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U.S. foreign policy in southern Africa.

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U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

by

Richard John Mahlum

June 1980

Thesis Advisor: Jiri Valenta

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U.S. Foreign Policy in Southern Africa

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Africa
Soviet Union
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U.S. - Soviet Relations

Nixon Foreign Policy - Africa
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Carter - World View

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of U.S. policy in southern Africa has been the concern over potential superpower rivalry and intervention in the region as a dangerous and unwarranted element in the U.S.-Soviet competitive relationship. Third, that an overreaction in the U.S. to the perceived Soviet threat and a dramatic reinstitution of the East-West perspective in U.S. foreign policy priorities could lead the U.S. to set aside the regional approach toward southern Africa that has marked the Carter Administration's African policy since 1977. This development may create a situation of incipient crisis for future U.S. relations in the region.
U.S. Foreign Policy In Southern Africa

by

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION  ---------------------------------------------------------------7

II. UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD SOUTHERN AFRICA  -------------------19

  C. 1974-1976, THE FORD ADMINISTRATION AND A NEW FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD SOUTHERN AFRICA-----55
  D. U.S. POLICY IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE ANGOLAN CRISIS ------------------------66


  A. FOREIGN POLICY IN TRANSITION AND POTENTIAL CRISIS  -----------------------71
  B. INITIAL FOREIGN POLICY EFFORTS AND THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION'S WORLD VIEW ---------79
  C. THE DRAmA OF POLITICAL INITIATIVES, STALEMATE AND BREAKTHROUGH ON RHODESIA  -------------------------------94
  D. THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION AND RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS  -------------------107

IV. CONCLUSION  ---------------------------------------------------------------116

FOOTNOTES  -----------------------------------------------------------------------127

BIBLIOGRAPHY  ---------------------------------------------------------------138

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST  -----------------------------------------------------147
-6-
I. INTRODUCTION

In the early months of the American election year 1980, there is compelling and growing evidence that the U.S. is encountering a crisis stage in its global and regional foreign policy pursuits. Certain trends underway in the late 1970's have been galvanized by the Soviet incursion into Afghanistan, and there is frenetic official and unofficial activity to try to sort out an appropriate U.S. response to the newest example of Soviet military and political aggrandizement. The Soviets' action in Afghanistan could hardly have come at a more sensitive time, given the U.S.'s predicament in the Iranian hostage crisis. These two apparent setbacks in U.S. foreign policy have triggered increasing criticism, alarm and even paranoia about the weakness and shiftlessness of U.S. foreign policy. Yet, while there are many opinions expressing concern over the allegedly dismal state of our foreign policy situation, there are too few vigorous and objective analyses and explanations accounting for where we are, where we have been, and where we are going.

The newest aggravations and developing hostility between the U.S. and the Soviet Union give rise to an urgent necessity that the leaders of this country maintain firm control over the foreign policy process, identify clearly national objectives and concerns of U.S. foreign
policy, and do all within their power to draw together a
new consensus of national purpose and resolve. Two key
elements in such an effort seem strikingly clear. One is
an assessment of our current status in the world at large,
with particular attention being given to the nature of our
relationship with the Soviet Union, and the other is a
fundamental examination of how "we", the American
body-politic as individuals and as a collective political
animal, constitute a fundamental part of the foreign policy
-- domestic politics problems in which we as a nation find
ourselves.

The "we" portion of the foreign policy problem is very
important for aside from being the collective actor in
international affairs, we are the individual actor in
domestic affairs and politics and the receptor-spectator of
what we see or think we know about the world both
domestically and internationally. Given the nature of our
upbringing, education, and experience along with the
values, interests and goals that have accumulated in the
process, we have deep foundations for our perceptions about
the world, and those perceptions are the critical lens
through which we undertake decision making not only as
individuals but as a nation as well. It follows therefore,
that if perceptions are a critical ingredient of foreign
policy making, then in any foreign policy dilemma they are
among the key features deserving examination under as
detached and analytical a frame of mind as possible.
There seems little doubt that perceptions contribute significantly to the disarray of our official, and even academic understanding of today's foreign policy environment. It seems abundantly clear, however, that the perception problem is not principally one of analyzing and gauging the essence, intentions, or drift of the Soviets' behavior in today's world. Nor is the perception problem one which tests this country's capacity or sensitivity to the numerous problems existing here, at home, and/or abroad. It is much more complicated than either of these two important concerns, for while it clearly involves those concerns, it involves the equally essential but more elusive ingredient of our own perceptions about ourselves -- the spectator, receptor, political actor -- in a complicated and sometimes openly hostile world. These perceptions, involving our expectations, understanding of reality, and capacity for self-conscious involvement in domestic and foreign affairs are subject to error, miscalculation and even self-deception. We are at once observers and participants in a world of dramatic and even spectacular changes where the processes and outcomes should not be expected to be necessarily beneficial or favorable to us, but where the inclination, nevertheless, is unmistakably bent toward that expectation. We are a people of extraordinary complexity and paradox, susceptible to a self-image which is itself founded in the potential for misapprehension and distortion by our own perceptions. As
with all humanity, we can be unwittingly victimized by our
own frailties in defining not only ourselves, but also our
relationship to the rest of humanity and to the world.

In the end, like the rest of humanity, we are patently
susceptible to all the human virtues and vices, but we are
caught through the fortuities of time, place and the course
of events with the status and role of being a superpower
which we (as a nation) sometimes are ill disposed to
exercise or even occasionally to want. Paradoxically, we
are prone to a self-righteous notion of our own importance
and inherent goodness while recognizing the existence and
potential of the dark side of ourselves -- and yet we are
flabbergasted that our good will, intent and good deeds are
not perceived by other nations for what they are ostensibly
intended to be (in this regard, we seem almost congenitally
unable to see the other's point of view.) We are
competitive but not war-mongers; we are challengers of the
status quo of nature but defenders of the notion that
change must be kept orderly and essentially as non-violent
as possible. We are at once the benefactors and the
victims of a heritage of law, convention, and negotiation
as the principal outside arbiters of the competitive urges
and impulses among men, with force of arms and war viewed
as the means of last resort. And yet we are susceptible,
even solicitous of an unencumbered pursuit of
self-interest, individually and as a nation.

As a nation and a people we are utterly, almost
unbelievably, complex. Our systems, our upbringing, our mix of cultures, our education, our multiple self-interests bend us each to "the courage of our convictions," to our expression of them, and in the end to the diversity of our wide and frequently incongruent opinions. In our contemporary political and social environment, diversity in motivations for power, identity, and pursuit of special interest has conspired to promote the often selfish pursuit of fractionalized, highly individualized concerns and interests. The temper of the times and modus operandi of special interest have tended to neutralize the desire and the need to found human efforts in the common interest of the good of the whole (or at least the majority). The former conventions of compromise and consensus-building have been relocated to the status of old saws no longer possible or even desirable. The decline of effective political power in the two party system has aggravated the problem of consensus-building and problem-solving, placing the burden more fully on the shoulders of the institutionally overburdened legislative and executive branches of government. Thus, the many problems demanding attention are perversely affected and complicated both by the institutionalized problems of the domestic political structure and by the acutely individualized and fragmented political environment that makes demands on that structure.

Along with these developments in our domestic political life have come dramatic changes in the world at large
particularly over the last ten years. Many of the domestic trends noted above are becoming world-wide phenomena. The former simplicity of a bipolar structure tenuously held together by the threat of assured destruction should the USSR and U.S. come into open nuclear conflict, has given way to a more complex international structure. Today's structure is marked by many new state-actors, state antagonisms, demands for more equitable distributions of the world's acquired wealth, and assurances for access to the promise of better tomorrows. There are old and new resentments, antagonisms, and open hostilities often fostered and capitalized upon by religious zealots, dictators, and acquisitive power seekers intent on not just having their say but on having their way. They have exerted a powerful influence in a world where convention and customs of order have been sacrificed to the will of their radicalism and demagoguery.

In such a world, the fears, beliefs, and actions of all of us are susceptible to the construction of defensive measures for survival and for protecting the self-interest. Psychologically, the natural inclination is to move toward greater degrees of certainty through the construction or acquisition of increased military might. Military power, presumably, should provide one with the capacity to defend oneself and one's interests, and to take the quick and dramatic stances needed to assert one's willingness and ability to employ it in moments of perceived danger. In
such instances, the impulse to resort to quick response postures becomes dramatically more dangerous in tactically and strategically complex situations. Yet, it is undeniable that military might and the force of arms is increasingly being viewed as a prime means of certainty in an uncertain world.

For a number of analysts the events and patterns of behavior extant in today's international arena suggest that the old order is (or already has) broken down and that we are witnessing a world in transition toward a new formulation of order in relationships and operating principles. Among the clearest signposts in the process is the relative decline in power of the two superpowers and the growth in influence of Third World nations. In the conceptualization of the process to this point, analysts perceive the remnants of the former East-West power structure as co-existing with an emergent North-South structure along far more diversified lines. The latter's emergence has brought with it a demand for reshuffling political priorities given the Third World's new and more urgent agenda of issues and demands. As the power relationship among nations is reorganized the role of the superpowers is undergoing considerable redefinition, altering expectations and demands on them. In such a world, many of the analysts assert that the old formulas of power and influence may not have the relevance they once did, and that new forms and processes of international
relations need to be devised to permit maintaining some level of order and for securing and perhaps even furthering one's traditional self-interests in a changing world.

These are but a few of the salient elements in the domestic and international environment of 1980 with which the foreign policy of the U.S. must contend. Clearly, it is an environment in dynamic flux, yet fundamental questions need to be addressed concerning the current state of U.S. foreign policy. First, if U.S. foreign policy is itself in a state of flux, to what degree does that fact contribute to an incipient crisis given the nature and quality of the foreign policy problems facing this nation? Second, a series of questions needs to be addressed: What is the nature of the developing situation? Why has it developed as it has? To what extent are "we" a part of the problem? What are our perceptions and priorities, and where do we go and what do we do from here?

The above outline does not begin to address the domestic and international ramifications of the problems currently being encountered in the foreign policy of the U.S. These ramifications are extraordinarily complex and difficult to analyze. The need to take account of changes in multiple internal and external realities, which can take place mentally very quickly (if not almost simultaneously) cannot be duplicated in written discourse. To even begin to deal with these simultaneous features would demand the comprehensive analysis that only a rather lengthy book
could provide. Clearly the form of analysis must be narrowed to a subject or to an area which is susceptible to detailed examination and to the prospect that it may yield in the process insight and understanding of the magnitude of the problems encountered in the development, exposition, and implementation of U.S. foreign policy. For any of a number of reasons, the region of southern Africa constitutes an unusually well suited case for undertaking such an approach. First, there is sufficient information regarding foreign policy pronouncements and interaction with the region to provide the source material for identifying and evaluating the historical development of U.S. policy toward the region. Second, global and regional developments have elevated southern Africa to a position of greater significance on the agenda of U.S. foreign policy concerns, particularly over the last five years. This fact is most significant because it reflects U.S. concern about the activity of the Soviets and the Cubans in the region, with the real and perceived issues at stake in the region's conflict situations, with tangible U.S. interests not only in the region but elsewhere on the African continent, and finally with the expressed desire of the U.S. to exercise an increasingly responsible role in the resolution of international conflict situations directly or indirectly affecting tangible and intangible American interests now and in the future. Third, the changes wrought in U.S. foreign policy toward southern
Africa provide an interesting and illuminating example of how regional policy concerns are affected by the changing patterns of global priorities in U.S. foreign policy. In turn, policy statements and behavior toward southern Africa reflect not only these global priorities, but also the general perceptions and expectations of this country's foreign policy elite. This elite -- elected leaders, appointed officials, analysts and interested-others -- in their statements and actions regarding southern Africa provide revealing examples of their perceptions of the U.S., their perceptions of the Soviet Union, their perceptions of world problems and priorities, and their perceptions of the role the U.S. ought to be exercising in its relations with the rest of the world. As this analysis unfolds, one of the primary objectives will be to identify the way in which changing perceptions in the U.S. regarding southern Africa are an outcome of changing perceptions of other global interests and problems. Moreover, a specific effort will be made to demonstrate the limiting effect these changes in global concerns and priorities have had on the relative effectiveness of U.S. policy toward southern Africa.

The analysis that follows will be divided into two main parts. The first portion will undertake an historical review of the principal developments in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy toward southern Africa in the period of 1954 to 1976. The second portion will undertake a detailed
examination of the foundations and scope of U.S. foreign policy toward southern Africa under the Carter Administration. The examination of the Carter Administration will first address its philosophical underpinnings and world view and then proceed to enumerate the chronological development of its policy in the region. That chapter will conclude with an analysis of Soviet-American relations and their influence on the conduct of the Carter Administration's policy toward southern Africa. The concluding chapter will be directed at an analytical evaluation of past U.S. policy in the region and the seeds of crisis that exist there today given the incipient reorientation of U.S. global priorities in the early months of 1980. The enumeration of these factors and their analysis is designed to identify the nature of U.S. foreign policy toward southern Africa and to demonstrate that the convergence of changing global priorities, the limits to U.S. power and influence, and persistence of regional problems and a continuing Soviet threat present a threshold for potential crisis to the U.S. in the region. U.S. foreign policy, increasingly responsive to the conservative political drift of the country, is particularly susceptible to an overreaction in the event of some new aggressive initiative by the Soviets and/or Cubans in the region, on the continent, or elsewhere on the littoral of Africa. Caution and restraint should mark U.S. policy at a time when regional and global foreign
policy priorities are in transition and the chances of miscalculation are so heightened. More significant, however, is the prospect that the U.S. might revert to its former attitudes of benign neglect and apathy toward Africa and its problems.

U.S. inattention to the persistent problems of southern Africa could quickly reverse the hard-won advances made over the last three years and could quickly reestablish one of the important preconditions to increased regional conflict and hostility in the creation of the same sort of regional power vacuum that existed prior to the Angolan Crisis of 1975-76.

The potential for continued and even heightened conflict in southern Africa suggests that U.S. policy will need to be continually mindful of the role it can play in the region as an influential broker for peaceful and evolutionary change. This thesis will describe how that role has come about and how that role retains its relevance today and for the future in U.S. relations with the volatile region of southern Africa.
II. UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD SOUTHERN AFRICA

On April 27, 1976, Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, announced a "major change in U.S. foreign policy toward southern Africa" at a luncheon address in Lusaka, Zambia. The change in foreign policy centered on three specific countries in the region - Rhodesia, Namibia, and South Africa. With the new policy, U.S. efforts were to be directed toward "active diplomatic and economic intervention to bring about change from white minority to black majority rule in Rhodesia and Namibia, and to stronger advocacy of expanded black political participation and elimination of apartheid in South Africa." 2 In Lusaka, Kissinger focussed attention on the regional problems of racial justice indicating U.S. support for "self-determination, majority rule, equal rights and human dignity for all the peoples of southern Africa - in the name of moral principle, international law and world peace." 3

While Secretary Kissinger had emphasized the local political dimensions of the problem, it was clear to virtually every observer of the southern Africa scene that the 'change' in U.S. policy was the direct result of Soviet and Cuban military involvement in the Angolan civil war of 1975. By April 1976, Soviet and Cuban military involvement had proved to be instrumental in the rise to power of the
Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA).

Moreover, the continued presence of Soviet advisors and Cuban forces in Angola, while surely a stabilizing factor for internal affairs of that nation, presented a potential and serious destabilizing factor for any future power struggles in the remainder of the region.

Thus, the redirection of U.S. policy in 1976 brought together a number of diffuse elements in what has persisted since that time as the 'problem of southern Africa'. Like so many international problems in the world today, it involves a highly complicated set of primary problems and sub-problems whose coexistence in the region poses continuing potential for intense political conflict and increasing violence. The United States' decision of 1976 to exert U.S. influence in the regional and international resolution of those problems was not only (or simply) a major change in the U.S. policy toward Africa and its most volatile sub-region. In addition, the new U.S. decision represented two further features of U.S. policy relating to the Soviets. One was that a major effort had been made to formulate and implement a viable U.S. alternative to the new and suddenly increased Soviet presence in the region following its incursion into the Angolan Crisis of 1975-1976. A second feature was that U.S. perceptions of detente had been revised following Angola and that the new U.S. policy toward southern Africa marked one form of the U.S. response to its new estimates of the nature and
meaning of that concept.

It is significant to point out from the outset that U.S. foreign policy in southern Africa, involves a much more complex milieu than involvement in the political machinations of a remote and volatile region in the world. Moreover, it is precisely the complexities and interrelationships of U.S. interests in the region, both in the short term and long term, which make the policy so important yet so difficult to undertake effectively. In this regard, there is a definite sense in which U.S. policy has been a tedious, if not desperate, effort to balance a number of competing national interests that are involved directly or indirectly in the problems of southern Africa. These interests -- social, economic, strategic, political, and even ideological, -- interrelate in U.S. perceptions, values, interests, and objectives with regard to southern Africa; and they are at once vulnerable and responsive to internal and external demands for change.

Indeed, change is a dominant characteristic in U.S. relations with Africa. Since the mid-1950's the political nature of Africa has changed dramatically from a colonial edifice to a continent with fifty-four sovereign states. As the political realities of Africa have undergone change, so too have U.S. interests shifted from a modest economic and political relationship in the 1950's, to increasing relations and interdependence with much of the continent by 1980. What is becoming more clear in regard to Africa is
that which has already become strikingly clear with the rest of the world: U.S. global interests and relations with other states and regions of the world are becoming much more complex. Moreover, increasing degrees of interdependence and of common interest have tied short term pursuits of gain to the actual costs and potential benefits that may be attained in either near or long term futures. These considerations have begun to weigh more heavily on policy makers, especially in U.S. relations with the Third World. While this development is partly the result of new realities and more sophisticated analysis, an important stimulus has been the perceived threat of Soviet competition. The Soviet Union, operating in direct and indirect competition with the U.S., has become a more viable global superpower whose expansion of power and influence has added new complexity to U.S. interests and relations with the Third World. Given the difficult and complicated nature of superpower rivalry, U.S. policy makers are compelled to assess at virtually every turn the limits, nature, and relevance of that competition as a factor influencing pursuit of U.S. national interests in the Third World. Such assessments address the strategic, military, economic, and political implications of heightened competition (or worse--direct confrontation) with the Soviets particularly over issues which involve less than vital interests to either of the protagonists. Indeed, other interests aside, the most important concerns
of both superpowers in Third World areas such as Africa tend to involve one another and the perceived influence or advantage one may be assuming at the other's expense.

The balancing act of weighing multiple national interests in a milieu of regional problems and superpower rivalry lies at the heart of U.S. policy toward southern Africa. The problems and the policy are extraordinarily complex; they are very important; and they are quite dangerous due to the volatile nature of the political realities in the region, the symbolic and real competitions of the superpowers, and the intensities of conviction and potential hostility of the multiple actors involved there. Southern Africa is a complex web of internal and regional political strife, competition for rich resources, protection of economic interests and commitments, vying for strategic influence and access, and a competitive battleground for ascendancy of superpower influence on future realities. The divergent and diffuse interests of the numerous actors involved there have come to make southern Africa an increasingly important meeting ground of competing values, beliefs, interests, and political aspirations.

This chapter will examine the history of U.S. policy toward southern Africa in the period from 1954 to 1976. The analysis will be broken down into the sections: 1) 1954-1968, The Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson Administrations; 2) 1969-1974, The Nixon Administration;
and 3) 1974-1976, The Ford Administration and a New Policy toward southern Africa. The purpose of this approach is threefold: a) to provide an historical account of United States foreign policy toward southern Africa, b) to examine the assumptions and political philosophy that underlie U.S. policy during this period, and c) to examine the influence which the U.S.-Soviet relationship has exerted on U.S. perceptions of its role in the region. This analysis will address the historical setting out of which a renewed U.S. interest and involvement in the region was engendered in 1975-76, and the development and implementation of a new foreign policy stance which emerged in the period of 1976-1980, the subject of analysis in the succeeding chapter.


Mid-twentieth century American interests in Africa had been confined largely to its military and strategic importance in World War II and the gradual development of trade with the European-controlled colonies. In the 1950's growing U.S. concern with the incipient nationalism of the underdeveloped world, its goals of independence, and America's negative attitudes toward colonialism found expression in the views of John Foster Dulles. Following a trip to the Near East and Southern Asia, Dulles, in a speech to the nation on June 1, 1953, espoused a U.S. stance on the issue of colonialism that is still a current
in U.S. political thinking:

Most of the peoples of the Near East and Southern Asia are deeply concerned about political independence for themselves and others. They are suspicious of the colonial powers. The United States too is suspect because, it is reasoned, our NATO alliances with France and Britain require us to try to preserve or restore the old colonial interests of our allies.

I am convinced that United States policy has been unnecessarily ambiguous in this matter. The leaders of the countries I visited fully recognize that it would be a disaster if there were any break between the United States and Great Britain and France. They don't want this to happen. However, without breaking from the framework of western unity, we can pursue our traditional dedication to political liberty. In reality, the Western powers can gain, rather than lose, from an orderly development of self-government.

I emphasize, however, the word "orderly." Let none forget that the Kremlin uses extreme nationalism to bait the trap by which it seeks to capture the dependent peoples. 4

Through 1956, however, European colonialism was the political reality in Africa (outside of Egypt, Ethiopia, Liberia, Libya and South Africa), and Europe's colonial hegemony dominated U.S. perceptions regarding the continent. Africa seemed to be inexorably linked by history to the continent of Europe 5 and, as a consequence, responsibility for colonial internal affairs and the eventual process of decolonization were considered by the U.S. to be European colonial problems. Moreover, in a world where U.S. concerns centered on the bipolar nature of the cold war and on containment, European control of the African continent contributed to the perceived bulwark against communist expansion. While most U.S. congressional leaders of both parties felt independence was the best way
to forestall communist penetration in the region, the perceived nature of African 'political reality' along with the conservative bent of the Eisenhower Administration produced the practical effect of an African policy of "benign noninvolvement." 6 The policy of the U.S. in the colonial period, according to Wallerstein, had consisted of three "essential elements": 1) the priority of world political alliances, 2) the urging of decolonization on Europe and 3) the opposing of any political radicalism in Africa. 7

In 1956, the process of decolonization in Africa began to accelerate with the formation of independent states in Morocco, The Sudan, and Tunisia. By the end of 1960, there were 28 independent states in Africa and U.S. policy was subject to respond to this new reality in a major shift of political emphasis. The shift, initiated by the Kennedy Administration in 1961, involved the formal recognition of the newly independent states, the establishment of embassies and diplomatic exchanges, and an effort toward building a basis for better relationships and understanding with the new African leaders. 8 The most specific policy initiative involved the identification of certain "bellwhether states" for the development of special relationships and specific economic development assistance. 9

By 1962 approximately seventy-five percent of the territory in Africa had achieved independence. Yet, two
difficulties remained which together would pose a major problem for future U.S. policy -- the continued colonial status of the remaining portion of Sub-Saharan Africa and the attendant problems of self-determination and majority rule that were becoming increasingly important political issues in white dominated southern Africa. The outline of these problems was perceivable to some Africa observers in the early 1960's, but U.S. involvement with Sub-Saharan Africa was marked by moderation in both political and economic initiatives. Indeed, economic involvement was the primary ingredient of the U.S. - African interrelationship. In this regard, Wallerstein asserts that the U.S. policy had two objectives: "an expansion of African involvement in the world economy, and a relative open door for U.S. investment and trade." 10 U.S. official and private interests in economic relations with Africa were part of a broader foreign policy orientation. David L. Buckman asserts that: "The growing official interest in stimulating African trade and investment was motivated in part by idealism and the desire to 'foster economic development,' in part by a number of foreign policy considerations aimed at increasing American influence, offsetting communist trade and investment initiatives, and encouraging the creation or continuation of stable governments." 11 U.S. trade with all of Africa increased from $1.3 billion in 1960 to over $10 billion by 1974 (5% of total U.S. trade); while U.S. investments in Africa
increased from $925 million in 1960 to $4.23 billion in 1974 (2% of total foreign investments in 1960; over 3% in 1974). Under the Kennedy administration, U.S. bilateral economic aid and food programs were accelerated significantly to a level of $600 million per annum in the years 1962-63.

U.S. economic aid dwindled through the remainder of the 1960's and into the early 1970's as part of a growing national disenchantment with the prospect of winning political advantage from foreign aid. By the mid-70's Africa's share of the worldwide total of U.S. foreign economic aid had actually been reduced from about one-fifth to one-tenth. Part of the impetus to this development had originated in the Clay Report (Report of the Special Committee to Strengthen the Security of the Third World, 1963) which recommended that U.S. bilateral aid to Africa should be gradually eliminated. Both the Clay Report and the Korry Report ("Policy for Development in Africa," 1966) had cautioned U.S. policy makers against the advisability of promoting military aid programs in Africa due to the potential wastage of U.S. and African resources and the prospect that increased interstate tensions and competitions might develop, setting a precedent for enlarged African military establishments.

U.S. policy on arms transfers to Africa in the period of 1960-1975 remained remarkably consistent and essentially very conservative. In that period, the U.S. Military Aid
Program (MAP) to Africa accounted for less than one percent of the world total and foreign military sales less than three percent of U.S. global commitments. The consistency and limited dimensions of U.S. arms transfers were the result of two interrelated factors: 1) the regional ceiling of $40 million established by Congress in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 for military grants, cash, and credit transactions between governments; and 2) the fact that, typically and generally, African military establishments and their support requirements had been organized and sustained through arrangements with the former colonial metropoles with the result that little supplementary assistance from the U.S. was required. The limited emphasis on military establishments facilitated the prospect for maintaining the political status quo in the new and fragile independent states. In this regard, U.S. policy provided active support of European provisions for the post-colonial era, and an equilibrium that was to be severely jolted in 1975 by Soviet activities in southern Africa.

Under the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, U.S. involvement in Africa was most dramatic in relation to crisis events in Zaire (until 1964 the Belgian Congo). From its independence in 1960 through a mercenary rebellion in 1967, Zaire experienced repetitive internal turmoil and the threat of possible Soviet unilateral intervention. U.S. policy in these crisis situations was exercised
through a) the UN with substantial U.S. financial and logistical support for deploying UN forces to the area (1960-1961), b) the use of direct logistical support for transporting Belgian paratroopers to Zaire (1964), and c) military assistance to the central government of Zaire both directly and through the intermediary of the Ethiopian government during the mercenary rebellion (1967).

While the U.S. was willing, if not eager, to exercise its prerogatives in influencing events in independent Africa, its free exercise of power was constrained in relations with the remaining portion of Africa still under colonial rule. The continuing deference of U.S. policy to the influence of Europe in African internal affairs (especially for former colonies) was reflected in the "five pillars" concept enunciated by Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, G. Mennen Williams, in March, 1965. The "five pillars" for African policy, as sub-elements of a "worldwide foreign policy of peace, freedom, and prosperity." 22 were: 1) U.S. support for self-determination; 2) encouragement of the solution of African problems by Africans themselves and support of their institutions through which solutions could be reached (e.g., the Organization of African Unity-OAU); 3) support of improved standards of living through trade and aid; 4) the discouragement of arms buildups beyond the needs of internal security or legitimate self-defense; and 5) encouragement of other countries of the world, particularly
the former European metropoles, to recognize their continuing responsibilities toward Africa. 23

For the U.S., the 'five pillars' represented a balance of positive and negative aspects of policy. The positive aspect was a balanced formula of prescriptive policy orientations, which, while recognizing the existence of substantial problems and complexities in Africa, nevertheless, addressed "mutual" U.S. and African political goals and aspirations, economic relations, and military-security provisions. In this regard, the "five pillars" revealed a clear concern about the complicating potential threat of communist "subversion" -- "the entry of Red China into the African Continent, and its competition with Moscow, have increased and made more complex, rather than diminished, the total impact of Communist imperialism in Africa." 24 Implicitly, the U.S. was orienting its policy toward a patient, 'necessarily' gradual, long term program of assistance and political support for African desires, aspirations, and choices. In this, the U.S. policy toward Africa in the 1960's was a potent manifestation of the belief in and preference for evolutionary change. However, the thrust of the policy from another perspective involved an American ideological counterweight (premised on freedom of choice for Africans themselves) to a negative aspect of policy, the perceived threat of Communist subversion and possible insurgency on the African continent. Thus, the "five pillars" were a
complicated admixture premised on evolutionary change and a significant underlying purpose - limiting the opportunity for communist advances or interference in the affairs of the continent. The convergence of these policy intentions, objectives, beliefs and preferences is evident in Williams' discussion of the 'five pillars' concept:

In this statement of our African policy fundamentals, I have not mentioned opposition to, or containment of, Communism. However, there is no question that the support of freedom over communism is basic to and a product of, the aforementioned tenets that guide United States policy in Africa. From time to time special measures may be needed to meet crisis situations - and they will be taken vigorously when necessary - but conditions in Africa are such that the support of true African independence and development is, in the long run, the surest guarantee that Africa will remain in the world of free choice and keep communism at arm's length.25.

By the mid-1960's, one of the most significant effects of the decolonization process lay in the increasing power and influence of Third World nations within the forum of the United Nations (U.N.). As a consequence, U.S. policy, especially in Africa, began to encounter the mixed advantages of having to weigh traditional power interests against the newly emerging interests of the independent Black states of Africa. In certain cases, even where U.S. economic interests were at stake, the U.S. was able to assess the views of competing groups of African actors and to choose a course of action reflecting the best political interest of the U.S. Thus, in 1963, under President Johnson, the U.S. backed the U.N.Security Council initiation of an arms embargo against the Republic of South Africa
(RSA). The implementation guidelines of the new policy were established at the level of Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in January 1964. The operative paragraph stated that: "Items having distinct nonmilitary utility, but in no case any arms, ammunition or other items of weapons nature, may be exported to or sold in SA if ordered by and for civilian non-governmental use." 27

Within southern Africa, the issue of independence for Northern and Southern Rhodesia rested on the contentious problem of NIBMAR (No Independence Before Majority African Rule). In Northern Rhodesia this pre-condition had been satisfied for the British and the colony achieved independence taking the name Zambia, on October 24, 1964. In Southern Rhodesia, white resistance to NIBMAR was manifest in the Rhodesia Front (RF) Party led by Ian Smith. After several unsuccessful attempts to negotiate a satisfactory agreement with the British to effect independence founded on a long-range promise of transitioning to black majority rule, the RF party announced a Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) on November 11, 1965. The U.S. was quick to follow the British initiative of declaring the act illegal. U.N. mandatory economic sanctions were imposed on Rhodesia on December 16, 1966. U.S. support of these sanctions included an executive order requiring that "the last Rhodesian ore (chrome) that could be exported to the US under sanctions was that which had, at least, been blasted

-33-
from the mine face before Johnsons's order [establishing the sanctions] of 5 January 1967." 28

In the latter half of the Johnson Administration, U.S. involvement with Africa was at a low ebb with declining economic aid and a political dissociation marked by deference to British, U.N., and OAU leadership in the affairs of Africa and especially the region of southern Africa. U.S. national priorities and energies had shifted dramatically to the ongoing war effort in Vietnam. Given the continuing foreign policy concerns of stability in East-West relations and security in Europe, combined with the developing problems of dissent and fragmentation in the domestic political arena over Vietnam, the U.S. was bound to allow its earlier concerns over Africa to slip to the status of relative neglect. As Whitacker points out: "The U.S. indifference was made more comfortable by the apparently low level of Soviet interest in Africa during much of this period," though the Soviets "... maintained a flow of aid to various of the southern African liberation movements throughout the decade." 29


The inauguration of President Richard M. Nixon in January 1969 brought a new establishment of domestic and international leadership to power in the U.S. Its mandate in foreign policy was abundantly clear -- to extricate the
U.S. from its military commitment in South East (S.E.) Asia; its domestic mandate, implied and therefore less clear -- to facilitate a restoration of domestic harmony and equilibrium following the turbulent years of 1967-1968. Both tasks were monumental in scope and closely interrelated. While easing of domestic strife might have little direct effect on the international predicament, public sentiment could be relaxed by favorable breakthroughs in the international arena. Thus, the new administration would be marked by frequent foreign policy initiatives and the eventual pronouncement and elaboration of a new era in international relations. On the homefront, a return to stability and the status quo would be encouraged by extolling the merit and necessity of domestic self-restraints through "law and order." With the power and authority to do so, Richard Nixon and his administration were taking the initiative, especially in foreign affairs.

When Richard Nixon took office, he was determined to take charge of foreign policy and to reestablish formal procedures for policy making. He appointed a long-term friend, William P. Rogers, as Secretary of State and Henry A. Kissinger as his Assistant for National Security Affairs. At the same time, Nixon undertook to revitalize the National Security Council (NSC) as a central mechanism for policy formulation and decision making. With Kissinger as its nominal head, the "core of the system was a network
of interagency committees at the Under Secretary level," along with several special sub-groups. With the formulation and manning of the new NSC system complete, Nixon and Kissinger ordered a sweeping re-evaluation of foreign policy and national security issues. The resulting studies were to be very comprehensive, covering a broad "range of options, rather than agreed positions, on many issues." These studies were termed National Security Study Memoranda (NSSM's) whose evaluations and recommendations when acted upon were issued by the President (or later by Kissinger) as a National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM). An NCS staff of between 45 to 55 professional personnel was also organized with duties involving a wide range of functions from analysis and reports to superintending "the work of the departments and agencies, ensuring central control on a host of issues." 

Given the wide assortment of problems that had faced the U.S. in early 1969, the Nixon Administration had set about its tasks with remarkable energy, obvious forethought, and considerable organization. The most significant structural feature to appear in the administration was the organization and centralization of a responsive, executive-oriented foreign policy apparatus in the NSC system. Under the personal tutelage of Kissinger, such an organization, tasked with the formidable project of re-evaluating the full range of U.S. foreign policy issues, interests, and opportunities, was ideally suited to produce
a number of important new perspectives and new directions in U.S. international relations. While these would be forthcoming at a later date, certain other patterns were emerging or had become objective facts. The most readily evident was the "taming of the traditional foreign policy bureaucracy." Both Nixon and Kissinger held a distrust of the bureaucracy -- Nixon's based on government experience and his view of its dampening of executive prerogative; Kissinger on more theoretical, but equally averse grounds. With a relatively inexperienced foreign policy representative installed as Secretary of State, the traditional nucleus of executive foreign policy making was relegated to a secondary, functional position. The mode of operation for foreign policy making had become the NSC system and the personal diplomacy effected by the President and his chief emissary, Henry Kissinger, whose activities were principally conducted under the shroud of high level, secret diplomacy.

The earliest policy statements and progress reports of the administration tended to focus on the efforts to resolve U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War. As these policy positions evolved, the theme of the discussions, which centered on South-East Asia (S.E. Asia), became known as the Nixon Doctrine. That policy, expressed for the first time in the President's Guam press conference of November 3, 1969, stressed three guidelines which, taken together, provided an "essential rationale for
retrenchment" of U.S. "material and political involvement in behalf of other states." 38 As such, its essential thrust involved self-reliance for other states with U.S. burdens of support being taken up much more selectively and, then, only in partnership with a state which had demonstrated its willingness to help itself, first and foremost.

Robert E. Osgood suggests that the broader and more "coherent conception of the patterns and modes of international politics and their relationship to America's position in the structure of international power" put forward by Nixon might be more properly called the "Nixon Strategy." 39 The basic features of this strategy included: a) "the achievement of an international order congenial to American values, an aim that transcends specific tangible interests in various parts of the world," b) the pursuit of a "stable structure of relationships" as the basis for the evolving international order; and c) the pursuit of these aims through negotiations and diplomacy. 40

Nixon's first annual report to the Congress provided a comprehensive exposition of his views on the "new era of international relations." That new era would involve "a new U.S. approach to foreign policy." 41 The postwar period had ended; the military balance of power had been altered with both sides recognizing a "vital mutual interest in halting the dangerous momentum of the nuclear arms race"; and the former vitality of the "isms" was alleged to have
been lost. The framework for a durable peace was to be built on partnership, strength, and a willingness to negotiate. Furthermore, policy needed to be creative, systematic, based on facts, knowledgeable of alternatives, prepared for crises, and effectively implemented. Thus, the Nixon Strategy was a formulation of a significantly altered, if not altogether new, U.S. foreign policy approach in a world which had undergone dramatic changes in the post-war era. A fundamental element among those changes was the increased Soviet strategic and conventional strength and the consequent alteration it had effected in the balance of power. As Nixon's foreign policy views would unfold over time, the importance of secondary orbits of power such as the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) and the economic and political power of Western Europe (e.g., the European Economic Community) and Japan would be added to his concept of a more fluid and complex arrangement of the international order. So complete was Nixon's belief in fundamental changes in the balance of power that international order was expected to involve a complete muting of military power relations by some future date (5, 10 or 15 years from 1971) when Nixon expected the world could witness the emergence of "five great economic superpowers" whose power would "determine the economic future and, because economic power will be the key to other kinds of power, the future of the world in other ways in the last third of the century."
The predilection of the Nixon administration to view the "era of negotiation" in terms of an emerging economic order and a muted traditional power confrontation is a critical assumption in the Nixon appraisal of Third World realities, especially that of Africa. Thus, the Nixon Report of 1970 formalized the administration's dim view of Africa's problems and future prospects. The report acknowledged an awareness of the "grave problems" the continent still faced and the previous lack of a "clear conception" by America regarding relationships with Africa and her particular problems. In the report, Nixon asserted two major concerns for the U.S. "regarding the future of Africa":

1. That the Continent be free of great power rivalry or conflict in any form. This is even more in Africa's interest than in ours.

2. That Africa realize its potential to become a healthy and prosperous region in the international community. Such an Africa would not only be a valuable economic partner for all regions, but would also have a greater stake in the maintenance of a durable world peace. 46

The Nixon Report (1970) went on to enumerate three challenges to the African continent: economic development, weathering the inevitable strains of nationhood, and the deep-seated tension in the southern sixth of the Continent. In regard to the latter region, the report asserted that the U.S. "stands firmly for the principles of racial equality and self-determination," yet,

At the same time, the 1960's have shown all of us - Africa and her friends alike - that the racial problems in the southern region of the Continent will not be
solved quickly. Those tensions are deeply rooted in the history of the region, and thus in the psychology of both black and white.

Though we abhor the racial policies of the white regimes, we cannot agree that progressive change in Southern Africa is furthered by force. The history of the area shows all too starkly that violence and the counterviolence it inevitably provokes will only make more difficult the task of those on both sides working for progress on the racial question. 47

A key point throughout the Nixon years was his view concerning outside interference, and with regard to it, Nixon's language was strong and forthright. His statement was at once a warning and a plea for self restraint in the actions of other states toward Africa. Its significance lies in its implied acknowledgement that conditions were indeed ripe (especially in southern Africa) for such interference and in the prescriptive notion that the restraint of the U.S. should be matched by the restraint of others. As noted earlier, the relative lack of Soviet activity in Africa in the late 60's had provided a favorable circumstance for a parallel U.S. disinterest in the continent. 48 That fact notwithstanding, the U.S. position on noninterference involved a curious blend of assumptions, prescription, and expectation concerning the prospects for outside influence upon African problems. As a guide to actual practice, it was elevated to the status of a central tenet of U.S. policy regarding Africa:

The United States is firmly committed to non-interference in the Continent, but Africa's future depends also on the restraint of other great powers. No one should seek advantage from Africa's need for assistance, or from instability. 49
The first Nixon Report had tacitly combined the concepts of self-reliance from the Nixon Doctrine with the 'five pillars' concept of 'leaving Africa's problems to the resolution of Africans.' In one regard, these were the reverse side of the non-interference tenet, while in another regard, they constituted a defense mechanism to the double approach-avoidance conflict over meddling in the difficult, intractable problems faced by the Africans. On the clearly positive side, the U.S. outlook represented in the first Nixon Report permitted maximum latitude to Africans (black and white) to resolve their own problems, and satisfied the desire of most black African leaders to have the superpowers stay out of their conflicts. In 1970, the U.S.-African relationship was largely satisfactory (on the surface) and the Nixon Report had warmly welcomed the initiative of the Lusaka Manifesto of 1969. That Manifesto was a declaration by fourteen black African leaders to pursue a negotiated "peaceful transfer of power, over an undefined period, to African majority rule." 50

Nixon's second annual report to the Congress in 1971 was a modest reformulation of the main themes contained in the first, along with a status report on the accomplishments of the preceding year. The "core" of his foreign policy was the search for an international structure based on partnership with the "necessary adjuncts of strength to secure our interests and negotiations to reconcile them with the interests of others." 51
relations between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. required a willingness "to practice self-restraint in the pursuit of national interests," and the respect of each for the interests of the other.

The discussion of U.S. policy toward Africa was revised in the second report and organized around the concepts of peace, development, and justice as goals of Africa's current political life. U.S. support was directed toward providing various forms of assistance in attaining those goals, "as our resources permit." The report's discussion of justice included a review of U.S. policy measures regarding racial and political justice in southern Africa. For the U.S., "the violence to human dignity implicit in apartheid" should not be condoned nor could a "violent solution to these problems." The discussion on justice concluded with an important statement on the white regimes of the region: "We do not...believe the isolation of the white regimes serves African interests, or our own, or that of ultimate justice. A combination of contact and moral pressure serves all three." These words were of far-reaching importance, for, while the U.S. remained firmly committed to evolutionary change, the nature of U.S. policy practices was undergoing a subtle but significant shift. During the Johnson administration, policy toward southern Africa had been based on support of black goals and aspirations, principally through the combination of moral and economic pressures on the white
regimes of Rhodesia, South Africa and the Portuguese territories. By February of 1971, the Nixon administration had undertaken to apply its influence on these regimes through a combination of contact and moral pressure. Contact, as its policy in practice would indicate, involved a relaxation of the restrictions on arms embargoes and Export-Import Bank credits to the RSA and Portuguese territories, and the lifting of economic sanctions on Rhodesia to facilitate chrome imports to the U.S. Contact provided a more flexible mechanism for U.S. policy, served to improve U.S. economic relations in southern Africa (with the white redoubt), and provided a clear indication that the white regimes were not to be subjected to further isolation from the U.S. under the Nixon Administration.

These developments appear to have been the consequence of a number of interrelated factors. Perhaps the most basic factor was a fundamental difference in philosophical and political outlook. The issue of sanctions involves the practical question of whether 'the carrot or the stick' is most effective in inducing another political entity to respond in a desired manner. While the Johnson administration had indicated its predilection through endorsing and supporting various UN-initiated economic restrictions against the white regimes, his successors evidenced a preference to seek favorable results through economic inducements and solicitations rather than sanctions. More specifically, however, two events in the
first year of the Nixon administration provided an impetus to the relaxation of economic pressure on the white regimes. The first was the major review of American policy toward southern Africa ordered on April 10, 1969: NSSM 39 included a review of past and present policy but focussed on a thorough and extraordinarily rational examination of five options for 'future policy' toward the region. \(^{56}\) In spite of some redeeming virtues, NSSM 39 has been assailed as the quasi-philosophical foundation for a pronounced negative turn in U.S. policy toward southern Africa, generally, under the Nixon and Ford administrations. \(^{57}\)

According to one analyst, Edgar Lockwood, the substantive analysis of NSSM 39 misperceived the basic issues at stake in the minds of black Africans in southern Africa. The issue was not racial prejudice or discrimination - its social context - but the more fundamental political issue of transferring power from the control of white minority regimes to the black majority. \(^{58}\) A major part of the analytical difficulty lies in the premises of Option 2: "The whites are here to stay and the only way that constructive change can come about is through them." \(^{59}\) There is a broad consensus among analysts that Option 2 became the implicit, if not explicit, operational mode for the Nixon administration. As a result, its 'premises', 'posture' and 'operational examples' have provided a fruitful starting point for analyzing certain of the outlooks and intentions of those who managed the U.S.
policy toward Africa in those years. A portion of the "General Posture" for Option 2 illustrates the point:

We would maintain public opposition to racial repression but relax political isolation and economic restrictions on the white states. We would begin by modest indications of this relaxation, broadening the scope of our relations and contacts gradually and to some degree in response to tangible – albeit small and gradual – moderation of white policies. . . . At the same time we would take diplomatic steps to convince the black states of the area that their current liberation and majority rule aspirations in the south are not attainable by violence and that their only hope for a peaceful and prosperous future lies in closer relations with white dominated states. . . . This option accepts, at least over a 3 to 5 year period, the prospects of unrequited US initiatives toward the whites and some opposition from the blacks in order to develop an atmosphere conducive to change in white attitudes through persuasion and erosion.\(^{60}\)

A number of analyses have demonstrated the lingering affect of NSSM 39 perspectives on subsequent foreign policy problems encountered by Nixon, Ford, and Kissinger in southern Africa. One such analysis by John Marcum concerning the lessons of Angola points to the NSSM 39 view that "African insurgent movements were ineffectual and not 'realistic or supportable' alternatives to continued colonial rule." Moreover, in regard to the black insurgency movements and the prospects of their achieving success the NSSM analysis "questioned 'the depth and premanence of black resolve' and 'ruled out a black victory at any stage.'\(^{61}\) These perspectives were proven patently wrong with the abrupt termination of Portuguese control over the territories of Mozambique and Angola in 1975.\(^{62}\) Marcum's analysis illustrates not only the perceptual weaknesses of NSSM 39 but its particular susceptibility to
being overcome by events in a volatile and potentially revolutionary environment. More significantly, the perceptions and expectations of NSSM 39 tended to distort analysis and acceptance of intelligence reports that things were changing both in Portugal and in the colonies. The rigidities induced by 'hanging onto the white regimes' and doubting the prospect for a black resolution until it was a virtual fait accompli neutralized the prospects for U.S. policy adaptations and flexibility as events unfolded in southern Africa.

A second impetus to a relaxation of the economic pressure on the white regimes originated in the bureaucracy. In December 1969, Maurice Stans, the Secretary of Commerce, submitted a memorandum to the President containing four recommendations for U.S. policy on economic relations with southern Africa. Stans' recommendations represented the narrowly defined economic views of a classic Allisonian Model II bureaucratic organization. His recommendations, however, closely paralleled certain of the operating examples that had appeared in Option 2 of NSSM 39. He urged the easing of restrictions on export promotion to the Republic of South Africa (RSA); making all Export-Import Bank credit and facilities, and especially direct credits, available to the RSA; easing the arms embargo on RSA to a point "no more restrictive than the norm applied by other major trading nations adhering to the relevant UN resolutions": and
modifying the U.S. economic sanctions against Rhodesia to permit imports of chrome ore.  

The effort to ease economic restrictions against the white regimes of southern Africa in 1969 and 1970 closely paralleled the prescriptive measures outlined in NSSM 39. The approach was undertaken incrementally and with care not to stir overt opposition to economic practices reflecting political or psychological support for those regimes; NSDM 75, "the 150,000 ton exception," was approved in 1970 permitting Union Carbide to import chrome from Rhodesia. This action overturned the Johnson policy prohibiting such imports as well as the U.N. resolution of December 16, 1966 establishing the selective mandatory sanctions against Rhodesia.

With these developments as a background, the passage of the Byrd Amendment seemed all the more astonishing as a blatant shift away from support for the black movements of southern Africa. In fact, the Byrd Amendment (introduced by Senator Harry Byrd, I-VA) was a complex matter that represented several disparate factors intersecting in an action that had the appearance of a major reversal and substantial betrayal to the Black African cause. Since it was originally drafted as an amendment to the United Nations Participation Act of 1971, it is evident that its supporters viewed it, at least in part, as a unilateral means by which the U.S. could avoid or circumvent the increasingly strident postures being taken by the U.N., in

-48-
particular with regard to sanctions in southern Africa. Secondly, the increasing militancy of U.N. positions had exceeded the bounds to which the majority of the congress would go in the application of the 'stick' to Rhodesia. Thirdly, and most importantly, the supporters of the amendment had made a clever use of a) lingering cold war sentiments by suggesting the vulnerabilities of the US to its increasing dependence on imports of chrome ore from the USSR, given the sanctions on Rhodesian ore; and b) the adverse effects that sanctions had caused in the price of chrome, in the U.S. steel market, in unemployment, and in depletion of the national chrome ore stockpile. 65

The administration seems to have been only mildly opposed to the measure since its opposition was merely token. Passage of the amendment seems to have been one of those unique occasions when blatant international costs to national prestige were accepted in order to facilitate or to bolster domestic power politics, U.S. sovereignty in relation to the U.N., and especially a narrowly defined, short-term concept of national interest. The amendment, which ultimately was enacted as a statutory change to the Strategic and Critical Materials Stockpiling Act after being signed by the President on November 17, 1971, provided that the president could "not prohibit the importation of a strategic material from a free world country, if such a material is being imported from a Communist-dominated country." 66
Passage of the Byrd Amendment by Congress aroused quick and negative reactions in the U.N. which "expressed grave concern" over the U.S. prospective violation of Security Council resolutions, even before the document was signed. The U.S. action was a remarkable departure from the Kennedy-Johnson years when the U.S. had usually provided conscientious support to the black African independence initiatives of U.N. It was a clear reflection of the Nixon administration's growing irritation over and antipathy for U.N. politics. The developments of 1971 within the U.N. General Assembly "afforded a dramatic illustration of the divergence on policy toward Southern Africa that had developed between the United States and a majority of U.N. member nations, particularly those belonging to the Communist and 'third world' groups."67

By comparison with the first two Nixon Reports to congress, the third report (February 1972) was considerably more muted in its tone regarding Africa's future and its "awesome problems" of modernization and the southern Africa problem. The most striking new proposal was the notion put forth of a "policy of economic support, political restraint, and mutual respect." 68 Restraint was rationalized in regard to southern Africa in the following statements:

The notion that one nation, however powerful or well-intentioned, can master the most intractable issues plaguing foreign societies belongs to a past era. For our part, we look toward black and white in Africa to play the primary role in working toward progress consistent with human dignity. Southern Africa
contains within itself the seeds of change. We can and will work with others to encourage that process. 69

The "successes" of the Nixon years in foreign policy initiatives were the high priority issues of detente, Salt I, and the rapprochement begun with the PRC. These events of 1971, and principally of 1972, provided a degree of confidence that emerges in the fourth Nixon Report. The discussion is more candid and forthright with regard to Africa as well. The policy goals of the U.S. remained "unchanged: political stability, freedom from great power intervention, and peaceful economic and social development." 70 Non-interference in African internal affairs was still considered a "cardinal principle of United States policy" and "restraint should characterize great powers conduct." 71

In his fourth report, Nixon's treatment of the southern Africa problem exhibited a very new bent - on open recognition of South Africa as "a dynamic society with an advanced economy." 72 In a paragraph concerning the U.S. approach toward RSA, the language is a virtual replica of elements in NSSM 39:

We have sought to maintain contact with all segments of South African society. We do not endorse the racial policies of South Africa's leaders. But we do not believe that isolating them from the influence of the rest of the world is an effective way of encouraging them to follow a course of moderation and to accommodate change. 73

The history of his administration's difficulties in the U.N. over Africa and other Third World issues was being complicated by the emergence of the nonalignment movement.
and its ability as a third power bloc to exert international pressure on the U.S. or USSR. Nixon's scheme of "stable structures" was confronted with the new difficulties and uncertainties of this power factor which undoubtedly helped to prompt his remarks that: "We have an interest in the independence and nonalignment of African countries. We ask only that they take truly nonaligned positions on world issues and on the roles of the major powers." 74

Finally, the dominant theme of his approach to Africa was reiterated: "We will continue to encourage evolutionary change in Southern Africa through communication with the peoples of the area and through encouragement of economic progress." 75

Richard Nixon left to his successor a foreign policy legacy marked by four significant features, each of which would have an effect on future relations with southern Africa. First, the mechanism of foreign policy decision making had become progressively more centralized and compartmentalized within the executive branch. It included the President, his personal advisors, and a small group of analysts in the NSC and State Department, both of which were headed by Henry Kissinger, after his appointment as Secretary of State. Thus, to a substantial degree the fortunes and fate of U.S. foreign policy had come to rest more and more on the shoulders of one man and on his abilities, organization, and use of available time.
Second, the transition from the cold war to detente had been facilitated, but the 'new' relations between the superpowers had not been thoroughly tested; had been subjected to the icy chill of reactions over Soviet involvement in the Yom Kippur War of October 1973; and had carried into the "new era" mutual propensities for reflexive fears, mistrust, and apprehension.

Third, the foreign policy of the U.S. toward southern Africa had been fully rationalized and elaborated in a logical progression from NSSM 39 through Nixon's fourth report to the Congress. During the Nixon years, the official outlook on Africa had been that it neither represented nor involved "vital interests for the U.S.", and that the dominant characteristic in Africa was the prevalence of "intractable problems." Given these "realities", the assumption and prescription that other states become more self-reliant (Nixon Doctrine), and the prescription and expectation that the superpowers would not interfere in Africa (an element of Detente), the operating principle for U.S. policy was "to leave Africa to the Africans." These perceptions were representative of an apparent paradox in the administration's thinking: its attitudes indicated a marked bias toward preservation of the status quo and yet seemed to acknowledge that if change were indeed to come it ought to be through evolutionary change. These seemingly contradictory notions lay at the foundation of Nixon's policy toward southern Africa, which
witnessed the gradual reorientation of U.S. tangible and intangible interests away from support for black African goals and aspirations and toward contact, communication, and perceived, if unintentional, support of incumbent white regimes.

Fourth, and perhaps most significantly, the American domestic base was beginning to unravel for a number of diverse reasons, many of which were directly associated with the person and style of Nixon himself. Clearly, post-Vietnam insecurities, frustrations, and doubts were major contributing factors apart from Nixon, but he was tainted by association with a number of its effects and symbolic characterizations. The first was the growing suspicion of the executive branch as an "imperial" (dangerously non-democratic) source of power and decision making in foreign policy matters. The second feature concerned the secretiveness and exclusiveness of high level personal diplomacy. Next, serious questions were being asked about the authority to undertake and to provide control over covert operations in a democracy (e.g., the CIA role in the overthrow of Allende in Chile in 1973) which involved a number of significant questions and problems related to national intelligence gathering and clandestine operations. Finally, in these and other areas of domestic and foreign concerns, the Congress was beginning to reassert prerogatives and to raise questions which for the Ford administration would become major
stumbling blocks in pursuit of its foreign policy toward southern Africa in late 1975 and early 1976.

C. 1974-1976, THE FORD ADMINISTRATION AND A NEW POLICY TOWARD SOUTHERN AFRICA

The Ford Administration inherited the foreign policy strengths and weaknesses of the Nixon era along with the mechanisms and personnel that had superintended that policy. Unfortunately, in policy matters and public confidence, the U.S. had experienced a trying year prior to August 9, 1974 when Gerald R. Ford assumed the Presidency. Not only was the country troubled over its experiences in Vietnam, but it had undergone a major domestic political crisis in the Watergate scandal and Nixon's resignation. U.S. - Soviet relations were floundering over continued SALT II and Mutually Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) negotiations, and problems over trade and economic relations produced through the mutual obstinacy of the two countries. In other areas (e.g., energy problems, peace efforts in the Middle East, the Cyprus Crisis, nuclear non-proliferation, and mounting pressure of third world power politics in opposition to the industrialized countries and their policies), events and trends seemed to converge in increased frustrations and problem-ridden concerns for the U.S. in 1974.

The new president was subjected to pressures almost immediately. The increasingly important consequences of
the Portuguese coup of April 1974, had begun to find tangible expression by late in the year. The "winds of change" had heightened black African and third world pressure on the white regimes of southern Africa, especially in the principal forum of expression, the U.N. Thus, after unsuccessful attempts to have the Republic of South Africa's "credentials" nullified and to expel her from the U.N. (October 30, 1974), a ruling on November 12, 1974 temporarily suspended South Africa from participation in the General Assembly. Later in the year, the U.S. incurred a direct U.N. censure (December 13, 1974) for the continued importation of chrome and nickel from Rhodesia under the Byrd Amendment.

The continuity in U.S. policy toward southern Africa under Ford was reflected in Secretary Kissinger's words to the foreign ministers and permanent representatives of the states in the OAU on September 23, 1975. Kissinger's address referred to the "three major concerns" which America had with regard to Africa:

That Africa attain prosperity for its people and become a strong participant in the economic order, an economic partner with a growing stake in the international system; that self-determination, racial justice, and human rights spread to all Africa; and that the continent be free of greatpower rivalry or conflict.

In the same address, Secretary Kissinger referred to the issue of Angola in such a muted tone that one is compelled to note the dichotomy between "words and deeds." In the discussion and analysis to follow, it will become obvious that Kissinger's knowledge of and involvement with
the Angola situation was considerably more intimate than his words to the OAU group seemed to convey. Kissinger remarked:

But I want to say a cautionary word about Angola. Events in Angola have taken a distressing turn, with widespread violence. We are most alarmed at the interference of extra-continental powers who do not wish Africa well and whose involvement is inconsistent with the promise of true independence. We believe a fair and peaceful solution must be negotiated, giving all groups representing the Angolan people a fair role in its future. 82

One analyst concludes that U.S. involvement in Angola was already considerable by September 1975, having been re-initiated in January. At that time, the CIA and the NSC "40 Committee," 83 cognizant of a renewed Soviet effort to support the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and of the prospect that the contending factions of the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (NFLA) and the National Union for Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) would be at a disadvantage in this circumstance, had authorized the expenditure of $300,000 in CIA funds for support of the FNLA. 84 After a Soviet resupply of some estimated 100 tons of arms and associated material to the MPLA between March and June of 1975, the CIA, NSC and State Department were directed to undertake a study of possible alternative U.S. actions. On July 18, the "40 Committee" approved an increase in U.S. covert assistance to both the FNLA and UNITA. Bender reports that: "The $14 million which was approved in July was increased to $25 million in August and to about $32 million in November." 85
Between July and August of 1975, however, the tactical successes of the FNLA/UNITA forces reversed the earlier successes of the MPLA achieved through July 1975. These FNLA/UNITA successes were supported by South African, Zairian, and miscellaneous 'Western' mercenary forces, which internationalized the combat on a regional basis. In response to the threat posed to the MPLA by the intervention of South African forces on October 23, 1975, the Soviets and Cubans undertook a substantial increase in their support effort in late October and November 1975. This support effort included more Soviet military equipment and advisors and an increase in Cuban armed forces personnel. 86

Further efforts by the Ford administration to bolster the FNLA/UNITA forces, however, began to encounter resistance within the Congress. Senate Foreign Relations hearings were held on November 6, 1975 to ascertain the degree to which U.S. covert operations in Angola had been undertaken. Leaks of that hearing's testimony appeared the next day in The New York Times which opened the issues to public scrutiny and to an evolving polarization of the issue between the administration and the Congress. 87 Through January of 1976 the administration continued to push for an active U.S. role in financial and military support to the FNLA/UNITA, but actions by the Senate and House had effectively neutralized any prospect for continued covert operations and seriously undermined
administration proposals for direct overt support to the FNLA/UNITA factions. In the meantime, the Cuban presence and Soviet support had begun to turn the tactical advantage back to the MPLA who by February 1976 had obtained a substantial military victory throughout the country.88

In a statement on the "Implications of Angola for Future U.S. Foreign Policy" before the Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, January 29, 1976, Secretary Kissinger analyzed the administration's position on Angola and what the decision to withdraw from continued competition might mean for U.S. foreign policy. The statement clearly revealed the bipolar prism through which the administration, and especially, Kissinger, continued to view the Angolan situation, at the cost of perceiving accurately the complicated internal dynamics of the situation.89 In excerpts from the statement, Kissinger asserted that:

The classical pattern of accumulating marginal advantage must be overcome and mankind must build more constructive patterns if catastrophe is to be avoided.

But our efforts have been founded upon one fundamental reality: peace requires a sense of security, and security depends upon some form of equilibrium between the great powers. And that equilibrium is impossible unless the United States remains both strong and determined to use its strength when required.

If a continent such as Africa, only recently freed from external oppression, can be made the arena for greatpower ambitions, if immense quantities of arms can affect far-off events, if large expeditionary forces can be transported at will to dominate virtually helpless peoples - then all we have hoped for in building a more stable and rational international order is in jeopardy.

-59-
The effort of the Soviet Union and Cuba to take unilateral advantage of a turbulent local situation where they have never had any historical interests is a willful, direct assault upon the recent constructive trends in U.S. - Soviet relations and our efforts to improve relations with Cuba. It is an attempt to take advantage of our continuing domestic division and self-torment. Those who have acted so recklessly must be made to see that their conduct is unacceptable.

Angola represents the first time since the aftermath of World War II that the Soviets have moved militarily at long distances to impose a regime of their choice. It is the first time that the United States has failed to respond to Soviet military moves outside their immediate orbit. And it is the first time that Congress has halted the executive's action while it was in the process of meeting this kind of threat.

America's modest direct strategic and economic interests in Angola are not the central issue. The question is whether America still maintains the resolve to act responsibly as a great power - prepared to face a challenge when it arises, knowing that preventive action now may make unnecessary a more costly response later.

For Kissinger and the administration the principal objective in Angola had been "to respond to an unprecedented application of Soviet power achieved in part through the expeditionary force of a client state." The U.S. preoccupation with the bipolar relationship also pervaded the second objective: "To help our friends in black Africa who oppose Soviet and Cuban intervention." Observers and African specialists at State, in the Congress, and in academia were taking into account additional factors internal not only to Angola, but also to the perceived mood and attitudes of the domestic constituency in the U.S. For a number of the critics of the administration's policy, global interests needed first
of all to be balanced with realistic appraisals of the capabilities of the FNLA/UNITA, their prospects for success, and the resultant short and longer run advantages and disadvantages of U.S. participation in the struggle. For most of those critics, and for many different reasons, the wisest course of action seemed to be to take 'no side' in the struggle; that is, for America to stay out of Angola. 93 Some assessments of the Angolan crisis went even further in suggesting that the administration had failed to acknowledge one of the "vital lessons" of Vietnam -- that "both 'global' and 'local' circumstances must be carefully considered before the U.S. commits itself to a faction in a foreign civil war." 94

U.S. policy problems over Angola were not ended, and indeed were worsened, by the U.S. reluctance to recognize the new MPLA government and insistence on tying South African withdrawal from Angola to a complete withdrawal of Soviet and Cuban forces. According to Colin Legum, a letter circulated to the African heads of state prior to the OAU summit of February 1976 suggesting this precondition, linked the U.S. more completely to the RSA in the eyes of some black Africans and alienated others like Nigeria's head of state, General Murtala Mohammed. The latter was prompted to criticize President Ford's "presumption" and "flagrant insult" to the intelligence of African rulers and to question: "How can we now be led to believe that a Government with a record such as the U.S.
has in Africa can suddenly become the defender of our interests?" 95

The crisis in Angola had revealed a number of basic problems in the U.S. policy toward southern Africa. Not only had the substantive efforts of the administration failed to effect a desired outcome, but the Soviet and Cuban presence had been firmly implanted in Angola, threatening not only the rest of southern Africa, but also U.S. interests regionally and globally. Furthermore, the Angolan crisis had provided blatant proof of the lack of domestic consensus on a policy not only for Angola but for the region generally. Under these circumstances a serious reappraisal of U.S. policy was called into existence producing the one benefit that was to come of the Angola crisis for U.S. policy - a new policy, founded on a new role of restrained, but positive activism in the politics of the region.

The new post-civil war policy was expressed by Secretary Kissinger at Lusaka, Zambia on April 27, 1976. According to Bender, that new policy was based on the U.S. desire to prevent the Soviet Union and Cuba from expanding their influence in the region and included a dual approach. First, to "vigorously" endorse majority rule in Rhodesia and Namibia; and second, to "prevent 'further Angolas' by threatening U.S. retaliation if the Soviets or Cubans become involved in either of the territories dominated by white minority regimes." 96
In its elaboration of a ten point plan for transitioning Rhodesia to majority rule, the new policy offered a combined U.S.-UK proposal for resolution of the most urgent and potentially volatile issue in the region. There was remarkable objectivity to the policy which avoided choosing any of the "sides" or political factions in the conflict over Rhodesia. Moreover, the new policy marked the first occasion in the Nixon-Ford era when the U.S. had taken a specific stand founded in both action and rhetoric favoring demonstrable changes toward black majority rule in the region. In his analysis of the policy, Bender contends that the new policy averted an "almost certain collision course with the Soviet Union and/or Cuba over an issue [majority rule in Rhodesia.]" In the process, the U.S. had refined its notion of 'leaving Africa to the Africans' by allying itself with the opinions and decisions, first, of the front line states, and second, of the OAU. While the issue of majority rule in South Africa was left purposefully vague, a more vehement protestation was leveled against Pretoria for its policy of apartheid. At Lusaka, Kissinger had urged the RSA to utilize its influence to "promote a rapid negotiated settlement for majority rule in Rhodesia." In this approach, the U.S. had redefined its relationship with Pretoria while recognizing the continuing importance and influence the RSA held for future regional political developments.
In the pronouncement of a new U.S. policy toward southern Africa and the efforts of his shuttle diplomacy that followed it, Kissinger once again displayed a remarkable degree of flexibility and adaptability. From the depths of frustration and ineffectiveness in the late stages of the Angolan Crisis, the U.S. found itself by September - October 1976 in the position of a major mediator in the negotiations for transition to majority rule, particularly in Rhodesia. That turn of events had neutralized the immediate opportunities for Soviet involvement in accelerating guerilla warfare and revolutionary change in the region. Moreover, the new U.S. presence had dramatically improved the prospects for a moderate course of development in the region under much more stabilized circumstances, although a clear potential existed for further accelerations of conflict and hostility. While there were many complex issues to be encountered and solved, perhaps over a long period of time, the U.S. had chosen a new course reflecting an awareness of not only the African realities involved, but also the hopes and aspirations of its people and leaders as well.

While the Ford administration had managed a remarkable recovery in the reformulation and espousal of a southern Africa policy, a number of problems remained which became focal points of election year politics regarding foreign policy. The U.S. foreign policy proposals of the Democratic Party Platform of 1976 focussed attention on
reorientation of U.S. thinking regarding "the intrinsic importance of Africa and its development to the U.S." Such thinking was viewed "in terms of enlightened U.S.-African priorities, not a corollary of U.S.-Soviet policy." Among the measures proposed in the party platform were:

1. To promote African economic development through increased bilateral and multilateral assistance.
2. To reorient policy towards unequivocal and concrete support of majority rule in southern Africa.
3. To tighten the arms embargo on RSA.
4. To deny tax advantages to all corporations doing business in RSA and Rhodesia who support or participate in apartheid practices and policies.
5. To repeal the Byrd Amendment and fully endorse UN-ordered Rhodesian sanctions.
6. To avoid any activity regarding Namibia that would recognize or support the illegal RSA administration of that territory.
7. To undertake efforts to normalize relations with Angola.

These proposals were to function as the operational premises of the new Carter administration policy toward Africa, yet difficulties remained over the legacy of U.S. policy through the preceding years. Summing up the problems of that past policy in an election night address in Boston, Senator Dick Clark remarked that:

Indeed, the trouble with our African policy and with much of our policy towards other nations and continents is that it has been tied too closely to grand strategy - too tightly to the perceived immediate exigencies of thwarting Soviet power, and with too little thought about either the indigenous needs of the people who are affected by our policy or about the long-term interest of the United States.
D. U.S. POLICY IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE ANGOLAN CRISIS

The analysis to this point has presented an historical review of U.S. foreign policy toward southern Africa in the period 1954-1976. The developments of that period were important elements preconditioning the international competition that emerged over Angola in 1975-76. That crisis found fundamental aspects of U.S. policy either threatened or directly violated by the escalating nature of Soviet and Cuban support to the MPLA. While U.S. covert operations in support of the FNLA, and later the FNLA/UNITA, may have been contributing factors to the Soviet escalation, the outcome of the crisis found the U.S. handcuffed by domestic constraints on further commitments, and the Soviets and Cubans rather firmly entrenched in Angola. The crisis had produced a breakdown in the status quo of the region through the combination of U.S. and Soviet increases in financial and/or military support to subnational factions; through the further internationalization produced by the incursion of regional combat forces; and through the inability of neighboring states and the OAU to control or significantly influence the resolution of internal conflicts from their earliest stages.
These breakdowns affected the essential features of U.S. policy toward Africa which had extended from the Kennedy years to the Ford Administration: noninterference in the affairs of Africa by the superpowers; limits to arms aid and sales as a means of maintaining a status quo among the states of Africa; and the encouragement of Africans to seek their own solutions for uniquely African problems. With these essential features of U.S. policy affected, a number of consequences emerged. Initially, there were subjective consequences which involved new and rather pressing questions concerning Soviet intentions; however, these brought into focus the full range of perceptions and counter-questions about both Soviet and U.S. behavior over Angola, and the global relations and intentions of the great powers. Analysts or observers in the U.S. whose perceptions were based on a cumulative assessment of Soviet adventurism in the Middle East, the continued buildup of Soviet strategic and conventional forces, the 'threat' of her expanding Navy, and the impressive dimensions of her logistical air and naval support to the Cubans and MPLA in Angola, found more than sufficient indicators to conclude that the Soviets were exhibiting blatant pursuit of world hegemony.

For others, less inclined to believe that the Soviets could even have (much less be embarked on) a 'grand design', Soviet opportunism in Angola, along with the aforementioned manifestations of increased power and
"reach", posed a new and substantial reason for re-evaluating the premises, expectations, and policy of detente. While perceptions and conclusions varied, the result of these analyses was becoming clearer: Soviet involvement in southern Africa had added a new and complicated dimension to U.S.-Soviet relations, which tended to provoke a tougher, more cautious U.S. approach in the fragile relationship of detente.

The Angolan Crisis was a watershed in the history of African decolonization. By the time the crisis had been settled with the MPLA's military victory in February 1976 and its recognition as the de facto power (the People's Republic of Angola), the political climate of southern Africa had been radically changed. The line of white redoubt had been pushed further south - now the outstanding issues were majority rule in Rhodesia, independence for Namibia from South Africa's "illegal" hold, and the ultimate problems of an end to apartheid and the development of autonomous political participation for South Africa's black majority. Prospects for settling these issues peacefully seemed, in the short run, to be far less likely given the Angolan precedent of massive outside intervention in the military-political struggle. The problems of southern Africa had undergone a major internationalization, adding another complex and potentially volatile dimension to the already complicated situation. Furthermore, two of the most powerful elements
in the southern African power equation had been dealt serious setbacks in the Angolan crisis. The OAU had exhibited little influence in ameliorating the internal conflicts of the three Angolan nationalist factions, and the South African armed forces committed to the Angolan offensive in October 1975 had met with substantial enough resistance (both military and political) to be withdrawn without having achieved either a military decision or a favorable political result by its intervention. In short, the power politics of southern Africa had undergone a dramatic, if not traumatic, readjustment. Superpower presence had altered the power situation significantly, but had not clarified the uncertain dimension of prospective violence in the region. Moreover, superpower involvement had complicated the number and nature of available options for competing factions and groupings within the region, adding yet another element of uncertainty.

The issues at stake in the political conflict of southern Africa had assumed a new cast with the increased interest, presence, and participation of the superpowers. The competitive nature of their relationship had increased the importance of their influencing or solving the region's political problems as a means of gaining access to or influence over economic markets, rich resources, favorable strategic dispositions, and status and prestige in the political courting of third world nations. These factors tended to further complicate the nature of southern
Africa's problems as the region became an increasingly important meeting ground of competing values, interests, goals, and ideologically-tinged aspirations. Southern Africa had become a highly complicated web manifesting uncertain prospects for either stability or chaos. Indeed, uncertainty and complexity were the principal elements of the situation in southern Africa as James E. Carter and his administration came to power in January of 1977.
III. 1977-1980 THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION

This chapter on the Carter Administration and its policy toward southern Africa will follow a different analytical approach than the preceding chapter which was principally a chronological approach. The following analysis of the Carter Administration is founded upon the proposition that a major internal transition has occurred in its foreign policy outlook and priorities. This transition, probably underway from as early as mid-1978, has become a clear manifestation in mid-1980. The significance of the transition is directly related to the changing perspectives of the Administration regarding U.S. relations with the Soviet Union. That critical element of foreign policy has begun to forge considerable changes in the overall foreign policy outlook that marked the early years of the Administration (from 1977 to late 1979). Thus it is possible to speak of two distinct phases in the Carter Administration's foreign policy. It is within this analytical framework that the development of and alterations in the Carter Administration's foreign policy toward southern Africa will be examined.

A. FOREIGN POLICY IN TRANSITION AND POTENTIAL CRISIS

The foreign policy of the United States under the Carter Administration has been marked most significantly by two transitional phases. The first transition was the
thoroughgoing and purposeful alteration in political philosophy and mode of conduct in foreign affairs following the Nixon and Ford Administrations. In both philosophy and style, the Carter Administration had rejected its predecessors' penchant for thinking and practicing 'realpolitik', their proclivity for secretive, centralized and personalized diplomacy; and their view of international affairs as essentially bipolar. The second transition, more complex and more difficult to analyze because it is still in progress, is and has been the internal readjustment, redefinition and even reversal of the foreign policy outlook and behavior of the administration in the face of certain compelling realities. The Carter Administration has been confronted by perceived setbacks not only in the form of international challenges and issues, but also in the form of sharpened and more persistent dissent and criticism at home. In 1979, national political awareness had already been heightened due largely to the domestic and international economic problems of inflation and energy and the domestic politics of a forthcoming election year. The crises in Iran (November 1979) and Afghanistan (December 1979), however, have stimulated a dramatic upsurge of popular concern in the U.S. with foreign affairs. President Carter and the members of his administration have begun to respond to these forces of international challenge and domestic pressure, in a manner which provides clear indications that
U.S. foreign policy is undergoing a major transition. In the short term, this second transition has produced a fluid and uncertain dimension to the conduct of foreign affairs. Perhaps even more significantly, however, it has tended to blur the sharp images of thought and perception that had emerged during the first several years of the administration when the predominant emphasis was clearly derived from a pluralistic, "world order" conception of America's role in foreign affairs.

While time will permit a clearer understanding and better historical perspective, there is sufficient evidence to outline the major features of both transitions of the Carter Administration. The first phase marked the transition in philosophy, principle, and action away from the dominant foreign policy outlook of the Nixon-Kissinger-Ford era toward the "new world order" international thinking of the Carter Administration. Political thought, prescription and action were dominated by the concepts of a pluralistic, diversified world environment; by a deemphasis in relative importance of the bipolar relations of the U.S. and the Soviet Union; by the emphasis given to the policy of human rights; by the promulgation of stricter arms control policies; and by the implementation of a regional approach to foreign policy problems rather than the geopolitical - 'realpolitik' approach of the Kissinger era. In the Carter Administration, phase one was a period marked by the
assertion of a U.S. foreign policy which acknowledged a leadership role for the U.S., but a role circumscribed (beyond the limits envisaged by Nixon and Kissinger) by the realities and demands of a progressively more complex and highly diversified world environment. The Carter Administration, like its immediate predecessors, had accepted the view that the power and influence of the United States was relatively diminished in comparison with earlier periods (the late 40's, 50's, and 60's) when the strategic and conventional military strengths of the United States and the Soviet Union had been the focal point for the creation of both the image and reality of two opposing international power blocs. While perceptions were not always clear about which state possessed the most (or the best) strategic nuclear strength, the threat of nuclear war and the capability of the superpowers to inflict unacceptable and relatively assured destruction upon each other was a perceived reality which dominated the cold war years and conferred upon the two leaders a preponderant political influence in the international community. The perceived disequilibrium in U.S. - Soviet strategic strength evidenced by the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 began to be rectified by the Soviets in a major military buildup starting in approximately 1968. The Soviet advance toward strategic parity ran roughly parallel with a second influence which sapped the confidence and the self-image of the U.S., the unsuccessful effort to effect a satisfactory
result in the war in Vietnam. No other event in the post-war years had given the U.S. pause to reflect on the limits of its power and influence (and even its will) as did the national trauma and tragedy of the Vietnam War. Its imprint was sharply etched in the thinking of the Carter Administration as the most significant indication that the world had become dramatically more complex and that the U.S. must be much more cautious in its commitment to the entanglements of Third World problems.

In the U.S., perceptions of important changes in the world situation had led Nixon and Kissinger to refer to a "new era of international relations" and to a new role for the foreign affairs of the U.S. Strategic parity with the Soviets, the intractable nature of Third World problems, and the limits on U.S. resources available to effect its political will in an intransigent outside world had led to the redefinition of the role for the U.S. in foreign affairs. These were embodied in the Nixon Strategy and contributed in part to the style and method of Mr. Kissinger's personal diplomacy. Under President Carter, the role of the U.S. was further redefined but in terms designed to effect "affirmative approaches" rather than reactive approaches. In this regard, the Carter Administration perceived that the near- and long-term interests and advantages of the U.S. lie in the ability and willingness to affirmatively facilitate the emerging (if as yet not well defined) "new world order". Thus, for the
Carter Administration, in phase one, the role of the United States was viewed as more limited in its direct ability to influence or control events and developments in the world at large (particularly through military means), and yet as well-positioned and equipped politically, socially, and economically to affect and influence indirectly the form and means by which the world, and particularly the emerging Third World, would evolve toward a "new order - a new international economic order, political order, information order, and technological order."\textsuperscript{103}

For the Carter Administration, however, a transition to phase two seems quite clearly to have come into existence by January of 1980. Dissapointments and setbacks encountered through the first three years of the administration had resulted in a gradual reassessment and readjustment of policy outlook and position. By 1979, the issue of human rights, once termed by President Carter "the soul of our foreign policy,"\textsuperscript{104} had been quietly withdrawn from the forefront of the administration's international concerns. Even the tough-minded early pronouncements of policy concerning controls on arms sales and military assistance to Third World countries had been eroded by the compelling reality that arms were a key element in U.S. bi- and multilateral diplomatic negotiations. Moreover, the administration had stood firm for nearly three years against the tide of rising protest and criticism of U.S. geopolitical decline (primarily as the result of the
continuing Soviet strategic and conventional military buildup; and the evidence of Soviet aggressive opportunism, military flexibility, and expansion of influence in Africa and South-East Asia). However, following the Soviet's incursion into Afghanistan in late December 1979, the administration was compelled to undertake a searching re-evaluation of its premises and expectations in dealing with the Soviet Union. That event, coupled with the international embarrassment and tragedy of the Iranian hostage crisis, had focussed national attention on the rampant instability and potential threat to our vital interests in the Persian Gulf.

These events and particularly the increased perceived threats to vital interests in the Persian Gulf region have resulted in a major shift in administration perspective and policy. That shift is the essential feature of phase two in the foreign policy of the Carter Administration. Already it has been marked by a number of significant developments. Among these are: the revitalization of a bipolar perspective of world events and developments, the emergence of heightened confrontation politics with the Soviets, and the suspension of the SALT II Treaty ratification process in the Senate. Furthermore, the resignation of Secretary of State Vance can be seen in part as the result of the bureaucratic conflict that was going on within the administration over the primacy of the policies and mode of phase one or the presumed need for the
policy toughness and hardline deemed desirable in phase two. 106

U.S. foreign policy caught up in such dramatic events and in such potentially extensive transition is a foreign policy which already exhibits crisis characteristics. It is faced with the prospect of reorientating and adjusting itself while holding together certain of the demonstrable advances and advantages it had attained during phase one, including its relations with the Third World and particularly with Africa. Thus, for example, having employed the techniques and practices of the phase one period to facilitate a settlement to the Zimbabwe-Rhodesia problem, the Carter Administration now faces a heightened prospect that excessive concern about the Soviets could undercut or even reverse the role the U.S. played in the settlement process.

The above explication of two phases in the foreign policy of the Carter Administration establishes the analytical framework for examining its policy toward southern Africa. In a process already begun, the following examination will concentrate on the philosophical underpinnings of the Carter Administration approach to the formulation and implementation of the policies which helped to facilitate the emergence of the independent and sovereign state of Zimbabwe in April 1980.
B. INITIAL FOREIGN POLICY EFFORTS AND THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION'S WORLD VIEW

As the Carter Administration assumed control of the U.S. foreign policy in early 1977, the Democratic platform proposals for U.S. policy toward Africa began slowly to be incorporated into a fully rationalized and institutionalized foreign policy for Africa. Two key appointments indicated the interest and concern of President Carter in the Third World and especially in African problems. The first was his appointment of the experienced, moderate, and highly respected Cyrus R. Vance, as Secretary of State, and the second was the symbolic and psychological advantage found in appointing the first black, Andrew Young, as U.S. Representative to the United Nations. Both men became influential actors and spokesmen of the administration's concerns for and policy toward the Third World, and especially for the heightened interest of U.S. policy generally toward Africa. U.S. concern with that continent was first demonstrable in the visits to Africa of high-level administration officials such as Mr. Vance and Mr. Young (in his ten day visit to the continent in February 1977), and of President Carter in his trip to Africa in April of 1978.

The early visits to Africa made by Young and then Vance were designed not only as symbolic gestures, but also as a means by which to solicit the views and recommendations of
African leaders as inputs and checks of the developing corpus of U.S. policy toward Africa. After several months, of analysis and gestation, that policy was formalized by Secretary Vance in an address entitled "The United States and Africa - Building Positive Relations" on July 1, 1977. In an analysis of that address, Jennifer Seymour Whitaker notes that Secretary Vance:

... emphasized the need to take an affirmative rather than a reactive approach, minimize the East-West competition so as not to allow it to distort regional events, recognized the importance to African states of economic development and indigenous nationalism, and affirm that economic cooperation and active diplomacy will constitute the main forms of interaction, with military ties and arms sales downplayed.107

A casual reading of Mr. Vance's address might lead one to judge that the Carter approach to Africa was little more than an evolutionary step along the track established by Mr. Kissinger's initiatives in southern Africa in April 1976. Under closer examination, however, the address actually defines an emerging Africa policy of the Carter Administration involving important departures from its predecessor, not only in philosophical outlook, but also in the assessment of U.S. policy interests and stakes involved in its relations with the continent. The Carter approach, rather than merely adjusting to the lead of its predecessor, had organized its thinking around a profoundly different mentality concerning Third World problems and had reconstructed a foreign policy to foster its views of the best interests of the U.S. Indeed, it is perhaps the
essential difference in the Carter approach to southern Africa in phase one that the problems of that region were viewed first (and primarily) on their own terms, and then as matters which affected and could be affected by U.S. interests there and in the rest of the continent. Thus, an increased and even major importance seems to have been attributed to the local complexities of "regional events" and to the analyses, objectives, and problem-solving techniques of black African leaders, with a resolve to fashion or re-fashion U.S. interests and participation as supporting, or even secondary, elements of the overall problem-solving process.

One of the early indications of a new Carter Administration perspective on U.S. interests in Africa could be found in the comments of William E. Schaufele, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, who in an April 16, 1977 address before the American Academy of Political and Social Science in Philadelphia specifically refuted the notions that U.S. interests in southern Africa were either strategic, military, or even primarily economic. As Adam and Stebbins have noted, by implication, Schaufele was indicating that "U.S. policies in southern Africa were founded in political interests - and, not least, on the concern for human rights and human dignity in Rhodesia, Namibia, and the Republic of South Africa." Such an implication was made explicit in the address on U.S. policy toward Africa by Mr. Vance in which he
prescribed not only the policy interest toward Africa, but also the basic propositions from which it was to proceed:

\[\ldots\text{ our policies must recognize the unique identity of Africa. We can be neither right nor effective, if we treat Africa simply as one part of the Third World, as a testing ground of East-West competition.}^{109}\]

Functioning with this basic proposition in mind, the basic objective and method of U.S. policy toward Africa would be:

\[\ldots\text{ to foster a prosperous and strong Africa that is at peace with the world. The long term success of the African policy will depend more on our actual assistance to African development and our ability to help Africans resolve their disputes than on maneuvers for short-term diplomatic advantage . . . the future of Africa will be built by African hands. Our interests and our ideals will be served as we offer our own support.}^{110}\]

Evidence of such support had already been signalled in the successful effort by the Carter Administration to have the Byrd Amendment repealed. No other overt action by the U.S. had carried the symbolic repudiation of previous administrations' supposed good will and supportive rhetoric toward black African nationalists as had that legislative provision which permitted the U.S. to import chrome and nickel from Rhodesia in defiance of the U.N. economic sanctions mandated in 1966. Following a vigorous effort by the administration to seek its repeal, the Byrd Amendment was terminated on March 18, 1977, only eight weeks into the new administration.\(^{111}\)

Other concerted efforts in the early months of the administration were directed at revitalizing the role of
the U.S. in making headway toward resolution of the independence problems in Rhodesia and Namibia and toward progress in black political participation in the Republic of South Africa. In regard to Rhodesia, on March 10, 1977, President Carter and British Prime Minister Callaghan had agreed to a new joint effort to resolve that problem peacefully with a new timetable aimed at achieving independence for Zimbabwe under majority rule by sometime in 1978. In May of 1977, Secretary Vance and British Foreign Secretary David Owen began to hammer out the details of the joint U.S.-British initiative under which the transition to black majority rule would presumably take place. With regard to the problems in Namibia, the U.S., on April 7th, had joined with the other four Western nations represented in the U.N. Security Council (Canada, France, West Germany, and the United Kingdom) to reassert their commitment to U.N. Security Council Resolution 385 and to urge South Africa's Prime Minister Johannes Vorster to set aside the so-called Windhoek Plan which was deemed totally unacceptable given the criteria set down in Resolution 385. And in mid-May, Vice President Mondale met in Vienna with Prime Minister Vorster "to convey the new policies of our administration, regarding southern Africa - specifically Rhodesia, Namibia, and South Africa itself."

Put most simply, the policy which the President wished me to convey was that there was need for progress on all three issues: majority rule for Rhodesia and Namibia and a progressive transformation of South African society to the same end. We believed it was
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particularly important to convey the depth of our convictions.116

The active pursuit of desirable changes in southern Africa by the Carter administration seemed very much indeed to spring from deep convictions. Those convictions may not have been readily identifiable (or even believable) to domestic or foreign observers in the first year of the administration; but the official speeches, pronouncements, and actions of high level administration personnel during the first two years of the administration now constitute a body of empirical evidence which reflect the political philosophy and world view out of which the new foreign policy of the U.S. was constructed. The critical relationship of those thoughts to the formulation and implementation of the Carter approach to foreign policy makes it instructive on its own merit to identify and examine the intellectual and philosophical underpinnings of the emergent foreign policy of the Carter Administration not only for its relevance in phase one, but as the point of departure for adaptations being undertaken in philosophy and outlook in phase two. Four features of the Carter Administration's philosophy and world view deserve particular attention: the premises of the philosophy and world view, the view concerning the nature of change, the goals of foreign policy as a reflection of philosophy and outlook, and the methods by which philosophy and policy are to be implemented.
The political philosophy and world view of the Carter Administration appear to have been founded on at least four premises. First and foremost, change in the world of domestic and especially international political life was inevitable. The fundamental interest of the U.S. and its political leadership was to get on the side of change or even to foster it in desirable directions, rather than to stand in its way or to simply react to it. Second, political leadership in the U.S. should strive to have its political activity guided by the moral and ethical principles and values to be found in the essential character of the nation. Third, the U.S. retained significant responsibilities in its role as a world leader, not only in relation to its allies and adversaries, but now progressively toward the Third World and to the unresolved problems affecting all humanity and the well-being of the planet. The fourth premise seemed at once to energize the others and in part to spring from them—the fundamental humanism that pervaded the political thinking and rhetoric of the administration. At its source one could detect a kind of moral repugnance at the depersonalized, dehumanizing nature of the bipolar confrontation, cold war, and attendant disregard for the "human element" in the foreign policy pursuits of the U.S. in the preceding decades.

Perhaps the central concern of the Carter Administration has been its observation of and philosophy
regarding the nature of change in today's world. Viewed as an inevitable phenomenon in today's world, change was, and continues to be perceived as extraordinarily complex, ongoing, and vast in both its extensive and intensive dimensions. The President's National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, has enunciated the view that a simple proposition helps explain the complexity of today's world; "we are living in an era of the most extensive and intensive political change in human history . . . our generation is living through a genuine global political awakening." 117 President Carter has repeatedly referred to the phenomena of change and has expressed the view that, "when I took office two years ago . . ., I was convinced that America had to pursue a changed course in a world which was itself undergoing vast change." 118

Critics of the Carter Administration have pointed out the potential weakness of being too preoccupied with the nature of change and especially with change in the Third World. Robert W. Tucker, for example, has suggested that the concern of the Carter Administration with "how to play a constructive role in this change, how to get on the side of it rather than to oppose it and to suffer increasing isolation from so many nations and peoples . . . has continued to evoke uncertainty in policy." 119 Given the implications of this concern with change (which included the view that the international system had become far more complex, far less hierarchical, more interdependent, and
less susceptible to the arbitrament of force as a means by which to resolve conflicts of interest), Tucker argues that the Carter Administration saw itself oriented toward a relevant future, in contrast with the Kissinger era in which U.S. foreign policy had been "mired in an irrevant past."\(^\text{120}\) According to Tucker's analysis, "the principal policy expression of this contrast was the emphasis placed by the Carter Administration on the importance of North-South relations" and its rejection of the Kissinger preoccupation with the tradition-bound perspectives of the East-West relationship.\(^\text{121}\) Moreover, "world order" politics were evoked in the North-South relationship, while the East-West relationship conjured up the irrelevance of balance-of-power politics.\(^\text{122}\)

Other observers, however, have perceived the world view and political philosophy of the Carter Administration quite differently. One observer contends that there are members of the Carter Administration who share some of the perceptual and intellectual outlooks of Henry Kissinger. Peter Jay, British Ambassador to the United States from 1977 to 1979, asserts that an undeclared intellectual consensus exists between Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski:

The undeclared intellectual consensus . . . goes well beyond the general notion of creative global pluralism as a basis for American involvement with friends and neutrals. The need for a higher cause than mere equilibrium and order, for a moral dimension, for the recognition that the necessary equilibrium and order have to be dynamic, not static, for appreciation of the
flexibility of political multipolarity contrasted with
the rigidity of military bipolarity, for relevance to
the problems of the emerging two-thirds of the world,
for avoiding exclusive preoccupation with U.S.-Soviet
relations, for seeking positive relations with the
Third World, for acknowledgement of turmoil as a
permanent condition of the world, for a new order
adjusted to this turbulence and for engaging the moral
sanctions of the American public - all emerge as shared
themes in their conceptual work (though not always in
their policy making). 123

Though certain conceptual themes may be shared by
Kissinger and Brzezinski, there have been distinctive
differences expressed by President Carter's assistant for
national security affairs. Even though he holds the
distinction of being the most widely recognized "hard-
liner" in the Carter Administration's higher echelons, Dr.
Brzezinski has developed something of a reputation as the
most eloquent spokesman in the administration in expounding
its philosophical and political views regarding change and
its implications in today's world. Among the most
important changes that have occurred in the international
environment, Dr. Brzezinski includes those that have
occurred in the relationship between the U.S. and the
Soviet Union, changes in the world at large, and the
changes that have demanded alteration in the nature of U.S.
foreign policy. Each of these are elements found in an
address prepared for the Trilateral Commission meeting in
Bonn, West Germany, October 30, 1977, in which Dr.
Brzezinski presented an analysis of "American Foreign
Policy and Global Change":

-88-
A secure and economically cooperative community of the advanced industrial democracies is the necessary source of stability for a broad system of international cooperation. We are aware of the pitfalls of constructing a geometric world . . . that leaves out the majority of mankind who live in the developing countries. A global structure that would ignore this reality would be inhumane, for it would reflect indifference to the hardships of others; it would be unrealistic, for we cannot ignore scores of nations with whom we are increasingly interdependent; and it would be damaging in the long run, for the problems that we neglect today will come back in a more virulent form tomorrow. We are therefore seeking to create a new political and international order that is truly more participatory and genuinely more responsive to the global desire for greater social justice, equity, and more opportunity for individual self-fulfillment.

East-West relations, notably U.S.-Soviet relations, involve and will continue to involve elements of both competition and cooperation. We are quietly confident about our ability and determination to compete, economically, politically, and militarily. But managing a relationship that will be both competitive and cooperative cannot be permitted to dominate all our perspectives. Today, we do not have a realistic choice between an approach centered on the Soviet Union, or cooperation with our trilateral friends, or on North-South relations. Instead, each set of issues must be approached on its own terms. A world where elements of cooperation prevail over competition entails the need to shape a wider and more cooperative global framework. We did not wish the world to be this complex; but we must deal with it in all its complexity, even if it means having a foreign policy which cannot be reduced to a single and simplistic slogan.

[Foreign policy today] . . . calls for support based on reason . . . A concentrated foreign policy must give way to a complex foreign policy, no longer focussed on a single, dramatic task - such as the defense of the West. Instead, we must engage ourselves on the distant and difficult goal of giving shape to a world that has suddenly become politically awakened and socially restless.

The goals of U.S. foreign policy as a reflection of the Carter Administration's philosophy and world view in phase one seem to have been definitively tailored to facilitate
what Brzezinski has termed a central design. That is "to make the United States constructively relevent to a world of turbulent change."125 As the President's early speeches indicated, and especially his May 22, 1977 address on "Foreign Policy and National Character" at Notre Dame, the five priorities of U.S. policy in the order of their importance to him, personally, were human rights, relations with and among the democracies, relations with the Soviet Union, taking steps to improve the chances for lasting peace in the Middle East, and attempting to reduce the danger of nuclear proliferation and the world-wide spread of conventional weapons.126 However, by February of 1979, the foreign policy objectives of the President had been more carefully enumerated and consisted of the following four broad objectives:

1. To buttress American power on which global security and stability depend;

2. To strengthen our relations with other nations throughout the world in order to widen the spirit of international cooperation;

3. To deal constructively with pressing world problems which otherwise will disrupt and even destroy the world community we seek;

4. To assert our traditional commitment to human rights, rejoining a rising tide of belief in the dignity of the individual.127

At some point philosophical outlook must encounter the practical matter of how to implement policy and how to effect the specific means and methods by which to transfer policy into action. While much of this process was undertaken in a rather conventional diplomatic fashion, the
Carter Administration demonstrated certain unique propensities of thought, word, and activity. First, the administration's approach to foreign policy seemed to be constructed on a clearly "positivist" approach to problems -- problems that could be properly identified were susceptible to solution, particularly through the application of hard work, dedication, and patient efforts to see the problem-solving effort through to a satisfactory conclusion. The proper identification of problems required not only a reappraisal of the foreign policy problems facing the U.S. but also the application of a more eclectic technique in examining each problem. Thus, problems were viewed not only (or just) in the way the problem affected American geopolitical interests, but in terms of the problem itself - that is in terms of its local complexities. One element of the local complexity of a problem was the way in which the problem might be viewed by local and regional actors who shared some stake or concern in both the resolution of the problem and in the process(es) by which it was resolved. Such a perspective opened up new prospects for weighing the relative interests of the U.S. not only in terms of the local and regional aspects of a given problem, but also in terms of the potential each problem exhibited for conflict and/or cooperation between the superpowers.

On May 22, 1977, in a commencement address at the University of Notre Dame, the President expressed his views
regarding the methods he wished to see employed in the conduct of foreign policy under his administration. The President asserted that:

I believe we can have a foreign policy that is democratic, that is based on fundamental values, and that uses power and influence, which we have, for humane purposes. We can also have a foreign policy that the American people both support and for a change, know about and understand.128

Perhaps the most significant alteration in method and perspective of the administration in phase one was its deemphasis of the East-West relationship as the principal lens through which to view U.S. foreign policy. The President seems clearly to have expected that relations with the Soviets could be continued and even furthered under the rubric of detente, though in a modified form that would emphasize more fully a cooperative and enlightened self-restraint. Thus, in an address on "U.S.-Soviet Relations" in Charleston, S.C. on July 21, 1977, the President expressed the belief that: "What matters ultimately is whether we can create a relationship of cooperation that will be rooted in the national interests of both sides. We shape our own policies to accommodate a constantly changing world, and we hope the Soviets will do the same. Together we can give this change a positive direction."129
While the complexity of the relationship continued to be recognized, particularly in such concepts as the multi-layered nature of the relationship,\textsuperscript{130} critics such as Robert W. Tucker suggest that the primary deficiency of the Carter reorganization of priorities regarding the Soviets lay in the fact that the administration did not consider the Soviets a serious threat.\textsuperscript{131} While advisors close to the President, such as Dr. Brzezinski, were hardly likely to consider the Soviets not a serious threat, it is important to emphasize the positive role and expectation of the State Department as a major force in outlining the administration stance toward the Soviets. In this regard, Secretary Vance was particularly influential. His perspective is very clear in statements he made before the House Committee on International Relations on June 19, 1978:

The potential we and the Soviets share for mutual annihilation carries its imperative for us both: We must seek to reduce the risks of confrontation, particularly the risks presented by an uncontrolled nuclear arms race; to work to moderate our differences; and to seek to expand other areas of mutually beneficial cooperation . . . In short, . . . we seek to emphasize the work of peace. But obviously detente is a two way street: The future course of our relations will depend also upon the choices made in Moscow.\textsuperscript{132}

With regard to methods of implementing U.S. foreign policy, one further comment might be instructive in defining the mode of operation of the administration. The decentralized, and somewhat disorganized, structure of the
top figures in the administration promoted the semblance (if not the reality) of a broader participation in the foreign policy process of the U.S. than had been the case under Dr. Kissinger. The result promoted broadened opportunities for disseminating Carter perspectives and policy views and effected increased opportunities for absorbing the views and recommendations of other interested actors or spokesmen on the varied problems arising as foreign policy concerns for the U.S. This "technique" had its pitfalls, however, as the eventual resignation of Ambassador Young over secret consultations with Palestinian Liberation Organization representatives in September 1979 would amply demonstrate. Nevertheless, the personal and conference diplomacy of multiple U.S. diplomatic actors insured the availability of considerably more feedback to the President on the important issues and problems facing him and U.S. foreign policy.

C. THE DRAMA OF POLITICAL INITIATIVES, STALEMATE AND BREAKTHROUGH ON RHODESIA

In mid-1977, the potential for increased conflict over Rhodesia was very real. On July 5, 1977, forty-eight members of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) meeting in Gabon had endorsed the notion that the Patriotic Front should continue its tactic of guerilla warfare as the best means by which to pursue black majority rule in Rhodesia. In an effort to placate growing opposition to the status
quo in Rhodesia, Ian Smith announced on July 18 his intention to dissolve the Rhodesian parliament and to hold general elections on August 31. His purpose was to seek voter approval of a plan calling for an "internal settlement" with moderate black nationalist leaders, a new constitution, and broader political participation for blacks in the new government. Smith's proposals had set in motion a new and complicated dimension to the resolution of the Rhodesian situation.

In August, U.S. initiatives to cut through the complicated web of problems were stepped up in two parallel developments. The first was an effort by President Carter in early August to seek a common ground and mutually agreeable plans for dealing with the problems in concert with the Front Line states. Following two days of talks with President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, widely acknowledged as the unofficial leader of the group and as a leading spokesman of black African political views and aspirations, the President announced on August 5 that the leaders had reached almost "complete agreement" on a diplomatic policy to promote peaceful transition to black majority rule in both Rhodesia and Namibia. The second development, which began following Secretary Vance's visit to London on August 12, involved the initiation of intensive consultations between American and British representatives tasked with finalizing the proposals of the Anglo-American Plan.133
On August 31, 1977, the final details of the new Anglo-American Plan for Rhodesia were completed. These details were made public the following day in a British White Paper. The proposals contained in the plan were directed at a "restoration of legality in Rhodesia and the settlement of the Rhodesian problem." 134 The plan contained seven "elements" among which were "the surrender of power by the illegal regime", permitting "orderly and peaceful transition to independence", a provision for "free and impartial elections", a transitional administration under the British government, a U.N. presence during the transition period, a new Independence Constitution, and a Development Fund of between US $1000 million and $1500 million to revive the economy of the country contingent upon "implementation of the settlement as a whole." 135

Prospects for a successful resolution of the long-standing problem of Rhodesia based on the Anglo-American Plan were severely dimmed by the reluctance of the Patriotic Front (Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe) to endorse it, and by the disregard shown the proposals by Rhodesia's Prime Minister Ian Smith and his Rhodesian Front Party. The Rhodesian elections of August 31 had resulted in a vote of overwhelming confidence for the Rhodesian Front Party and for Prime Minister Smith, who accepted the vote as a mandate to negotiate his own plan for an internal settlement. Negotiations within Rhodesia to that end resulted in Smith's presentation on November 24, 1977 of a
"modified version of his plan for an internal settlement that would involve the establishment of majority rule, based on adult suffrage, under conditions to be negotiated with black leaders inside the country." 136 The outline of this proposal was effected in the so-called Salisbury Agreement of March 3, 1978 which saw the signing of the "Internal Settlement" agreement by the black Rhodesian leaders Senator Jeremiah Chirau, Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole and Bishop Abel Muzorewa.

The emergence of this agreement for an internal settlement, (which provided only the semblance of black majority rule by December 31, 1978), produced the principal result of galvanizing international opposition to Smith's initiatives. Nkomo and Mugabe were quick to denounce the settlement at the U.N. on March 8. On March 14, the U.N. Security Council in Resolution 423 declared any settlement under the auspices of the Smith regime "illegal and unacceptable." 137 Somewhat belatedly, on March 25-26, four of the five African front-line states, all of whom opposed the internal settlement, announced their backing of the Anglo-American plan. Efforts to revitalize negotiations based on this latter plan found the Patriotic Front at last agreeing to an all-party conference after meeting with Vance, Owen, Young and the front-line Presidents between April 14-16, 1978. 138

Political machinations and maneuvering over Rhodesia would mark the remainder of 1978 as proponents for one plan
or the other attempted to wrest support for their option from important political actors or constituencies. Following the swearing in of Muzorewa, Sithole, and Chirau as co-leaders in the new Rhodesian Executive Council (March 21, 1978), the State Department had finally termed the Salisbury agreement "illegal" and unworkable on March 27, 1978. But as the months passed, an impasse developed in the refusal of the newly formed Rhodesian Executive Council to attend a all-party conference sponsored by the British and Americans, and in the refusal of Britain and the U.S. to lift economic sanctions against Rhodesia. While the Western leaders held firmly to their commitment to convene on all-party conference, the Executive Council was hard at work attempting to soften up the Western stance on economic sanctions. The visit of Bishop Muzorewa to Washington in July of 1978 was undertaken to promote congressional and popular support to this end. His visit prompted an OAU warning to the U.S. not to violate the U.N. sanctions in effect against Rhodesia. On July 26, 1978, the Senate, nevertheless, voted (59 to 36) to lift those sanctions if progress should be made in Rhodesia toward a freely elected government willing to enter into negotiations with the Patriotic Front. Interestingly, on the same day the State Department had refused Muzorewa's request to lift the sanctions after he had again rejected proposals for an all-party conference. Through the remainder of 1978 and into 1979 the impasse continued, as the Rhodesian Executive
Council made preparations for the national elections set originally for December of 1978, and subsequently delayed until April of 1979. The continued efforts of Secretary Vance and Foreign Secretary Owen to seek an all-party conference, even as late as a March 17 call for such talks prior to the April elections, were rejected by Salisbury. 139

The British and American Plan and the diplomatic efforts to effect it had aimed throughout this period at more than a simple political arrangement for bringing about black majority rule. Indeed that was the major objection with the internal settlement. Rather, the aim was to bring all the contending parties together in yet another effort to work out the provisions for a transition phase and an internationally approved settlement based on free elections. At the same time, some modification of the constitution was required to eliminate the entrenched privileges for whites provided for in the "internal settlement." Throughout the effort, the U.S. and Britain had taken great pains not to choose one side or the other and to sustain the credibility of the "neutral solution" they had worked out. 140 Still, the principal bartering tools for wringing concessions from Ian Smith and his new "internal settlement" had been first, to withhold recognition of the legitimacy of his regime and second, to support that action through economic sanctions. Thus, when U.S. congressional initiatives regarding the lifting of
economic sanctions arose in mid-1978, they posed the considerable threat of undermining not just one of the pillars of U.S.-British strength, but the entire process as well. As such, the initiatives were among the first visible signs of serious domestic opposition to the Carter Administration's southern Africa policy. The Case-Javits amendment to the International Securities Act of 1978 (September 26, 1978) mandated "a unilateral lifting of sanctions against Rhodesia upon a Presidential determination that two conditions had been met: (1) a finding that the government of Rhodesia had demonstrated its willingness to negotiate in good faith at an all-parties conference on all relevant issues; and (2) a finding that a government had been installed chosen by free elections in which all political parties and population groups had been allowed to participate freely with observation by impartial, internationally recognized observers." 141

The degree to which differences existed between the executive and legislative branches in their perceptions of the nature of the problem and how to solve it was brought to light in the wake of the Rhodesian elections in April, 1979. On May 15, 1979 the Senate adopted a nonbinding "sense of Congress" resolution urging the President to lift sanctions against Rhodesia within two weeks of the time that the new government would be installed in Salisbury. 142

On June 7, however, the President, acting in compliance
with his obligations under the Case-Javits amendment, announced that he had decided not to lift sanctions since the Rhodesian election had failed to adequately satisfy the amendment's provisions. On June 12, the Senate responded to the President's decision by voting 52-41 in favor of a second Byrd Amendment (this time to the defense authorization bill for 1980) calling for immediate lifting of sanctions. On June 28, the situation was salvaged by the U.S. House, however, which voted in favor of a bill introduced by Representative Steve Solarz (D-NY) which required a "termination of sanctions against Rhodesia by October 15, 1979 unless the President determined that it would not be in the national interest to do so." 143 Although in a subsequent vote on July 10, the House elected to leave the issue of sanctions to the President, a House-Senate conference on July 30, approved another Javits compromise proposal which required the President to lift sanctions by November 15, 1979 unless such an action was not in the national interest. 144

While the congress attempted to assert its influence on the course of U.S. decision-making over Rhodesia in its post-election predicament, developments were underway for reasserting a new effort at a negotiated settlement. The British elections had brought the Conservative Party into power with a new Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher. On May 23, Secretary Vance had met with Lord Carrington, the new British Foreign Secretary, and among their discussions had
been a mapping of the new approach to take toward Rhodesia. On August 3, 1979, Mrs. Thatcher announced the outline of new proposals calling for a new constitution, a cease-fire, and British-supervised elections. On the heels of a Commonwealth Conference in Lusaka during the first week of August where agreement was reached regarding the new initiative, each of the parties to the Zimbabwe-Rhodesia problem agreed to take part in the newly scheduled talks set for London in early September.

The London Conference was initiated on September 10, 1979 by Lord Carrington who deftly supervised and maneuvered the opposing factions through the difficult negotiations and subordinate agreements of the conference. On December 5, 1979, the Patriotic Front agreed to the last details of the plan, effectively achieving a consensus by all the parties on proposals for the transition phase, election phase, and the constitutional provisions under which they would be carried out.

The extraordinary success of the London accord brought a number of associated developments to fruition very quickly. On December 6, the U.S. Senate voted an end to economic sanctions that was to go into effect on January 31, 1980 or upon the arrival of an interim British governor in Salisbury. On December 11, the Rhodesian Assembly repealed the 1965 UDI by a vote of 90-0, and set aside the constitution framed under the internal settlement. With the arrival of the British Governor, Lord Soames, in
Salisbury on December 12, Britain ended its economic sanctions; and on December 15, President Carter announced that U.S. economic sanctions would be terminated on the 16th of December. On the 21st of December, the U.N. Security Council voted to end its thirteen year embargo on Rhodesia as well, meaning that the real prospect for both economic and political normalcy were clearly on the horizon for early in 1980.

As David Ottaway, Africa correspondent for the Washington Post, points out: "The London agreement represented a tremendous diplomatic coup for Prime Minister Thatcher and her Tory Party." He contends, however, that the Carter Administration "... played no direct role in the breakthrough," though "in preventing the Muzorewa government's supporters in Congress from forcing through legislation lifting sanctions, ... it forestalled an action which might well have torpedoed the London Conference." It is worthy of note that the President steadfastly resisted the pressure to acquiesce to Congress, and that he took definitive stands at critical junctures to keep U.S. policy on the track toward its desired objective of a comprehensive settlement, even though the responsibility and direct role of the British overshadowed the U.S.'s participation in the final arrangements for the settlement. Indeed, one is compelled to note the 'fortuitous' timing of the U.S.'s reversion to a subordinate and much less active role, at the very time
when the British were assuming the more active, central, and critical functions of mediator and coordinator in the settlement process. This development marked the effective re-emergence of one of the five pillar concepts from the 1960's - to emphasis the special role of the former colonial powers in the resolution of African political problems.

The emergence of congressional resistance to President Carter's exercise of his policy prerogatives in southern Africa certainly meant that the U.S. position, so carefully and assiduously pursued over the first two and one half years of his administration, had been considerably weakened. Given this development, the administration's capacity to take or maintain a flexible and assertive leadership role had been considerably diminished. Though the Carter foreign policy team that had worked so hard to get the U.S. policy on the "right track" with regard to southern Africa would surely have relished playing the central role in the final successful efforts of achieving a Rhodesian settlement, the goals and objectives of their policy efforts had been realized: an internationally recognized settlement facilitating the viable political prospect of democratic elections being held, with the black majority and all the competing factions participating in the electoral process.

There is no doubt that the settlement of the Rhodesia-Zimbabwe problem must be considered the "success"
of British foreign policy and particularly the result of the brilliant efforts of Lord Carrington. Nevertheless, there is the sense in which the supportive efforts of the U.S. and the constructive role it had designed for itself must be considered a success for the Carter Administration as well. Clearly, while its role in the final negotiations was very limited, the objective of U.S. policy in regard to Zimbabwe had been successfully attained. Paradoxically, this qualified success of the Carter Administration's foreign policy in southern Africa, the product of phase one priorities and world view, occurred at a time when the administration was undergoing the change, or indeed had made the change, to the priorities, redefined world view, and subsequent policy changes of phase two. Perhaps the experience of seeing the cherished expectations and hard work of a southern Africa policy almost dashed by the counter-pressure of a domestic power base, and especially the Congress, was an occasion for re-evaluating some of the more optimistic notions about the relationship of the domestic factor to foreign policy goals and modes of operation.

What had clearly become a source of Administration concern, however, was the domestic perception that the U.S. was allowing the Soviets to get the upper hand in more locations and on more opportunities than was acceptable. As the national political mood moved further toward the right with each apparent setback to the U.S.
internationally, the Administration found itself lagging behind repetitively - caught in the throes of two forms of reaction: One, reacting to the turbulent charges occurring outside the country, and two, reacting to the gap between its relative equanimity toward those outside events and the more conservative stances of the public, congress, and the majority of bureaucracies. By mid-1979, the disturbing question of "who was leading whom?" was becoming more and more relevent both inside government and outside of it.

The accumulation of three years of mini-crises, deterioration of relations with the Soviets, and chronic domestic problems with which to try to deal had established the 'reality' preconditions for a change in administration outlook; political polls had preconditioned the need for a change in leadership style; an upcoming election had preconditioned the necessity for attuning policy and style to the perceived expectations of the political constituency; and the crises in Iran and Afghanistan triggered the reflex to undertake changes immediately rather than later. Thus by January of 1980, the need had become particularly clear that the administration, perhaps against its better intellectual judgement, had to make some definitive changes within its outlook, its policy, and especially the substance of its leadership role in the United States.

There were many domestic and international problems for the Administration to contend with and numerous
modifications that could be incorporated to facilitate improving its image. Yet, no problem area seemed as critical, substantively and symbolically, as the deterioration of U.S.-Soviet relations virtually all across the board. Thus, a face-lift of policy and a reorientation of priorities toward the Soviets could achieve a high degree of spontaneous and genuine favor in domestic political support. Given the real and perceived nature of its problems with the Soviets, the Administration evoked the historically conditioned reflex of 'getting tough with the Russians' which must have seemed not only a suitable domestic political expedient, but an international necessity as well.

The problem, however, remained in the short run what it had always been -- how to deal with the Soviets and with the "relationship" of the U.S. and the USSR, not only on its own terms, but in terms of its potentially disruptive and catalytic influence on the course of events in the international arena.

D. THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION AND RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS

With regard to an overall assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the Carter Administration in foreign policy, it appears that the perspectives, instincts and philosophical underpinnings of the policy were essentially well founded, particularly in regard to the Third World.

-107-
The major difficulty of the administration's foreign policy centered on the U.S. approach toward the Soviet Union both in phase one and in phase two. The approach in phase one for dealing with the Soviets, which was to have been a sophisticated blend of competition and cooperation, in fact, may not have been well thought through. It seemed to exhibit a certain philosophical weakness, but more important, seemed inattentive to the task of employing a full array of political and economic measures to effect desireable results in the competitive-cooperative relationship. What contributed to this development and to the subsequent problems that have developed in the U.S.-Soviet relationship?

In a world of complex, diverse demands engendered by substantial political, economic and social heterogeneity, strategic parity had presented an opportunity for the U.S. to neutralize and perhaps even defuse the military and strategic nuclear elements of U.S.-Soviet competition, a competition in which the Soviets had demonstrated certain structural and psychological advantages. By neutralizing the relative importance of that continued competition, the U.S. had established a favorable precondition from which to exert an "especially advantaged" competitive edge over the Soviets in dealing with the rest of the world. This effort, first conceptualized and capitalized upon by Nixon and Kissinger, was carried forward under Ford and continued in modified form under
Carter. The critical variables in the concept were the maintenance of a relative balance in military posture and neutralization of the expansionist proclivities of the Soviet Union through a new and more subtle form of containment. This took the form of the carrot and stick techniques of "cooperation" which (from the U.S. view) was designed to encourage Soviet restraint in exchange for such U.S. concessions as trade and technology transfer, and agreements to undertake negotiations on arms control and disarmament. The concept of a cooperative/competitive relationship was premised on the general notion that the US could help bring the Soviets along toward maturity as a respectable super power and responsible member in a stable world order by developing a relationship in which the actions of each would be governed by mutual restraint, responsibility, and negotiation. The relationship would be reinforced by "linkages" to economic relations and cultural interchange. Thus, Soviet behavior could be moderated through the discipline imposed by external contacts and the desire to assure the continued exchange of economic and technological benefits. 151

Under Nixon and Ford these notions were operationalized under a bipolar conception of a world wherein U.S.-Soviet relations functioned as the predominant measure of and means for maintaining and assuring international order. The bipolar relationship received maximum attention as the central construct of international perceptions. However,
these notions of structure in the relationship were vulnerable to collapsing under a foreign policy establishment that might deliberately play down the bipolar relationship, and in the process fail to exert the continued, sufficient, and if necessary, progressive pressure to restrain the Soviet leadership's proclivity for expansion. In phase one, the Carter Administration, preoccupied with world order priorities and concerns, tended to downplay the prospect of Soviet expansionism and the presumably limited benefits to accrue to the Soviet Union out of such behavior. Moreover, the administration seems clearly to have held out high expectations for the utility that cooperation, mutual interest, and restraint could afford as effective and essentially passive means through which potential Soviet expansionism could be kept in check. Lack of realistic political measures, high expectations, and miscalculation, then, tended to opt against keeping or inducing the Soviets to exhibit the sort of responsibility and self-restraint the U.S. would like to have seen.

This unfolding reality of a deterioration in U.S.-Soviet relations was evident to the administration by as early as September 1978.\textsuperscript{152} Having recognized this fact, perhaps the most glaring weakness of the Carter Administration in demonstrating effective measures toward managing U.S. relations with the Soviet Union and in coming to grips with the changing realities it perceived in the
roles of both the U.S. and the Soviet Union in the international community has been the failure in effective communications. Not only had the successive administrations of Ford and Carter demonstrated an inability to communicate with the Soviets effectively, but these administrations (and especially Carter's) seem to have been woefully ineffective in communicating to the American public a realistic image of the Soviet Union. The image of the Soviets in recent years has been influenced more by the press and the conservatives than by administration spokesmen. In effect, this fact has worked to the disadvantage both of the Carter world order set of priorities and of the effectiveness of its overall foreign policy.

Perceptions of the Soviet Union vary widely. For the Carter Administration, the image of the Soviets, implicit in the de-emphasis of the bipolar conceptions of U.S. vs. Soviet competition, is the notion of the Soviet Union as a viable military power, but as an essentially impoverished and ineffective economic empire, deserving of little more than second-rate super power status. A second image, more widely held in conservative perceptions, is the view of the Soviet Union as an expansionist empire. In a world of chaos and disorder, the Soviet Union, as a relatively viable superpower, is going to exert its force and influence to obtain results (in its sphere of influence and outside its sphere) favorable to its interests. A third
view of the Soviet Union reflects its present status and the outline of what appears to be the Soviet Union of the near future. That is the view of the Soviet Union, regardless of its idiosyncratic manner or psychology, as a viable super power, limited in its ability to exercise a full range of long term assistance, aid, and political-economic development, but with the real and increasingly flexible capability to exert its power and will forceably in regions of the world remote to its heretofore circumscribed sphere of influence. This is the view of a Soviet Union, confident and proud of its accomplishments, with a certain ideological zeal to forge its way of life and beliefs on receptive brethren in a conflict ridden world. This is the view of a nation and a way of life whose orthodoxy is taken for granted and whose behavior is viewed as self-righteous and self-justifying (in much the same way as in the U.S.) and which feels in these twin self perceptions that it has not only the right, but also the historical obligation, to promulgate its influence on a world victimized for too long by the injustices of the capitalist economic order.

In short, we delude our selves in such sophomoric-notions as conceiving that we alone can contain Soviet power and expansion by carrot and stick techniques. Nor, however, do we do justice to our best interests by suggesting that each overture of Soviet expansionism be countered by the sabre-rattling of increased defense
expenditures or movement of troops and equipment to remote locations on the globe to counter the real or perceived Soviet threat. Rather, what we desperately need is a broad strategic and tactical understanding (a consensus perhaps short of a doctrine or an all-encompassing format represented by a single concept like "containment") around which to organize our military, political, economic, and social resources for dealing with the Soviets and the threat they actually present to us - the threat that a society and nation, less humane, less well organized, less concerned with the human verities should stimulate in us the fool, to be outmaneuvered and outclassed because of our own insecurities and inability to see the contest at stake for what it is. There is a battle, there is a contest, there is a threat; but we are part of and deeply involved in a large-scale ongoing process - the exercise of power and influence by the two most powerful nation-states on Earth. Given the power the U.S. and the USSR already possess and the potential for the long run to increase qualitatively and quantitatively in the accumulation of even more power, there is every reason to expect that our battle will be protacted, uneven in relative successes or failures for both of us, and unlikely to succumb to a facile, one-sided victory without the horror of an all-out military engagement. Patience and determination to be firm but flexible in our assessment of the battle and in our actions seem to be virtually mandatory. Furthermore,
given the long-term nature of the contest, the extraordinary complexity of international problems, and the inevitability of mistakes, setbacks, recoveries, lucky breaks, and real successes, there is no reason to gauge the contest in the short term as a zero-sum game where one's gain is the other's loss and vice versa.

Thus, if we as a nation do not come to perceive the competition with the Soviet Union in some mutually agreeable fashion (even allowing for substantive differences on many issues), and do not fashion for ourselves some broad form of consensus as to the nature of the competition, what it means in terms of a protracted commitment, and our stake in it, we face the prospect of frenetic anxiety and insecurity over a contest we tend to view too narrowly and with too much alarm. It is just this sort of lack of understanding and inordinate fear that pose the most dangerous prospect that we may unwittingly propel ourselves, as the Soviets so deeply fear, into a military confrontation that might otherwise be avoidable if we think and act with greater self-assurance and understanding. Moreover, self-assurance and understanding would go far to promote our ability to carefully define and firmly defend those interests at home and abroad which we consider to be vital, as well as those other interests we are willing to make commitments to protect, nurture, and sustain. At the same time our flexibility would be materially advanced in our awareness that the contest can be tailored by our wise
identification and selection of the measures we want to use to effect our influence and protect our interests, with the final reservation to defend them (or even to go on the military offensive) to ensure their survival and perhaps even our own, under a system and way of life we have come to cherish.
IV. CONCLUSION

The conclusions one can draw from an analysis of the U.S. foreign policy toward a sub-regional problem area such as southern Africa are subject to reflect one's starting point and frame of reference, and also certain limitations of relevance to overall U.S. foreign policy problems. It seems abundantly clear that such a limited scope of analysis, no matter how thorough-going, is only able to explore a certain dimension of the problem. The full diversity of the southern Africa problem and the relative significance of the U.S. foreign policy aspect of that problem are only explicable within a framework that devotes equal attention to the other primary aspects of the problem: i.e., Soviet foreign policy and involvement, and the nature of the regional dimension of the problem in all its diversity. Yet, given the limits in scope of the analysis presented here, which has concentrated on the political and philosophical objectives of U.S. policy formation and implementation, there are a number of conclusions that can be drawn from the analysis which in addition to their own intrinsic merit, may have relevance as indicators of things to come in the foreign policy approach of the U.S. toward the region.

The central objective of this thesis has been to identify the goals and substance of the U.S.'s political...
interests in its foreign policy toward southern Africa. The effort has illuminated the fact that there are elements of essential continuity in the U.S.'s multiple interests in Africa and in the foreign policy pronouncements of successive administrations. The key element seems clearly to have been a U.S. interest in promoting (both in word and action) a political reality in Africa that should be free of outside interference (military intervention) by communist states and particularly the Soviet Union. From the first element and its essentially negative aspect flowed the second and third elements of continuity. The second being that the unique problems of African nation-building and modernization along with the institution of viable and legitimate political organization and structure were problems that lent themselves to being solved almost exclusively by Africans themselves. Thirdly, whatever coordination, problem-solving, and assistance might be required should be provided in the main by the former colonial powers of Western Europe. The fourth element centered on the generalized interest of the U.S. to witness the economic development of the continent both on its own terms for the positive effect it would bring to the development of African society generally, and for the prospect that the continent could enter more fully into the world economic system. In this regard, Africa was viewed as a valuable source of raw materials, products, and goods and as a huge potential market for the finished products.
and goods of Western industrialized society. The fifth element, at least through 1975, was to limit the sale and transfer of military hardware and technology to African states.

While U.S. policy has demonstrated continuity in the above elements, there have been significant changes in the nature and intensity of the U.S.'s political interests and perspectives toward southern Africa. The benign neglect that characterized the Eisenhower years gave way to the increased idealism, hopes, and policy pronouncements of the Kennedy and the early Johnson years. By 1965, the policy of the "five pillars" represented a rounded U.S. foreign policy approach toward Africa, though its importance diminished substantially in the late 60's, due primarily to U.S. preoccupations in Southeast Asia. This situation was the legacy to Nixon and Kissinger, who in their "new era" thinking had relegated southern Africa and the continent as a whole to a rather low priority among the foreign policy concerns of the U.S. Furthermore, there is evidence which indicates that under the Nixon Administration, the U.S. viewed the nature of the growing black African independence and black majority rule problems of southern Africa as primarily racial and not political. Therefore, the U.S. approach to southern Africa was to deal with it through "contact," persuasion, and negotiation with the white populace and governments in the region, in the hope of inducing gradual social evolution rather than
political resolution. Thus, inattentiveness and misreading the local dimensions and intensity of the problem were added to the dominant predilection to view the region as a sub-element in the bipolar relations of the U.S. and Soviet Union. These were the characteristics which marked the broad outline and mentality of the Nixon-Ford perspective and their foreign policy approach toward the region into 1975.

The Angolan Crisis marked a true watershed in U.S. relations with southern Africa. Soviet and Cuban support to the MPLA was perceived by the Executive Branch as a direct threat to the basic elements of U.S. policy in Africa and as a general threat to the power and prestige of the U.S. The legislature, deeply suspicious and cautious of another Vietnam-like entanglement in a Third World country, perceived the U.S. interest very differently, and blocked Executive proposals to increase U.S. support to the FNLA and UNITA. It was out of this twin domestic and international crisis that Dr. Kissinger and his assistants fashioned the remarkable reorientation of U.S. policy toward southern Africa presented at Lusaka in April 1976. The new policy was a bold and well-conceived U.S. counter-stroke to Soviet adventurism in the region and had been designed, after all, as a means to offset the Soviet's military presence in the region. But the policy was also intended to demonstrate a new U.S. interest in seeing the political problems in the region solved by non-violent
means and under a stepped up and more urgent agenda.

The Carter Administration has continued and even intensified that U.S. commitment, operating in phase one from a significantly different global perspective than did Kissinger. While continuities in the basic elements of U.S. policy have remained essentially intact, the intensity of the Carter Administration's foreign policy efforts in southern Africa can be viewed as a reflection of its phase one dedication to the regionalist approach to geopolitical problems. During phase one, the Carter Administration perceived the U.S. interest in southern Africa and the region's problems to be predominantly political. As a result, U.S. policy was directed toward the task of solving the regional and internal aspects of a "political problem". In the Administration's view, such an approach would provide the best means of pursuing or maintaining other U.S. interests including countering Soviet activities in the region. This outlook provided the motivating factor to U.S. support of the British initiatives and negotiations which in late 1979 and in early 1980, finally resulted in a settlement of the Rhodesia-Zimbabwe problem.

In the first half of 1980, however, there is evidence of a subtle, but perceptible change taking place within the Administration concerning its perspectives and policy toward the region. Perhaps it is because of the progress already made in southern Africa or more probably because of the increase in the perceived threat to U.S. vital
interests in the so called "arc of instability", but, a shift of foreign policy emphasis seems clearly to be underway in which southern Africa concerns are simply no longer the sort of top priority matters they once were. While southern Africa could not possibly remain a top priority of U.S. foreign policy indefinitely, there is danger of allowing a certain inattentiveness to deteriorate to the former conditions of apathy or neglect. Such a development in combination with the reemergence of a U.S. bipolar perspective oriented on a perceived Soviet threat could easily reconstitute the conditions and the sort of political vacuum in southern Africa which existed prior to the Angolan Crisis of 1975.

The central undertaking of identifying the goals and substance of U.S. policy toward southern Africa has illuminated a number of characteristics in the domestic and international environment which possess a direct relevance to the nature and conduct of U.S. foreign policy. The fundamental characteristic is change. It is persistent, dynamic, and frequently turbulent. A second fundamental characteristic is the extraordinary diversity of domestic and international realities, which are marked by the increasing importance of the Third World political, economic, and social demands for redistribution of the world's wealth and for increased political participation in the decisions affecting the international order. Change, diversity, and increasing demands on the international
system interrelate to produce an arena of complex heterogeneous, competing interests. The nature of the environment and the sort of relationships and pursuits that characterize it are subject to widely different individual and national "perceptions". In the U.S., perceptions tend to function in a constant state of flux as the polity attempts to estimate what is "real" and "ideal" in the foreign affairs of this nation. The tension of these shifting estimates in an essentially dualistic political system may account for the pendulum-like changes in domestic perceptions and the influence such changes exert on the course of U.S. foreign policy.

In the course of this historical and analytical examination of U.S. foreign policy toward southern Africa, a number of important underlying features and characteristics have received special consideration for the part they play in the formulation and implementation of U.S. foreign policy, and a number of observations have been made about the complex process involved in the making of that policy. This analysis has focused considerable attention on perceptions and philosophical outlook. They are critical ingredients in evaluating and establishing the foreign policy goals, interests, and priorities of the U.S. and frequently manifest themselves in the exercise of national power and influence through foreign policy. The analysis has highlighted the abiding interrelationship of domestic and international affairs and the synergistic
effect the two elements have on the nature of bilateral and multilateral relations. In part, the analysis has been concerned with the nature of power, not so much in its positive or mechanical aspects, but perhaps more significantly, in the ways in which it is subtly limited by philosophical outlook, by pluralistic constraints, by superpower rivalry and fear, and by mutual or self-imposed restraints. Implicitly, it has suggested the considerable degree to which limits exist on the power and influence of the U.S. (and the Soviet Union as well).

The analysis has addressed the central role the Soviets have played and continue to play in the regional and geopolitical interests of the U.S., and in the abiding influence the Soviets have exerted in prompting alterations and redirections in U.S. policy in southern Africa. Thus, for example, the Soviet role in Angola can be singled out as the most critical stimulus to the new U.S. policy toward southern Africa which emerged under Kissinger's direction in 1976. The analysis has also referred frequently to the general nature of U.S-Soviet relations, to the changing nature of U.S. perceptions of and policy toward the Soviets, and to the frequent disappointments and frustrations experienced by the U.S. with the competitive-cooperative relationship.

Given the importance of the Soviet influence on U.S. policies and international perspectives, the analysis has explored the underpinnings, thrust, and relative merit of
the regionalist versus the globalist perspective in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy. The two approaches are not mutually exclusive. The relative successes of the regionalist approach in southern Africa, however, must be weighed against the need to be highly attentive to other global concerns of the U.S. and to the special importance of the bipolar relationship of the U.S. and Soviet Union. The important thing to consider is the relative advantage that can be capitalized upon in the regional approach when it is selectively applied to given foreign policy problem areas. Given the complexities of the international arena and its diverse problems, the availability of both approaches presents a clear opportunity to adapt U.S. responses to different situations and to have flexible options for supporting what Mr. Brzezinski has termed a "complex foreign policy".154

The analysis has also explored the near-term prospect of an emerging crisis threshold in U.S. foreign policy generally, and in southern Africa specifically. The main feature of this development is related to the last point concerning the merits and utility of the regionalist-globalist approach in U.S. foreign policy. By early 1980, a number of factors had combined to produce the major changes of phase two in the Carter Administration, including the deterioration of U.S.-Soviet relations, the Iranian hostage crisis, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, increased perceived threats to the stability of the Persian
Gulf region, and the entire complex of these events being subjected to the turmoil and rhetoric of an American presidential election year. The main feature of phase two has been the reappearance of the bipolar perspective in U.S. geopolitical thinking, attended by a considerably more right-leaning attitude and hard line within the administration in its dealings with the Soviets. The outline of these changes and its implications for subordinate foreign policy problems is not yet clear, and indeed, given the ambivalence and transition of the dominant foreign policy approach from regionalism to a bipolar globalism, there is currently a perceptible void in U.S. policy regarding the concepts and coordinating direction of its southern Africa policy. While the prospect of continued conflict and hostility in southern Africa remains very real, the current status of U.S. policy toward the region is marked by an apparent withdrawal, caused in part by the uncertainties of an overall U.S. foreign policy in apparent drift.

Finally, it seems important to sum up the dominant thrust of this analysis which has been to deal with the extraordinary complexity of both the foreign policy of the U.S. and of the many international problems with which it has to deal. In exploring the nuances of complexity of these interrelated factors, the analysis has attempted to suggest implicitly what Colin Legum made explicit at a conference at the Naval Postgraduate School in July of
1979: "[We in the West] . . . have to accept and learn to live with the dilemma of conflicting interests and pluralism, and the uncertainties of what that implies." Mr. Legum's comments are at once an exhortation to the U.S. to refine its perspectives and foreign policy outlook and a plea to avoid the reductionism of simple answers and policy responses in a complex world, both of which are premises upon which this thesis has been undertaken.
FOOTNOTES

1. The use of the term 'southern Africa' in this paper refers to the one-sixth of the continent, roughly two million square miles, lying south of the northern borders of Angola, Zambia, Malawi, and Mozambique.


9. Lewis identifies four states that were selected for this special designation - Tunisia, Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Tanzania. See Lewis, op. cit., p. 283.


18. Lewis, op. cit., pp. 298-301.


23. Ibid., pp. 542-548.

24. Ibid., p. 540

25. Ibid., pp. 542-543.

which opened up the definition of those items that could be sold to the RSA.

27 Ibid., p. 121.

28 Ibid., p. 121. Both the provisions noted here underwent significant change in the Nixon administration signalling a major alteration in policy toward southern Africa which in turn cast grave doubts on U.S. objectives and support for self-determination and black majority rule in the region.


31 Ibid.

32 Ibid.

33 Ibid.

34 Ibid., p. 8.


36 Ibid., pp. 95-96.


39 Ibid.

40 Ibid., pp. 3-4, & 10.

The Soviet stance of inactivity in that period may have been taken as a more permanent reality than it should have been. The U.S. commitment to non-interference in African internal affairs was so thorough that a Joint Chiefs of Staff study during the Nixon years called for ending the Strike Command responsibility for contingency operations in Africa and giving this responsibility to the U.S. European Command. Instead, the White House decided to have Africa removed from the area of responsibility of any U.S. command and for any future planning or operations to be undertaken by the Joint Staff. See Palmer, *U.S. Security Interests*, pp. 37-39.


Mr. Morris attributes the...
development of NSSM 39 to three major problems: 1) ignorance of southern African history and politics within the Foreign Service, 2) the role, policy and decision making played by the Kissinger/Nixon White House, and 3) the parallel incompetence, distraction and ignorance of the Congress, press and public. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Corporate Interests in Africa, 95th Cong., 1st Session., January, 1978, pp. 198-199. The political counterpoint to Mr. Morris's observations was that of Donald F. McHenry on the same date. See ibid., pp. 201-202.


59 Ibid., p. 105.

60 Ibid., p. 106.


63 Bruce Oudes, op. cit., p. 120. The first three recommendations were evaluated in subsequent NSC meetings and interagency memos and were implemented under modified provisions either by NSDM or through the easing of bureaucratic notification procedures. See a series of declassified memoranda dealing with these subjects in the period of April 1970-March 1971 in Africa Contemporary Record 1975-76, pp. C97-C106; also John Marcum in testimony before the U.S. Congress, Senate Committe on Foreign Relations, U.S. Policy in Africa. 94th Cong., 2d sess., 1976, p. 241.


67 Stebbins and Adam, American Foreign Relations, 1971 pp. 429-430. On December 9, 1971, the U.S. and Portugal agreed to continued American access to an Azores airbase in exchange for U.S. economic aid -- an event which tended to
reinforce perceptions of U.S. complicity with 'the white redoubt.'


69 Ibid., pp. 105-106.


71 Ibid., p. 157.

72 Ibid., p. 159.

73 Ibid.

74 Ibid.

75 Ibid., p. 160.

76 Kissinger Study of Southern Africa, op. cit, p. 81.

77 See Stebbins and Adams, American Foreign Relations 1974. (New York: New York University Press, 1977), pp. 378 and 563. The continuing reluctance of the Soviet Union to liberalize its Jewish emigration practices was countered by the congress' insistence on "linkage" of emigration and the granting of most-favored nation status to the Soviets. This linkage was promulgated by the Jackson-Vanik amendment to the proposed Trade Reform Act of December 1973.

78 Ibid., pp. 1-11.

79 Ibid., pp. 390-406. In these proceedings the U.S. had officially opposed such actions on legal-technical grounds, producing yet another impression of U.S. support for the RSA's reactionary policies over vehement protestations by Ambassador John Scali to the contrary.

80 Ibid., pp. 406-407.


82 Ibid., p. 484.

83 The "40 Committee" was the designation of the NSC group which dealt with covert operations.

Bender, op. cit., p. 87.

Legum and Hodges, op. cit., p. 15.

Bender, op. cit., pp. 96-99.


Marcum, Lessons of Angola, pp. 408, 418, and 421.


Ibid., p. 613.

Ibid.


Bender, op. cit., p. 101. Among the most important congressional critics were Senators Dick Clark and John Tunney.

Legum and Hodges, op. cit., pp. 30-31; also see Bender, op. cit., pp. 112-114.

Bender, op. cit., p. 109.

Ibid., p. 111.

"Text of the Kissinger Statement," Congressional Digest, op. cit., p. 32.


From the text of Mr. Vance's address, ibid., p. 311.

Ibid., p. 73.

Ibid., p. 63.

Ibid., p. 68.

Ibid., pp. 68-69.

This resolution of January 30, 1976 provided "that free elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations be held for the whole of Namibia as one political entity" and not by tribal or ethnic subdivisions which was part of the Turnhalle Plan. Ibid., pp. 67-68.
This plan, known also as the "Turnhalle Plan," was developed in the South West African capital during a constitutional conference meeting between white rulers and moderate blacks in which they outlined a plan for multiracial development and independence. The major objection by the Western powers was that the plan had completely left out the territory's largest and most active liberation movement, the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO). Ibid., p. 66.

From excerpts of Vice-President Mondale's News Conference, Vienna, May 20, 1977, quoted in Adam and Stebbins, ibid., p. 70.


Ibid., p. 462-463.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.


Stebbins and Adam utilize the term "multilayered relationship" in *American Foreign Relations, 1977*, p. 19; Secretary Vance pointed to a similar conception in his view that the fundamental nature of the U.S.-Soviet relationship "is not a relationship with a single dimension but with many." Cyrus R. Vance, "Elements of U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet Union", *Department of State Bulletin* 78 (August 1978): 15.

The legality issue referred to was the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) by Rhodesia on November 11, 1965 which subsequently had been almost universally condemned as illegal and invalid.


Adam, "Chronology 1979," p. 768.


Ottaway, op. cit., p. 642.

Primarily these advantages are perceived to be the willingness and lack of political cost involved in the dedication of substantial resources and energy to their conventional and strategic military buildup as well as the perceived lack of Soviet inhibition and restraint in the use of force to effect military solutions to political problems facing them. A capsule view of diverging opinions about the nature of the Soviet threat can be found in the article, "How Real is the Soviet Threat?", U.S. News and World Report (March 10, 1980):33; Peter Jay suggests that the Soviets may have a philosophical edge in Marxism and may benefit from "sheer ruthlessness." See Jay, "Regionalism as Geopolitics," p. 511.

Stanley Hoffmann, Primacy or World Order, p. 58.


Zigniew Brzezinski utilized the term "arc of crisis" in a quote found in Time (January 15, 1979): 18.

Colin Legum, commenting to the Conference on Communist States in Africa held at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, Ca., July 26-28, 1979.
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