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A changing European Security and defense architecture and its impact on Turkey

Yikilkan, Orhan.
Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School

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THESIS

A CHANGING EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENSE ARCHITECTURE AND ITS IMPACT ON TURKEY

by

Orhan Yikilkan

June 2001

Thesis Advisor: Donald Abenheim
Second Reader: Tjarck Roessler

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Since the 1991 Maastricht Treaty, the European Union countries have been trying to form a common security and defense identity as one facet of the European Union unification process. The efforts to create "separable but not separate" European forces within NATO have accelerated in the last three years and changed direction toward creating an autonomous "European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP)" within the framework of the EU. This policy concerns some non-EU European NATO allies, such as Turkey, and Norway, as well as non-European NATO allies, such as the United States and Canada.

The developments in the European security structure in the aftermath of the French-British St. Malo Declaration (1998) have profoundly changed the discussion of an all-European force. The ESDP is an evolving process. The impact of the latest developments on Turkey's position in the European security system and Turkey's security policies is significant. Turkish national security interests compel it to be part of a new European security system and of security arrangements in the post-Cold War era. Turkey should have some institutional links to European Security and Defense Policy that would enable it to influence the decisions of its European counterparts on the matters that could affect Turkey's interests. European security cannot be provided without Turkey. How Turkey will fit into the new European security system will depend on its European membership process, its unique geostrategic position and its special relationship with the United States.
A CHANGING EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENSE ARCHITECTURE AND ITS IMPACT ON TURKEY

Orhan Yikilkan
1st Lt., Turkish Army
B.S., Turkish Military Academy, 1994

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June 2001

Author: Orhan Yikilkan

Approved by: Donald Aberheim, Thesis Advisor

Narck Roessler, Second Reader

James J. Wirtz, Chairman
Department of National Security Affairs
ABSTRACT

Since the 1991 Maastricht Treaty, the European Union countries have been trying to form a common security and defense identity as one facet of the European Union unification process. The efforts to create “separable but not separate” European forces within NATO have accelerated in the last three years and changed direction toward creating an autonomous “European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP)” within the framework of the EU. This policy concerns some non-EU European NATO allies, such as Turkey, and Norway, as well as non-European NATO allies, such as the United States and Canada.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Developments in the European security structure in the aftermath of the French-British St. Malo Declaration (1998) have profoundly changed debate about the possibility of creating an all-European force. By expressing its willingness to have a sound European military to deal with post-Cold War security problems, the United Kingdom with its pro-European “New Labour” government, became one of the leading actors in promoting a common European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). This fundamental change in UK policy toward the ESDP was a watershed event in the evolution of the ESDP since the United Kingdom had been the most ardent opponent of such an EU project.

The possibility of an all-European security and defense structure also has started discussion on both sides of the Atlantic. The discussion focused on the feasibility of such a posture as well as the ESDP’s possible impact on NATO. As the leading member of NATO, the United States maintained the approach that the ESDP should eschew the so-called “three D’s”: decoupling, duplication, and discrimination.

The ESDP is an evolving process. The uncertainties of the new security environment and the institutional ambiguities of the ESDP are the major reasons creating the discussions about its feasibility. The warnings that the ESDP should not create new institutions in the European security system, but rather should focus on increasing the capabilities overlook the importance of institution-building for the European integration process. The latest developments have clearly revealed EU members’ political will to construct an autonomous ESDP. The most significant consequence of the process starting with St. Malo is that today the EU has a much more “autonomous” prospect of European
security and defense identity in comparison to what was envisaged with the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) back in 1994. The efforts, which were first started within NATO to create "separable but not separate" European forces, have accelerated in the last three years and shifted toward creating an "autonomous" ESDP within the framework of the EU. These developments particularly concern some non-EU European NATO allies, such as Turkey, and Norway and non-European NATO allies, such as the United States and Canada.

In the Turkish case, the issue is more complicated. Considering the latest developments, the ESDP affects Turkey more than any other member of the Alliance. Turkish national security interests compel it to be a part of a new European security system and of security arrangements in the post-cold war era. Turkey should have some institutional links to European Security and Defense Policy allowing it to influence the decisions of its European counterparts on the matters that could affect Turkey's interests directly or indirectly. In this regard, any form of Turkish exclusion from a European security system, if coupled with her political marginalization from the European unification process, could lead Turkey to pursue its interests unilaterally.

European security cannot be provided without Turkey. In terms of collective defense, the end of the Cold War has changed Turkey's strategic importance for European security. However, it still can help stabilize a region which is evolving into one of the world's most problematic areas.

How Turkey will fit into the new European security system will depend on its European membership process, its unique geostrategic position and its special
relationship with the United States. As long as Europe needs NATO and the United States for its collective defense, it will also need to consider Turkey’s concerns and demands and try to integrate Turkey to the new ESDP structures. Turkey should not expect to secure a full role in the decision-making process of the ESDP, as it wanted, since the ESDP is an EU project and EU countries would never grant a full role in decision-making to a non-EU member in order to preserve the EU institutions’ autonomy. Likewise, the EU should not expect Turkey to agree on automatic access to NATO planning structures and assets and to remove its veto, as it wanted, since this would mean a dilution in Turkish membership in NATO. The Turks will not agree to a second-class status in the Alliance. Both sides have legitimate arguments, both sides need to reconsider their positions and both sides must compromise, if a solution is to be found to the current problem between the EU and Turkey.
I. INTRODUCTION

A. BACKGROUND

Since the 1991 Maastricht Treaty, European Union countries have been trying to form a common security and defense identity as one facet of the European Union unification process. The efforts to create “separable but not separate” European forces within NATO have accelerated in the last two years toward creating an autonomous “European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP).” This policy concerns some non-EU European NATO allies, such as Turkey, Norway and non-European NATO allies, such as the United States and Canada. This thesis explores this process in detail.

The developments in the European security structure in the aftermath of the French-British St. Malo Declaration (1998) have changed the discussion of an all-European force. By expressing its willingness to have a sound European military capability to deal with post-Cold War security problems, the United Kingdom with its pro-European “New Labour” government, became one of the leading actors in promoting a common ESDP. This profound change in British policy toward the ESDP has triggered what may be called the “St. Malo Process.” This process not only accelerated the move toward a more “autonomous” European security and defense posture but also started an expansive discussion about the feasibility of such a force, its possible impact on the future of NATO and on the transatlantic relationship. This thesis examines the underlying

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1 The term “separable but not separate” was first used by former US Secretary of State Warren Christopher in 1992 and then at the 1994 Brussels Summit, the term entered into official NATO language. See the Brussels Declaration of the North Atlantic Council, 11 January 1994, Available [Online]: <http://www.nato.int>.
factors, which started the St. Malo process, with a special emphasis on the UK’s role and the feasibility of such a defense posture.

This thesis also examines the impact of the latest developments on Turkey’s position in the European security system and Turkey’s security policies. Because of its geostrategic position, Turkey has been a strategic partner for European countries and especially for the United States for a long time. Though the end of the Cold War changed Turkey’s strategic importance for European security in terms of collective defense, Turkey is still an important factor in stabilizing the Balkans, the Mediterranean, the Middle East, and the Caucasus.

Turkish vital national security interests compel it to be a part of a new European security system and of security arrangements in the post-cold war era. Turkey should have some institutional links to European Security and Defense Policy that would enable it to influence the decisions of its European counterparts on the matters that could affect Turkey’s interests. This thesis further suggests that European security cannot be provided without Turkey. Turkish exclusion from a European security system, if coupled with its political marginalization from the European unification process, could lead Turkey to pursue its interests unilaterally. This could create strains in the relations between Turkey and Europe. Turkey’s integration into the new European security system is essential for Turkey, but equally essential for Europe and North America.

B. METHODOLOGY AND STRUCTURE

The methodology used in this thesis relies mainly on a qualitative analysis of primary sources, including communiqués, treaties, and transcripts of government policy
statements. It also draws upon secondary resources, such as scholarly and journalistic analysis of core issues.

The thesis has two main sections dealing with two main topics. The first section, comprising the second and third chapter, examines the ESDP’s evolution and feasibility, its position vis-à-vis the United States, while the second section discusses the ESDP’s impact on Turkey’s position in the European security system and the Turkish security policies.

Following Chapter I (Introduction), Chapter II provides information about the ESDP. The chapter starts with a brief examination of the evolution of the idea to develop a European security system since the attempt of the European Defence Community (EDC) in the early 1950’s to the EU efforts of the 1990s. It then focuses on the latest developments that have occurred over the last two years. Chapter II also discusses the circumstances that led to the idea of a European force that would deal with contingencies such as Bosnia and Kosovo. This chapter emphasizes the significance of Kosovo in inducing Europe to establish an effective system and to acquire the capabilities to cope with such problems. It further discusses Britain’s and France’s position vis-à-vis the ESDP and their roles in the latest developments.

Chapter III examines the feasibility of the ESDP and the reasons for being either optimistic or pessimistic about the ESDP. This chapter also discusses the obstacles hindering a sound ESDP, as well as the factors that could help to reach such a goal. It touches upon the capability gap between the United States and its European allies and the need to close this gap. Furthermore Chapter III also discusses US policy toward the ESDP since this policy would have a decisive affect on the fate of ESDP.
While the first three chapters provide a general overview of the factors affecting the realization of the ESDP and analyze the latest developments, the following two chapters deal particularly with Turkey’s role and position in the European security system and the impact of the latest developments on Turkey. Chapter IV investigates Turkey’s place in the European security system and its strategic importance for regional as well as global security. The chapter gives a general overview of Turkey’s commitments to Europe’s defense and security and the impact of the latest developments in the European security structure on Turkey. It also touches upon Turkey-EU relations particularly stressing the triangular relationship between the EU, Turkey and the US.

Chapter V examines Turkey’s policy toward the ESDP and if realized, the ESDP’s possible impact on Turkey. Turkey as a member of NATO has been a part of the European security system for nearly 50 years, and it still regards being a part of the European security system as essential for its security interests. However, Turkey has growing concerns about its position in the changing architecture of the European system and is attempting to secure a place in the new system. This chapter examines how these changes in the European security system could affect Turkey, what concerns it has, how justifiable they are, and what the consequences for Turkey and Europe could be if Turkey were excluded from the new security arrangements.

The thesis concludes with the presentation of its findings about the feasibility of the ESDP and its possible impact on Turkey.
II. EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY (ESDP)

A. FROM EDC TO ESDP:

The idea of an all-European force dates back to May 1952 when France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy and the three Benelux states signed the European Defense Community (EDC) Treaty, inspired by the Pleven plan, named after French Defense Minister, Rene Pleven. In 1950, he called for the creation of a European Army. The EDC was designed to save resources, to improve effectiveness, and to limit the power of Germany to make war by denying it a General staff and separate armed forces. The French believed, the German rearmament and a national army, which was deemed necessary if Germany joined a European defense organization like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), could only be acceptable if it were within a supranational body like the EDC, in which the German forces would be integrated to and controlled by a European Army. The EDC would operate under a European defense minister, who would be responsible to the European Assembly and a European Council of Ministers and have a common budget.²

However, the incorporation of defense into a supranational format was a leap too far and too soon for 1950s Europe. Despite the strong support and pressure of the United States, which hoped the project would strengthen NATO by strengthening Western European unity and by increasing the effectiveness of limited European resources allocated for defense,³ the project was shelved in 1954. Although the EDC project failed,


³ For US approach to EDC see John Lamberton Harper, American Visions of Europe, Cambridge
the notion of having an all-European force and the discussion of the potential effect that such a force could have on the transatlantic alliance never died. Most of these discussions were initiated by France, which has always favored a Europe more independent from the US and has viewed such a force as a tool to realize this goal. There were numerous failed attempts to establish an all-European force:

- Western European Union (WEU)(1954),
- the Franco-German Treaty (1963)
- US promoted, ill-fated Multilateral Force (MLF) (1963-64),
- EUROGROUP (1968),
- EDIP(1970),
- WEU(1984-revitalized),
- EUROCORPS (1992-first established as a Franco-German Corps following the Bilateral Brigade established in 1987.)

Albeit the form and configuration of the European force and the degree of support behind it, and the various players’ perceptions of the controversy over such a force varied somewhat from time to time, the main themes of the issue have always remained the same. Representing the extreme sides of debate, the United States tended to view these efforts as a tool to increase the European share of the European defense burden and tried to channel them into a form that would strengthen the transatlantic alliance and at the same time not threaten the US leadership in the alliance while France viewed the efforts as a way of having a more independent Europe by gradually decoupling the United States from Europe. The attempts after the EDC to create a European defense structure such as the WEU, the Franco-German Security Treaty or EUROGROUP failed to achieve the French ambitions. This was true, in general, because the Cold War made a reliable


4 Ian Thomas, pp. 38-46.
European defense structure created by only Europeans unthinkable and because most Europeans feared that such a European force might decouple the United States from Europe and put their collective defense, security and stability in danger.

Because of these concerns, instead of moving toward being an independent European army, the development of European security identity proceeded hand in hand with the development of NATO in a mutually reinforcing course. NATO represented the outer ring of European security structures while the WEU and the NATO European pillar, which found additional expression in the NATO EUROGROUP, were playing a supporting, subservient role. However, the end of the Cold War brought a new unstable security environment in which the Soviet threat was gone, the dependence on the United States for European defense was decreased, and the need for a high readiness level for collective security problems such as peacekeeping and peacemaking missions was increased. This situation seemed to offer the possibility that the European members of NATO, acting under the WEU and later ESDP, would seek to distance themselves from American leadership.⁵

Accordingly, after the Cold War, the efforts accelerated to have an independent European force as one pillar of the European unification that would enable the European Union to become an international player on the “political/security field” and make its voice heard. The inability of the European countries to react and to participate unanimously in the Gulf Crisis (1990-91) in the beginning and the subsequent US dominance in the Gulf War underlined the fact that the European countries were in dire

⁵ Ibid p. 169.
need of adapting their security institutions and acquiring military capabilities to the challenges of the post-Cold War world.6

In December 1991, the members of the European Community signed the Maastricht Treaty, transforming the European Communities into the European Union (EU), and setting the goal of establishing a monetary union and a common currency, the Euro. The treaty was also a European response to the changing European security and defense environment including, as part of that Union, a commitment to “define and implement a common foreign and security policy” that would eventually include the “framing of a common defense policy, which might in time lead to a common defense.”7

The treaty designated the Western European Union as the organization responsible for implementing defense aspects of the EU’s decisions on foreign and security policy. The WEU members subsequently agreed (in Petersberg, Germany in 1992) that they would use WEU military forces for joint operations in humanitarian and rescue missions, peacekeeping, crisis management and peace enforcement—the so-called “Petersberg tasks.”8 The new Franco-German Corps—to become the core of a “EuroCorps”—which was created just before this meeting, would be excellent for carrying out these tasks.9

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6 For the impact of the Gulf War on the evolution of the post-Cold War European security architecture see Gulnur Aybet, A European Security Architecture after the Cold War, St. Martin’s Press, LLC, New York, 2000, pp.97-114.


9 Rob De Wijk, NATO on the Brink of a New Millenium: The Battle for Consensus, Brassey’s Atlantic Documentaries, 1997, p.56.
With these developments transpiring, the relationship between the WEU and NATO started to concern the United States. Reflecting these concerns, US Secretary of State Warren Christopher warned Europeans in 1993 that “there must be separable but not separate capabilities” that would enable Europeans to conduct such tasks and US officials in NATO maintained this approach. Additionally, in the preparation period of the Brussels summit, at an informal meeting of NATO defense ministers in Travemünde, Germany (October 1993), the US side proposed the “Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF)” as a new Alliance concept to meet both Alliance and WEU force requirements for out-of-area operations. However, this concept would evolve and lie dormant until 1996 before being fully accepted as an Alliance concept. Nevertheless, NATO’s Brussels declaration of 11 January 1994 supported strengthening the European pillar of NATO through WEU. It outlined the concept of “separable but not separate” capabilities, the need for better coordination and planning, and the furtherance of the emerging European security and defense identity (ESDI) that would enhance the ability of the allies to work together toward a common defense and other tasks.

Owing to developments in the first half of 1990’s, both the United Kingdom and France were arriving at similar conclusions about the future of European security by the mid-1990’s. This was partly because of their joint experiences on the ground in Bosnia, the growing reluctance of the United States to be involved in European security problems, and the fear of Congressional swings toward either isolationism or a new

10 Ibid, p.74-75.
11 Ibid, p. 76.
burden-sharing debate. Furthermore, due to the requirements of interoperability, command and control procedures that surfaced during these years, a politico-military consensus also emerged in France favoring a closer link to NATO. The needs of the post-Cold War environment had necessitated a serious rapprochement for practical cooperation with the Alliance.

In the second half of 1995, the British government began actively searching for ways to create a European security and defense identity within the framework of the Alliance, and in a fashion that would facilitate France’s return to a full military integration in NATO: (the British long-standing dissent to the idea of autonomous European defense system will be discussed later). Early in 1996, both the French and British governments proposed what became known as the “Deputies Proposal.” NATO forces in Europe have always been commanded by an American officer who occupies the position of Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). The British and French suggested that the Deputy SACEUR, traditionally a senior European officer, and other European officers in the NATO command structure, wear WEU command hats as well as their NATO and national command hats. This multiple-hatting procedure would, without duplication of resources and personnel, permit the Western European Union countries to use the NATO command structure to organize and to command a military operation under largely European auspices.

14 Ibid, p.23.
16 Ibid.
At the spring 1996 session of NATO ministers in Berlin, Germany, the NATO foreign ministers once again agreed on a plan to build a European defense pillar inside the NATO Alliance. They reiterated that an ESDI (European Security and Defense Identity) would be created within the Alliance by making NATO "assets and capabilities" available for future military operations commanded by the Western European Union. Such decisions would be made by consensus on a case-by-case basis, meaning there would be no automaticity. To facilitate such operations, European officers in the NATO structure would, when appropriate, shift from their NATO responsibilities to WEU command positions.17

Additionally, as put in the final communique, the ministers determined that adapting the Alliance to the post-Cold War roles should be guided by three fundamental objectives:

- to ensure the Alliance's military effectiveness and ability to perform its traditional mission of collective defense while undertaking new military roles;
- to preserve the transatlantic link by strengthening NATO as a forum for political consultation and military cooperation;
- to support development of an ESDI by creating the possibility for NATO-supported task forces to perform missions under the direction of the WEU nations.18

The communique also emphasized the issue of participation: "As an essential element of the development of this identity" we "should take into account the

17 Ibid.
participation, including in European command arrangements, of all European Allies if they were so to choose.”

In 1996, NATO also adopted the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept as a “deployable multinational, multi-service formation generated and tailored for specific contingency operations,” after three years of discussion since it was first introduced in Travemünde (1993). Thus, through the CJTF, forces assigned to NATO and trained in NATO exercises could be used in conjunction with or entirely for WEU operations. This linkage of the WEU’s operational role to NATO has resulted in “separate but not separable” capabilities, to be used either by the WEU or NATO.

However, even after Berlin, the question was what military operations the European Allies could actually assume within the framework of the new arrangements. Despite “the hour of Europe” rhetoric articulated by some EU (then EC) officials, the intervening years have demonstrated that they lack the combination of military resources and political will to take on operations like IFOR or SFOR in Bosnia, and the United States provided most of the key resources for the air war against Serbia in 1999. In 1997, when impending chaos in Albania threatened to destabilize southeastern Europe, the Europeans were not even able to agree on organizing an intervention under the Western European Union. If this had been done, the operation could have been a perfect

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19 Ibid.


21 This refers to Luxembourg Foreign Minister and Chairman of the EC Council of Ministers (then), Jaqu Poos’ speech on June 28, 1991, in which, referring to the Bosnia problem, he said, “This is the hour of Europe not of the Americans, if one problem can be solved by the Europeans, it is the Yugoslav problem,” quoted in Yost, NATO Transformed, p.193.

22 Charles Perry et al. “NATO Enlargement Costs and Burden-sharing Issues” in NATO After Kosovo,
Petersberg-type mission with WEU members, acting under the authority of the WEU for humanitarian and rescue tasks, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management and peacemaking. But, the Alliance solidarity within the WEU was not strong enough to trigger institutional support. Not only the UK but also Germany opposed the request of the Southern European members that a Special Session of the WEU Council be convened to grant the WEU the authority of the military operation. Thus, instead of a WEU force, an Italian-led ad hoc coalition force (7,000 troops from Austria, Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, Romania, Spain, and Turkey) intervened under the name of Operation Alba. All these experiences have led observers to bemoan the fact that Europe does not have the military capacity required to maintain stability on the borders of the EU/WEU member states, to say nothing of the capacity to project force beyond the Balkans.

In June 1997, the EU members, who were in the process of updating and strengthening the Maastricht Treaty, signed the Treaty of Amsterdam, which was ratified by the member nations and came into force in 1999. In the area of common defense policy, the Treaty of Amsterdam included a reference to the "Petersberg tasks" and authorized the adoption of EU common strategies. The treaty also included the creation of the position of a "High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy," a

eds. Rob De Wijk et al., (Royal Netherlands Military Academy), p.73.


24 Ibid.

25 Sloan.

position that was not filled until September 1999, when former NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana accepted the position.

B. **BLAIR INITIATIVE**

In the autumn of 1998, the discussion on European defense was changed profoundly when British Prime Minister Tony Blair decided to push for a European Union role in defense. Blair first articulated his ideas at an informal EU summit in Pörtschach, Austria, in October 1998. Tony Blair was making a significant change in Britain's traditional anti-integration policy in defense matters by announcing Britain's willingness to realize an effective CFSP (Common Foreign Security Policy) within the framework of the European Union, provided it was militarily sound, intergovernmental in nature and not harmful to Atlantic solidarity. Blair reaffirmed his approach on 3 November 1998 in a major address to the North Atlantic Assembly's annual session in Edinburgh, Scotland. Blair, complaining that Europe's ability for autonomous military action was so limited, called for major institutional and resource innovations to make Europe a more equal partner in the transatlantic Alliance. This was a profound change in Britain's policy toward the ESDP. The reasons behind the change was considered curious since nobody expected such a move from London.

Traditionally, the United Kingdom had opposed the idea of creating a European defense system autonomous from the transatlantic alliance. The United Kingdom had

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28 Jolyon Howorth, p.5.
shared US skepticism regarding initiatives that might create splits between the United States and Europe in the Alliance, particularly those with roots in French neo-Gaullist philosophy. European Union nations’ lack of political will and their inability to conduct military operations independently from NATO were frustrating, but the United Kingdom also had another reason for this change of policy. Britain had learned a lesson: to shape Europe’s future according to British interests and in order to avoid its unwanted side effects, Britain had to remain engaged to the EU and had to lead the European integration process. Shunning the EMU by not participating in the Euro, Blair’s government viewed the “defense pillar” of the union as a suitable area to remain critically engaged and even, considering Britain’s “military superiority” over other European countries, to lead the integration of the European Union. In parallel with that, some analysts said that Blair wanted to demonstrate a commitment to Europe at a time when the United Kingdom was not going to join in the inauguration of the Euro.

Consequently, at a regular French-British Summit, Blair met with President Jacques Chirac at St. Malo in early December 1998. The declaration, named after this French resort, envisioned creating a European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) with the means and mechanisms to permit the EU nations to act “autonomously,” should

29 Ibid, p.5.
30 Examples of the UK’s blockage of EU defense or security policy initiatives: 1950-54 (EDC); 1997 (merger of EU and WEU).
31 For a detailed discussion of Britain’s EU vocation see Hugo Young, This Blessed Plot: Britain and Europe from Churchill to Blair, The Overlook Press, New York, 1998.
33 Antonio Missiroli “CFSP, Defence and Flexibility” Available [online] at
NATO not decide to act in some future scenario requiring military action.\textsuperscript{34} It is said that the French delegation reportedly had lined up support from German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder before the meeting, giving the declaration even more weight.\textsuperscript{35} The St. Malo declaration marked a watershed event in the ESDP process.

The declaration emphasized the European Union’s role on the international stage and the need for strengthened armed forces that could react rapidly to the new risks, and which were supported by a strong and competitive European defense industry and technology. The Union had to have appropriate structures and a capacity for analysis of situations, sources of intelligence and a capability for relevant strategic planning, without unnecessary duplication. The declaration also pointed out the need for an intergovernmental institution that would enable the Union to have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises.\textsuperscript{36}

However, this institution would not change the EU countries’ position in other European security institutions. The NATO and WEU collective defense commitments of the EU members had to be maintained, obligations to NATO honored, and the various positions of European states in relation to NATO and otherwise had to be respected.


\textsuperscript{35} Stanley R. Sloan.

These developments had some repercussions on the other side of the Atlantic. As a reflection of US concerns (then) Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, formally declared the US Administration’s support for the initiative. For a long time the United States had been quite critical of Europe’s lack of military capabilities and urged them to increase their defense expenditures, but cautioned the Europeans against “the three D’s”: duplication, decoupling, and discrimination. Secretary Albright would also emphasize these concerns at the December 1998 ministerial meetings in Brussels, just days after the St. Malo meeting.

According to Albright, the Allies should not duplicate what was already being done effectively in NATO. This would be a waste of defense resources at a time when defense spending in most European nations was declining. More fundamentally, the new European initiative should not in any way “decouple” or “de-link” the United States from Europe in the Alliance, or the European defense efforts from those coordinated through NATO. This could result from a lack of candor and transparency that the United States feared might be an intended or unintended consequence of the new European approach. A tendency to “gang up on” the United States, or just the US perception of such an occurrence, could surely spell the end of the Alliance. Finally, Albright insisted that there be no discrimination against NATO Allies who were not members of the European Union. This point—applied in particular to Turkey, but also to European Allies, Norway,

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Iceland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, as well as Canada and the United States on the North American side of the Alliance.\textsuperscript{38}

In spite of these footnotes to US support for the initiative, it moved ahead, in parallel with NATO’s conduct of the air campaign over Kosovo, which intended to stop the Serbian atrocities in the province and to allow Kosovo refugees to return to their homes in peace. The Kosovo campaign justified and added impetus to the Blair initiative. When the numbers were totaled after the air campaign, the United States had conducted nearly 80 percent of the bombing, 90 percent of the air-to-air refuelling, and had met approximately 95 percent of the intelligence requirements.\textsuperscript{39} From the US perspective, the fact that the Allies for the most part were not able to contribute to such a high-tech, low casualty campaign validated the wisdom of the Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI).\textsuperscript{40} The DCI, adopted at the Washington summit in April 1999, was designed to stimulate European defense efforts to help them reach the US levels.\textsuperscript{41} From the European perspective, the experiences in Kosovo clearly demonstrated Europe’s (undesirable, and perhaps growing) military dependence on the United States, and the need to do something about it.

In an effort to incorporate what the Europeans had done toward the ESDP and mold it to the NATO framework, heads of governments welcomed the developments in the European Security and Defense Identity, at the April 1999 Washington Summit. A

\textsuperscript{38} Stanley R. Sloan.


\textsuperscript{40} Ibid, pp.118-120.

compromise was reached between the non-EU members and the EU members of NATO. They agreed that the European Security and Defense Identity would be developed within the alliance and modeled after the 1996 Berlin decisions. The Alliance was endorsing the Europeans to act autonomously; but the Alliance would retain the decision-making. According to what may be called "the right to first refusal" the issues related to the ESDI would be discussed by the Atlantic Council, which would decide if the matter should be pursued by the Alliance as a whole or left to EU military action with the help of NATO. This was clearly constraining the ESDI within NATO and falling short of granting the EU the right to decide autonomously. Moreover, the presumed availability of NATO assets for European operations was also in doubt, since no one could shelter the EU against a veto by a non-EU member. Thus, the ESDI within the NATO framework began losing clout. This, in turn, diminished the hope to realize the European aspirations to establish an effective European security and defense pillar. This prompted the EU efforts to construct the ESDP within an EU framework.

In the meantime, the German EU Presidency transformed the set of national and bilateral initiatives triggered by the St. Malo declaration into a formal European Union process. At the Cologne EU Summit of June 1999 member states decided to establish a permanent EU Political and Security Committee (PSC) and an EU Military Committee to make recommendations to the PSC. They also established an EU Military Staff, including

42 Munever Cebeci.
44 Francois Heisbourg, p.47.
a Situation Center to transfer WEU assets to the EU, and they agreed to hold regular as well as ad hoc meetings of the General Affairs Council (GAC), including the defense ministers. Finally, they approved the designation of Mr. Javier Solana as High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, in line with the Amsterdam Treaty. Summit conclusions also included an Annex providing the guidelines and principles for strengthening of the common European policy on security and defense.

By the end of 1999, the EU had tied a major package together based on the guidelines of the St. Malo statement. Javier Solana had moved from his position of NATO Secretary-General to the post of EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy. In addition, it was agreed that Solana would become WEU Secretary-General to help pave the way to merge the WEU within the EU, as was confirmed at Cologne. Additionally Solana also served as Secretary General of the EU Council.

In Helsinki in 1999, the efforts toward a European force transformed into a more tangible form. The EU members declared their determination “to develop an autonomous capacity to make decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and to conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises.” They noted that the process “will avoid unnecessary duplication and does not imply the creation of a European army.” In addition, they agreed on a series of substantial steps required to implement their political commitment, including:

- cooperating voluntarily in EU-led operations, Member States must be

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able, by 2003, to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least one year military forces of up to 50,000-60,000 persons capable of the full range of the Petersberg tasks;

- new political and military bodies and structures will be established within the Council to enable the Union to ensure the necessary political guidance and strategic direction to such operations, while respecting the single institutional framework;

- modalities will be developed for full consultation, cooperation and transparency between the EU and NATO, taking into account the needs of all EU Member States;

- appropriate arrangements will be defined that would allow, while respecting the Union's decision-making autonomy, non-EU European NATO members and other interested States to contribute to EU military crisis management;

- a non-military crisis management mechanism will be established to coordinate and make more effective the various civilian means and resources, in parallel with the military ones, at the disposal of the Union and the Member States.\(^{47}\)

In Helsinki, the EU countries demonstrated the political will to create an autonomous ESDP. Consequently in Brussels in November 2000, in accordance with the so-called Helsinki "headline goal" the defense ministers of the EU member states took a major step in creating an autonomous ESDP by agreeing to provide a pool of about 100,000 personnel, 400 combat planes and 100 warships to comprise the Euro Rapid Reaction Force, which would be a maximum of 60,000-strong at any time\(^{48}\). The European Union also invited nonmembers to contribute troops. On this invitation, Turkey offered to contribute a mechanized brigade of up to 5,000 men, 36 F-16 warplanes, two


transport planes and a small flotilla of ships in return for an important role in planning the organization's military operations.\textsuperscript{49}

The "Military Capabilities Commitment Declaration" recognized both the need for further strategic capabilities and "the need to further improve the availability, deployability, sustainability and interoperability of forces has, however, been identified if the requirements of the most demanding Petersberg tasks are to be fully satisfied." The declaration also touched upon the relations with NATO. It referred to the need for mutually reinforcing the EU's capability goals with the DCI without unnecessary duplication. It also ensured that non-EU members' contributions would be considered to facilitate their possible participation in EU-led operations in accordance with the Helsinki and Feira decisions. However, the declaration placed much more emphasis on the "preservation of EU's autonomy in decision making" and the capabilities that would enable EU "to intervene with or without recourse to NATO assets."\textsuperscript{50}

C. ESDI OR ESDP?

As a result of developments between 1998-2000, though most of the analysts were still using these concepts of ESDI and ESDP interchangeably, by the end of 2000, ESDP became an EU project, while the ESDI was mainly a NATO one. Though the US arguments about ESDP remained the same as if it were ESDI, actually the developments triggered by the "Blair Initiative" substantially changed the nature of discussion. The Europeans had shifted the platform on which the European security and defense identity


would be build from NATO to the EU. Europeans managed to turn what had begun as a NATO project (ESDI) into an EU project (ESDP). The language of NATO documents was emphasizing on the capabilities and cautioning against “the three D’s”: duplication, decoupling and discrimination (NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson would then change the rhetoric from “the three D’s” to “the three I’s”: inclusiveness of all NATO allies, indivisibility of the transatlantic link, improvement of capabilities\textsuperscript{51}), while EU documents after St. Malo emphasized the “autonomy” and the EU-only institutions. The Cold War circumstances that prevented Europeans from having an effective ESDP have substantially changed and the circumstances of the post-Cold War security environment seem to necessitate, to contribute and even to accelerate the creation of a European force rather than prevent it.

The speed of developing an effective ESDP has been breathtaking. In almost three years, Europeans have accomplished more in security and defense areas than they had previously achieved in fifty years. More importantly, the inclusiveness of the ESDP is unprecedented when compared to other European Union projects, such as a Single Market or the EMU, which included at the beginning only a plurality of members. These accomplishments also demonstrated that a relatively more integrated Europe can achieve even more ambitious goals that it could have imagined previously. The high level of integration and the remarkable success of the unification process during the 1990’s played a decisive role in achieving such ambitious goals in ESDP. Clearly, the high level of European integration has been a greatly contributing factor to the speed and extent of

achievements, yet there were also other specific factors that produced the St. Malo/Helsinki process.

The first factor was the “American decision to tip the balance of US policy in favor of greater autonomy for the EU, primarily as a way of satisfying Congressional demands for burden-sharing, but also in the hope that this would relieve the pressure on an overstretched imperium with increasingly complex global security responsibilities.”52 Second was the long-standing French pressure to have a more autonomous European defense posture. Third was the “Blair Initiative” that removed the largest stumbling block in the way of achieving an effective, sound ESDP. And finally the humiliating European failures in dealing with post-Cold War security problems epitomized in Bosnia and reached to peak in terms of military capabilities in Kosovo.

Clearly, these underlying factors mentioned above are sensible and the developments to establish a sound ESDP are head-spinning. However, they did not prevent, but rather raised a multitude of questions and concerns about the feasibility of the ESDP and its possible impact on the future of NATO. Although most of the analysts and commentators have been pessimistic about the feasibility of the ESDP and its possible impact on NATO, and believed that it would never be realized, considerable reasons for being optimistic exist.

The next chapter concerns the question of the feasibility of ESDP and explores the reasons to be optimistic or pessimistic about its future.

III. THE FEASIBILITY OF THE ESDP

Since the launch of a common European security and defense policy within the European Union framework after the Cold War, much discussion about the feasibility of the ESDP has occurred. This is partly because of the doubts emanating from the failures of such efforts during the Cold War and partly because of the uncertainty of the post-Cold War security environment. The literature on the ESDP focuses either on a pessimistic or on an optimistic view of a European security and defense posture. However, both groups address various factors that either support or oppose the realization of the ESDP. This chapter examines those factors and the reasons for being pessimistic or optimistic about the future of the ESDP, stressing the US position on the ESDP.

A. THE REASONS FOR BEING OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE FUTURE OF THE ESDP

There are seven primary reasons for being optimistic about the future of the ESDP. First, the European Union's political will desires an effective ESDP. The European Union as a major economic player in the world wants to secure a commensurate political role on the international stage to be able to defend its members' interests and to confront any international crisis that affects it. Obviously, this could only be possible by being a military power as well as being an economic power. To make its voice heard, the European Union must put muscle behind it. Recent experiences have clearly shown that the European Union, although it is a leading world actor, does not, without a military instrument, really have the capability to make its presence felt in resolving of major crisis. There is a strong belief that the European Union's success will
depend on its ability to combine military and non-military elements to manage and to resolve crises.\textsuperscript{53}

A second reason for optimism is that, Europe has the resources, means, and economic power to create such accapability if it has the political will. The European Union with its 15 members comprises a population of 375 million while the United States has between 270 to 280 million. The European Union, as a whole, has an enormous economic dimension, which is, in terms of GDP ($8.053 trillion), only second to the United States ($8.5 trillion) and controls 37 percent of the world’s total exports and 36 percent of the world’s total imports, while the US comparable figures are 16.5 percent and 13.5 percent respectively.\textsuperscript{54} The European Union countries have military forces of 1.9 million versus 1.4 million in the United States and spend 60 percent of what the United States spends for defense.\textsuperscript{55} In an optimistic view, synergies, rationalization, restructuring of defense expenditures of EU countries coupled with an economy at the scale mentioned above should be sufficient to give the EU the forces it will require for “Petersberg-type” missions, if not for a collective defense. Furthermore, this could be done without having to increase defense budgets. “ In the post-Cold War context, 60 percent [of what the United States spends for defense] should be more than enough to deal with contingencies inside and along the periphery of Europe. After all, that figure represents one fifth of the world’s military expenditure!”\textsuperscript{56}


\textsuperscript{54} \textit{The World Factbook}, CIA homepage.


\textsuperscript{56} Quoted in Holworth from Heisbourg in note 88 p. 42.
The third reason one can be optimistic about the ESDP is the fundamental change in the United Kingdom’s attitude toward the ESDP. For a long time, some European countries led by the UK viewed an all-European force as a threat to NATO and feared that an autonomous European defense system would damage the effectiveness of NATO by weakening the ties with the United States. For those reasons these countries, especially the UK (fueled by long-standing “Euroskepticism”) always opposed the ESDP and prevented its realization. Nevertheless, the UK under Blair’s “New Labor” is no longer opposing, but rather advocating its creation. To some analysts the UK wants to compensate for having shunned the EMU with a commitment to Europe by leading the ESDP, one of the few areas through which the UK could be “at the heart of Europe.” Some also argue that this position could also contribute to the UK’s strategic value on both sides of the Atlantic, considering the UK’s special position in the transatlantic alliance as the strongest ally of the United States while also being one of the leading countries of the EU.57

A fourth reason to be optimistic about the success of the ESDP is that the continuation of the “Kosovo effect.” Kosovo served as a wake-up call for the EU countries showing the Europeans that they could not even solve a security problem on their own continent.58 “Kosovo effect” was influential in two ways. First, after the disastrous and humiliating inability that was demonstrated in handling the Bosnia problem, Kosovo reaffirmed that Europe was in dire need of developing real military


capabilities and institutional structures for effective crisis management. Second, it demonstrated that in the unpredictable and unstable security environment of the post-Cold War era Kosovo-like contingencies have become quite likely to emerge and every nation should be prepared to deal with such contingencies. The "Kosovo effect" was the igniting motive behind the Europeans' efforts to establish the ESDP and seems to be a permanent factor urging the EU to acquire the capabilities and mechanisms for a sound ESDP.

The fifth positive reason for believing that the ESDP will succeed is that the instruments created by the EU to achieve the ESDP goal, such as common strategies, common positions, and joint actions are on an intergovernmental basis. Thus, in the absence of any treaty-based instrument requiring the transfer of sovereignty to a supranational body, the EU members do not view their national prerogatives as being challenged. This facilitates the development of the ESDP. For this reason, so far, in terms of inclusiveness and speed, the ESDP has achieved an unprecedented success in the European unification process. All 15 members of the EU are participating in the project, while no other project of the EU has enjoyed such full attendance or progress in such a short time.

A sixth reason for optimism is that Europe already has a number of multinational force structures for various purposes. Though some of them are still symbolic and some of them exist primarily on paper, at least there are some force structures to use as a

59 Ibid.


61 Francois Heisbourg, p.8

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starting point. Examples of these existing forces include: France, Italy, Spain, Portugal: the Army Joint Rapid Reaction Force (EUROFOR) and the European Maritime Force (EUROMARFOR), EUROCORPS which is composed of France, Germany, Belgium, Spain and Luxembourg and has a strength of 60,000 personnel, and the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC), not to mention the various bilateral/trilateral arrangements, at the corps level, and included lower force levels. With an effective planning and rationalization, these forces can be gathered to form a future European army.62

The last and the most important reason to be optimistic about the ESDP is the remarkable progress European countries achieved in the integration and unification process. Most authorities realize that future “Unified Europe,” “Confederation,” or “United States of Europe” is impossible without a common foreign policy and a sound military power that would enable the EU to become a global player. The more integrated Europe becomes, the more increased the urge to have an effective ESDP will be. Furthermore, the successes in the other pillars of EU process will also be a strong impetus to establish an autonomous European army to make the EU a stronger global player. Therefore, as long as the unification moves forward, the ESDP is also likely to advance. So far, the EU has been very successful in forming a consensus on long-term policies that are making a measurable step-by-step progress toward a goal for which the means (and not simply the objective) are defined. This strategy has worked in establishing other pillars, and it seems likely to work in the ESDP.

62 Ibid p.74. In terms of salaries and individual benefits Europeans spend more than what the US spends on its military personnel.
The European Union process has always been a success theory of institutions.\textsuperscript{63} The EU countries first agreed upon the institutions and the improvements followed. Although the debates on the ESDP emphasize the need for further capabilities rather than the institutions and even point out the danger of having institutions without capabilities,\textsuperscript{64} the importance of institutions in the unification cannot be denied. Institutions matter for the EU in a unique way: the process of European integration is a joint exercise in norms-setting and institution-building. Since the 1980s, each new step in European integration has brought along its own set of institutional requirements. "Defence will inevitably do the same, all the more so because the EU is currently void of any defence culture: only in a specialised institutional setting will such a culture be imported into it, and solidify."\textsuperscript{65}

Additionally, as in previous stages of European unification, Jean Monnet’s recipe of establishing \textit{solidarites de fait} in order to ensure lasting progress, as opposed to attempting to resolve all basic issues of principle before starting to move, appears to be working. Having a high profile person like Javier Solana in the CFSP High Representative position is really a strong reason to be optimistic about the ESDP’s future.

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\textsuperscript{64} Reflecting the common US approach on “capabilities before institutions” US Ambassador to NATO, Alexander Vershbow maintains that: “The ESDP cannot be viewed primarily as a political exercise in European institution-building. Rather, it should be seen as an opportunity to harness NATO and the EU’s comparative advantages to solve security problems. Otherwise, the ESDP will fail in its essential purpose.” From his speech on “European Defense and NATO: A Vision of the Future NATO-EU Relationship” in Centre d’Etudes Europeennes de Waterloo, Waterloo, Belgium, October 19, 2000.
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\textsuperscript{65} G. Adreani.
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B. THE REASONS FOR BEING PESSIMISTIC ABOUT THE FUTURE OF THE ESDP

The compromise reached between the United States and European countries at the Washington summit of the Atlantic Alliance clearly constrains the European Security and Defense Identity inside NATO, as noted earlier, giving it the right to act, but not to decide autonomously. What is suggested is that ESDI decisions will be discussed by the Atlantic Council, which will decide if the matter should be pursued by the Alliance as a whole or left to the EU military action (WEU-led operations) with the help of NATO. In this case, a presumption of availability of NATO assets for European operations is also clearly established.66

However, no degree of previous commitment could guarantee the EU that a non-EU NATO member would not veto these assets for EU-led operations. More importantly, there is no guarantee whatsoever that the right quantitative and qualitative amounts of American national assets, which are not permanently available to NATO, will be made available to the EU on request—particularly if the United States is facing a major crisis in another part of the world. So getting the ESDP to work effectively under the current circumstances seems doubtful.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the breakdown of the Warsaw Pact there has been no serious threat to Europe’s existence, so creating a European defense system hardly seems urgent. It is widely accepted that problems like Kosovo and Bosnia are likely to occur in post-Cold War era and the Europeans must deal with these threats,

but they do not impose a serious danger to Europe’s existence and unless there is a real threat, the ESDP process is destined to be slow.

Even if we admit that the EU nations are willing to establish the ESDP, a considerable gap between European and US capabilities still exists in terms of implementing strategies that call for force projection, as in the case of the Petersberg tasks. Although EU member states collectively spend some 60 percent of what the United States allocates to its armed forces, European countries, due to Cold War force structures, get a disproportionately low return on their budgets in key areas, such as procurement and research and development. In some areas the European allies have collectively only 10 to 15 percent of the assets of the Americans, and sometimes less (e.g. strategic reconnaissance). With regard to the DCI, in the areas essential for implementing a military operation, such as deployability and mobility, sustainability and logistics, effective engagement, survivability of forces and infrastructure, command, control and information systems, the European countries’ capabilities are simply inadequate to carry out the most likely missions. Substantial improvement is needed.

Currently, European forces are manpower-intensive and unable to be employed, rapidly, at great distances. Taken together, Europeans spend less than the United States on developing and buying new weapons and equipment and training the people who operate them. As Heisbourg put it in, the reality is simply that the current state of input

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67 Francois Heisbourg, p.84.
68 Ibid, p.84.
70 Ibid.
makes it impossible to reach the headline target in a meaningful manner. A rapidly deployable, sustainable corps-sized force in the field requires the equivalent of a three-corps base; in other words, a ground force headline goal of 60,000 requires an overall force of at least 200,000 deployable soldiers and the corresponding air and naval components. If not more, from five to seven times the number of soldiers must be available for rotational employment.

Accordingly, in November 2000, EU countries announced their national military contributions to realize the headline goal of 2003. However, the offers at the Union meeting demonstrated that even this target is a long way from being realized. The total number of troops nationally offered was about 100,000 (half of the goal) along with 400 aircraft and 100 ships. As a reminder, the EU countries currently field ground forces of 1.1 million (out of a total standing force of 1.9 million), of which only a small fraction is currently deployable and sustainable in the field. Considering these facts, creating a pool of up to 200,000 deployable soldiers will be a long and costly task implying major budget reordering.

According to the experts, the most difficult problem to be solved, as everybody agrees, is the resources problem. According to Heisbourg, the headline goal corresponding to the most demanding Petersberg tasks cannot be met if:

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72 Heisbourg, p. 94.
75 Heisbourg, p.94.
Europe’s acquisition and material expenditure, at some $36 billion, remains at around 40 percent of the US level ($82 billion, equipment plus RDT&E): air transport, C3I and specialist assets, such as IFRF and OEW/SEAD are not cheap. They are indispensable for serious force projection;

Europe’s operation maintenance (O&M) spending remains at around 40 percent of the US level. The readiness and sustainability of the headline force cannot be adequately ensured under such a condition;

Europe’s capital investment (including R&D) per military person is a third of the US level. This is a rough but not unrealistic measure of the firepower production per soldier. The same point applies to O&M per soldier, where the ratio is just as low.\textsuperscript{76}

In the light of declining defense budgets of EU countries and constraints imposed by the EMU, reaching these goals at least for the foreseeable future is cumbersome. European countries have much difficulty in convincing their citizens of the necessity of increasing their defense budgets.\textsuperscript{77} On one hand, the political agenda favors defense integration that will stretch defense budgets. On the other hand, it is unlikely that frustrated national leaders have the political capital necessary to convince their publics to invest their tax dollars in quantities that could close the technological gap and result in improved real capacity for independent military action. It seems unlikely that Europe will have more money to spend. Even France and the United Kingdom have proposed defense budgets that are essentially flat through the first part of this decade. Many EU nations are already struggling to live with the constraints of the EMU. At the same time, like all industrialized nations, they are facing enormous pressures to increase social and

\textsuperscript{76} Ibid, p.94.

entitlement spending. The budget picture will only grow worse over the next decade as European populations continue to age.\textsuperscript{78}

A further difficulty comes from the complicated security arrangements of member (or non-member) countries. There are six principle groups of countries with whom the EU must deal:

- Those members of NATO who will become members of the EU soon after the permanent ESDP institutions and headline force begin to operate: Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. These countries are already Associate members of WEU.

- Those NATO members who have expressed no wish to join the EU or which have rejected membership: Iceland and Norway. These countries are also Associate Members of WEU.

- Those countries who are EU members but not NATO members: Ireland, Sweden, Austria and Finland.

- The group of seven countries, which are candidates for both NATO and EU membership, and may become members of both at different times and in differing order: Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. These countries are Associate Partners of WEU.

- Turkey, an essential member of NATO by virtue of its strategic location, military power and sheer size, is waiting for EU membership. It is also an Associate Member of WEU.\textsuperscript{79}

- Finally, as a unique member, there is Denmark: an EU and NATO member, within the WEU only as an observer with limited rights and privileges.

\textsuperscript{78} Victor Homola, "Schröder Firm," \textit{New York Times}, March 8, 2001. Chancellor Gerhard Schröder said his government would not yield to calls for increased defense spending, despite warnings from the military of a potential threat to its NATO commitments. A leaked report said the German armed forces were already $140 million short this year. See also Loren B. Thomson, "Regional Integration and Trans-Atlantic Decay," \textit{Sea Power}, Washington, January 2001. Thompson cites from the former Chair of NATO's Military Committee, Gen. Klaus Naumann, who said in an interview in March 2000 that considering the budget limitations, the ESDP goals could take ten years to reach.

\textsuperscript{79} Heisbourg.
To set the guidelines for the proper relationship with these countries is a vast challenge for the EU. The relations with Turkey have already caused a problem depriving the EU of desired automatic access to NATO’s command, control and decision-making structures for EU-led operations. The problem will be further complicated with the future memberships of Malta and Cyprus, which are neither members of NATO nor the WEU. Shortly, both the enlargements of NATO and the EU present serious challenges for the ESDP.

The last and maybe the largest obstacle before an autonomous ESDP is the United States and this deserves to be elaborated.

C. **THE ESDP AND THE UNITED STATES**

For many years the US has been critical of Europe’s defense budgets and emphasized the need for creating defense capabilities that would enable Europe to solve its continental problems. Indeed the United States turned out to be right in its criticisms given Europe’s inability to deal with several contingencies after the Cold War. Therefore, the US administrations have applauded the formation of the ESDP with the following hopes:

1. **The United States’ Potential Benefits from the ESDP**

   First, since the end of the Cold War and the dramatic decline in the offensive capabilities of Russian Forces, US defense planning has reduced the resources for defending its European allies against a major assault. The current threats (small-scale conflicts, peace keeping missions) on the continent could very well be handled by the EU

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81 Heisbourg, p.51-52.
members with the assistance of a few or no US forces. Even though Europe might not have the capability to assume the full range of the “Petersberg tasks” for several years to come, a serious European effort to develop and fund new capabilities could eventually benefit the United States by reducing the resources required for the most likely European contingencies.82

The United States might also benefit, for these developments might provide additional capabilities for responses to conflicts beyond Europe. Many European countries have been reluctant to support military operation beyond Europe. To handle the security problems in the problematic regions such as the Mediterranean and the Middle East have been generally viewed as the United States’s duty. Similarly, European countries for the most part have been unaware of new threats to security including those stemming from spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), terrorism, and ethnic, racial, and religious conflicts. A broader European perspective on security requirements and better force projection and sustainability would make Europeans more valuable to the United States in operations beyond Europe.83

A third benefit to the United States would occur because greater European self-reliance and responsibility might reduce European resentment of current US dominance in continental security matters and this could eventually remove the barriers to French full reintegration into NATO’s integrated military command structure. Furthermore, the developments in the ESDP within the framework of the EU could force European neutral states, namely Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden, to acknowledge their responsibility

82 Stanley R. Sloan.
83 Ibid.
for security and force them to make contributions to the continent’s security. Even going beyond just contributing, these neutral states could eventually become NATO members strengthening NATO both politically and militarily.84

2. US Concerns about the ESDP

The United States’s concerns about ESDP could be summarized in a phrase known as “three D’s”: duplication, decoupling, and discrimination as mentioned earlier.85 For a better understanding, the following elaborates on why the United States considers these issues crucial:

First, regarding “duplication,” the ESDP could produce rhetoric, promises and institutions that would duplicate NATO systems but provide no additional capabilities. The United States supports the EU’s wish to increase its capabilities and defense expenditures, but does not support new institutions that could complicate the decision-making process and confound the coordination between the EU and NATO.86 To illustrate, European countries continue to reduce spending on defense despite their rhetoric to the contrary.87 The developments in the institutions but not in the capabilities justifies US criticisms about duplicating of NATO systems. Additionally the European decision to create “autonomous” military capabilities suggests that Europeans would

84 Ibid.
85 See note 37.
87 Loren B. Thompson.
create capabilities that are already available as NATO (US) assets rather than creating additional capabilities for NATO.\textsuperscript{88}

Second, in regards to "discrimination," the ESDP could create artificial divisions and distinctions among NATO allies, undermining NATO's political cohesion. NATO has proved to be efficient as an institution. Its members have already shown the required political and military will to make it work. However, the ESDP's exclusive nature has already caused some problems among NATO members.\textsuperscript{89} The dynamics of the new arrangements within the framework of the ESDP may deepen differences among the members again undermining NATO's political cohesion. The differences between the security needs and threat perceptions of EU and non-EU members of NATO could eventually undermine the overall effectiveness of NATO.\textsuperscript{90}

Third, regarding "decoupling," the ESDP could become a beginning point for a destructive EU-US rivalry thus ending the transatlantic alliance. There are suspicions in Washington that the ESDP would become a neo-Gaullist means for Europe to differentiate its foreign policies from that of the United States. France's anti-Americanism is a well-known fact and the United States is concerned that France's attitude toward "US hegemony" will become the entire EU's attitude.\textsuperscript{91} Already there are reports that diplomats of some EU member states have pressured the Czech Republic,

\textsuperscript{88} Sloan.


\textsuperscript{91} John Bolton "The European Threat to NATO's Future Creating a New Defence Alliance Could Fundamentally Alter the Continent's Relationship with the US" Financial Times, London February 11,
Hungary and Poland (countries waiting for EU membership) to support the EU rather than the US positions on the NATO/EU relationship.\textsuperscript{92} As former Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, Marc Grossman, confirmed, "There are some people who are demanding that EU candidates in Eastern Europe choose somehow between Europe and the transatlantic relationship."\textsuperscript{93} Additionally, the recent Russian support for the ESDP recalled all too clearly old Soviet proposals for a "European House" that excluded the United States.\textsuperscript{94}

Despite suspicions that the ESDP could be the beginning of a strategic rivalry between the United States and Europe, many US officials found these suspicions exaggerated. According to a former Clinton administration official, Ivo Daalder, who served on the Clinton Administration's National Security Council staff, "Washington's suspicions [about ESDP motivations] are not only exaggerated; they are fundamentally misplaced. Europe's problem today, as Kosovo underscored, is not its potential future strength. On the contrary, the real problem is Europe's actual political and military weakness."\textsuperscript{95}

Some scholars like Brzezinski warn that the concerns about the ESDP should not prevent the United States from supporting European unification.\textsuperscript{96} Professor Simon

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\textsuperscript{96} Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Living with a New Europe" \textit{The National Interest}, Washington, Summer 2000.
Serfaty presented a similar theme in his statement to the House Committee on International Relations. According to him “Entering a new century, our main fear about Europe should be that of a Europe that is weak and divided, and our main hope should be for a Europe that does become stronger and more united.”

At the final analysis, one could say, the United States, despite its reasonable concerns, supports the ESDP because it could enhance European security commitments, provide additional capabilities, enable European countries to handle their own small-scale security problems without undermining transatlantic alliance and NATO. Thus, provided that it has institutional links with the alliance, the United States is not against the ESDP or against an “autonomous” European security structure unless it undermines the transatlantic alliance.

Nevertheless, an important point should not be overlooked. The ESDP, even in its most harmless form, will be a potential threat to NATO’s coherence since the ESDP will make a distinction between “collective defense” and “collective security” missions of the Alliance. This in turn will create some division among the members. Everybody agrees that collective defense, although not of primary importance in the present strategic situation, is still one of the alliance’s fundamental security tasks. By contrast, as the April 1999 Washington summit made clear, regional crisis management by NATO occur only on a case-by-case basis. For the EU, on the other hand, crisis management in Europe will be a permanent function. The United States has no concern about such an arrangement

2000.

since it will provide the United States with the flexibility in its course of action and relieve it from the burdens of European security commitments. However any division of labor between NATO and the EU that would relegate the alliance to collective defense only, while leaving crisis management to the EU, would marginalize its non-EU European members.\textsuperscript{98} As shown in the next chapters this particularly applies to Turkey.

As a European non-EU NATO member, Turkey, the subject of the second section of this thesis, has different concerns about the ESDP. It is against any form of “autonomous” ESDP that excludes Turkey. Turkey rightfully has its own concerns about the implications of the ESDP. To elaborate those concerns and implications, the following chapters examine Turkey’s place in the European security system and its position regarding the ESDP.

IV. TURKEY IN THE EUROPEAN SECURITY SYSTEM

A. FROM THE “OTHER” OF EUROPE TO “ALLY”

Turkey’s relations with Europe and its place within the European security system have gone through three stages. The first stage was before the modern state of Turkey emerged from the Ottoman Empire and began its role in the international system. Turks have been a part of Europe geographically since their arrival in Asia Minor in the eleventh century and economically since the fourteenth century with the first Ottoman grant of trade privileges to the Genoese in 1352, which also granted trade subsequently to Venice and Florence, and later to France in 1569, to England in 1580 and to the Netherlands in 1612. The recognition of Turks as a political part of Europe occurred only in the nineteenth century, at the Paris Conference of 1956, when the Ottoman Empire was officially included in the Concert of Europe. Until that time the identification of the Ottoman Empire and the notion of Turk were defined in terms of the adversarial “other.” Turkey, although a peripheral European power like Russia at the time, was nevertheless involved in the evolution of European politics, alliances, wars and the emergence of the European states system.
The second stage of Turkey’s identification vis-à-vis Europe came with the creation of the modern Turkish state in 1923 with a pledge to follow a path of modernization and Westernization. The beginning of the Cold War and the redefinition of what defines the concept of Europe in terms of what constituted the “West” brought Turkey into the fold. This led to the creation of a “Western security community” centering around NATO. According to Bradley Klein, it constituted a “project” to create a “Western system” through a variety of institutions which ranged from the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. However, as Klein maintains, the focal point of this system was the transatlantic relationship embodied in NATO for the raison d’être of this system was preserving one “way of life” against another. In this sense, Turkey was no longer the “other” in terms of Western identification, but very much a part of this Western ideal as well as the security architecture that was established to preserve this ideal. Turkey’s involvement with Western institutions, essentially, started in this period.105

During the Cold War, Turkey had a clear-cut role to play. Turkey’s commitment to NATO’s collective defense effort was to hold NATO’s southern flank against the Soviet threat. In doing so, Turkey was also to deny the Soviets access to the Mediterranean and the Middle East, thus, contributing to the implementation of the containment strategy.106 Since the Soviet Union’s soft “underbelly” was rather exposed


106 See NATO Strategy Documents (1949-1969), MC 14/1 pp. 22-26. NATO strategy documents were declassified and disclosed to public by the North Atlantic Council in 1997. Documents are also available through NATO Homepage at <http://www.nato.int>.
to Turkey, this also forced them to deploy a considerable portion of their military assets in the south comprising 24 divisions, which otherwise could have been concentrated against the central region.\textsuperscript{107} However, NATO’s culture of “central frontism” prevented the allies from giving the credit to Turkey for this critical role.\textsuperscript{108} To understand the importance of Turkey’s role in the Cold War properly, a former military official argues that “Turkey’s military strategic importance of the time cannot be completely portrayed...without asking what would have been the consequences had Turkey not been a member of the North Atlantic Alliance, but instead a member of the Warsaw Pact.”\textsuperscript{109}

During this stage, Turkey’s security interests remained inextricably linked to Europe. The necessities of the Cold War security environment easily fit with Turkey’s Westernization and modernization project, which started with Ataturk. This caused Turkey to become gradually more of a part of the European security system. Aside from NATO, Turkey became a member of the Council of Europe, the CSCE/OSCE, and an associate member of the EU and the WEU; thus, it subscribed to the same set of values as the Euro-Atlantic community. A significant number of Turks started to live in Europe as a result of the post-World War II flux of the Turkish labor force to European countries. The Turkish economy was essentially tied to Europe as over 50 percent of Turkey’s exports went sent to Europe. Therefore, during that time, the peace and security in


Europe became of paramount importance to Turkey as the nation became a more integrated part of Europe.\textsuperscript{110}

Furthermore, the increasing integration with Europe was something that Turkey had always wanted since its foundation:

Turkey’s incorporation into Western European security arrangements after World War II seemed to afford Turkey the European legitimacy it always sought. During the Cold War, Europe’s identity was reinvented along security lines and the Communist bloc became the Other/non-Europe. As long as the line of demarcation was the Iron Curtain, realpolitik dictated that Turkey’s Europeanness not be openly questioned.\textsuperscript{111}

The third stage of Turkey’s role and identity vis-à-vis Europe started with the end of the Cold War when the “Western security community,” which was inherited from the Cold War, began searching for a new role in the new security environment. A collective defense to a common threat was replaced with the promotion of central Western values—that is, first of all democracy and free market economics—with an added emphasis on human rights. The security community used the institutions inherited from the Cold War as a vehicle to achieve this purpose, particularly to spread these values to the post-communist world.\textsuperscript{112} The shift of emphasis from collective defense to collective security seemed to decrease the strategic importance of Turkey in the Europeans’ eyes.\textsuperscript{113} In addition to that, the promotion of these values, the discussions of NATO, the WEU, and the EU enlargements also brought the issue of redefinition of Europe to the forefront and

\textsuperscript{110} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{111} Meltem Muftuler-Bac, p.29.

\textsuperscript{112} Gulnur Aybet.

\textsuperscript{113} Ian O. Lesser, “Bridge or Barrier?: Turkey and the West after the Cold War,” in Turkey’s New Geopolitics: From the Balkans to Western China, Graham Fuller and Ian O. Lesser et al., Westview Press, San Francisco, 1993, pp.108-109.
Turkey’s place in Europe came under scrutiny. Further reflecting this point, although the reassertion of Turkey’s strategic importance for Western interests in the Middle East gave a new momentum to Turkey’s relations with the United States, it failed to produce a similar effect in Turkey’s relations with Europe since it showed Europeans Turkey’s Middle Easterner side and the extent of threats it faced there.\textsuperscript{114}

Despite the fact that the end of the Cold War substantially reduced the strategic importance of Turkey in the European security system in terms of collective defense, the new post-Cold War security challenges to European security still make Turkey a valuable strategic partner for Europe. European security is being defined in broader terms. In the new European security environment, the most prominent risks are on Europe’s southern periphery and most of these contingencies are likely to happen on Turkey’s borders, or nearby. Thus, in the newly emerging security environment, post-Cold War security challenges, such as ethnic problems, energy security, countering the threat of weapons of mass destruction and missiles, “congaging”\textsuperscript{115} Russia, drug trafficking, illegal immigration are some areas requiring cooperation between Europeans and Turks.\textsuperscript{116}

Regarding such problems, Turkey is very well located:

Turkey’s geographic location can be considered an enviable strategic military asset. It offers Turkey the option for acting either as a bridge or as


\textsuperscript{115} The term “congagement” was coined by RAND in order to define the US strategy toward China and later for Russia as well since neither \textit{engagement} nor \textit{containment} express the two key Western objectives in dealing with both countries. For further information see Zalmay Khalilzad et al. \textit{The Future of Turkish-Western Relations: Toward a Strategic Plan}, RAND, Santa Monica 2000, p. 89-93.

\textsuperscript{116} Zalmay Khalilzad “A Strategic Plan for Western-Turkish Relations” in Zalmay Khalilzad et al. \textit{The Future of Turkish-Western Relations: Toward a Strategic Plan}, RAND, Santa Monica 2000, p. 79-96.
a barrier over critical routes of transportation, both maritime and land (the Straits and both the east-west and north-south). It provides an easy and short access to strategic natural resources. These used to be silk and spices in the past; more recently Middle East oil, and now Caspian and Central Asian gas and oil. It can also be an ideal power base for force projection in a universal way. As such, Turkey could potentially influence the Balkans, the Black Sea and the Caucasia, the Middle East and the Mediterranean.117

In addition to potentially influencing its surrounding,118 Turkey from a systemic perspective, plays the role of an insulator, a peripheral actor in all of the security regions surrounding it, namely the Balkans, the Middle East and the Caucasus. Its main function, in practice, is to separate other regional security concerns from each other.119 By doing so, Turkey plays a highly important role in securing the periphery of Europe. It stabilizes its region and prevents the problems of those three hot spots from being complicated by spilling over into one another. Other than the above factors, as stated by a former Senior Advisor to the President of Turkey, Turkey also:

Acts as a model for the newly independent countries in the region and helps them to protect their independence and entrance into the international community, serves as a springboard for the progressive expansion of Western values deeper eastward and with its secular regime, it offers a dynamic alternative to fundamentalism.120

Finally, Turkey’s high level of integration to Europe makes it an important part of Europe without which European security is unthinkable. There are close economic, social, and political bonds between Turkey and Europe, which integrates Turkey so

117 Sadi Erguvenc.

118 Although Turkey has the potential to influence its surroundings by virtue of its location, as Ian O. Lesser noted, location does not guarantee regional influence, as has been the case from 1923 to the 1980’s.


120 Nezihi Çakar, “A Strategic Overview of Turkey,” Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs, June-August 1998 Volume III-Number 2, Ankara. General Nezihi Çakar (rtd.) served as Senior Advisor to the President of Turkey.
strongly in Europe. The customs union with the EU in 1996 made Turkey “the nonmember country institutionally most strongly integrated with the EU.”\textsuperscript{121} In 1998, about 50 percent of Turkish exports went to Europe and about 52 percent of Turkey’s imports came from Europe.\textsuperscript{122} Most Turkish firms abroad are in the European Union countries and three million Turks live, nearly five percent of Turkey’s population, forming the greatest number of Turks living outside Turkey.\textsuperscript{123} This number roughly equal the populations of some small Eastern European states waiting for EU membership. In one respect, the migrant Turkish population in EU countries can be seen as “an extension of Turkey in Western Europe.”\textsuperscript{124} With its NATO membership, Association Membership in the WEU, and Association Agreement with the EU, Turkey has close political and military bonds with Europe. Furthermore, Turkey is also a member of the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and other politically relevant European institutions ranging from trade unions to political party organizations.\textsuperscript{125} Considering all these facts, one could understand how the security of Europe and Turkey is so intertwined that every nation’s security is interconnected with the others.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{122} Ibid, p.181.
\item \textsuperscript{124} Heinz Kramer, p. 182.
\item \textsuperscript{125} For detailed information on economic, social, and political bonds between Turkey and Europe see Heinz Kramer, Cp. 11 “Europe: Still the ‘Desired Land?’” in \textit{A Changing Turkey: The Challenge to Europe and the United States}, Brookings Institution Press, Washington, D.C., 2000, pp. 181-202.
\end{itemize}
However, despite the fact that their security is so entwined, the developments in the European security architecture after the Cold War have seemingly ignored Turkey’s place in the European security system.

B. TURKEY’S CONTRIBUTIONS TO EUROPEAN SECURITY IN THE POST-COLD WAR

The end of the Cold War (1989-91) marked the end of the greatest threat to European security, but it also brought a number of security challenges that had been dormant during the Cold War era. Without doubt, Turkey has contributed significantly to resolving such security challenges. Turkey joined and backed Western coalitions’ positions in handling these challenges, rather than acting unilaterally, which could well be a complicating factor in the Balkans and Caucasus, considering its Ottoman past. Doing so, it played a positive role in solving problems. In addition to that, Turkey actively participated in military humanitarian interventions to deal with these problems by contributing considerable amount of military force, by sharing the economic burden of these security problems, and by accepting a substantial number of refugees.\footnote{Zalmay Khalilzad et al. pp. 36-38.}

Bosnia is a good example of Turkey’s role in Western security. Before the military intervention in Bosnia started, the Turkish government received a lot of public criticism for not doing enough. Despite strong public pressure to pursue a more assertive, unilateral policy,\footnote{Heinz Kramer. p. 147.} Turkey aligned its policy with the overall framework created by its major Western allies and the UN Security Council. Consequently, in 1993, after the intervention started, Turkey contributed a squadron of F-16s to support NATO operations to enforce the no-fly zone over Bosnia. It provided 1,500 soldiers to the Implementation
Force (IFOR), the UN-led peacekeeping force, and later 1,000 soldiers to the Stabilization Force (SFOR), which is still there. Furthermore, Turkey is the main partner of the US-initiated “equip and train” program for the Bosnian Federation Army. The United States provides military equipment and Turkey provides training.\footnote{128}{Ibid. pp. 151-152.}

The Turkish government was also active in shaping the policy of the Muslim group of states called the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) and kept this organization from developing a special Islamic approach and policy. The OIC contact group, of which Turkey was a leading representative, normally kept continuous relations with the international contact group in preparing the various international conferences that tried to find a way to end the Bosnia war.\footnote{129}{Ibid. p. 153.}

Turkey also participated in the first crisis management mission conducted in Europe by a multinational military force composed of Europeans only. Turkey contributed nearly one-tenth (700 out of 7,000 troops coming from Austria, Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, Romania, Spain and Turkey) of the troops for the Italian-led peacekeeping effort in Albania, "Operation Alba," in 1997.\footnote{130}{Fred Tanner, “Conflict Management and European Security: The Problem of Collective Solidarity.” Paper prepared for the First Geneva Center for Security Policy (GCSP)-Yale (ISS) Seminar in Leukerbad, Switzerland., 21/22 August 1998, Available [Online]: <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/securityforum/Online_Publications/WS4/Tanner.htm> Accessed on February 4, 2001.} Turkey, at the invitation of the Albanian government, subsequently sent a military contingent of advisers, together with Italy and Greece, to help rebuild the Albanian forces.\footnote{131}{John Roper “The West and Turkey: Varying Roles, Common Interests,” The International... 51} Similarly, Turkey is presently helping to modernize Macedonia’s armed forces. In July 1995, the two
countries signed a military cooperation agreement providing for the exchange and military training of military experts and joint military exercises.\textsuperscript{132}

During the Kosovo conflict, Turkey joined its European and American allies in their high-level efforts to convince President Milosevic to stop the violence in Kosovo and to settle the conflict by compromising with the political representatives of the Kosovar-Albanian population. When the violence continued and Milosevic refused the international offer for a peaceful compromise, Ankara supported stronger international measures against the Serbs and declared its readiness to contribute to such an operation with eighteen F-16’s.\textsuperscript{133} Subsequently when NATO activities escalated, Turkey offered air bases for alliance missions and participated in air strikes with 21 planes.\textsuperscript{134} Turkey also accepted a considerable share of Kosovar refugees, up to 26,000 (among other countries such as the United States which accepted 20,000 people; Germany 40,000, Norway 9,000, Sweden 15,000 and Canada 5,000,\textsuperscript{135}) many of whom joined relatives who had long been living in Istanbul and Izmir.\textsuperscript{136}

Other than participating in peacekeeping/peacemaking missions, Turkey is also a strong promoter of regional cooperation for security and stability. In this regard, it signed


\textsuperscript{132} Zalmay Khalilzad et al. p.37.

\textsuperscript{133} Heinz Kramer, p.152.


\textsuperscript{136} Turkey has a sizeable population of ethnic Kosovars, Macedonians, and Bosnians many of whom migrated to Turkey during the slow withdrawal of the Ottoman Empire from the Balkans and after the
a number of bilateral agreements in all fields of cooperation, including "The Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighborliness, Cooperation and Security." with Bulgaria, Albania, Romania, and Macedonia.\textsuperscript{137} It has taken the lead in establishing a multinational peacekeeping force in the Balkans (the Southeast European Brigade, or SEEBRIG)-comprising units from Turkey, Greece, Italy, Romania, Bulgaria, Macedonia, and Albania. Upon the invitation of the German presidency of the European Union, Turkey participated in the political directors meeting in Bonn/Petersberg on 27 May 1999 where the stability pact for Southeastern Europe was drafted.\textsuperscript{138} Consequently, in Cologne, 10 June 1999, with those countries "who seek integration into Euro-Atlantic structures" Turkey signed the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe which aims at "strengthening countries in South Eastern Europe in their efforts to foster peace, democracy, respect for human rights and economic prosperity, in order to achieve stability in the whole region."\textsuperscript{139}

Complementary to its relations with Balkan states aimed at providing stability and security for the region, Turkey is supporting the creation of multilateral regional political and economic cooperation plans. With its functioning institutions, "The Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) project stands out as the most comprehensive and ambitious regional economic cooperation effort" in the region. Although it did not

\textsuperscript{137} Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey Homepage, “Relations with the Balkan Countries,” available [online]: \textless http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/ae/balkan.htm \textgreater Accessed on February 18, 2001.


develop as envisaged in 1992\textsuperscript{140} and although it is still far from Turkish expectations that it would directly help to stabilize the region. Should it be improved, the BSEC could well be an important link between Europe and Central Asia and even an instrument for conflict resolution and regional stabilization.\textsuperscript{141}

C. A TRIANGULAR RELATIONSHIP: TURKEY, THE UNITED STATES, AND THE EUROPEAN UNION

An important factor that always has an impact on Turkey’s relations with Europe is Turkey’s relations with the United States. Considering the special relationship developed between the two nations in the post-Cold War, it would not be wrong to argue that the relations between Turkey and the United States is likely to have an impact on Turkey’s position in the European security system.

During the Cold War, the United States, Western Europe, and Turkey had a common foreign and security policy as mentioned earlier. All three maintained an overwhelming priority on responding to the perceived threat of the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, the end of the Cold War changed the security interests of these countries. The essential difference between the United States and Europe in the analysis of post-Cold War security challenges is that the United States shares with Turkey a view that security must be increasingly seen on a trans-regional basis while the countries of the European Union concentrate, primarily if not exclusively, on problems of European security.\textsuperscript{142} This has implications not only for the scope of the CFSP and the European

\textsuperscript{140} Former Turkish President Ozal being the driving force behind its creation, the BSEC includes Turkey, Bulgaria, Albania, Greece, Romania, Moldova, Ukraine, Russia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia.

\textsuperscript{141} Heinz Kramer, pp.158-162.

\textsuperscript{142} John Roper "The West and Turkey: Varying Roles, Common Interests" \textit{The International Spectator}, Volume XXXIV No. 1 (January-March 1999).
security and defense policy (ESDP) but also for NATO and for the future cooperation among Western Europe, Turkey and the United States within that structure.

For the United States, Turkey is in the unusual position of being both a contributor to European security in a formal Alliance context and a partner in addressing wider problems influencing European, Middle Eastern, and Eurasian security, most of which lie outside the NATO area. Turkey is an “attractive international partner for multilateralists and unilateralists alike.”

US public rhetoric has affirmed Turkey's strategic significance in the post-Cold War era. In the earlier part of the Clinton administration, US officials emphasized Turkey's role as a "front-line state" that is "at the crossroads of almost every issue of importance to the United States on the Eurasian continent." More recently, Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott asserted that US-Turkish relations have "even more of a hardheaded, geopolitical, strategic rationale in the post-Cold War period than . . . during the Cold War." As Makovsky points out:

Post-Cold War Turkey is an important ally for the United States. Its manifold strategic roles are now widely recognized: a moderate, pro-Western state in an unstable area; a rare, probably unique, example of democracy, however flawed, in a Muslim-majority state; a supporter of Israeli-Palestinian peace and a pace-setter in Islamic world normalization with Israel; a base for Operation Northern Watch, which enforces a no-fly zone in northern Iraq, a key element of Washington's Iraq strategy; an ideological counterweight to Iran; a buffer against resurgence of Russian aggression; a forceful but pacific and anti-separatist advocate of the causes of besieged Muslims in its region (Azerbaijan, Bosnia, Chechnya, and

143 Ian O. Lesser, “Western Interests in a Changing Turkey,” in Zalmay Halilzad et al. The Future of Turkish-Western Relations: Toward a Strategic Plan, RAND, Santa Monica 2000, pp. 54-61.


Kosovo), all of whose kin are liberally represented in Turkey's population mix; an important, non-Russian line of communication with the West, and to some extent a role model, for the still-unsteady Turkic-language states of the former Soviet Union; and a potential outlet for Caspian Sea energy resources as an alternative to Russian and Iranian routes.146

Although Turkey's transregional position makes it a valuable partner for the United States, which has global commitments and interests, the same factor causes Turkey to be left out of regional European security arrangements. The EU, at least for now, does not want serious security problems and "rogue states" on its borders.147 Many Europeans fear that Turkish membership in the ESDP would expose them to new risks and could import Middle East conflicts into the EU. As a strategic analyst noted back in the beginning of the 1990's:

As the half-century imperative of containing Soviet power wanes, Europe has lost a great deal of its interest in the strategic engagement of Turkey. Indeed, as Europe looks to the creation of its own defense identity, there is a risk that Turkey will be seen as a strategic and political liability: a strategic liability because of its complex and immediate security concerns; a political liability because of its position outside the European Community [then] and its close bilateral relationship with the United States.148

Considering EU's reluctance to include Turkey in the security and defense initiatives, this prospect seems to be proved. Other than that, the ESDP is an EU initiative and the EU wants to preserve its autonomy, yet one further difficulty comes from this point. The EU views the inclusion of non-EU countries into new ESDP structures as a

146 Ibid.
147 Ian O. Lesser, "Western Interests in a Changing Turkey," in Zalmay Halilzad et al. The Future of Turkish-Western Relations: Toward a Strategic Plan, RAND, Santa Monica 2000.
dilution of the ESDP’s EU identity and considers that as a death of initiative before it is even born.\textsuperscript{149}

However, the United States wants to see Turkey in the European security system. One of the US objections to the ESDP: “discrimination,” as mentioned earlier particularly applies to Turkey. The top American officials insistently breach the issue of the participation of non-EU NATO allies into the new EU security and defense structures.\textsuperscript{150} The NATO officials and the United States support the Turkish position toward the ESDP and push Europeans to find a solution to relieve Turkey’s concerns.\textsuperscript{151} As long as the EU needs NATO and the United States for its security, it will not be able to discard Turkey’s demands on being included in the new European security and defense structures.

As the third chapter of this thesis shows at least for the foreseeable future, Europe will not have the capabilities and forces that will relieve it from reliance on the United States for collective defense against Russia, (still regarded as a potential threat to Europe, despite the substantial decline in its military power)\textsuperscript{152} though Europe might have the capabilities to deal with contingencies such as small-scale conflicts and peacekeeping missions. For the other threats identified in NATO’s strategic concept, such as large-scale


\textsuperscript{150} For US officials’ approach on the issue see several statements made by former Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, current Sec. of State Colin Powell, US Permanent representative to NATO Ambassador Alexander Vershbow. Statements are available in chronological order in “US Mission to NATO Homepage,” available [online]: <http://www.allied.be/usa/info/esdi.html> accessed on February 21, 2001.

\textsuperscript{151} Appearing before a defense conference organized by Forum Europe in Brussels, NATO Secretary General George Robertson said the EU needed to “find a genuine solution” so that Turkey with other non-EU allies could be “fully involved.” Remarks by NATO Secretary General at the conference “Defense Europeanne-Le concept de convergence,” \textit{M2 Presswire}, March 29, 2000.

\textsuperscript{152} For a discussion of NATO and Russia see Alfred van Staden “Logic and Animal Spirits: The Cohesion of the Transatlantic Relationship in the New Millenium” in \textit{NATO after Kosovo}, Rob De Wijk et
peacekeeping/peacemaking, ethnic conflicts, WMD, drug trafficking, religious fundamentalism and energy security, Europe still needs the United States and NATO.\textsuperscript{153} The same defense and security needs are also relevant, by virtue of its geostrategic position, vis-a-vis Turkey. Henceforth, even if the EU denies Turkey a role in the ESDP, it would still need Turkey for its collective defense and security as it needs NATO and the United States as well. Therefore, it is unlikely that the EU will ignore Turkey as a security and defense partner and will be unresponsive to its demands. EU’s messages to Turkey seems to justify this view.

The messages conveyed by the top officials of the EU and the ESDP to Turkish officials aimed to relieve Turkey of its concerns by giving assurances that one way or another Turkey will definitely have a link with the ESDP and its sensitivities will be considered.\textsuperscript{154} Nevertheless, there is still no sign of an offer of institutional arrangement that will satisfy Turkish demands as being a full member of new ESDP decision-making structures.

\textsuperscript{153} For the relevance of NATO and the need for US leadership see Rob De Wijk “What is NATO?” in ibid, pp. 3-18.

\textsuperscript{154} Andrei Palaria, “NATO to Play Decisive Role in Ensuring European Security” Itar-Tass News Wire, New York, June 1, 2000 Javier Solana says “We will create a new structure of European defensive component, and this is why we’re taking into account the points of view of different countries, including Turkey’s concern.”
V. TURKEY AND ESDP

A. TURKISH POLICY TOWARD THE ESDP

The end of the Cold War raised a lot of concerns in Turkish security and defense policy-making circles: with the main threat to Europe’s existence gone, Europe’s redefinition of its new security architecture could exclude Turkey. For this reason, Turkey initially supported the creation of a European security and defense identity since it would be developed within the framework of NATO, of which it is a full member. Thus, Turkey hoped it would not be excluded from the process.

Indeed, Turkey could manage to influence the developments in the European security and defense identity. For example, during the discussions of the CJTF Concept, one of the most significant Alliance adaptations along with the “deputy proposal” to stiffen the ESDI, Turkey stood firmly against any efforts that could exclude Turkey from the decision-making process of the CJTFs if the operation were led by the WEU. As far as NATO assets would be involved in the CJTFs, Turkey would fully participate in the WEU decisionmaking. Similarly, concerned about its place in the European security system and the possible implications of the developments after St. Malo, Turkey presented the issue to the Washington NATO anniversary summit meeting in April 1999. During this meeting, Turkey stressed the necessity of its explicit agreement with any decision of the NATO council concerning the use of alliance assets for European purposes. Turkish diplomats successfully enforced a change in the language of NATO’s New Strategic Concept in which this right is implicitly acknowledged by a reference to a

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155 Munevver Cebeci.
case by case basis for alliance decisions. They also managed to change a paragraph in the Washington Communiqué regarding a more independent European role in defense. In both cases, Turkey tried to stop what it regarded as the growing exclusion from the emerging European security and defense identity.\textsuperscript{156}

However, the results of St. Malo disappointed Turkey. To Turkey's dismay, in the place of the NATO's ESDI project, today there is the ESDP, which is an EU project of which Turkey is not a part. Since it is not a member of the EU, Turkey has no means of influencing the ESDP's evolution. In addition to that, the nearly complete absorption of the WEU into the EU structures with no set guidelines for Associate Members deprived Turkey of its acquis within the WEU. In Turkish eyes, the worst case scenario had become a reality and Turkey became increasingly uncomfortable with the developments in the European security structure. Turkey tried to influence the process articulating its concerns about the developments and appealed to the EU for further improvements in the participation of non-EU NATO members in new EU security structures, but it could not achieve the desired results.\textsuperscript{157} Even the Turkish offer, upon EU's invitation to non-EU European countries, to contribute to the new European Union force with a mechanized brigade of up to 5,000 men, 36 F-16 warplanes, two transport planes and a small flotilla of ships in return for an important role in planning the organization's military operations did not provide the desired results.\textsuperscript{158}

\textsuperscript{156} Heinz Kramer, p. 217.

\textsuperscript{157} Complaining about the unresponsive behavior of the EU to Turkish concerns, Ambassador Omur Orhun from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey says Turkey's "appeals and warnings seem to have fallen on deaf ears." In Omur Orhun, "European Security and Defense Identity-Common European Security and Defence Policy: A Turkish Perspective," \textit{Perceptions}, September-November 2000, Volume V, Number 3.

\textsuperscript{158} Gordon, M.R. "Turkey Offers Troops for New European Force, with a Proviso" \textit{New York Times}, 60
Meanwhile, it became clear that the EU would not be able to have an "autonomous" ESDP outside NATO and would need Turkey's consent to construct the ESDP within the NATO framework. There seemed to be three ways to get the ESDP to work. The first was for Europe to increase its defense spending to achieve the required capabilities. For obvious financial reasons that was impractical. Second, was "smart spending" and restructuring. Europe could restructure its military by reducing territorial defenses, abandoning conscription, cutting back manpower levels, and building up volunteer forces able to operate at great distances. Finally, Europe could organize as a single defense entity within NATO. After strong US warnings that an "autonomous" ESDP would make the Alliance a "relic" of the past, a compromise was reached between the EU and the United States. The compromise stated that command and planning of such a new European force would be done within the NATO structure and this forced the EU to follow a mixed course composed of the second and the third alternatives listed above. In turn, the EU wanted to have an automatic access to command and planning structures of NATO and a list of assets available for an EU-led operation. However, despite strong pressure from the EU members of the alliance and the United States as well, Turkey vetoed such an automatic access to NATO planning structures and assets, arguing that these demands are against its security interests and contrary to what


159 In December 2000, US Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen, during a NATO ministerial meeting said that "If NATO and the EU with its ESDP are seen as autonomous and competing institutions . . . rather than integrated, transparent, and complementary ones, then NATO and collective security are likely to suffer leaving North America and Europe alike to rely on uncoordinated, inefficient, and ad hoc responses to destabilizing threats." Cohen also said at the Brussels meeting that NATO would likely become "a relic of the past" if the EU's ESDP were to compete with NATO's capabilities or with the institution itself. Quoted in Thompson.
was agreed upon in the 1999 Washington Summit. This caused some tensions in Turkish-EU relations and still strains the relations.\(^{160}\)

**B. TURKEY’S CONCERNS ABOUT THE ESDP**

Along with the United States, Turkey has been the most vocal country in the Alliance, warning the EU about the ESDP issue. From the beginning, Turkey wanted non-EU European allies to be involved in the new EU security and defense structures. After the EU accelerated the “autonomous” ESDP movement, Turkey supported the US position warning the EU about “the three D’s”: Decoupling, Duplication, and Discrimination. Since “discrimination” is particularly related to Turkey, its warnings and objections focused on the participation of non-EU NATO allies in the ESDP. Turkey shares the general concerns that the other non-EU NATO members have.

After summarizing some general concerns, the rest of the chapter elaborates Turkish concerns. In addition to concerns regarding “the three D’s,” which are to varying degrees shared by non-EU Allies, there are some other basic concerns that are shared by Turkey and other non-EU NATO members.

Primary among these several concerns is the fact that a non-Article 5, EU-led Petersberg-type operation may eventually transform into an Article 5 contingency which would directly implicate the security and defense of all Allies. Even if this situation does not transform, it may have an indirect effect on other Allies. It seems that any possible EU operation will employ the same sets of forces and capabilities assigned for the full

\(^{160}\) Turkish veto infuriated some leading EU countries, especially Germany. German Defense Minister Rudolf Scharping pressed Turkey to drop its objections to granting European Union access to planning structures. Mr. Scharping even implied that Turkey’s application to the European Union could be adversely affected if its opposition continued. Roger Cohen, “World Briefing, Germany: Pressure on Turkey,” *New York Times*, April 7, 2001.
range of Alliance missions. Furthermore, an EU operation, regardless of the capabilities used, might affect the legitimate security interests of other Allies. Therefore, there should be a mechanism that would enable non-EU Allies to have a voice in this kind of decision.

Considering the latest developments, the ESDP seems to affect Turkey more than any other member of the Alliance. For a better understanding, the rest of this chapter deals with particular Turkish concerns and objections pertaining to the ESDP.

1. **Participation**

The developments since the British initiative and the Cologne Declaration on a common security and defense policy have significantly changed the current European security and defense structure. With the absorption of WEU structures into the EU, the debate on participation of WEU Associate Members in the decision-making process for EU-led Petersberg operations has become a question of including them in the new ESDP framework.

Involving WEU Associate Members in the new ESDP framework has been of great concern, especially for Turkey. Of the Associate members, Turkey has taken the most pronounced stand.\(^{161}\) The approach taken by Turkey and the other Associate Members is significant: it seems that the political involvement of Iceland and Norway in such operations does not matter much as long as they are fully informed on developments. Iceland’s unique position—it does not have any armed forces—gives it greater flexibility in its approach to the issue. Furthermore, Iceland and Norway have no

intention of becoming EU members, for the time being. Therefore, in principle, they are not enthusiastic about having that kind of relationship with the EU.\textsuperscript{162}

When it comes to the new three Associate Members, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, three countries with a clear prospect of EU full-membership, they clearly do not have to worry about total exclusion from EU affairs. Nevertheless, any arrangement that will provide them with the means for further involvement in the ESDP framework in this transitionary period, before their full membership of the EU, will undoubtedly contribute to their capabilities for interoperability and harmonization with the EU in this field.\textsuperscript{163}

For the “other” Associate Member, Turkey, the issue is more complicated. Lacking the prospect of full membership of the EU, and being geostrategically located in a difficult region close to the major areas of crisis which might constitute potential zones for the exercise of Petersberg missions, Turkey apparently has different concerns:

What NATO identifies as major risks and threats can be found in the areas surrounding Turkey: proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, religious fundamentalism, illicit arms and drugs trafficking, political unrest, international terrorism and mass movement of refugees. Therefore, in this changed strategic environment, Turkey is concerned with suggestions of regional solutions or of the predominance of non-Article five operations. Turkey is not a country in the central part of Europe that enjoys the safety and security of its borders.\textsuperscript{164}

This statement clearly points out Turkey’s grounds for seeking further involvement in all European security arrangements. Consequently, participation in the planning and implementing of all Petersberg-type operations that could happen in these

\textsuperscript{162} Munevver Cebeci,
\textsuperscript{163} ibid.

\vspace{1cm} 64
major troubled areas is of great importance for Turkey—not only as a NATO ally, but also as a regional actor whose interests will inevitably be affected by further developments. Therefore, Turkey supports its cause more vigorously regarding participation in the decision-making process of EU-led WEU operations or any future arrangements made within the ESDP framework. It does so, unlike some nations, because these issues are crucial to its national interests.\footnote{Ibid. Quoted from former Turkish Second Chief of Staff Cevik Bir.}

In Helsinki in 1999, the European Council declared Turkey as a candidate for full membership of the EU, and declared that it would be given a pre-accession strategy without addressing any dates or perspectives in detail. Yet Turkey's full membership in the EU still remains a remote possibility. In these circumstances, the participation of WEU Associate Members in the future ESDP framework becomes especially significant for Turkey when compared with other Associate Members.

2. Preserving the Acquis within the WEU

Turkish objections to the ESDP focus on preserving the legal and political acquis they had within the WEU structure. Incorporating of the WEU into the EU structure seemed straightforward to the EU member states. However, the status of Turkey, a WEU Associate Member is still unclear. As an associate member it enjoyed all the possibilities of participation in WEU activities from the biweekly meetings of the WEU council and having five officers on duty in the defense planning cell to the participation of Turkish Parliamentarians in the WEU assembly, which met twice a year. The only exception, although important, was the exclusion from decision making in the WEU council and the

\footnote{Ibid,}
exclusion from the collective defense clause of the Brussels Treaty. Even the dispute about Turkey's inclusion in WEU decision-making in case of using the CJTFs was solved: As far as NATO assets would be used in CJTF's Turkey would fully participate in WEU decision-making. Furthermore, Turkey was and still is a full embodied and entitled member in one of the WEU's sub-organizations, the WEAO/WEAG—just as all NATO members.

However, after the WEU Council ceased to exist and the WEU's functions were transferred to the EU Council, it was not clear if WEU Associate Members would have any input into the decision-making process, or even if they would be consulted at any stage of the EU-ESDP deliberations. For Turkey in particular, this is a cause of concern.

Clearly, Turkey would like to have assurances at this stage, namely, that its political, institutional and legal acquis within the WEU be preserved. The Western European Armaments Group (WEAG), Eurocom and Eurolongterm were originally bodies within NATO, and were transferred to the WEU. In these cases, Turkey was already a full member and participant. “Once these institutions of the WEU became absorbed into the EU, will Turkey’s legal acquis in these bodies cease to exist?” a Turkish scholar asked. On the other hand, Turkey also had a political acquis within the WEU, as it held in the WEU Council since 1992. For example, Turkey was also a signatory to the WEU Declaration on the EU Amsterdam Treaty. From the Turkish perspective, the absorption of the WEU into the 2nd Pillar of the EU presents problems

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regarding the status of its legal and political acquis with the WEU, since Turkey has no participation in the ESDP process.  

3. Strategic Balance with Greece

Another cause of concern for Turkey would be the possible impact of changes in the European security and defense architecture to the relationships between Turkey and Greece.

Turkey was concerned that it would have to confront all of Europe when it had a problem with Greece, for Turkey saw the European security system in ways that alarmed them. And they knew that Greece used the EU to put pressure on some bilateral security problems, especially on Cyprus. As a Turkish scholar, Erol Manisali put it:

"The EU will have the opportunity to pressure Turkey concerning her relations with Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration by using the ESDP, as the Aegean and the island of Cyprus will be seen within the boundaries of the EU. Even today it is considered as such. The "strategic balance" between Turkey and Greece will be altered completely. While Greece is both in NATO and the ESDP, Turkey participates only in NATO. Greece will begin to use the EU militarily against Turkey."

The EU's more assertive attitude toward Cyprus problem also fueled the growing concerns. Assuming that it would be a "catalyst effect" in the Cyprus problem, the EU declared that it could offer a full membership to the Greek Cypriot part of Cyprus even though the conflict remained unresolved. Consequently, Greek Cypriots stated that

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167 Ibid.


they wanted to participate in Europe’s common security policy.\textsuperscript{170} This situation has been criticized by some member states, as Thomas Diez noted, because:

The Cypriot membership may alter the strategic environment of east Mediterranean to the extent that the EU’s foreign policy and defence dimensions are strengthened in the coming years, with the formerly non-aligned Cyprus becoming part of a European security and defense identity, while NATO member Turkey may have to remain outside for the time being....\textsuperscript{171}

Nevertheless, the concerns of such scholars are somewhat exaggerated—at least for now and not thoroughly shared by Turkish decision-making circles.\textsuperscript{172} There are also good reasons for Turkey to believe that these developments will not have any effect on its relationship with Greece. The EU countries’ traditional approach to the Turkey-Greece problems presently remains neutral since both countries are NATO members.

The second paragraph of Part III-A of the Petersberg Declaration stressed that the security guarantees and defense commitments in the treaties which bind the Member States within WEU and NATO were mutually reinforcing and would not be invoked by those subscribing to Part III of the Petersberg Declaration in disputes between Member States of either of the two organizations.\textsuperscript{173} To put it plainly, this clause was included to prevent non-WEU member NATO countries and WEU full members from using the guarantees provided under these organizations against each other in disputes among


\textsuperscript{172} Phone conversation with Col. Ergun Mengi, Head of European Security Affairs Department in Turkish Joint Chiefs of Staff, April 12, 2001.

\textsuperscript{173} Munevver Cebeci.
themselves. Under the tenets of this declaration despite Greece's objections, EU countries maintained their "neutral" position vis-à-vis Turkish-Greek disputes. Though as the new ESDP structures develop, there is no guarantee that in the long term this attitude will be maintained, it seems unlikely to change in the short term.

4. European Vocation and Dilution of NATO Membership

Another cause of concern for Turkey is related to Turkey's EU vocation. Turkey has always seen its relations with the European Union (EC-before 1993) as a natural complement to its relations with NATO. Indeed, in many respects the 1963 Ankara agreement was a result of the Turkish NATO membership. With this agreement, Turkey became an associate member of the EC, expecting that someday it would eventually become a full member of the EC. Turkey's ties to the EC were enhanced in 1970 by the Additional Protocol, which foresaw the establishment of a Customs Union between Turkey and the EC. Relations with the EC, however, were always seen by Turkey in a broader political context—as part of the wider effort to Westernize Turkish society and complete the Atatürk revolution. Unfortunately, these prospects were to be diminishing, if not destroyed, due to the military intervention in politics and the outrageous reaction in Europe, over a certain period of time.

Nevertheless, the end of the Cold War significantly changed the context for Turkish membership. Prior to the collapse of the Wall, Turkey's problems with the EC were primarily economic. Afterward they broadened as the EC (later the EU) began to put greater emphasis on political, social, and cultural factors. As Gulnur Aybet has noted,

174 Ibid.

175 Address by Sami Kohen, a columnist for the Turkish daily Milliyet to Washington Institute for Near East Policy on "Turkey and Europe: Integration or Alienation?" on August 4, 1999. Available
“Not only the parameters of European security but also those of European culture were being redefined, as the division of Europe ceased to exist and Europe—east and west—was finding new grounds for bonding in historical, cultural, and religious terms.”176

Furthermore, the end of the Cold War changed the primacy of institutions in Europe. The EU became more prominent and NATO more complimentary. For many years, Turkey saw its place in the European security system as proof of its Europeanness. NATO membership has formed the legitimacy of this argument. Turkey has seen its position in NATO and the European defense system as evidence and justification for the necessity of its being in European institutions and as a ultimate guarantee of EU membership. After all, Europe’s security needs in the Cold War had made Turkey a part of the European security system. Therefore, Turks have seen the inclusion in the ESDP as a “litmus test” of the EU’s willingness to accept Turkey as an EU member. Because of its geostrategic importance, security issues were considered the first arena on which the EU countries would be willing to cooperate with Turkey. But the last developments in the ESDP disproved this belief to Turkey’s dismay. Turkey’s exclusion from the ESDP along with a remote possibility of the EU membership, decreased, if not totally destroyed, Turkey’s hopes of an eventual EU membership.

Additionally, Turkey views all ESDP effort as a detriment to NATO’s existence. Turks think that sooner or later the ESDP will take NATO’s place177 in the European security system, and they will lose their first class status in the European security system


provided by an equal membership in NATO to a second class status in European security
affairs. Reflecting this point are the statements of Turkish Ambassador to NATO:

We are not against a larger international role for the EU since it is in our interest to join an organization which plays an even more important role than it does today. But we are against arrangements that would give us a second-class status. At present, as a member of NATO, Turkey has full rights in all NATO initiatives and operations concerning European security. We believe that another European security initiative in which we will have less opportunities, less power, and less influence is not a good offer. We believe that there should not be any dividing lines between the EU member states and those that are candidates for membership. Similarly, we believe that there should not be two or more levels of security among NATO countries in Europe. The European pillar of NATO is not the European Union; it is the European allies, all European allies of NATO, including Turkey, Norway, Poland, the Czech Republic and Iceland. There are six European countries that are not yet members of the EU and we cannot exclude them while talking about the European pillar of NATO.178

Another problem could arise from the possibility that some central and European states would be granted EU membership before Turkey. Because all of these new EU members would automatically become a part of ESDP as well, they would have a higher status in European security affairs over a staunch, long-standing NATO ally.179 Likewise, if automatic access to NATO planning capabilities is granted to EU, as EU wanted, this will also involve the non-NATO EU states (so-called “neutrals” and “non-aligned states”), notably Sweden, Finland, Ireland, and Austria, in NATO planning mechanisms.

177 Phone conversation with Col. Mengi.
179 Heinz Kramer, p.219.
In the Turkish view, this is another unacceptable consequence of granting automatic access to the EU while Turkey is being excluded from ESDP structure.\textsuperscript{180}

5. **The Need for NATO**

One of the important concerns Turkey has, though it has an indirect effect on the discussion of the ESDP, is related to its need to NATO's collective defense guarantees. Russia is no longer a systemic adversary, but it still causes more security concerns for Turkey than for any other European country. Admittedly, there is no longer a direct Russian military threat since there is no shared border between the two countries. In addition, Russia has become one of the leading economic partners of Turkey. And Turkey relies heavily on Russia for its growing imports of natural gas. Compared to the Cold War, one could say that Turkey feels much less threatened by Russia today. However, Russia's continuing involvement in violent Caucasian and Transcaucasion conflicts poses the possibility of Russian-Turkish conflicts, given the links that bound Turkey to many countries in the region. Furthermore, Russian troops continue to be stationed at Turkey's borders with Armenia and Georgia, which disturbs Turkish security circles. Turkey's concerns were further fueled by Russia's success at achieving some change in the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty regulations about the amount of military forces and equipment in the flank zones, thereby making Turkey the most exposed member of the alliance to the "residual threat" of the collapsed Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{181}


The rivalry between the Turkey and Russia over the newly independent Central Asian states, the unresolved issue of oil and gas pipelines in the Caspian region and Turkmenistan, and the Russian S-300 deal with Cyprus have also been other issues of tension in the two countries’ relations.\(^\text{182}\)

Additionally, Turkey is uneasy with the increased ship traffic after the oil transportation from the Russian harbor of Novorossiisk started since it poses a serious environmental threat to its most crowded city, Istanbul.\(^\text{183}\) Turkey signaled that it would make further regulations on the passage through the straits, to which Russia ostensibly objects. Therefore, the straits will likely be another issue of discussion between these countries in the coming years.

In addition to a “residual threat” stemming from Russia, with its exposure to the weapons of mass destruction (WMD), religious fundamentalism, and ethnic conflicts in its surroundings, Turkey is also regarded the most threatened member of the alliance. Apparently, the end of the Cold War has also brought a divergence in security needs of alliance members, and it is imperative to remember an important aspect of this issue, as seen from the Turkish perspective. Taking it as a potential threat to the cohesion of the Alliance, Rob De Wick broaches the issue of different “zones of security,” which emerged in the Alliance region after the Cold War:

Turkey, which is in the zone of “maximum danger,” will undoubtedly have a different threat perception than the Netherlands, which is the zone of “maximum peace.” Turkey is likely to put more emphasis on NATO’s traditional collective defense tasks, while the Netherlands will emphasize NATO’s crisis response operations, including peacekeeping.\(^\text{184}\)

\(^{182}\) Ibid pp. 22-31.


\(^{184}\) Rob De Wijk, “What is NATO” in *NATO after Kosovo*, Rob De Wijk et al. p.4.
This seems to be the case so far.

Given the attitude of Europeans to Turkey’s security concerns\(^\text{185}\) and considering the “different zones of security,” which emerged after the Cold War, Turkey tends to see the ESDP under a different light as compared to other members of the Alliance. It views the ESDP as a threat to NATO and unless some sort of institutional links are created between the two, Turkey will continue to be wary about the future of NATO and its status within the European security system. The growing divergence between Turkey’s and Europe’s security interests could eventually push Turkey to act on its own to secure its national interests. Turkey’s place in the new ESDP structures must be defined.

Yet defining Turkey’s status within this new institutional development is not just a matter of institutional membership status. There are also practical considerations over security interests. As noted earlier, in Petersberg-type operations, it is likely that for the foreseeable future, any crisis to emerge is likely to occur in a region of close proximity to Turkey, as Turkey’s geo-strategic setting is surrounded by turbulent regions, from the Balkans, the Caucasus to the Middle East. Therefore, any Petersberg-type operation to be deliberated within the EU Council in relation to these regions will have a direct bearing on Turkey’s national security interests. This is an important consideration. Already there is a feeling in Turkish decision-making circles that NATO’s European Allies are less sensitive to Turkish security concerns than the United States.\(^\text{186}\) For example, there is less

\(^{185}\) Germany’s hesitant response to Turkey’s request for Allied Mobile Force-Air reinforcements during the Gulf crisis highlights this problem. To many Turks, Germany’s ambivalent response raised questions about the reliability of the Article V guarantees of NATO.

sympathy from Northern Europe to the threats Turkey faces from regional proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, whereas the United States has been more responsive to Turkey’s demands for Allied support and cooperation in this context.\textsuperscript{187}

Although it is too early to say this, if the European Allies seem to be indifferent to the threats facing Turkey and if the ESDP’s growth weakens rather than strengthens the Alliance, which has been the case so far, then, Turkey might revert to a renationalization of its defense, a posture highly undesirable for NATO or a future ESDP, since Turkey has demonstrated over the years that it is in fact a reliable ally in times of crisis in a turbulent region.\textsuperscript{188} All of these considerations tie in directly to the status of Turkey within the evolving ESDP. Therefore, the need to define Turkey’s status and role in this structure and to find ways to tie Turkey to new structures as soon as possible are not only beneficial for Turkey’s interests but also for the interests of its European Allies.

\textsuperscript{187} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{188} Ibid. See also Zalmay Khalilzad et al., Turkish JCS Huseyin Kivrîkoglu articulated his concerns in a ceremony held in Poland, and he warned that the ESDP could be detrimental to NATO’s solidarity and coherence.
VI. CONCLUSION

From the inception of NATO, the debate over a European force that would strengthen the European pillar of the alliance has never ended. The concept of a European-only defense has always been defined differently by various nations. Their expectations and goals were always different, yet the main themes of the dispute have remained constant.

With a close look, one could see that throughout the Cold War years, since the first attempt to launch a European Defense Community (EDC), the discussion of a European force has continually comprised these elements:

- Europe’s inability to meet its security and defense needs,
- Europe’s over dependence on the United States for its defense (Considered humiliating by countries such as France),
- Europe’s inability to cooperate (lack of political will and unity),
- Rebalancing the burden sharing,
- Keeping the United States engaged in European affairs,
- Containing the Soviet threat,
- Integrating Germany in the European security system,
- Determining who would be included,

Considering the developments of the last ten years in forming a European force and the rhetoric behind it, the main discussion is the same as it was during the Cold War. Despite the fact that the Soviet threat to its existence has vanished, the last decade showed that Europe still does not have the means to deal with its security and defense problems. There is a strong need for further capabilities that would enable Europe to act on its own, but Europe still lacks the money to realize this. The efforts to solve this problem should still consider the need to preserve the transatlantic link.
The greatest change in these elements was the collapse of the Soviet Union. This removed the threat that tied Europeans’ hands, making the United States “indispensable” for their defense for fifty years. The need for US leadership and engagement in European security affairs is still relevant given the inability of Europeans during the last decade to handle their continental problems. The expectations, aims, and intentions of the different players are still various and complex. For example, the United Kingdom’s and Germany’s perceptions of the ESDP are substantially different from the French perception. While the French view the ESDP as a way of decreasing the US influence in European affairs, the United States still views the ESDP as a way of realizing the long desired fair burden-sharing by leading Europeans to create extra capabilities, and thus to spend more. Therefore, considering these facts, it would not be wrong to say that despite the remarkable changes in the security environment by the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the controversy over the European force has remained the same. However, this is not to say that the fate of the ESDP will be as unsuccessful as the previous attempts. The ESDP seems to be an evolving process. It is too early to predict its future.

As we go into a new decade, the ESDP seems to be an evolving process, and it will continue to evolve for at least another twenty years. There has been much debate about the ESDP both in Europe and on the other side of the Atlantic. The uncertainties of the new security environment and the institutional ambiguities of the ESDP are the major reasons creating those discussions. Considering these uncertainties and ambiguities, nobody could predict where the ESDP might go. However as shown in this thesis, some significant issues came to the fore, as a consequence of the process starting with St. Malo.
The most significant feature of the developments of the last two or three years is that today the EU has a much more “autonomous” prospect of European security and defense identity when compared to what was envisaged with the ESDI back in 1994. However, the question is how this will be done without causing harm to the transatlantic alliance.

The last three years made it clear that if Europeans hope to create an “autonomous” ESDP, this cannot be done without creating some level of decoupling, duplication, and discrimination. Therefore, “doing it right” became the most important point to be considered.

Everybody agrees that if it is done right, the EU’s creating an autonomous ESDP establishment of a military crisis management capability for situations where NATO as a whole chooses not to engage could benefit the Alliance and the transatlantic relationship. If it is done correctly, the ESDP could expand the pool of forces and could rectify some of Europe’s capability gaps. It could further help to rationalize and to redirect resources, resulting in a more balanced burden-sharing, and leading to a genuine strategic partnership between the EU and NATO. Nonetheless, if it is done poorly, this new venture could divide the transatlantic Alliance, could diminish the European capacity to manage crises, and could weaken Alliance cohesion and solidarity.

The warnings that the ESDP should not create new institutions in the European security system, but rather should focus on increasing the capabilities overlook the importance of institution-building for the European integration process. Considering the EU’s unification history, it is very likely that Europeans will first create the required institutions, and then they will go forward and will focus on the capabilities, not the reverse. So far, this has been the case and is likely to remain so in the near future.
The latest developments have clearly revealed EU members’ political will to construct an autonomous ESDP. As long as British support for the initiative continues—and it seems likely that it will—along with France and Germany’s support, the ESDP could well be realized and could give the Europeans the capability to deal with any contingencies on the continent. Nevertheless, the latest developments have also showed that, at least for the foreseeable future, it seems unlikely for the EU to secure the money, the political cohesion and military capabilities that would enable it to deal with Petersberg-type contingencies. Thus, NATO is likely to continue to be “the only game in the town,” not only for collective defense needs but also for collective security needs.

How Turkey will fit into the new European security system will depend on its European membership process, its unique geostrategic position and its special relationship with the United States. As long as Europe needs NATO and the United States for its collective defense, it will also need to consider Turkey’s concerns and demands and try to integrate Turkey to the new ESDP structures. These links are unlikely to be institutional and, in a manner of speaking, that would mean a “backdoor entrance” to the EU. Furthermore, Turkey should not expect to have a full role in the decision-making process of the ESDP, as it wanted, since the ESDP is an EU project and EU countries would never do that in order to preserve the EU institutions’ autonomy. Likewise, the EU should not expect Turkey to agree on automatic access to NATO planning structures and assets and to remove its veto, as the EU wanted, since this would mean a dilution in Turkish membership in NATO. The Turks will not agree to a second-class status in the Alliance. Indeed, both sides have legitimate arguments, both sides need
to reconsider their positions and must compromise, if a solution is to be found to the current problem.

In order to ensure that there is a reciprocal benefit and, indeed, to move the ESDP process forward at all, the EU must resolve the participation issue. It should ensure the regular involvement of non-EU Allies in shaping the strategy and in conducting the military planning for EU-led operations and exercises affecting their security. The EU’s Nice conclusions were a generous start, but they have not settled the issue. Turkey as a non-EU European Ally has pledged significant assets and capabilities to the EU’s Headline Goal. It has an Article-5 security obligation that could be triggered if EU-led operations should escalate. It has proven its worth as a stalwart partner in actual European crises, and continues to do so.

Turkey’s identity in terms of the political and cultural evolution of post-Cold War Europe has come under scrutiny, yet a European security architecture cannot be envisaged without Turkey. Assuming that Turkey’s strategic importance for Europe has decreased is wrong. Security in the post-Cold War era is no longer identified in terms of building a massive collective defense against an identifiable enemy. Instability, national movements, the control of natural resources in regions of turmoil all have and are likely to continue to have a bearing on European security interests. In this context, Turkey’s geostrategic importance for Europe has, if anything, increased. A country with democratic institutions (which may not satisfy the EU criteria for the moment, but are nevertheless democratic), a country with a competitive free-market economy, a country which refrains from unilateral action in times of crisis and works through institutional and diplomatic channels as part of the Western system, a country which has a long-
standing working relationship with Western institutions in a region of instability hosting vital strategic natural resources, such as oil and gas, has to remain part of the European security architecture; any other alternative would be detrimental to European security interests.
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   80815 Bebek, Istanbul
   Turkiye

9. Bilkent Universitesi Kutuphanesi...............................................1
   06533 Bilkent, Ankara
   Turkiye
10. Ortadogu Teknik Universitesi Kutuphanesi
    06531 Balgat, Ankara
    Turkiye

11. Harp Akademileri Komutanligi
    Kutuphane
    Ayazaga, Istanbul
    Turkiye

12. Orhan Yikilkan
    KKK Gnl. Pi. Pr. Bsk.ligi
    06100 Bakanliklar, Ankara
    Turkiye