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
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
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The BAROMETER



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The BAROMETER is a student newspaper for the exchange of ideas and information concerning the development and improvement of the professional environment at the Naval Postgraduate School.

"Because of all that is at stake in the critical period ahead, we must reject the well-intentioned but misguided suggestion that this is the time to slash America's defenses by cutting billions of dollars off our budget for national security."

President Nixon in a speech aboard the USS INDEPENDENCE in Norfolk, VA. on Armed Force Day, 1973.

EDITORIAL COMMENT: Representative Otis G. Pike (D-N.Y.) presented this very timely and provocative speech to the Armed Forces Management Association in Washington on 7 June.

Pike, a veteran member of the House Armed Services Committee, is a cantankerous friend of the military. He fumes at some of the Pentagon's maneuverings but basically supports military budgets and is a proponent of a strong defense. Recently he took the forefront in getting the Navy to stop practice firing on the Puerto Rican island of Culebra where for thirty years the less than 1,000 American citizens living there have been harassed by U.S. Navy's weapons training. Despite his serious demeanor, Pike retains a sense of humor. His periodic press releases are read regularly by non-constituents who appreciate biting satire with serious overtones.

FEATURE: THE MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX REVISITED

"By way of setting the stage, I would like to read an extract from what I am sure is the favorite newspaper of this distinguished audience. "The President has boldly and courageously committed this Nation to a great power role in Asia. It is a role for which many of his countrymen may not be prepared. It is a role from which most of them surely would like to escape. It is a role that history would have compelled them to disavow or embrace sooner or later....The President's paper is simply a declaratory statement describing the task we have already undertaken and one that we undertook, if we had rightly understood it-the moment that World War II compelled us to assemble the greatest military force in world history. That force and power deprived us of the luxury of indifference toward or isolation of events anywhere in the world."

Incredulous as it may seem that was a verbatim extract from an editorial which appeared in the Washington Post.

Not yesterday's edition, obviously, but rather the one that came out July 13, 1966, not seven years ago.

Perhaps the secret of remaining abreast of the "Times"-or the "Post"-and garnering all those Pulitzer Prizes is not to become overly-rigid in one's thinking.

Four years ago in presenting to Congress his views on the threat which American military power must be prepared to withstand, Secretary Laird described the threat thus -

"While we do not consider aggression by the USSR likely in the present political climate, the fact remains that the Soviets have a vital interest in preserving the status quo in Central Europe and in retaining their hold on Eastern Europe. A crisis that could lead to a conflict could arise if the political situation substantially changed in a way that threatened the USSR or its hegemony over Eastern Europe, or if a Soviet government saw opportunities for other ways to apply critical pressures on the cohesion of the Alliance. Such a crisis could escalate to hostilities."

Tremendous changes have taken place since that time. A year ago in February the President of the United States accompanied by a full brigade of reporters and television cameramen exchanged toasts of hospitality and friendship with Mao Tse Tung and Chou En Lai. On year ago last month with another brigade of reporters and cameramen, President Nixon visited Moscow and signed an agreement which allegedly limited strategic arms. Soviet basketball teams play ours all over America. Chinese gymnasts have replaced Chinese ping-pong players as a stellar attraction. Russian diplomats lounge in their Embassy and Chinese diplomates lounge at the Mayflower.

These fantastic breakthroughs in our international relations have caused such a tremendous re-evaluation over at the Pentagon that this year the Secretary of Defense said: "While we do not consider aggression by the USSR likely in the present political climate, the fact remains that the Soviets have a vital interest in preserving the status quo in Central Europe and in retaining their hold on Eastern Europe. A crisis that could lead to a conflict could arise if the political situation substantially changed in a way that threatened the USSR or its hegemony over Eastern Europe, or if a Soviet government saw opportunities for other ways to apply critical pressures on the cohesion of the Alliance. Such a crisis could escalate to hostilities."

I can't tell you which Secretary of Defense said it, for I don't remember which week it was said, but it's as if the Rip Van Winkles of the Pentagon had not heard about anything which has happened in the past four years.

Our Defense planners really ought to be launching a new talent search for a more likely villain to portray in their annual analysis of the military threat.

Russell Baker, the joker-in-residence with the New York Times, may have inadvertently come up with a likely candidate. In a recent column he speculated on the choices open to the President to distract the media's obsessive attention away from Watergate. His inspired first choice was that the President should bomb France.

Considering the wariness with which Presidents Pompidou and Nixon faced each other on neutral ground up in Iceland last week, this may not be as funny as Baker intended. Even the codfish swimming offshore held the promise of doing what France had failed to do, that is, breaking up the NATO alliance, the cornerstone of all U.S. foreign policy.

The trouble that a lot of us seem to be having in rethinking a coherent defense posture for this great nation, I suspect, really stems from the trouble we're having shaking off the spell of Camelot. Who in this room, for example, can forget the exhilaration on hearing John F. Kennedy's great declaration: "We shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and the success of liberty."

But that was in 1961, and the ensuing decade has made it abundantly clear that we will *not* pay *any* price.

-we will *not* bear *any* burden

-we will *not* meet *any* hardship

-and most certainly we will not oppose any foe to assure the survival and success of liberty, at least as liberty is defined and practiced in Vietnam, Cambodia, or for that matter, Greece.

In 1970, the new doctrine was articulated by President Nixon thus: "(My) central thesis is that the United States will participate in the defense and development of allies and friends, but that America cannot-and will not-conceive all the plans, design all the programs, execute all the defense of the free nations of the world."

So we begin to talk about "fly before buy" and "design to cost".

If top management in defense industry is confused and whiplashed by the contradictions in our defense policies, it's probably because, at bottom, our defense policies don't accord with our diplomatic initiatives and, indeed, as time goes by seem to be diverging ever further apart.

But what's a joint chief to do when he doesn't know from one day to the next on what continent he's to be fighting in defense of what kind of liberty, whether it will be in a jungle swamp, frozen tundra, or high sierra, against sophisticated mechanized armies supported by nuclear weapons, or guerrilla bands armed only with AK 47s? He's going to ask for more, that's what he's going to do.

And so words like "back-up" and "redundancy" crop up in the jargon emanating from the Pentagon. "Redundancy" has a nicer lilt to it than "duplication" which, as everybody knows, is wasteful. So's "back-up" of course, but if you can remove the customary connotation, with any luck and a good P.R. staff you can convince civilians that it's actually a military virtue.

Ergo, to assure nuclear deterrence we need a "triad of forces." That is, if the Minuteman missile fails, for some ungodly reason to exit its silo when the button is pushed, we need Poseidon submarines at sea to go after the same target. And if both fail, we need to send a manned strategic bomber to do the job.

If all three work as planned, however, which even I concede is possible, we need a special staff of high-ranking admirals and generals to keep the same target from being eliminated not twice over, but thrice over. And that, of course, is what we've got in the Joint Strategic Targeting and Planning Staff situated in a deep hole out in Nebraska.

Industrial management feels the backlash of all this in responding to Requests for Proposals ("RFP's") which issue from the Pentagon from time to time for super-sophisticated hardware. And even if it's for an air defense missile systems that will engage 50 targets simultaneously on the move and throw rocks when it runs out of missiles, some contractor will bid on it. And even though the missile performs superbly in user tests, when the rock ejector jams, there is consternation, recrimination and hard feelings all around-and the Congressman who reads the GAO report and rushes to expose the foul-up gains another headline.

I admire the fortitude and endurance of contractors who persist in the competition. In my own district I have had a case in which the plans, specifications, and assorted forms given to a prospective producer of a very simple flat felt washer weighed 7½ pounds-and a lot of it was microfilm.

The problem of course, is not exclusively of the Pentagon's own making: we in Congress and you in industry share culpability in the unwieldy, cumbersome and inefficient structure which has been achieved. So where do we go from here?

I do not believe we can or should greatly reduce defense spending.

I do not believe that our active duty military establishment is too large.

I do not believe our active duty military establishment is too strong.

What I do believe is that it is too fat and that it is high time that we consider not only the cost of our military establishment but also *where* the money is being spent and the relationship of this spending to today's realities, not those of Camelot.

First, in the strictly physical sense, the entire United States military establishment is larded-and I use the word advisedly-with both officers and enlisted men whose personal physical condition is such that their presence in our military establishment contributes to its weakness and not to its strength. We have air-conditioned them and inner-sprunged them and foam rubbered them and ice-creamed them to the point where a 10-mile hike would be an insurmountable burden for far too many of our military.

The fat in our military is, of course, demonstrated in another way, and that is in our grade structure. It is too large in generals and admirals, lieutenant generals and vice admirals, major generals, brigadier generals and rear admirals, colonels and Navy captains, major and lieutenant commanders. It is not too large in captains, first and second lieutenants, lieutenant j.g. and ensigns in the Navy. And the same imbalance holds true in the enlisted ranks.

The ratio of officers to enlisted men was one officer for every 7 and one-half enlisted men only five years ago. Today it is one officer for every 6 enlisted men. That trend will continue until someone with authority to make it stick says "no".

Perhaps the greatest mistake Congress has made has been in lacking the intestinal fortitude to say "no" to the all volunteer Army when it was proposed by the Administration and when we believed it wouldn't work. You are all familiar with what we have done in increasing military pay to attract volunteers and to keep him in the service.

This is why there isn't any money left for research, and this why there isn't any money left for development, and this is why there isn't any money left for procurement, and this is why there isn't any money left for operations, and this is why our military is drowning in fat as well as in paper.

It is time-it is long past time that we changed our thinking. We have looked backward for our threats and it's time we looked forward. If we are going to look backward anywhere, let's look backward to the toughness and leanness and manness of the military establishment we used to have and can have again if only some tough mean people in

the Pentagon and some tough mean people in industry and some tough mean people in Congress would only have the guts to say "no" once in a while."

(Editorial Comment and Feature taken from July 1973 issue of the ARMED FORCES JOURNAL.)

FEATURE: HOUSE PANEL WANTS MORE F-111s, CUTS F-15 BUY IN HALF.

Major shift in FY 74 USAF aircraft procurements from those recommended by the Pentagon are in store, if the House Armed Services Committee's mark up of the DoD procurement authorization bill is upheld by the rest of Congress.

Changes which the House panel voted to make on 19 and 20 June, when it began its annual mark up of DoD's procurement and R&D requests, would:

.Continue F-111 production. Deputy Defense Secretary William Clements decided recently not to keep the F-111 line open with a new buy. The line is scheduled to shut down in December of 1974 when the last of 550 aircraft now programmed will be delivered. Although the Administration did not request them in either year, Congress directed in FY 72 and FY 73 that F-111s continue to be built, funding 12 each year. In FY 73, another \$30-million was voted for long lead time parts against a "possible buy" in FY 74, but DoD has refused to release the money. Some feel the Air Force has not been enthusiastic about buying more because of concern that it could somehow jeopardize the future of the B-1 bomber. But production of the strategic version of the F-111 ceased some time ago; the only line now open is for the Tactical Air Command version.

One of the committee's concerns about stopping the F-111 buy at this juncture is that the new aircraft approved to rejuvenate the Tactical Air Command—the F-15 and A-10 close support aircraft—are still unproven, whereas the F-111 is proven, it is not a "vintage" system, and would not have a "warm production line" if either the F-15 or A-10 ran into problems or delays as they enter service. (Representative Samuel Stratton (D-NY) said the USAF/Clements decision was "both stupid and wasteful and should not be tolerated by the taxpayers.")

The 425 F-111s bought for TAC provide only 137 extra planes to support its four wing operational force. This leaves a margin of only 48% for attrition replacement, combat crew readiness training and maintenance pipeline. By comparison, the F-4E buy provides a margin of 80%, the A-7 buy a margin of 77% and the F-15 buy (510 aircraft to support 288 at squadron level) gives a margin of 75 percent. Without an additional buy, TAC's F-111 force would drop to 3 effective wings in 1979 and to only 1 in 1982 (March AFJ). The committee voted to fund 12 new planes at about \$126-million.

Support for the House action is sure to come from the House Appropriations Committee, which told Clements, after he announced his decision not to buy more, to not divert the \$30 million which had been voted for the possible follow-on buy. The panel said it wanted another chance to review the program. Similar support is also likely from the Senate Armed Services Committee; the outlook from the Senate Appropriations Committee is uncertain.

*Impound A-10 production funds until the new close support aircraft has passed all of its R&D milestones. DoD's FY 74 budget included \$112.4-million for development and \$30-million to buy long lead time production components. The House panel voted to require that the latter money not be released until the committee is shown data that the Air Force plane and its new General Electric 30mm GAU-8/A cannon are ready for operational service. The GE gun was selected for final development over a Philco Ford entry on 14 June after a three month "shoot out" at Eglin AFB.

*Cut the Air Force's F-15 fighter buy in half. The panel is concerned about recent failures of the aircraft's Pratt & Whitney F100PW-100 engine during its qualification tests. More than "sixty deficiencies have yet to be corrected, one panel member told AFJ, and he said the committee feels there is no need to build production up so fast until the engine is fully proven. Last year, the first 30 production F-15s were funded at \$453.6-million, including spares, plus another \$454.5-million for research and development.

*The current budget request, which the House panel has voted to cut, would fund 77 more planes at almost a billion dollars, not including another \$229.5-million for R&D. The total FY 74 funding request is \$1.148-billion. Maj. Gen Benjamin Bellis, USAF F-15 Program Director, recently told a group of journalists that the plane's target cost is still \$10.4-million per copy and that the first production models are "under target".

Continue Navy F-14 production, including funds for a "fly off" between stripped down versions of the F-14, General Dynamics' YF-16, F-4N, and a "tail hook" version of the F-15 to fill out Navy/Marine Corps fighter requirements after a joint buy of 313 Phoenix-carrying F-14s is completed. Fifty F-14s would be funded. Clements has proposed in FY 74, another 50 each in FY 75 and FY 76 and 29 more in FY 77. The Marine Corps would get roughly every fourth one of these aircraft, enough for four squadrons-but not enough for any attrition allowance.

Senator Stuart Symington (D-Mo.), in a Navy hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee on 19 June, complained that the F-14 had been "shoved down the throats" of the Marine Corps to lower the F-14's cost to the Navy. (The Marine Corps had sought to buy \$131-million worth of F-4Js, but Navy CNO Admiral Elmo Zumwalt told Congress it was a "bad decision" and succeeded in getting Navy Secretary John Warner and Clements to have the Marine Corps "reconsider" its choice of planes.)

Under current thinking, 313 F-14As would be bought in all. Including R&D, this program would cost out at \$6.02-billion, \$19.2-million per plane, compared with earlier estimates totaling \$5.26-billion or \$16.8-million per plane. Clements has told Congress that a decision on what follow-on plane to buy-a non-Phoenix carrying F-14D or one of the other candidates to be tested in the fly-off-would be made in July of 1976.

Clements has estimated that Grumman will lose about \$100-million on the F-14 contract, but expressed concern that Grumman's cost cutting efforts and management still need to be improved. But neither he nor Zumwalt addressed the fact that Grumman's work accounts for only about 25% of the plane's cost. Subcontractors account for another 25% and the plane's weapons and fire control system entail the other 50%. Senator Barry Goldwater (R-Ariz.) has long expressed his frustration at getting F-14 cost data from the Navy, finally forced an estimate last March that the Phoenix missile and its AN/AWG-9 fire control system would come out to at least \$7.62-million per plane. Each Phoenix missile costs about \$453,000, the AWG-9 \$3.56-million.

Not to fund USAF A-7 production. On 20 June, the House panel defeated by a substantial 24 to 8 record vote a proposal to continue production of the Air Force A-7, although no such funds had been requested by the Air Force. The Navy, however, is buying 42 A-7E Corsair IIs in FY 74 at a cost of \$190.1-million, including initial spares.

No major funding changes, AFJ has learned, are expected on the Air Force B-1 Strategic bomber, for which \$473.5-million is budgeted. Similarly, the Navy's CVN-70 nuclear carrier (657.0-million) and new Trident sub (\$1.176-billion) are expected to undergo only minor funding revisions from the House group. Although strong fights are expected on the floor of the House attempting to cut those three programs, they are not expected to result in significant changes from what the Armed Services Committee is recommending.

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SERVICE NOTE: F-14A CRASH

Navy/Grumman F-14A variable-geometry air-superiority fighter crashed last week about 60 mi. off Pt. Mugu, Calif., following an apparent ejector malfunction in the test launch of a Raytheon Sparrow air-to-air missile. Both Grumman crewmembers ejected successfully and were recovered by a Navy helicopter.

Aircraft at the time was flying in a zero-g condition at an altitude of 5,000 ft. and a speed of Mach 0.95. Test called for a Sparrow to be launched from the aft semi-submerged missile station along the fuselage centerline located just forward of the tail hook.

The missile was launched, the crew felt a thud against the fuselage and then saw the Sparrow porpoising forward of the aircraft, with its top fins missing. This was followed by an explosion and fires on board the F-14, which then pitched up to a 70-deg. angle. At this point, the crew ejected.

On separation, the Sparrow is programmed to eject with a nosedown pitch of 13-15 deg. Movies and telemetry data indicate that this particular missile ejected in a level position, puncturing a fuselage fuel tank before falling away.

(Aviation Week and Space Technology, June 25, 1973)