it is envisioned that many federal, state, local and private organizations will need to develop internal organizations for coordinating support with the Department of Homeland Security. The organization that could potentially have the greatest impact on U.S. Homeland Security Strategy achievement is the Department of Defense. Therefore, it is critical that the Department of Defense design an effective internal organization for supporting the U.S. Homeland Security Strategy and the Department of Homeland Security. This thesis will analyze the Department of Defense's initial efforts in developing its Homeland Security Support organization, and will evaluate its potential effectiveness for supporting the U.S. Homeland Security Strategy. This thesis further seeks to provide a model for organizations to utilize in developing and diagnosing their homeland security support organizations.



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## I. INTRODUCTION

### A. PURPOSE

The purpose of this thesis is to assess the potential effectiveness of the Department of Defense Homeland Security Support organization through evaluation of its alignment with the U.S. Homeland Security Strategy and the proposed Department of Homeland Security.

### B. BACKGROUND

The traditional view of U.S. homeland protection has always been to protect the U.S. homeland through engagement of military forces external to the U.S. borders. However, September 11, 2001, awakened the U.S. to the reality of asymmetric threats and attacks directly on U.S. soil and within U.S. borders. As a result, President George W. Bush believes that a new government structure is needed to better protect the U.S. from the "changing nature of the threat". [Ref. 1]

In June 2002, President Bush presented a formal proposal to Congress for the creation of the Department of Homeland Security. Once approved, this new Cabinet-level agency would serve as the single focal point for U.S. homeland protection. It consolidates the homeland security activities and functions currently spread over 22 other federal agencies, including activities within the Department of Defense. Additionally in July 2002, President Bush published the first-ever National Strategy for U.S. Homeland Security, establishing a 'road map' for implementing U.S. Homeland Security strategy.

In the 2002 National Defense Authorization Act, the Department of Defense was directed to conduct a study on its role in homeland security and to develop a comprehensive plan that would provide for the most beneficial organization structures for supporting U. S. homeland security [Ref 2]. The challenge for the Department of Defense in developing new organization support structures stems from the fact that its traditional homeland security mission focuses on the protection of U.S. interests through engagement of military forces from abroad. However, in supporting the U.S. Homeland Security Strategy, the Department of Defense would have the additional responsibility of providing domestic security support to the Department of Homeland Security.

While the Department of Defense has always supported interagency cooperation such as with the U.S. Departments of State, Energy, Transportation, Justice, as well as with the federal intelligence agencies, no formal structure ever existed to facilitate this support. In fulfilling the objectives of U.S. Homeland Security Strategy, the Department of Defense must now develop an internal organization that facilitates effective security support to the Department of Homeland Security.

### **C. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES**

The primary objective of this research is to answer the question: Will the Department of Defense's Homeland Security Support Organization be effective in supporting the U.S. Homeland Security Strategy and objectives of the Department of Homeland Security? And secondly, if it is determined to be effective, can the organization be modeled

and applied to other U.S. institutions involved with supporting U.S. Homeland Security Strategy implementation.

#### **D. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY**

In researching these objectives, I reviewed published materials, Congressional testimony, and current policy guidelines from the Internet related to U.S. Homeland Security. The primary sources of my research included the National Strategy for Homeland Security, the Department of Homeland Security proposal, analysis and commentary from U.S. Homeland Security Institutions and organizations, and Department of Defense Homeland Security policy and guidelines. Through examination of these materials I developed an organizational framework for the requirements for supporting U.S. Homeland Security Strategy and the Department of Homeland Security.

I also conducted personal interviews and discussions with Department of Defense managers responsible for developing the Department of Defense Homeland Security Support Organization. During the course of my research I conducted a telephone interview with Mr. Richard Burmood of the U.S. Joint Forces Command, Joint Task Force for Civil Support (JTF-CS) Planning representative, and gathered information from electronic mail communications with Major Mike Whetston of U.S. Joint Forces Headquarters - Homeland Security (JFHQ-HLS) and Major Ben Owens of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (OASD). From Mr. Burmood's interview I determined the role of the Joint Task Force organization in supporting U.S. Homeland Security efforts. From communications with Major Whetston I obtained the Unified Military Command perspective in



supporting U.S. Homeland Security efforts. Major Owens provided the Department of Defense policy perspective on supporting homeland security.

Finally in order to analyze the Department of Defense's Homeland Security Support organization and to evaluate its potential effectiveness for supporting U.S. Homeland Security Strategy, several alternative models for assessing organizational effectiveness were investigated. The model selected was Roberts' Organization Systems Framework Model and Nadler and Tushman's theory of congruence based on their ability to relate organizational effectiveness to strategy and organizational design.

#### **E. CHAPTER OVERVIEW**

Beginning in Chapter II, I will establish the foundation and requirement for a formal Department of Defense support organization through analysis of the National Strategy for Homeland Security and the proposed Department of Homeland Security Organization. Next in Chapter III, I will provide an analysis of the Department of Defense's Homeland Security policy and core support structure, and an evaluation of its congruence with U.S. Homeland Security Strategy utilizing Roberts' OSF model, and finally in Chapter IV, I will provide a summary, conclusions, and final recommendations of findings.

## II. U.S. HOMELAND SECURITY

### A. U.S. HOMELAND SECURITY STRATEGY

#### 1. Key Policy Actions Leading to the Formation of U.S. Homeland Security Strategy

Figure 1 depicts some of the key policy actions leading up to the formation of the first-ever U.S. National Strategy for Homeland Security. This by no means is an exhaustive list of all the actions taken following the attack on America. However, these specific actions highlight the need for establishing formal linking organizations and management structures to support the new U.S. Homeland Security Strategy. It also reveals early efforts by the Department of Defense to establish its Homeland Security support structures.

Sep 11, 2001	America attacked
Sep 20, 2001	President Bush announces creation of White House office of Homeland Security and appoints Pennsylvania Governor Tom Ridge as Director.
Sep 24, 2001	2002 National Defense Authorization Act calls for the Department of Defense to conduct a study on its role in homeland security and to develop a comprehensive plan that provides for the most beneficial organization structures for supporting U. S. homeland security

Oct 2, 2001 Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld announces Secretary of the Army, Thomas E. White as Department of Defense's executive agent for homeland security

Oct 8, 2001 President Bush swears-in Governor Ridge as Assistant to the President for Homeland Security, and issues Executive Order creating Office of Homeland Security

Oct 16, 2001 President issues Executive Order establishing the President's Critical Infrastructure Protection Board to coordinate and have cognizance of Federal efforts and programs that relate to protection of information systems

Oct 29, 2001 President Bush issues directive establishing the organization and operation of the Homeland Security Council

Apr 17, 2002 Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld announces 2002 Unified Command Plan realigning U.S. military structure and creating the U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM)

Jun 6, 2002 President Bush proposes creation of U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Jun 6, 2002 Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld issues statement of support for the Department of Homeland Security

June 2002 Department of Defense proposes creation of the Office of Homeland Defense Policy and Department of Defense Office of Intelligence

Jul 16, 2002 President Bush creates the first-ever U.S. National Strategy for Homeland Security

Figure 1. Key Policy Actions Leading to the Formation of U.S. Homeland Security Strategy [After Ref. 1:pp. 19-24]

Almost immediately following the September 11 attack, President Bush established the White House office of Homeland Security and appointed Pennsylvania Governor Tom Ridge as its Director. Around this same time, the 2002 National Defense Authorization Act was signed. In its final version the Department of Defense was tasked to conduct a study on its role in homeland security and to develop a comprehensive plan which would provide for the most beneficial organization structures for supporting U. S. homeland security.

On October 2, 2001, the Secretary of the Army, Thomas E. White, was designated as the Department of Defense's executive agent for homeland security matters, signaling the Department of Defense's efforts to make homeland defense a top priority. During this same month President Bush issued executive orders establishing both the U.S. Critical Infrastructure Protection Board and the Homeland Security Council (HSC).

The HSC was established in order to serve as the overall coordinating body for U.S. Homeland Security strategy, similar to the role the National Security Council (NSC) plays as Defense policy coordinator. Accordingly, current plans call for the Department of Defense to maintain representation on both the NSC and HSC. [Ref.3]

On April 17, 2002, the Department of Defense revised its Unified Command Plan (UCP). UCP(02) was developed in order to realign the military Unified Command Structure. Among the key changes in UCP02 was the establishment of the U.S. Northern Command or USNORTHCOM. Effective October 1, 2002, USNORTHCOM will be responsible for U.S. Homeland Defense, placing the homeland security missions previously performed by the various other combatant commanders under a single command. Additionally, USNORTHCOM will be responsible for coordinating all requirements for military support to civil authorities, which currently is the responsibility of the Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) and its Joint Task Force organization. [Ref. 2]

On June 6, 2002, President Bush proposed creation of the Department of Homeland Security. The President's proposal outlines the mission, organization, and functions of the new department, and highlights key consolidation efforts. However, the proposal does not provide an overarching strategy for U.S. Homeland Security.

Immediately following this announcement the Secretary of Defense issued his statement of support for the proposed organization, and announced his proposals for establishing the Office of Homeland Defense Policy and the Department of Defense Office of Intelligence.

Finally, on July 16, 2002, the first-ever national strategy for U.S. Homeland Security was announced. Thus, the foundation for strategy implementation was initiated and the need for federal, state, local, and private agency cooperation and support in implementing U.S. Homeland Security strategy was established.

## **2. Analysis of U.S. Strategy for Homeland Security**

In his opening letter to the U.S. Strategy for Homeland Security, President Bush outlines his purpose and intent for developing this new strategy. It is important, as he writes, for all Americans to understand that "[t]his is a national strategy, not a federal strategy". In other words this is not simply some top-down federal *policy*, but a *strategy* that requires participation and cooperation by all Americans and throughout all levels of American society. Furthermore, it is hoped that from this overarching strategy mutually supporting state, local, and private sector strategies will emerge. [Ref. 3]

In presenting this strategy the President seeks to answer four basic questions:

1) What is "homeland security" and what missions does it entail?

2) What are the most important goals of homeland security?

3) What is the federal executive branch doing now to accomplish these goals and what should it do in the future?, and

4) What should non-federal governments, the private sector, and citizens do to help secure the homeland? [Ref. 3]

President Bush ends his opening statement by emphasizing that this strategy is just the beginning and will be evolutionary and dynamic process. [Ref. 3] Consequently the strategy can only be judged on how well it addresses these four questions.

One of the top organizations in the field of U.S. National and Homeland Security is the Advanced National Strategy and Enabling Results (ANSER) Institute for Homeland Security. Originally chartered in California with the assistance of the RAND Corporation in 1958, ANSER became one of nine Federal Contract Research Centers (FCRC) serving a single Department of Defense client - the Air Force Director of Development Planning (later named Deputy Chief of Staff/Research and Development). After dropping the FCRC designation in 1976, ANSER began working for numerous Air Force organizations, other Department of Defense components, and other federal agencies. In April 2001, the ANSER Institute for Homeland Security was formally established to provide consultancy and research services in the area of homeland security. The ANSER Institute for Homeland Security currently leads the debate on U.S. Homeland Security through executive-level education, public awareness programs, workshops for policy makers and online publications. Many of their key personnel and board of advisors include former senior-ranking military officers and leaders, including Dr. John Hamre and Admiral Harold W. Gehman Jr., USN (retired).

On July 19, 2002, ANSER provided a concise analysis on the U.S. Homeland Security Strategy entitled "*The National Strategy for Homeland Security: Finding the Path Among the Trees*". ANSER concludes in its final assessment that the *Strategy* does in fact achieve its intended purpose, and by answering the four questions posed by the President in his opening statement, provides a useful framework for understanding "what must be done, who must do it, and what actions are required to get started". ANSER frames its analysis by identifying four key themes within the strategy that provide direction to the Nation for strategy implementation: Federalism, Accountability, Fiscal Responsibility, and Prioritization of Effort. [Ref. 5]

**a. Federalism**

The first important theme is Federalism: "the idea that the federal government *shares* authority, responsibility, the mandate for action, and the struggle for resources with state and local governments and private sectors". [Ref. 6] This statement promotes the idea of partnership as opposed to federal government control, and establishes the need for interagency cooperation and coordination between all federal, state, local, and private sector organizations, and specifically the need to develop linking organizations and liaisons with other federal and non-federal agencies.

However this theme does not imply abrogation of the federal government's leadership role. In fact, it assumes the approval of the proposed Department of Homeland Security (which will be discussed in the following section) as the central coordinating agency for U.S. Homeland



security [Ref. 6]. Furthermore, in keeping with the Tenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution which ensures the rights of states in retaining their independent power and authority, Federalism promotes the idea that programs below the national level are merely "suggestions" and "not mandates". It implies that efforts should be made to consolidate plans where possible, and organizations should seek to fill in "the gaps" in programs in order to reduce U.S. vulnerabilities [Ref. 7].

***b. Accountability***

A second theme is Accountability: that all U.S. homeland security - related programs must be measurable, show results, and that individuals be held responsible for the results [Ref. 8]. This theme addresses the importance of applying management control to homeland security programs. In order to evaluate the overall effectiveness of the U.S. Homeland Security Strategy, management controls will need to be established in order to measure performance and results. It will therefore be critical for management control functions to be designed into all homeland security-related programs and organizations.

***c. Fiscal Responsibility***

A third theme, closely related to Accountability, is Fiscal Responsibility. As the Strategy states, "Government should fund only those homeland security activities that are not supplied, or are inadequately supplied, in the market". [Ref. 9] This sends a clear message that it is not the federal government's intentions to build or finance additional programs where they already exist, whether within the federal, state, local government,

or private sector, but instead to seek consolidation and integration of these programs.

**d. Prioritization**

And the final theme is Prioritization of effort, not from a strictly budgetary standpoint (which is the typical method used by the federal government in prioritizing federal programs), but instead from a strategic standpoint. Without regard to budgetary or resource constraints, six initiatives, or critical mission areas were established early on as the top priorities for the Department of U.S. Homeland Security:

Intelligence and Warning

Border and Transportation Security

Domestic Counter terrorism

Protecting Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets

Defending Against Catastrophic Threats

Emergency Preparedness and Response [Ref. 10].

The net objective of these themes or strategic issues is to create an organization that is responsive and therefore capable of effectively managing U.S. homeland security efforts.

ANSER additionally addressed issues that they felt were missing from the Strategy. Two of these issues were: How to centralize budgeting issues related to homeland security; and How to better 'marry' intelligence to law enforcement. These could potentially impact Department of Defense policy and the design of its

organization structure for supporting the proposed Department of Homeland Security. [Ref. 11]

The issue of centralizing budgeting issues related to homeland security was first raised during a May 7, 2002 hearing before the Senate Appropriations Committee on Homeland Security with the Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld testifying. During this hearing Senator Pete V. Domenici (R-New Mexico) commented "...I would just observe that one of the most difficult problems that I think the appropriators are going to end up having is distinguishing what functions are homeland defense and what functions are defense...when we put our bills together, how do we know that the distinction between that which is defense and that which is homeland security is what we would think?" [Ref. 2]

The concern Senator Domenici is expressing is the potential for crossover or duplication of missions and budgets. ANSER rightly noted this as a key factor missing from the Strategy, which could be potentially challenging for the Department of Defense as it seeks to define its role in Homeland Security.

For the second issue of 'marrying' intelligence with law enforcement, the Strategy does acknowledge the need for improved integration. However it does not provide any specific solutions. In the area of "intelligence" alone, major improvements are necessary. While it is clear that military intelligence plays a vital role in homeland security, intelligence within the Department of Defense, and throughout the U.S. for that matter, remains essentially fragmented and dispersed without much effort of

consolidation. As the Strategy recognizes this need to better 'marry' intelligence with law enforcement, the Department of Defense must carefully consider this issue when designing its homeland security support organization.

Through the four themes of Federalism, Accountability, Fiscal Responsibility, and Prioritization of Effort, the U.S. Strategy for Homeland Security seeks to provide a 'road map' for strategy implementation that produces both a responsive and responsible organization. Under the concept of Federalism the Strategy calls for a 'partnership' effort by federal, state, local, and private organizations. However, the plan establishes the federal government as the lead organization for coordinating and managing this effort. The Department of Homeland Security was proposed in order to fulfill this purpose as well as to try and achieve operational efficiency through consolidation and integration of homeland security functions.

## **B. THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY**

### **1. The Proposed Organization, Mission, and Functions**

As proposed under the 2002 Homeland Security Act, the primary mission of the Department of Homeland Security is to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America's vulnerability to terrorism, and to minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur [Ref. 12]. The primary mission is further divided into the six critical mission areas that were mentioned in the previous section, including: Intelligence and Warning, Border and Transportation Security, Domestic Counter

terrorism, Protecting Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets, Defending Against Catastrophic Threats, and Emergency Preparedness and Response. In order to accomplish these mission areas four functional divisions were established within the Department:

Border and Transportation Security

Emergency Preparedness and Response

Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Countermeasures

Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection  
(see Figure 2 below).




Figure 2. Organization of the Department of Homeland Security [From Ref. 1:p. 9]

First, under Border and Transportation Security, the Department would be responsible for all security operations

related to U.S. borders, territorial waters, and transportation systems. They would be required to unify and assume responsibility for the operational assets of all federal agencies previously responsible for these activities including the Coast Guard, Customs Service, Immigration and Naturalization Service and Border Patrol, the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service of the Department of Agriculture and the recently created Transportation Security Administration [Ref. 13].

For the second division, Emergency Preparedness and Response, the Department would be responsible for federal emergency management including domestic disaster preparedness and response, the training of first responders, and the administration of grant programs for firefighters, police, and emergency personnel. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and all its functions and operations would be incorporated under this division. This division would be responsible for integrating all federal interagency response plans into a single, comprehensive, government-wide federal response plan. [Ref. 13]

The Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Countermeasures Division within the Department would be responsible for preparing for and responding to all threats involving weapons of mass destruction. Through this division national policy and state and local guidelines would be established, as well as drills and exercises directed in order to prepare for a CBRN attack. [Ref. 13]

Finally, the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Division of the Department would be responsible for analyzing and fusing together all homeland threat-related intelligence as gathered from the various federal, state, local, and civil intelligence organizations. This division would also be responsible for evaluating and assessing vulnerabilities in order to better protect U.S. critical infrastructure including "food and water systems, agriculture, health systems and emergency services, information and telecommunications, banking and finance, energy, transportation, chemical and defense industries, postal and shipping entities, and national monuments and icons". [Ref. 14]

Two other key divisions that would report directly to the Department Secretary include a State, Local, and Private Sector coordination division. This division would be responsible for streamlining and coordinating federal homeland security programs with state, local, and private sector officials, and providing these organizations with a single liaison or point of contact. [Ref. 14] The other division that would report directly to the Department Secretary is the Secret Service. The Secret Service would continue its primary mission of protecting the President and other government leaders. However, it would be incorporated under the Department of Homeland Security in order to provide security for designated national events. [Ref. 14]

The proposal also calls for the original Office of Homeland Security and Homeland Security Council to remain

as an advisory and coordinating body to the President, equivalent to the National Security Council. [Ref. 14]

On June 27, 2002, the ANSER Institute conducted an analysis of the proposed Department of Homeland Security organization, summarizing the strengths and weaknesses and key points of the proposal, as well as highlighting key implications of the organizations design.

## **2. Strengths, Weaknesses, and Implications for the Department of Defense**

According to ANSER, the strengths of the proposed organization include:

1) Unity of command through the establishment of reporting authority to a single individual and a single organization.

2) Visibility and connectivity to all major homeland security issues.

3) A framework for assimilating and synthesizing homeland security - related intelligence under the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection division

4) A framework for Congressional oversight of Homeland Security programs and costs.

5) A single public voice for communicating U.S. Homeland Security matters.

6) Uniformity, cooperation, and organizational synergy through consolidation and integration of programs.

7) Clear responsibility for the management and utilization of national resources for crisis management and response.



8) A single point of contact for state, local, and private sector.

9) A solid organizational foundation in which to develop unifying plans, guidelines, and strategy. [Ref. 15]

ANSER also identified two key weaknesses of the proposal that have implications for other federal agencies involved with homeland security, but particularly the Department of Defense. They include:

1) The lack of focus on developing support organizations. As ANSER noted "the experience of every existing agency (to include the Department of Defense, the new department's closest cousin) indicates that a number of supporting offices must be created to develop the Secretary's priorities and messages (both internally and externally)".

2) The lack of identifying and defining relationships with other key organizations including the Department of Defense and the National Guard who according to ANSER "are large enough to foil the entire plan just by developing their own plans independently". [Ref. 15]

Furthermore, the proposal requires the Department of Defense to have to realign certain activities as well as transfer other activities to the Department of Homeland Security.

First, The Department of Defense, through the Navy and through the Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) Joint Task Force 6 (JTF-6), has historically played a key role in providing counter-drug operations support to the Coast Guard. However, since the Coast Guard is placed under the

Department of Homeland Security in the new proposal [Ref. 13], the Department of Defense would have to realign its drug operations support mission with the Department of Homeland Security under its Border and Transportation Security Division. This issue relates back to the concern posed by Senator Domenici over the potential duplication of missions and budgets, and the need to define and distinguish between an organization's traditional mission and homeland security support.

Second, under Emergency Preparedness and Response, the Department of Defense, through JFCOM's Joint Task Force for Civil Support (JTF-CS), currently coordinates military support to civil authorities directly with other federal agencies, but primarily with FEMA. Since FEMA would fall under the Department of Homeland Security in the new proposal [Ref. 13], the Department of Defense would have to realign its military activities support mission directly with the Department of Homeland Security.

Third, under Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Countermeasures, the Department of Defense has included in the President's FY03 budget a \$420 million proposal for development of the National Bioweapons Defense Analysis Center. If it is approved it would have to be transferred to the Department of Homeland Security. [Ref. 2]

Last, under Information Analysis and Critical Infrastructure Protection, the Department of Defense would transfer its responsibility for the U.S. National Communications System to the Department of Homeland Security [Ref. 1].

In order to support the U.S. Homeland Security Strategy, the Department of Defense established initial policy guidance and began developing its internal support organization. The next chapter will provide an analysis of both the Department of Defense's Homeland Security policy and support organization, and provide an evaluation of its alignment with the objectives, strategic issues, strengths and weaknesses of the U.S. Homeland Security Strategy and proposed Department of Homeland Security.

### III. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE HOMELAND SECURITY

#### A. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE HOMELAND SECURITY POLICY

Under the 2002 National Defense Authorization Act, the Department of Defense was directed to conduct a study on its role in homeland security as well as to develop plans for providing the most beneficial organization structures for supporting U.S. homeland security. In addressing the Department of Defense's role in homeland security, the Secretary of Defense in testimony before the Senate Appropriations Committee on May 7, 2002, provided general guidelines in establishing the foundation for Department of Defense policy relating to U.S. Homeland Security support. Later this testimony was developed into a prepared statement of Department of Defense policy which was presented before the House of Representatives Armed Services Committee on June 26, 2002 by Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Dr. Stephen Cambone.

In establishing Department of Defense Homeland Security policy, Secretary Rumsfeld sought first to make the distinction between *defense* functions and *homeland security* functions. He defined *homeland security* as "a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce the vulnerability of the United States to terrorism, and minimize the damage and assist in the recovery from terrorist attacks". He then defined *homeland defense* as "the protection of United States territory, domestic population, and critical defense infrastructure against external threats and aggression".

With respect to *homeland security*, Secretary Rumsfeld stated that the Department of Defense would operate in support of a lead federal agent, and with respect to *homeland defense*, the Department of Defense would take the lead and be supported by other federal agencies. For further clarification the Secretary provides three situations or circumstances in which military forces would be employed: *Extraordinary*, *Emergency*, and *Limited Scope or Duration*. [Ref. 2]

*Extraordinary circumstances* are those situations that would require the Department of Defense to execute its traditional military missions of deterrence or defeat of an attack from an external threat. Extraordinary circumstances fall under the category of *homeland defense*, which means that the Department of Defense would take the lead role and would be supported by other federal entities. Under the U.S. Homeland Security Strategy and proposed Department of Homeland Security organization planning would be coordinated, as appropriate, through the National Security Council, Homeland Security Council, Department of Homeland Security, and other affected federal agencies. [Ref. 2]

*Emergency circumstances* are those situations that are of a catastrophic nature and national significance such as responding to a WMD (Weapons of Mass Destruction) attack or assisting in response to natural disasters such as forest fires, floods, hurricanes, tornadoes, etc. Emergency circumstances fall under the category of *homeland security*, which means that the Department of Homeland Security would have the responsibility for coordinating the response of

federal agencies and, as appropriate, the interactions between those agencies and state and local organizations. The Department of Defense would play a supportive role and, through the interagency process, provide the necessary resources and capabilities needed to augment or support a coordinated effort. [Ref. 2]

*Events of limited scope or duration* include providing support for special events or missions as directed or assigned by the President. Similar to Emergencies, the Department of Defense would play a supportive role and through the interagency process, provide the necessary resources and capabilities needed to augment or support a coordinated effort. An example of this is security support for the recent Olympic Games in Salt Lake City. [Ref. 2]

It is important to note that under the Department of Defense's Homeland Security policy no violation or change in *Posse Comitatus* (the federal law which prohibits active duty military forces, excluding the National Guard when not in federal service, from engaging in domestic law enforcement activities) is envisioned. [Ref. 2] Under Presidential Decision Directives PDD 39, *U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism* and related directive PDD 62, and as authorized and requested by the President, military forces may be employed in response to acts or threats of domestic terrorism, and all requests for assistance in responding to acts or threats of domestic terrorism must be approved by the Secretary of Defense [Ref. 16]. Also the Department of Defense currently maintains policies on the authorized use of military forces in providing Crisis Management and Consequence Management during civil emergencies. Policy

relating to Crisis management is primarily addressed in Department of Defense directives 3025.15, *Military Assistance to Civil Authorities (MACA)* and 3025.12, *Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances (MACDIS)*, and policies relating to Consequence management are covered in Department of Defense directive 3025.1, *Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA)* [Ref. 16].

In addition to establishing these initial policy guidelines, the Department of Defense began to establish its Homeland Security Support organization by initiating three internal structural changes: 1) Reform of the Department of Defense Unified Military Command Structure, 2) Proposal for the establishment of the Department of Defense Office of Homeland Defense, and 3) Proposal for the establishment of the Department of Defense Office of Intelligence. These three restructuring initiatives combined to form the core foundational structure for the Department of Defense's Homeland Security Support Organization. These will be discussed in detail in the following section.

## **B. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE HOMELAND SECURITY SUPPORT**

### **1. Department of Defense Core Homeland Security Support Organization**

Figure 3 below depicts the Department of Defense's core Homeland Security Support Organization. The Department of Defense's first major initiative in developing its Homeland Security support organization was to revise the Unified Command Plan and realign the U.S. military command structure.




Figure 3. The Department of Defense Core Homeland Security Support Organization

Under the 2002 Unified Command Plan (UCP02), the U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) was created and given responsibility for U.S. Homeland Defense and U.S. Homeland Security support missions. Joint Forces Headquarters Homeland Security (JFHQ-HLS), which previously belonged to the U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), was reassigned to USNORTHCOM. JFHQ-HLS is responsible for coordinating the land and sea defense of the U.S. and is the liaison for military activities support to civil authorities. Two key subordinate units of JFHQ-HLS will also transfer to USNORTHCOM, the Joint Task Force - Civil Support (JTF-CS) and the Joint Task Force - 6 (JTF-6). [Ref. 17]

JTF-CS was created as a result of UCP99 in October 1999 to provide command and control consequence management



for Department of Defense forces deployed in the aftermath of a Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear or High-yield Explosive (CBRNE) incident [Ref. 18]. However, with the establishment of USNORTHCOM and the subsequent realignment of activities and missions, it is envisioned that JTF-CS's mission will be expanded to include providing military activities support to lead civilian agencies for other incidents or crisis related to U.S. Homeland Security [Ref. 19]. Under the envisioned Department of Defense core Homeland Security Support Organization, the JTF-CS organization would be aligned in supporting the proposed Department of Homeland Security under its Emergency Preparedness and Response mission area.

Since 1989 JTF-6 has played a key role in providing counter-drug operations support to the Coast Guard as well as other federal, regional, state, and local law enforcement agencies. Their future role and mission under the new structure is still undetermined. Under their current mission they would be aligned in supporting the proposed Department of Homeland Security under its Border and Transportation Security mission area. [Ref. 17]

Additionally, USNORTHCOM will have authority over the employment of the National Guard while they are under Title X status (federalized). The role and mission of the National Guard under the envisioned Department of Defense Homeland Security Support Organization is also still not yet fully developed. The current Department of Defense perspective is for authority over the Guards' activities to remain primarily a state function. [Ref. 4]

It is also important to note that under the Department of Defense's envisioned Homeland Security Support Organization, USNORTHCOM is only authorized to coordinate its homeland security support efforts through the internal Department of Defense organization and not directly with the Department of Homeland Security [Ref. 17]. The Joint Task Force (JTF) organizations (JTF-CS and JTF-6), in implementing the strategy set forth by USNORTHCOM, will provide direct support to the Department of Homeland Security under the respective Homeland Security mission areas.

The Department of Defense's second key initiative was to propose creation of the Office of Homeland Defense Policy within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and for a new Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Policy. This office would be responsible for ensuring internal coordination of Department of Defense policy, developing strategic planning, force employment, and civil support - related guidance, providing guidance to USNORTHCOM for its homeland defense and homeland security support mission, and providing coordination with the Office of Homeland Security, the Department of Homeland Security, and other government agencies. [Ref 2]

Finally, the Department of Defense's third initiative was to propose creation of a Department of Defense Office of Intelligence and for an Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. This office would seek to enhance Department of Defense intelligence-related activities and provide a single point of contact for coordinating national and military intelligence activities with the Director of

Central Intelligence and the Department of Homeland Security. [Ref. 2]

The effectiveness of the Department of Defense Homeland Security support organization will ultimately be determined based on how well it supports the new Department of Homeland Security in achieving the U.S. Homeland Security Strategy. However, since the Department of Homeland Security has not yet been approved, the outcomes and results of the new organization and U.S. Homeland Security Strategy cannot yet be measured.

According to Nadler and Tushman, authors of *Organization Design*, a more critical measurement of effectiveness is the alignment or congruence of an organization's components [Ref. 20]. Under the systems view of organizations, congruence can be defined as the degree to which an organization's components fit together [Ref. 20]. The components of an organization are its inputs, throughput or transformational processes, and its results or outputs. The basic hypothesis of the congruence theory is that the greater the degree of congruence or fit among an organization's components, the more effective the organization will be in achieving its intended strategy [Ref. 20].

Organizational effectiveness is defined as the degree in which an organization's actual outcomes or results are similar to its expected results, as specified from its strategy [Ref. 20]. Therefore in order to evaluate the potential effectiveness of the Department of Defense Homeland Security Support Organization, an analysis of its

core organizational components and assessment of their congruence will be made in the following section.

## **2. Analysis of the Department of Defense Core Homeland Security Support Organization**

As the complete Department of Defense Homeland Security Support Organization is not yet fully developed, it is assumed that the core organization, as depicted in Figure 3, will be adequate in predicting the behavior of the complete support organization. As discussed in the previous section, this assumption is based on the belief that this initial design provides the core foundation for the complete Department of Defense's Homeland Security support organization, and therefore should serve as an adequate model for predicting future organizational behavior. In order to analyze the components of the Department of Defense's core Homeland Security Support organization and to evaluate its congruence, Roberts' Organizational System Framework (OSF) Model will be utilized.

Roberts' OSF model was derived from, among other concepts, the basic Inputs, Processes, and Outputs (IPO) model [Ref. 21](see Figure 4) and Nadler and Tushman's congruence theory of organizations. It analyzes the components of an organization (its inputs, throughput, and results) and assesses their congruence in order to measure overall organizational effectiveness [Ref. 22] (see Figure 5). A key underlying factor of the OSF model is that organizations possess a greater ability to control factors within the throughput as opposed to inputs or results.

# Inputs, Processes, and Outputs (IPO) Model



Figure 4. Inputs, Processes, and Outputs Model [From Ref. 21]




Figure 5. Roberts' Organizational Systems Framework Model [From Ref. 22]

Factors within the throughput component of the OSF model are called the design factors of the organization, and include: the organization's tasks and jobs, technology or activity workflow, structure, people, and process and subsystems including financial management, human resource

management, and communication and information systems. Again, because the Department of Defense Homeland Security Support Organization is not yet fully developed, all of these design factors are not provided for in this analysis. The Department of Defense's core Homeland Security Support organization does, however, provide a good basic "structure" in which to perform an analysis. Therefore, in assessing the potential effectiveness of the Department of Defense Homeland Security Support Organization, the structure of the core organization will be analyzed and an evaluation will be made on its congruence with the inputs and results of the organization.

Figure 6 depicts the OSF model framework as applied to this analysis. According to the model, inputs to the organization flow into the throughput where they are transformed into results that flow out of the organization. In order for the inputs to produce the desired results, the throughput must be properly designed and congruent with the input.

## Department of Defense Core Homeland Security Support Organizational System Framework




Figure 6. Department of Defense Core Homeland  
Security Support Organizational System Framework  
[After Refs. 20, 21 and 23]

### a. *Component Analysis*

(1) Inputs. The Inputs provide the organization with its purpose or mandate, strategic direction, and includes any associated strategic issues. The mandate for the Department of Defense Homeland Security Support organization is derived primarily from the 2002 National Defense Authorization Act, which directed the Department of Defense to develop beneficial organization structures for supporting U.S. Homeland Security. Its strategic direction comes from the U.S. Homeland Security Strategy and the proposed Department of Homeland Security objectives, as well as from the associated issues and implications. As discussed in Chapter II, the primary strategic objective of U.S. Homeland Security is to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America's vulnerability to terrorism, and to minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur. The focus of this strategy is in six critical mission areas: Intelligence and Warning, Border and Transportation

Security, Domestic Counter terrorism, Protection of Critical Infrastructure and key assets, Defending against Catastrophic Threats, and Emergency Preparedness and Response.

The current strategic issues include: How to centralize budgeting issues related to homeland security (to prevent duplication of missions and budgets), How to better integrate intelligence with law enforcement, How to develop supporting organizations, and How to identify and define relationships with key organizations.

(2) Throughput/Transformational process.

The Throughput is the mechanism that transforms inputs into results. It is comprised of all the organization design factors including tasks and jobs, technology, structure, people, and process and subsystems. Again due to the current incomplete design of Department of Defense's Homeland Security Support Organization, only the "structure" will be analyzed and assessed under the throughput section of this model. Structures are typically viewed as ends unto themselves, however under the systems view of organizations, structure is the means in which to achieve the desired ends. Therefore, structural design can be the most critical factor in developing organizations, particularly for organizations seeking transformation.

As described in the previous section and as depicted in Figure 3, the Department of Defense's core Homeland Security support structure, typical of most military structures, is a centralized hierarchy. However, policy and planning is coordinated across internal organizations within the Department of Defense Homeland



Security support structure, as well as between the Department of Defense and the proposed Department of Homeland Security. This cross-coordination implicitly flattens the structure somewhat enabling greater flexibility and responsiveness as opposed to a rigid functionally coordinated structure. The JTF organization performs the integrative function by providing Emergency Preparedness and Response and Border and Transportation Security support directly to the Department of Homeland Security. They are the primary implementers of the Department of Defense's Homeland Security Support mission, serving as the front-line coordinators for military support. Key to this support is the intra-agency coordination that exists between the proposed Department of Defense Offices of Homeland Defense Policy and Intelligence and USNORTHCOM. Key external coordination exists between both the proposed new Department of Defense Offices and the proposed Department of Homeland Security.

(3) Results. Since the Department of Homeland Security has not yet been approved, the results of the new organization and U.S. Homeland Security Strategy cannot yet be measured. Therefore at this stage results can be viewed as the consequences of strategy that flow from the transformation process. In this model, the consequences for pursuing the intended strategy ultimately have implications on organizational design. These implications include the need to design organizations that foster partnerships and shared relationships, operational efficiency, accountability, flexibility, and responsiveness.

The potential effectiveness of the Department of Defense Homeland Security Support organization can be assessed based on determining congruence or alignment between the inputs (the U.S. Homeland Security Strategy, proposed Department of Homeland Security Organization, and their associated strategic issues, strengths, weaknesses, and implications), the throughput (the Department of Defense's core Homeland Security Support structure), and the results (how well it facilitates partnerships and shared relationships, operational efficiency, accountability, flexibility, and responsiveness). In the following section an assessment will be made on the congruence between the inputs, throughput, and results of the Department of Defense's core Homeland Security Support Organization. The terms that will be used to characterize the level of congruence between components are "weak", "average", and "strong".

**b. Congruence Assessment**

(1) Congruence between Inputs and Throughput. First, in evaluating congruence between inputs and the throughput, an assessment can be made based on how well the core Department of Defense structure addresses the strategic issues, strengths and weaknesses, and implications of the U.S. Homeland Security Strategy and proposed Department of Homeland Security objectives.

**Strategic Issues**

In addressing strategic issues, the first issue derived from the U.S. Homeland Security Strategy analysis was the concern over budget or mission duplication. By making the distinction between *homeland*

*defense and homeland security*, the Secretary of Defense provided an effective initial guideline for distinguishing missions and funding related to homeland security and homeland defense.

The second issue concerning the need for improving the integration of intelligence with law enforcement was effectively addressed through the proposal for creation of the Department of Defense Office of Intelligence. In addressing this issue the proposed new office would consolidate military intelligence and provide for coordination of intelligence information directly with the Department of Homeland Security.

The third and fourth issues concerned the need for identifying, establishing, and defining relationships with key organizations, and developing support organizations. The Department of Defense effectively addressed this issue by developing its core Homeland Security Support structure and initial policy guidelines for supporting the Department of Homeland Security.

Therefore, the Department of Defense's core Homeland Security Support structure (throughput) provides a fairly "strong" level of congruence in addressing the strategic issues of the U.S. Homeland Security Strategy and the proposed Department of Homeland Security objectives (input).

### **Strengths**

In assessing alignment with the strengths of the proposed Department of Homeland Security Organization,

the Department of Defense's core Homeland Security structure provides:

1) Unity of command in its organization structure with the appointment of USNORTHCOM as the military command responsible for U.S. Homeland Defense.

2) Visibility and connectivity between activities, as depicted in Figure 3.

3) A framework for assimilating and synthesizing homeland security - related intelligence with the proposed creation of the Department of Defense Office of Intelligence.

4) A framework for Congressional oversight of homeland security-related programs and costs. The Department of Defense's Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) would provide the capability for capturing homeland security - related programming, budgeting and cost information.

5) A single public voice for communicating homeland security matters from the Department of Defense, with the Secretary of Defense and through the proposed Office of Homeland Defense within the Department of Defense.

6) Uniformity, cooperation, and organizational synergy through consolidation and integration of programs. This occurs again through the establishment of USNORTHCOM. Complete support organization design should also address the consolidation and integration efforts within each of the Department of Defense services (Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps).

7) Clear responsibility for the management and utilization of Defense resources for crisis management and response. This is specifically accomplished through the JTF organization.

8) A single point of contact for state, local, and private sector. Again current Department of Defense policy requires the coordination with external agencies only through the Department of Defense or through the Office of the Secretary of Defense organization.

9) A solid organizational foundation in which to develop unifying plans, guidelines, and strategy.

Therefore, the Department of Defense's core Homeland Security Support structure (throughput) provides a fairly "strong" level of congruence in assessing alignment with the strengths of the proposed Department of Homeland Security (input).

#### **Weaknesses**

In addressing the two key weaknesses identified in the proposed Department of Homeland Security, the core Homeland Security structure, 1) provides a good initial support organization for supporting the Department of Homeland Security, and 2) establishes initial policy and guidelines for defining its relationship with the Department of Homeland Defense. However, the role of the National Guard under USNORTHCOM needs to be further clarified and defined.

Therefore, the Department of Defense's core Homeland Security Support structure (throughput) provides an "average" level of congruence in addressing the

weaknesses of the proposed Department of Homeland Security (input).

### **Key Implications**

In addressing the key implications of the proposed Department of Homeland Security Organization, four proposed changes could potentially impact the Department of Defense.

First, the current Department of Homeland Security proposal calls for transfer of the Coast Guard from the Department of Transportation to the Department of Homeland Security. The Navy and JTF-6 organizations currently provide counter-drug operations support to the Coast Guard under the traditional defense mission. However, upon transfer of the Coast Guard to the Department of Homeland Security, determination will need to be made on whether or not counter drug operations support will continue to fall under traditional defense, or under the category of *homeland security*, as distinguished by the Secretary of Defense. This is still undetermined, nor is it addressed in the Department of Defense's core Homeland Security Support Organization. However, until this determination is made, JTF-6 under the core structure will remain aligned with supporting the Department of Homeland Security's Border and Transportation mission.

Second, the current proposal also calls for the transfer of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to the Department of Homeland Security. The JTF-CS organization currently provides Emergency Preparedness and Response - related support to FEMA. Under the Department of Defense's Homeland Security Support organization, JTF-CS

will simply realign itself with the Department of Homeland Security in supporting its Emergency Preparedness and Response mission. The current Department of Defense Homeland Security policy also envisions JTF-CS as the agent for providing coordination for all military activities related support.

Third, the current proposal calls for the consolidation of all Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Countermeasure activities under the Department of Homeland Security. The primary implication for this is that the Department of Defense has included in the President's FY03 budget a \$420 million proposal for the development of a National Bioweapons Defense Analysis Center. This funding would simply be transferred to the Department of Homeland Security if the center is approved.

Last, the current proposal calls for the transfer of the National Communications System, which the Department of Defense currently manages, to the Department of Homeland Security. According to Secretary Rumsfeld's May 7, 2002, testimony, this transfer could be accomplished with only minimal impact to the Department of Defense [Ref 2].

Therefore, the Department of Defense's core Homeland Security Support structure (throughput) provides an "average" to "strong" level of congruence in addressing the key implications of the proposed Department of Homeland Security Organization (input).

(2) Congruence between Results and Throughput. In its analysis of the U.S. Homeland Security Strategy, the ANSER Institute for Homeland Security

developed the four themes of Federalism, Accountability, Fiscal Responsibility, and Prioritization of Effort, which are the consequential results or goals of pursuing the U.S. Homeland Security Strategy. The implications of these themes are that partnerships and shared relationships, operational efficiency, accountability, flexibility, and responsiveness must be built into the design of homeland security organizations. Therefore, in evaluating congruence between results and the throughput, an assessment can be made based on how well the core Department of Defense structure facilitates partnerships and shared relationships, operational efficiency, accountability, flexibility, and responsiveness.

#### **Partnerships and Shared Relationships**

Under the concept of Federalism, the Department of Defense's structure should be designed with the ability to establish shared relationships with other organizations supporting U.S. homeland security, and should be designed to achieve operational efficiency through consolidation. The Department of Defense's core Homeland Security Support structure is consistent with both of these through its USNORTHCOM organization (consolidation of homeland security functions) and JTF organization (facilitation of shared, cooperative arrangement). The proposed creation of the Department of Defense Office of Intelligence also is consistent with the creation of structures that facilitate sharing and partnership.

#### **Accountability**

Under the concept of Accountability, the Department of Defense's structure should be designed with



the ability to measure and show results, and to hold individuals responsible for these results. The U.S. military has always sought to hold its people and organizations responsible for their actions, but measuring results and performance has historically been a challenge. The Department of Defense currently utilizes the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) as a means to measure resource performance. However, identifying and defining metrics for homeland security - related results and performance is an area that will require further development. Other organizations as well will more than likely find it difficult to specify and define homeland security - related performance metrics.

#### **Operational Efficiency**

Under the Concept of Fiscal Responsibility the Department of Defense's structure should be designed with a focus towards avoiding duplication of effort and building additional capabilities where they may already exist. Again this is consistent with the realignment of USNORTHCOM and the consolidation of U.S. homeland security functions across the Unified Command Structure.

Under the concept of Prioritization of effort, the Department of Defense's structure should be designed with the ability to prioritize homeland security support efforts through a single channel. This too is accomplished through the establishment of USNORTHCOM.

#### **Flexibility and Responsiveness**

The net result of these four themes is the need to also create homeland security organizations that

will be responsive to rapid change and therefore capable of effectively managing U.S. homeland security efforts. Pete Verga, special assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Homeland Security and Homeland Security Task Force Director, equated the proposed Department of Homeland Security to the Secretary of Defense's initiative to transform the military from threat-based planning to capabilities-based planning. As Verga states, "this gives you a greater ability to respond regardless of what the threat is...if you have a set of capabilities that you can apply regardless of the threat, you end up with a much more flexible response." [Ref. 23] Therefore as Verga points out flexibility and responsiveness are key results and factors that must also be incorporated into the design of transformational organizations. In aligning its structure to incorporate partnerships and shared relationships, operational efficiency, and accountability, the Department of Defense core Homeland Security Support structure therefore also achieves flexibility and responsiveness in its design.

Therefore, the Department of Defense's core Homeland Security Support structure (throughput) provides an "average" to "strong" level of congruence in assessing how well it facilitates partnerships and shared relationships, operational efficiency, accountability, flexibility, and responsiveness.

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## **IV. SUMMARY, CONCLUSION, AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

### **A. SUMMARY**

The U.S. Homeland Security Strategy and proposed Department of Homeland Security provides the 'road map' for U.S. Homeland Security Strategy implementation. Key among the requirements for successful implementation, as identified through analysis of these documents, is the need for the federal government to develop partnerships and shared relationships with all affected federal, state, local and private U.S. institutions.

The Department of Defense, referred to as the new Department of Homeland Security's "closest cousin" by the ANSER Institute for Homeland Security [Ref. 15], could potentially have the greatest impact on U.S. Homeland Security Strategy achievement. As a result of the 2002 National Defense Authorization Act, the Department of Defense began establishing an internal organizational for supporting U.S. Homeland Security efforts. Beginning primarily with the realignment of the Unified Military Command Structure in April 2002, the Unified Command Plan 2002 (UCP02) established the U. S. Northern Command as the unified combatant command singularly responsible for U.S. Homeland Defense and Homeland Security support. The Department of Defense also proposed creation of two new internal offices, the Office of Homeland Defense Policy and the Office of Intelligence, as well as developed its initial policy to guide the Department's homeland defense and homeland security support efforts.

As a result of the criticality of the Department of Defense Homeland Security support efforts to U.S. Homeland Security Strategy achievement, this thesis sought to answer this primary question: Will the Department of Defense Homeland Security Support Organization be effective in supporting the U.S. Homeland Security Strategy and objectives of the Department of Homeland Security? And secondarily, if determined to be effective, can the organization be modeled and applied to assist other U.S. institutions in aiding U.S. Homeland Security Strategy implementation.

In order to answer these questions an analysis of the current Department of Defense Homeland Security organization was conducted using Roberts' Organizational Systems Framework Model and Nadler and Tushman's congruence theory. These models were utilized based on their ability to evaluate organization effectiveness by relating organizational inputs and design to strategy, which is particularly important for implementing U.S. Homeland Security Strategy. While the complete Department of Defense Homeland Security Support Organization is not yet fully developed, my analysis assumed that the core organization, as depicted in Figure 3, would be adequate for predicting the behavior of the complete support organization. Therefore, based on my research and analysis, the following conclusion is made:

## **B. CONCLUSIONS**

Overall the Department of Defense's Core Homeland Security Support Organization achieves a "fairly strong" level of congruence between its inputs, throughput, and

results. Therefore based on this core organizational structure, it is predicted that the complete Department of Defense Homeland Security Support Organization will be effective in supporting the U.S. Homeland Security Strategy and the new Department of Homeland Security.

### **C. RECOMMENDATIONS**

It is recommended that further research be conducted in those areas where congruence could not be fully evaluated as a result of incomplete information on the core Department of Defense Homeland Security Support structure. These areas include: 1) functional integration and consolidation efforts within the Department of Defense services (Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps); 2) the role of the National Guard under USNORTHCOM; 3) the role of the Navy and JTF-6 in counter drug operations as a result of the transfer of the Coast Guard to the Department of Homeland Security; and 4) how to define and measure homeland security - related performance metrics.

Further research is also recommended on analyzing the remaining design factors (tasks and jobs, technology or activity workflow, people, and process and subsystems including financial management, human resource management, and communication and information systems) that will be provided for once the complete Department of Defense Homeland Security Support Organization is fully developed.

Under the systems approach, organizations are viewed as both dynamic and evolving. As President Bush stated in his opening letter of the U.S. Strategy for Homeland Security, the Strategy is just the beginning and will be an evolutionary and dynamic process.

Therefore, the systems designed to employ the U.S. Homeland Security Strategy, which includes both the Department of Homeland Security and its support organizations, must also be evolving and capable of adapting to an evolving strategy. This is the very essence of transformation, and why organizations, as Peter Verga states, must be designed to achieve both flexibility and responsiveness. In adapting evolving strategy to organizations, a model must be adopted that enables continuous feedback from the results to the inputs and transformation process. A good model to use for this is the Cybernetic Feedback Model (CFM) [Ref. 21].

Figure 7 below depicts the basic CFM.

### Cybernetic Feedback Model




Figure 7. Cybernetic Feedback Model [From Ref. 21]

It expands upon the basic IPO model (Figure 4) and is structurally similar to Roberts' OSF model (Figure 5). The primary difference is that the CFM contains feedback loops

which enable the results to flow back to both the inputs as well as to the process. Figure 8 below depicts the application of this model to the Department of Defense Homeland Security Support Organization.

## Department of Defense Homeland Security Support System Transformational Feedback Model




Figure 8. Department of Defense Homeland Security Support System Transformational Feedback Model [After Refs. 20, 21 and 23]

In applying this model to the Department of Defense Homeland Security Support Organization the results or consequences of the strategy, which are partnerships and shared relationships, operational efficiency, accountability, flexibility, and responsiveness, flow back to the transformation process in order to be incorporated into the design of the internal organization. The results also flow back to the inputs in order to ensure the organizational direction is current and properly aligned with the rest of the organization.



Using this approach produces a system or organization that is capable of continual transformation, which for an evolving and dynamic process such as U.S. Homeland Security is essential. Applying this model also enables organizations to perform continual diagnosis to ensure that their inputs, throughputs, and results remain congruent.

Therefore, in answering the secondary research question: Can the organization be modeled and applied to assist other U.S. institutions in aiding U.S. Homeland Security Strategy implementation, it is recommended that the Department of Defense Homeland Security Support System Transformational Feedback Model (Figure 8) be adopted to develop new organizations for supporting the Department of Homeland Security. It is additionally recommended that this model be utilized to diagnose organizations in order to ensure that they remain congruent with the U.S. Homeland Security Strategy.

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