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**NAVAL
POSTGRADUATE
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MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

**COMPARISON OF THE FRENCH AND GERMAN
APPROACHES TO ESDP and NATO**

by

Lothar Pichler

June 2004

Thesis Advisor:
Second Reader:

Donald Abenheim
Hans-Eberhard Peters

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**COMPARISON OF THE FRENCH AND GERMAN APPROACHES TO
ESDP and NATO**

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

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ABSTRACT

In the process of the European implementation of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) at Maastricht in December 1991 until the Franco-British declaration on European defense at Saint-Mâlo in December 1998, the EU's European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) etched out the initial concept of a European Pillar within the framework of NATO expressed in NATO's European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI). The Franco-British declaration at Saint-Mâlo demonstrated the willingness of some EU member states to promote autonomous military capabilities within the EU that enables the EU to act outside of NATO's framework. The further development of ESDP led to concern among NATO officials and US diplomats regarding ESDP's potential challenging appearance to NATO. US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld expressed this concern about a growing EU opposition to the transatlantic policy of alliance. In January 2003, during the Iraq Crisis, Mr. Rumsfeld labeled France and Germany as the "Old Europe". The relation of ESDP to NATO is strongly affected by the national interests of leading European actors like France and Germany. The development of ESDP as either a competitor or support arm of NATO depends on whether the French or the German approach to European security becomes dominant.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

CDU	Christian Democratic Union
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIC	Capabilities Improvement Conference
CJTF	Combined Joint Task Force
CSU	Christian Social Union
DCI	Defense Capabilities Initiative
DC	Defense Committee
DSACEUR	Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe
EAPC	Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
ESDI	European Security and Defense Identity
ESDP	European Security and Defense Policy
EU	European Union
HQ	Headquarters
IMS	Integrated Military Staff
MC	Military Committee
NAC	North Atlantic Council
NACC	North Atlantic Cooperation Council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCW	Netcentric Warfare
NRF	NATO Response Force
PARP	Planning and Review Process
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander of Europe
SDP	Social Democrat Party
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
WEU	Western European Union

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In wake of the September 11th attacks against the United States, NATO, for the first time ever in its history, invoked Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. However, during the Iraq crisis of 2002-2003 the spirit of transatlantic solidarity expressed by all NATO members after the terrorist attacks vanished in the discussion of how to react to a potential Iraqi threat.

The rapid change of rhetoric on both sides of the Atlantic exposed the different threat perceptions among the NATO countries. During early 2003, the European NATO members France and Germany opposed the US strategy of preemptive force against the Iraq in the absence of a concrete mandate by the United Nation's Security Council. The fact that France, as well as Germany, interpreted the UN resolution 1441 as not including preemptive military force does not suggest that they shared a common approach to the Iraqi crisis. Germany ruled out the use of military means even before the final results of the weapons inspection were presented. France, in contrast, did not oppose the use of force, had a new UN resolution sanctioned it.

Critics questioned publicly the future of NATO because of the US unilateral approach to the crisis. Critics saw the Franco-German opposition to the US-led “coalition of the willing” as a further weakening of the European Pillar of NATO. However, this opposition was not representative of the European Union (EU) and member countries did not find consensus on the Iraq question. In the context of the European unification process and the development of EU's ESDP, the discord within the alliance raised the question, whether or not NATO still formed the primary organization of mutual defense and community of shared values or was the European Pillar of NATO via the ESDP not only “separable” but indeed “separate.”

In April 2003, France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg proposed to establish separate European military planning capabilities which led critics to

question the solidarity among NATO members. France and Germany supported this proposal to strengthen ESDP, although this step could easily be interpreted as competitive with NATO's European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI).

The reason for France and Germany to develop European capabilities regarding security beyond NATO's framework of ESDI has different historical roots. Analysis of the historical evolution of security policy in France and Germany, as the two major players that shaped the future composition of ESDP in its competitive or supportive role to NATO, shows the vast differences in each nation's objectives. The post World War II experience of France helped to create a security policy, which emphasizes French sovereignty and claim to leadership in Europe, independent military capabilities for the European Union and a separation from US domination in European security issues. Germany's foreign policy also reflects country's strong reaction to preventing future conflict, yet the focus and execution are quite different. Germany sought integration itself in multilevel security organizations, equal cooperation with European partners and NATO, while accepting more international responsibility.

The balance of these two approaches represented by France and Germany will likely decide if the ESDP will support NATO's role as Europe's prime organization for security or weaken the alliance by duplicating capabilities, decoupling from NATO and discrimination of NATO members not in the EU.

This research demonstrates with case studies of France and Germany how the historical experiences of major European actors have influenced the EU's approach to security and defense issues. The thesis illuminates the circumstances, which led to France's ambivalent relation with the Transatlantic Alliance as well as the root of Germany's struggle for international integration. The present and future nature of the ESDP is a product of the historical relation between France, Germany and the United States. Recognizing the events, which created French or German support of European Defense and the underlying national motives, is essential in evaluating the EU's relationship with NATO.

This thesis argues that, since the end of World War II, European security and defense has been a source of continuous negotiations, transformations and bargaining. On the basis of shared values the NATO members were repeatedly able to negotiate consensus mid crisis in context with their national interests. Although internal crisis like the transatlantic discord during the Iraq question were hardly unique, the inappropriate use of defamatory rhetoric among NATO members regarding the creation and support of a “coalition of the willing” in January 2003 represented a negative exception.

The comparison of the French and German approach to European security and defense after World War II does not suggest that ESDP will function solely as a supportive tool to NATO nor will it develop as a European competitor to NATO. The development of a more independent European defense in the form of the ESDP does not represent the end of the Transatlantic Alliance but signifies a sensible step toward the next transformation of NATO.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. PURPOSE AND QUESTION

This thesis focuses on the security and defense policies of two leading European nations, France and Germany, and their approach to NATO and the European Union policies for war and peace. Analysis of the French and German historical evolution regarding this issue since the end of World War II illuminates the character of major European policies in the assessment of the EU's European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) in relation to NATO, especially since the beginning of the 1990's.

The thesis suggests that different national security interests of the leading EU nations mark the future relationship of ESDP with NATO. These national security interests follow a specific pattern developed since the end of World War II and before. This thesis shows the development and structure of these patterns of security policy in case studies of both France and Germany. The concluding chapter assesses the ESDP's potential to develop as a competitor or supportive instrument for NATO.

The questions leading to these conclusions are:

- What were the milestones of transformation regarding NATO's European Security and Defense Identity and the European Union's ESDP? (Maastricht 1991, Petersberg 1992, Brussels 1994, Berlin 1996, Saint-Malo 1998, Cologne and Helsinki 1999, Nice 2000)
- What was the origin of the concept of French grandeur within the context of France's relationship to NATO and European defense? (EDC 1954, de Gaulle 1958, French withdrawal from NATO's IMS 1966, rapprochement with NATO 1995)
- Does Germany's promotion of ESDP signal a drifting apart from the Transatlantic Alliance? (Ellysee Treaty January 1963, Franco-German Brigade 1987, Euro-Corp 1992)

B. SIGNIFICANCE

The development of the ESDP might be the greatest challenge to the future of NATO. Although the EU members are presently not able to match the military superiority of the US, the ESDP could become a tool to duplicate NATO capabilities in order to separate European security issues from the dominant influence of the American allies. It is significant to recognize today's development of ESDP as the product of different and competing national interests. The recognition and promotion of those forces within the European Union, which supports the concept of ESDP as strengthening the European Pillar within the framework of NATO, is essential to preserving the successful security effort of NATO. A further alienation of NATO members through the misuse of NATO as a resource pool for ad hoc coalitions like the "coalition of the willing", which was formed under US leadership to create support for a military intervention in the Iraq in 2003, will play into the hands of those forces in the EU, which demand an independent European way to approach security challenges.

The significance of transatlantic institutions for war and peace and their development is recognized in a vast spectrum of specialized literature. Detailed information on German foreign and security can be found in Klaus Hildebrand, German Foreign Policy, From Bismarck to Adenauer, (London, Unwin Hyman Ltd, 1989); John S. Duffield, World Forsaken, (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1998); Max Otte, A Rising Middle Power?, (New York, St. Martin's Press, 2000); Constantine Menges, The Future of Germany and the Atlantic Alliance, (Washington, The AEI Press, 1991).

For in-depth Information on France see Anand Menon France, NATO and the Limits of Independence (New York, McMillian Press LTD, 2000); Michael Harrison The Reluctant Ally: France and Atlantic Security (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981); Richard Kuissel, Seducing the French (Berkley: University of California Press, 1996).

This thesis will concentrate on the European actors, who have considerable influence over the future of the ESDP. While UK continues to seek a way to take a larger role in Europe's effort to unite, it most likely will never

deviate from the historical ties it has with the US. The UK's conviction that the US participation and commitment is essential to guarantee Europe's security is the primary motivation for the UK to promote European capabilities within the NATO framework.

The position of the two continental European actors France and Germany is quite ambivalent with respect to the UK. The interaction of these two nations, which compete for the leading role in Europe and at the same time are dependent on each other to reach common goals, produces a continual pattern of support and challenges to the Transatlantic Alliance. Understanding the traditional objectives of these two nations will help to assess future characteristics of the ESDP and illustrated the problems at hand which extend beyond just slogan and rhetoric.

C. METHODOLOGY

The thesis analyzes the developments of NATO's ESDI and the ESDP based on agreements and treaties achieved during NATO and EU summits, since the end of the Cold War in 1990. To underscore interpretations of these developments, this thesis uses official speeches by representatives of specific nations or organizations, as well as expert commentary and secondary literature of strategic policies. A case study on France and Germany reaching back to the end of World War II and before shows a pattern of national security policy, which was influential for the EU's struggle to establish a common position on ESDP and a constructive relationship with NATO.

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II. NATO AND THE EUROPEAN PILLAR OF DEFENSE

The purpose of ESDP is not shaped by a single entity. Because Europe does not speak with one voice, the concept and goals of the common ESDP are the result of a European consensus.

Among the EU countries there are several different approaches as how to improve European capabilities for security and defense.¹ Although ESDP was born out off a broadly accepted necessity to establish and promote a European security and defense identity, the character of ESDP developed as a result of a variety of European objectives. The different sovereign nations of the EU try to shape ESDP accordingly to their national interests. Thus the ESDP is a product of negotiations leading to a consensus among the EU member states. The main influence in the evolution of ESDP lies with the economically and militarily dominant countries in the Union. This thesis concentrates on the two biggest continental actors, namely France and Germany.

To analyze the EU's position regarding ESDP means to understand the national forces acting on behalf of an independent European defense system or in favor of a European contribution to NATO as an Euro-Atlantic sphere of security.

The most significant aspect of ESDP will be its relationship with NATO. Despite the obvious necessity to improve Europe's military capabilities, ESDP will certainly develop as a tool for the EU in its bargaining process over the military burden sharing and international influence with the US. The analysis of Europe's leading actors like France and Germany in its historical position towards NATO and Europe's defense helps to understand the nature of the ESDP and its possible impact on NATO's cohesion thus increasing US concern.

¹ Giovanna Bono, NATO's Peace Enforcement, (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2003), p. 37.

See also Wallace Thies, Friendly Rivals (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2003); Stanley Sloan, NATO, the European Union, and the Atlantic Community, (Oxford, Rowan & Littlefield Publisher, 2003); Anand Menon, France, NATO and the Limits of Independence, (New York: MACMILLIAN Press INC., 2000); Ian Thomas, The Promise of Alliance, (Oxford, Rowan & Littlefield Publisher, 1997); Robert Hunter, The European Security and Defense Policy, (Santa Monica: RAND, 2002); Jacquelyn Davis, Reluctant Allies & Competitive Partners, (Dulles, Brassey's Inc., 2002)

The close cooperation between France and Germany created a continuous momentum for the European integration including on the defense issue. In contrast, the UK limited its involvement on singular events, especially regarding the defense issue. Without the change in the UK's position to a more autonomous European defense, it is doubtful, if the ESDP concept would have gained so much support. In general, however, the British approach to European Integration is more reluctant. The same is true for European defense efforts. The UK's interest in the improvement of separable EU capabilities is dominated by its special relationship with the US and its leadership position in the European arm of NATO. The British goal is to build support for an increase in European defense expenditures to supplement NATO and increase Europe's influence within the Alliance. The UK, for example, had no interest in putting the WEU under the control of the European Council (EC) like France and Germany did, nor does British policy reflect the notion of multi-polarity or the need to counterbalance US hegemony.²

In April 2003, Britain's Prime Minister Tony Blair answered his own rhetorical question: Why does this (France's theses on a multi-polar world) matter so much?

Because the outcome of this issue will now determine... the way Britain and the world confront the central security threats of the twenty-first century; the development of the UN; the relationship between Europe and the US; the relationship within the EU and the way the US engages with the rest of the world. It will determine the pattern of international politics for the next generation.³

A. ESDI; MORE THAN TRANSATLANTIC BURDENSARING

European defense since the foundation of NATO was a bargaining process between the two sides of the Transatlantic Alliance. Despite the recognition of the common threat on both sides of the Atlantic, it is the nature of

² Giovanna Bono, NATO's Peace Enforcement, (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2003), p. 38.

³ Jolyon Howorth, France, Britain and the Euro-Atlantic Crisis in Survival, (The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Vol. 45, No. 4, 2003), p. 185.

democracies to minimize their share of the burden to fulfill different national obligations of the modern welfare state. This is the reason why Europe as well as the US used multiple techniques to shift the burden of collective defense to other members instead of accepting it's to share of the burden. If the defense effort is seen as a zero-sum game the obvious solution is to convince other members to do more of the work while fending of requests from others.⁴

It is hard to distinguish whether a NATO member is shifting the burden of collective defense or being exploited by other members. Is the US, for example, exploited by the European partners since its defense expenditures are higher than its allies? It is necessary to recognize that larger members of an alliance have more extensive interests and ambitions than smaller partners, so the defense expenditures and monetary contribution to NATO are not necessarily a valid measurement of burden sharing. In addition, sharing the burden between Europe and the US led to a strong division of labor that influenced the balanced collective forces.⁵ The US claimed for itself the production of costly hardware and the establishment of power-projection forces. In contrast, the European allies had to accept the burden of unbalanced national forces heavily dependent on the collective forces to come to its aid.⁶ This shifting of the defense burden through the division of labor is one reason for the dilemma in which the European countries find themselves today with their effort to transform Cold War forces into mobile power-projecting forces. It is no surprise that the US possesses strategic bombers, aircraft carriers and marine amphibious forces, while the European forces are heavily equipped with large conscription forces focused on territorial defense and ground war.

⁴ Wallace Thies Friendly Rivals (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2003) p. 7.

⁵ Ibid., p.76.

⁶ Ibid., p. 62. Article 5: The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, **such action as it deems necessary**, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Nevertheless, the European members of NATO accepted their role too easily and continuously presented a target for US reproach claiming that the Europeans must increase their defense expenditures. Beginning in the 1950's and steadily increasing in the late 1970's US administrations promoted programs to convince their European partners to invest in military forces. The Carter administration promoted the European approval of a Long-Term Defense Program (LTDP) in 1977 to improve capabilities in logistics, electronic warfare and command, control and communications (C3). Later the Reagan administration developed a program for Conventional Defense Improvements (CDI), which focused on similar issues. Although the CDI program was endorsed by NATO in 1985, neither LTDP nor CDI could prevent the widening capabilities gap between the US and Europe.⁷ During the crisis in Bosnia 1995 the German General Klaus Naumann stated that the US de facto-monopoly of communication satellite channels

Indicates quite clearly that without American support, an operation like IFOR in Bosnia could not be done... There is no security for Europe without the Americans.⁸

Interestingly enough is the French evaluation for the gap between the EU and the US as expressed by an official French Ministry of Defense:

This conflict illuminated the differences between the military means of the United States and Europe. The United States has developed extremely large military means that are justified by America's world ambitions since the end of the Second World War.⁹

It is obvious that such long-term alliances like NATO can put heavy strain on the cohesion among its members. Not only had the question of burden sharing led regularly to discord, It is part of the nature of alliances among democracies to engage in constant bargaining processes over burden, strategy or sovereignty. The reason that NATO is still a working organization although

⁷ David Yost, *The NATO Capabilities Gap and the European Union in Survival*, (The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Vol. 42, No. 4, 2000), p. 102. See also Wallace Thies *Friendly Rivals*. (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2003), p. 170.

⁸ Ibid., p 102.

⁹ Ibid., p. 103.

often challenged with extreme pressures is the fact that NATO adapts to new situations. The dilemma of Europe's military deficiencies was recognized on both sides of the Atlantic, but the right impetus to solve the problem was missing.

B. THE WAY TO SAINT-MÂLO

After 1990, the European security environment changed dramatically. The call for a peace dividend was strong in all western countries. One result was a reduction of US troops in Europe. The large numbers of NATO troops to guarantee Europe's freedom against a nuclear and conventional Soviet menace were no longer seen as necessary.

The European NATO members came into a position where they were able to establish European security without the support of the United States.

It is evident that the United States is disengaging from Europe...it cannot both leave and ask Europeans not to have a defense of their own. If the Americans were going to contribute less, Europe needed to develop its own capabilities.¹⁰

This statement was an over-estimate of European capabilities and proved evident during the increasing conflict in the Balkan region. In addition to this growing confidence among the European members of NATO, the reunification of Germany led to the expectation that a future Germany would take a clearer responsibility regarding its share of the defense burden. The new weight of Germany promised a shift in the balance within NATO and a greater focus on Europe. Again, this turned out to be a gross overestimate.

Nevertheless, the changed security environment gave an obvious impetus for the unification of the European Union. What was already mentioned 1986 in the Single European Act as momentum toward the development of a collective European defense, took greater shape in December 1991 at the Maastricht meeting. The European Union agreed on "the long-term perspective of a

¹⁰ Anand Menon, France, NATO and the Limits of Independence, (New York: MACMILLIAN Press INC., 2000), p. 123.

common defense policy within the European Union, which might in time lead to a common defense.”¹¹ In this context, the issue of the West European Union, which more or less lived in the shadows of NATO, was addressed as a possible defense component of the EU.

The Maastricht Treaty on the European Union was signed in February 1992. The Heads of State of the EU agreed on a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).

The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defense policy, which might in time lead to a common defense. The union requests the Western European Union (WEU), which is an integral part of the development of the Union, to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications. The Council shall, in agreement with the institutions of the WEU, adopt the necessary practical arrangements¹²

NATO recognized this development of greater European responsibility regarding security and defense and adopted its political and military structures to reflect the emerging European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI). The nature of this greater European responsibility regarding security and defense was demonstrated through the Petersberg declaration, the WEU ministers met on 19 June 1992 at Petersberg¹³, near Bonn, to identify classes of tasks suitable for European capabilities.¹⁴ These Petersberg tasks, which were later incorporated into Article 17 of the Treaty of European Union by the EU's Amsterdam Summit (10th November 1997), included

- humanitarian and rescue tasks
- peacekeeping tasks

¹¹ Michael Quinlan, European Defense Cooperation (Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2001) p. 16.

¹² Treaty on the European Union, Maastricht, 7 February 1992, Title V, Article J.4.

¹³ Giovanna Bono, NATO's Peace Enforcement, (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2003), p. 57.

¹⁴ Michael Quinlan, European Defense Cooperation (Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2001) p. 20

- tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking

Although no permanent operational cell for WEU planning was established, a military planning cell of 40 staff members took over the task of identifying adequate forces for Petersberg missions.¹⁵

NATO's way to recognize this development of a greater European responsibility regarding security and defense was to make NATO assets available to EU led Missions on a basis of consultation in the North Atlantic Council (NAC).

The most promising instrument to secure Europe's effort within NATO's framework was the Combined Joint Task Force concept (CJTF). One characteristic of the CJTF concept was that it would provide separable but not separate deployable Headquarters to the EU.

The core concept of CJTF arose from the new challenges of the changed security environment.¹⁶ Small, diverse and unpredictable threat-scenarios called for a structural adaptation. The appropriate force structure should be easily deployable, multinational and tailored to specific military task. While the forces sub-groups are easy to assemble, the main focus is on the command and control arrangements. In order to guarantee the effectiveness of such a rapidly generated CJTF headquarters is composed of a core element, the nuclei, from existing NATO headquarters, which will be augmented by contributing partner countries. This concept enabled NATO to incorporate contributions from non

¹⁵ "At the December 1999 Helsinki European Council meeting, EU Member States set themselves a military capability target known as the Headline Goal. It requires that EU Member States be able to deploy 60,000 troops, within 60 days and sustainable for a year, starting in late 2003. These capabilities are to be used in support of Petersberg missions. EU-led forces assembled in response to a crisis would last only for the duration of the crisis and it would be up to the Member States themselves to decide whether, when and how to contribute troops.

The self-sustaining element is envisioned to include the command, control, intelligence capabilities, logistics, and air and naval assets required to carry out the full spectrum of the Petersberg tasks. An additional pool of deployable units and supporting elements are available to provide replacements as required." Gustav Lindstrom, The Headline Goal, (EU Institute for Security Studies); available from <http://www.iss-eu.org/esdp/05-gl.pdf>; internet; accessed 19 May 2004.

¹⁶ Giovanna Bono, NATO's Peace Enforcement, (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2003), p. 87.

NATO countries in context with a NATO enlargement as well as to support the evolving ESDI.

In 1994 at NATO's summit in Brussels the NATO members agreed to forestall the establishment of separate European structures by enabling the EU to draw upon NATO's resources. This concept was called the Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) and made the combination of non-NATO elements with NATO assets like Headquarters or communication systems possible. The 1996 meeting of foreign ministers in Berlin developed this concept even further and proposed that WEU led missions would make use of the multinational staff at NATO's Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) under the leadership of the Deputy Supreme Commander of Europe (DSACEUR), which is always a European senior officer.¹⁷

In addition, several other key elements were established.

- There could be "WEU-led" operations, including "planning and exercising of command elements and forces."
- NATO would identify "types of separable but not separate capabilities, assets and support assets, Headquarters, HQ elements and command structures, which could be made available, subject to decision by the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and subsequent monitoring of the use of these forces by NATO. This continuing role of NATO in the use of its assets was later broadened to provide for their return or recall, if they proved to be needed by the alliance – e.g. in the event of a competing crisis or conflict.
- Multinational European command arrangements within NATO would be worked out for WEU-led operations – i.e. "double hatting" of NATO personnel, who could be detached for use by the WEU. At the same time, NATO agreed that its Deputy Supreme Allied Commander of Europe (DSACEUR) could be used by the WEU as

¹⁷ Michael Quinlan, European Defense Cooperation (Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2001) p. 22

its own strategic commander in the event of a WEU military operation.

- All European members of NATO would be able to take part in WEU-led operations; including European command arrangements if they chose to do so (this was in particular a reference to Turkey).¹⁸

NATO's offer to use the CJTF concept to make NATO resources available to EU led operations led to misinterpretation by France of its original purpose¹⁹. France demanded that the CJTF staff reflect the composition of the troops committed and that the CJTF must serve NATO and WEU equally.²⁰

This interpretation led some in Paris to believe that a far-reaching "Europeanization" of the alliance was underway. It led some in Washington to believe that security tasks could in the future be divided between Europe and the United States, rather than shared."

"CJTF was hijacked by ESDI. At and after the Brussels Summit, U.S. and European officials, and therefore U.S. and European news stories, focused almost exclusively on how CJTF could be used by the Europeans acting without the United States. They did not make it clear that CJTF's first rationale, and most likely utility, would be to facilitate trans-Atlantic operational responses to the emerging challenges addressed by the new strategic concept.²¹

Despite the fact that France sought to gain automatic access to NATO's assets and capabilities, NATO clarified in June 1997 its approval regarding the availability of NATO resources to EU-led operations:

¹⁸ Robert Hunter, The European Security and Defense Policy, (Santa Monica: RAND, 2002), p.15.

¹⁹ Anand Menon, France, NATO and the Limits of Independence, (New York: MACMILLIAN Press INC., 2000), p. 51.

²⁰ Jacob Kipp, Key Issues Confronting France, (Fort Leavenworth, Foreign Military Studies Office, 1995)

²¹ Stanley Sloan, European Security and Defense Identity: An American Perspective, (National Defense University, Symposium concerning NATO activities, March 1997); available from <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/books/Books%20-%201998/NATO%201997%20Sept%202008/natoch3.html>; internet; accessed 19 May 2004.

- provisional approval of the ESDI-related elements of the terms of reference of DSACEUR, under which, taking account of his strategic coordination function, he would have permanent responsibilities during peacetime as well as during crises and operations;
- progress in developing arrangements for the release, monitoring and return or recall of Alliance assets and capabilities.²²

France saw this new freedom of action without the pressing threat of the Soviet Union as an opportunity to regain French influence in European security issues.

However, in the early 1990's, France was unable to avoid NATO's adaptation to the post Cold War situation (reform and "go-ahead" for enlargement) and to transform WEU into the main European security organisation, which was mainly due to the strong British reluctance²³ and to the German unwillingness to weaken NATO.²⁴

Three main aspects challenged the French aspirations. First, the deterioration of the Balkan crisis made obvious the gap between the military capabilities of the EU and of NATO with its US resources obvious. All members of the EU, including France, had to recognize that the EU was not able to control this regional conflict without the support of the US. Although the US was reluctant to commit to this European affair, it was certainly a way to underscore NATO's supreme position regarding military issues. This also provided an opportunity to counterbalance increasing refusal of US influence in European security, which is de facto inseparability from American security.

Second, NATO showed its capability to adapt to any new situation. Instead of declining to fulfill its superficial purpose, namely to contain Soviet

²² North Atlantic Council in Defense Ministers Session, Final Communiqué, 12 June 1997

²³ Giovanna Bono, NATO's Peace Enforcement, (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2003), p. 37.

²⁴ Jean-Pierre Froehly, The French Perspective: France's Position towards ESDI and ESDP (June 2000); available from http://www.dgap.org/english/text/france_esdi.html; internet; accessed 19 May 2004.

power, NATO placed more emphasis on Articles²⁵ concerning Collective Defense, which define NATO as an alliance of common objectives rather than a collective of guns and tanks. Article 10 of the Washington treaty²⁶, the admission of new member states, played a major role in NATO adoption to the new challenges. NATO's invitation to the Eastern European countries led to a confirmation of NATO's role as guarantor of European security. Eastern Europe was more interested in NATO's security umbrella than relying on the EU's plans to assure European defense. Remarkable in this context, is the French reaction in 2003 regarding Eastern European support of the US Iraq policy. Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, all of whom had dates for EU membership, joined EU members Britain, Spain, Italy, Denmark and Portugal in signing a letter in January 2003 to support Washington's stance on Iraq. French President Jacques Chirac called the letters "infantile" and "dangerous," adding: "They missed a great opportunity to keep quiet."²⁷

In 1995, France showed great reluctance to a possible NATO enlargement. The French Defense Minister Francois Lèotard explicitly rejected the extension of Article 5 guarantees to Central and East European states. While official statements emphasized French concern regarding Russia's reaction as a reason to delay NATO's enlargement, "privately, French officials expressed the opinion that enlargement should not be contemplated until the internal reform of NATO had been successfully carried out."²⁸ France continued to push for a reform of NATO, which reflects more European influence.

²⁵ Article 3: In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

Article 4: The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.

²⁶ Article 10: The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. Any State so invited may become a Party to the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America. The Government of the United States of America will inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession.

²⁷ BBC News, *New Europe' backs EU on Iraq*, (19 February 2003); available from <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2775579.stm>; internet; accessed 19 May 2004.

²⁸ Anand Menon, *France, NATO and the Limits of Independence*, (New York: MACMILLIAN Press INC., 2000), p.45.

Third, France's absence of NATO's integrated military structure prevented France from influencing NATO's new adjustments. Since France was hardly part of the "policy community", which promoted NATO's transformation as a peace-enforcement tool during the first air strikes in the Balkan crisis (1994) to Operation Deliberate Hope (1995), the realization of the CJTF concept progressed slow. In contrast, officials from the US, Germany and the Integrated Military Staff (IMS) were able to renovate NATO's role through the support of certain policy communities.²⁹

Furthermore, France lacked experience with NATO's internal structure, which in fall 1996 led to failed negotiations between Jacques Chirac and its Prime Minister Alain Juppe over the French demand for the position of CINCSOUTH.³⁰ This brought the French rapprochement with NATO's IMS to a sudden stop.

Although, NATO's arrangements, including the CJTF concept, promised a clear improvement of the EU's freedom of action regarding military challenges, in which NATO would not be involved, the British Prime Minister Tony Blair made a surprising statement at a informal gathering of heads of government at Portschach, near Klagenfurt in October 1998. Blair outlined the nature of the discussions on European defense matters at a press conference. No formal decisions or records were taken at the meeting.

A common foreign and security policy for the European Union is necessary, it is overdue, it is needed and it is high time we got on with trying to engage with formulating it and I think that people were pleased that Britain came to this with an open mind and was willing to participate in the debate and I think it is important that we do that.³¹

²⁹ Giovanna Bono, NATO's Peace Enforcement, (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2003), p. 118.

³⁰ Anand Menon, France, NATO and the Limits of Independence, (New York: MACMILLIAN Press INC., 2000), p. 56.

³¹ Mark Oakes, European defense: From Portschach to Helsinki (London: House of CommonsLibrary, 21Feb2000), p.11; available from <http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/rp2000/rp00-020.pdf>; internet; accessed 19 May 2004.

Since those meetings do not generate official communiqués it was an appropriate platform for Britain to make such a unexpected statement without drawing to much attention. It was a kind of test leading up to the Franco-British declaration on European defense in December 1998 in Saint-Mâlo.

Although Britain took a skeptical position toward EU's effort to incorporate autonomous military capabilities, Britain's disappointment with the EU's unimpressive weight during the Balkan crisis led to closer cooperation with France on this issue and to the following statement "the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises."³²

The Union must be given appropriate structures and a capacity for analysis of situations, sources of intelligence, and a capability for relevant strategic planning, without unnecessary duplication, taking account of the existing assets of the WEU and the evolution of its relations with the EU. In this regard, the European Union will also need to have recourse to suitable military means (European capabilities pre-designated within NATO's European Pillar or national or multinational European means outside the NATO framework).³³

The reason for this change of British policy regarding European defense was certainly based on different objectives than those of France.³⁴ Besides the fact that Britain needed to improve its image in a field of British strength, Britain's main objective was to improve of the military capabilities available in Europe. Britain did not seek EU capabilities for its own sake.

³² Joint Declaration on European Defense, UK-French Summit, Saint-Mâlo, 3-4 December 1998.

³³ Joint Declaration on European Defense, UK-French Summit, Saint-Mâlo, 3-4 December 1998

³⁴ Giovanna Bono, NATO's Peace Enforcement, (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2003), p. 127.

Saint-Mâlo gave Britain, which had not joined the European Monetary Union or subscribed to the Euro, a chance to appear committed to the European “vocation”; further, it enabled London to throw in its lot with Paris, where the latter had much at stake in its twin competitions for influence with Germany (the greater) and the United States (the lesser). Provided that Britain could convince the United States that it was not straying from its basic allegiance to NATO—or straining at the “special relationship” with Washington—this was a sustainable position. Indeed, on the morrow of Saint-Mâlo, one of its British negotiators said to the TPN meeting in London, with its clutch of U.S. members of Congress, that Britain would never countenance any interpretation of Saint-Mâlo that could weaken NATO’s primacy.³⁵

Promoting a European way to improve Europe’s military capabilities seemed to be the contemporary solution to increase the contribution of the European Pillar to NATO. Britain’s intent was to make the European NATO members and especially Britain a more capable partner for future NATO operations. The disappointing experiences during the Balkan crisis made a significant impression on Britain’s self-confidence and clearly illustrates Europe’s role in international crisis management.³⁶ The existing alternatives to convince NATO’s European members to accept more responsibility regarding robust military intervention capability were too weak.³⁷ The concept of NATO’s ESDI lacked a strong momentum. The European NATO members did not support the idea to increase their military expenditures within the NATO framework past its original engagement. In addition, neither the EU nor the European NATO members would be able to accomplish credible military missions without France’s contribution. It was quite doubtful if the French contribution would be tied to NATO’s framework. A further development of the WEU did not seem promising, since the WEU continued with its reputation of being insignificant vis-à-vis NATO. The WEU never became a focus for the head of governments. This attention was

³⁵ Robert Hunter, The European Security and Defense Policy, (Santa Monica: RAND, 2002), p. 29.

³⁶ Stanley Sloan, NATO, the European Union, and the Atlantic Community, (Oxford, Rowan & Littlefield Publisher, 2003), p.174.

³⁷ Michael Quinlan, European Defense Cooperation (Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2001) p. 31.

on the future development of a united Europe, a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and eventually a common security and defense policy.

Taken by surprise, the general reaction to the statements made at Saint-Malo was positive regarding the EU's commitment to take greater responsibility. Nevertheless, in the aftermath of the meeting Britain and the US emphasized that such a development must not be counterproductive to NATO.³⁸

US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright stressed NATO's role as primary security alliance for Europe,

I think what happened there was very important. There is a reason for the Europeans to find an identity in their own defense, but this is a thing that cannot be a *duplication* or *discrimination*. It is a manner by which the Europeans can share in the work of NATO. It is something that cannot hurt NATO because this is the most important alliance. But we think it is very important that the Europeans work in this manner because it is something that helps us in burden sharing.³⁹

Mrs. Albright foresaw the problems of autonomous European defense acting within NATO's framework. The concerns, which she expressed, became known as the *Three D's*.⁴⁰ A European establishment of autonomous capabilities, especially outside the NATO framework as mentioned in the statement, bears the risk of a decoupling of Europe from the US. In today's world marked by globalization it is not possible to decouple European security issues from US interests. This decoupling momentum would mainly be created by extensive duplication of NATO's military structures. The national expenditures of European NATO members in separate forces, headquarters or infrastructure, which are not subsidiary to NATO's existing resources, would constitute a waste of overall defense resources. This fear that Europe's NATO members would waste valuable national resources in duplication of existing structures instead of concrete improvements in defense capabilities explained the emotional critique of

³⁸ Stanley Sloan, NATO, the European Union, and the Atlantic Community, (Oxford, Rowan & Littlefield Publisher, 2003),p.173.

³⁹ United States Information Agency (8 December 1998); available from <http://www.usia.gov>; internet; accessed 19 May 2004.

⁴⁰ Stanley Sloan, NATO, the European Union, and the Atlantic Community, (Oxford, Rowan & Littlefield Publisher, 2003),p.173.

NATO officials and US diplomats on a proposal regarding separate European headquarters in April 2003. During a meeting of the heads of states of France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg, the national leaders, which opposed the Iraq intervention, announced plans to create a joint military planning system by 2004, and a multinational headquarters for European military operations in which NATO would not be involved.⁴¹ The political circumstances at this time made such a proposal out of question and this mini summit soon was branded as *Pralinen Gipfel*.⁴² Despite additional statements by Jacques Chirac that the proposal is not a decoupling of the EU from NATO, but a reinforcement of NATO's European Pillar⁴³, its apparent purpose was to suggest duplication of NATO capabilities.

Duplication was already an issue during the Birmingham meeting of NATO defense ministers in October 2000. The issue was the instruments of the defense planning process. Since NATO uses detailed and time-consuming planning instruments like the Defense Planning Questionnaire, EU ministers like the German Defense Minister Rudolf Scharping strongly proposed to drain off necessary information for EU purposes from this existing planning tool. This would avoid duplication and possible confusion with the collection of similar data for two different planning systems. It is no surprise that this concept was met with French resistance. France's inexperience with NATO's IMS made it difficult to accept too much dependency on NATO's framework.⁴⁴

The third D addressed by Secretary Albright was discrimination. Discrimination in this context is the exclusion of non-EU states from EU's decision making process regarding security planning. What might seem obvious at first, looks somewhat different when imagining the use of NATO resources for

⁴¹ BBC NEWS World edition, (30 April 2003); available from <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2987167.stm>; internet; accessed 19 May 2004.

⁴² Pralinen Gipfel(Ger.) = chocolate summit, since it was held in Brussels, famous for the manufacturing of chocolate

⁴³ Die Welt, (30 April 2003); available from <http://www.welt.de/data/2003/04/30/81750.html?s=1>; internet; accessed 19 May 2004.

⁴⁴ Michael Quinlan, European Defense Cooperation (Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2001), p.45.

EU led missions excluding NATO members like the US, Canada or Turkey from the planning process.

Turkey for example, which for a long time has tried to become a EU member, demanded the same openness for ESDP decision making⁴⁵ as had existed for WEU meetings. Although not a member state, Turkey used to attend these meetings. France also supported by Greece, led the opposition to this demand trying to establish a forum free from any external influence. The same would be true for Eastern European NATO members as long as they were not EU members. The Turkish reaction to this exclusion was to blockade consensus within NATO on issues related to the cooperation with the EU.⁴⁶ At a press conference following the Washington NATO summit in 1999, Turkish Foreign Minister, Ismail Cem, was reported to have said,

If EU countries want to set up their own defence organization, it is their business. However, when they want to use NATO's means, the NATO members, including Turkey, must also be involved in that.⁴⁷

The French President Chirac clearly emphasized ESDP's independence from NATO during the December 2000 meeting of heads of government at Nice, although he received words of warning from the US as well as from Prime Minister Blair and Chancellor Schroeder. Nevertheless, the Nice council meeting stressed its commitment for cooperation with NATO regarding the principles for consultation, cooperation and transparency. Furthermore, it addressed the necessary arrangements for an efficient EU access to NATO assets and capabilities. However, in situations where no NATO assets would be requested, the EU did not granted participation of non-EU NATO allies in the planning

⁴⁵ Mark Oakes, European Security and Defense Policy: Nice and beyond (London: House of Commons Library, 2 May 2001), p. 27; available from <http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/rp2001/rp01-050.pdf>; internet; accessed 19 May 2004.

⁴⁶ Michael Quinlan, European Defense Cooperation (Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2001), p. 47.

⁴⁷ Mark Oakes, European Security and Defense Policy: Nice and beyond (London: House of Commons Library, 2 May 2001), p. 28; available from <http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/rp2001/rp01-050.pdf>; internet; accessed 19 May 2004.

process. Non-EU NATO allies' participation would be limited to liaison officers exchanging information on operational planning. The concern was that the EU would start serious planning efforts before consulting NATO. This however, is in contrary to the EU's claim to concentrate on operations "where NATO as a whole is not engaged."⁴⁸ As a result, the perception of the ESDP remained ambivalent in non-EU countries, especially the US.

US Senators Jesse Helms and Gordon Smith expressed American suspicion that ESDP will rival NATO for supremacy in European security affairs. After the EU's Nice summit they warned that "European leaders should reflect carefully on the true motivation behind ESDP, which many see as a means for Europe to check American power and influence within NATO." The two Senators Helms and Smith continued to warn that "it is neither in Europe's nor America's interests to undermine our proven national relationship in favor of one with a European super-state whose creation is being driven, in part, by anti-American sentiment."⁴⁹

C. THE IRAQ CRISIS 2002-2003; IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO'S COHESION

The suspicion of a European counterbalance to US security policy and the US influence in NATO reached its climax during the discussions over the US led operation against Iraq in 2002-2003. The provocative demonstrations of various to the Iraqi issue on both sides of the Atlantic also affected NATO. France and Germany, two of Europe's big three, opposed the creation of a "coalition of the willing" and the US proclamation to act unilateral if necessary. Although NATO was not involved directly, the discrepancies among major members of NATO regarding this security issue had certain impact on NATO's reputation. Obviously,

⁴⁸ Robert Hunter, The European Security and Defense Policy, (Santa Monica: RAND, 2002), p.111.

⁴⁹ Andreas Hartmann, Europe's Military Ambitions - Myth or Reality?; available from <http://www.edc.spb.ru/conf2002/hartmann.html>; internet; accessed 19 May 2004. Hartmann is advisor of the EPP-ED Group (with 232 out of 626 MEPs) in the European Parliament. See also Jesse Helms and Gordon Smith, *European Defense Policy is Dangerous*, (Daily Telegraph, 28 December 2000).

NATO as the primary organization for security was not able to generate consensus among its members concerning the potential of Iraqi threat. Although, a general consensus existed concerning the need to support the UN resolution, the question of by what means still remained.

NATO Allies stand united in their commitment to take effective action to assist and support the efforts of the UN to ensure full and immediate compliance by Iraq, without conditions or restrictions, with UNSCR 1441.⁵⁰

NATO's member countries formed coalitions of common interests outside of the NATO framework. The US underscored its position by emphasizing its support from European countries like Britain and Spain. In addition, the US led coalition found support among the new NATO members like Poland. NATO did not serve as the framework to establish a common position among its members on the Iraq crisis, but was used as a pool of forces available to create ad hoc coalitions outside of NATO.

France, fearing it would lose influence regarding its permanent seat on the UN Security Council and Germany, being torn apart over the Iraqi question in the middle of a election campaign, expressed their opposition by ruling out any compromises long before it would have been necessary.

France saw its international influence steadily decreasing with the growing US willingness to act even without a new mandate by the UN Security Council. France interpretation of the existing mandate did not sanction the US plans for military intervention. The same interpretation was expressed by Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder in a speech to the German parliament.

Resolution 1441 does not contain any automatism to the use of military force. The priority task is to exhaust all resources for peaceful conflict resolution and optimize their use.⁵¹

⁵⁰ Prague Summit Statement on Iraq, (NATO Press release 2002/133, 21 November 2002)

⁵¹ Statement by Chancellor Schroeder, (German Embassy Washington US, Press release 13 February 2003)

Chancellor Schroeder continued that the transatlantic relationship won't be undermined by occasional differences of opinion.

We are united by a friendship that is based on mutual respect and the pursuit of common aims. And which therefore must withstand differences of opinion on important issues. Today's dispute is not about details of security policy. Nor about apparent strategic or economic benefits. And certainly not about the 'to be or not to be' of NATO.⁵²

Since France's influence in the NATO arena was too weak vis-à-vis the US, Chirac used the European forum to support an opposition.

Europe must realize the need to express its own vision of world problems and support this vision with a credible common defense. France is calling on her partners in the European Union and those going to join it to fulfill this ambition, in the service of peace and prosperity.⁵³

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Statement by President Jacques Chirac concerning the Iraq intervention, (Paris, March 20, 2003) at <http://www.info-france-usa.org/news/standpoint/stand10.asp>

III. FRANCE

A. FRANCE'S QUEST FOR AN INDEPENDENT EUROPEAN DEFENSE

1. The Origin of France's Desire for an Independent European Defense

The intangible phenomenon of France's search for prestige is firmly intertwined with the French policy regarding its role as a major power in Europe and overseas. The roots of modern French grandeur are influenced by the persistent menacing of the powerful German Empire in continental Europe and the British dominance as a nation that projects power worldwide. France superior role on the European continent was abruptly displaced by Germany in the Franco-Prussian War in 1870-1871.⁵⁴ The loss of the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine to Germany had a significant impact on French national pride. The French reaction to compensate for this loss was to divert its attention to the struggle for overseas colonies. In 1897, German Kaiser Wilhelm II followed Britain and France with his "place in the sun" policy challenging Anglo-French imperial interests in Africa and Asia.

The loss of French territory in 1871, the challenge by Germany overseas and the devastating defeat of France in two World Wars manifested the desire in French policy for sovereignty, independence and military strength. The Second World War left France as a ruined country. Obviously, France was far from accomplishing any of these objectives. In contrast it became highly dependent on the US and was even forced to compromise with the reestablishment of Germany as a European power. As a result of this long period of tension between France and Germany, the French relationship with Germany since 1945 shows alternating elements of distrust, dependence and a special obligation to secure peace between the two nations.

Hence, the French position regarding European security and defense has for decades differed from that of Germany and UK. The French national interest

⁵⁴ William Keylor, The Twentieth Century World (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 6.

after World War II was dominated by two objectives: first, to ensure that Germany would never again develop military forces which could threaten France and, second, to protect France against the rising Soviet threat in Europe.

Although NATO was the appropriate organization to achieve those goals, the French perception of the Atlantic Alliance was that it was dominated by the Anglo-American relationship. Since France was excluded from the initial negotiations, this perception aggravated it even further. France continued to claim to be the third leader of the Alliance. Examples are the French demand for the creation of a tripartite chief of staff, which would give France influence in the strategic planning process. The marginalization of the Standing Group as an executive organ, which gave France a limited say in strategic issues, the imbalance with the national feeling regarding the control of NATO's major command⁵⁵ and finally the confrontation with the US during the Suez crisis of 1956⁵⁶ made France a reluctant ally to NATO, from the beginning.

The principal victim of the (Suez) affair was the Atlantic Pact. If our allies could abandon us under difficult, if not dramatic, circumstances, they were able of doing it again if Europe, in turn, was threatened.⁵⁷

At least, NATO gave France the necessary guarantees against the threat of Soviet aggression or coercion. The alliance with UK and the strong US commitment to the NATO allies provided some assurance about Germany in addition to the continuing occupation regime. French political leaders were alarmed when West German rearmament became an essential factor for NATO's defense against the Soviet Union. The main US Joint Emergency War Plan (EWP) in 1948 was called Halfmoon. The plan predicted the Soviet Union to be

⁵⁵ Anand Menon France, NATO and the Limits of Independence (New York: McMillian Press LTD, 2000) p. 8. France held the major command under SACEUR over NATO's central region (AFCENT), while the US controlled seven and Britain five major commands.

⁵⁶ Kissinger, Henry. Diplomacy. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), p. 522.

⁵⁷ Anand Menon France, NATO and the Limits of Independence (New York: McMillian Press LTD, 2000) p. 9.

able to sweep to the English Channel in 60 days or less, within 200 days most of Turkey, Iraq and Iran would be overrun. A retreat behind the Pyrenees would be the Western Allies last foothold on the continent for a massive Normandy-type counterattack. It is obvious that such a plan engendered more hostile attention from the continental Europeans than from Americans, Canadians or British.⁵⁸ Especially during the Korean War (1950-1953), the US and most other NATO countries feared Soviet aggression in Europe. Since the French armed forces were still weak and engaged in combat in Indochina the Federal Republic of Germany and France further perceived the British commitment in continental Europe as reserved, German rearmament became a requirement for the alliance, rather than an expression of national choice.⁵⁹ The NAC meeting in Lisbon in February 1952 proposed the so-called Lisbon goals. Although unrealizable, the goal relied on major contributions of conventional forces by the member-states, including 12 divisions from the Federal Republic of Germany within an all-European army.⁶⁰ This was obviously in strong contrast to the dominant French conception of national interest at that time and brought the first major disagreement between France and its NATO allies, especially with the US.

France certainly recognized the need for stronger military resources and developed an alternative concept, which would permit the establishment of West German armed forces, but not under national German control. France's Prime Minister Renè Pleven proposed in October 1950 a plan to integrate German battalions under control of a supranational structure.⁶¹ The idea was German participation on the battalion level in a European army without a German General Staff and without any German divisions. The forces themselves would operate under a European defense minister.

The US had especially pushed for a modification of the plan and eventually a compromise in the form of the European Defense Community (EDC)

⁵⁸ Jordan, Robert Norstad – Cold War Supreme Commander (New York: Macmillian Press LTD, 2000), p. 75.

⁵⁹ Ian Thomas, The Promise of Alliance (Oxford, Rowman & Littlefield, 1997), p. 42.

⁶⁰ Jordan, Robert Norstad – Cold War Supreme Commander (New York: Macmillian Press LTD, 2000), p. 84.

⁶¹ John Harper, American Visions of Europe, (Cambridge: University Press, 1996), p. 301.

was agreed upon. In May 1952 France, West Germany, Italy and the Benelux states signed the EDC treaty.⁶²

NATO's February 1952 Lisbon final communiqué stressed that this European Defense Community would operate within the NATO framework.⁶³ The reason why the French National Assembly chose not to ratify the EDC treaty in 1954 was based on the culmination of several changes in France's security environment. The likelihood of a direct military attack from the Soviet Union gradually decreased after Stalin's death in early 1953. Détente remained a long way off, but the Cold War was entering a phase of greater stability in Europe. At the same time France felt increasingly excluded from the decision making process by Britain and the US. Germany, overcoming initial fear of a revival of national militarism, used its strategic importance to demand equal treatment. The French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman wrote in 1951 "Germany would either dominate the European army – the flower of the French army was dying in Indochina – or throw it over to pursue a militarist-revanchist course."⁶⁴

What influence the Soviet Union had on the failed ratification of the treaty is uncertain, but William Hyland, a former US government official and observer of the Soviet Union, claimed that the Soviets also sought to block EDC by promising to help France in its negotiations with the communist Vietnamese guerrillas if France would refuse to ratify the EDC treaty.⁶⁵

However, the most significant reason for France to reject EDC might have been the basic concept behind a military defense community. The US perception of EDC was to weld the European armies together, especially France and Germany. In contrast, France sought to create with EDC an instrument to integrate German military resources while limiting German control. French critics

⁶² Ian Thomas, The Promise of Alliance (Oxford, Rowman & Littlefield, 1997), p. 38.

⁶³ NATO, Lisbon final communiqué, 25 February 1952, Synopsis, Article 3.

⁶⁴ John Harper, American Visions of Europe, (Cambridge: University Press, 1996) p. 312.

⁶⁵ Constantine Menges, The Future of Germany and the Atlantic Alliance, (Washington DC: The AEI Press, 1991), p. 26.

argued that EDC would reconstitute German armed forces, while subordinating the French military to a supranational European organization.⁶⁶

The fundamental fact of all these tortuous negotiations spreading over nearly four years is that all the French governments from the end of 1950 till the actual rejection of EDC in 1954, knew that at no time was there a majority in the National Assembly or in the country to sanction EDC⁶⁷

The remarkable aspects of the EDC episode include France's proposal for a parallel but independent European defense structure and the strong Anglo-American concept of European defense within the NATO framework. Although EDC failed, it paved the way for Germany's admission to the WEU and NATO.

The dilemma of collective European defense was significantly affected by the triangular relationship between the US, France and Germany.⁶⁸ Germany's promising economic strength and its geo-strategic location made it a prospective partner in Europe. France as well as the US were both continually trying to gain influence over Germany. In its own struggle for sovereignty via international integration, Germany was often able to exploit this competition to achieve a bargaining position well beyond its actual power. This was clearly evident during the Fifth Republic, President Charles de Gaulle pressed impatiently for Germany's acceptance of an "exclusive association" between France and Germany. De Gaulle even demanded that Germany should support a joined proposal for a "French hegemony" in Western Europe.⁶⁹

Despite this competition, all three nations were well aware that because of their dependence on each other a productive relationship was not possible

⁶⁶ David Yost, NATO Transformed, (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2000), p. 30.

⁶⁷ John Harper, American Visions of Europe, (Cambridge: University Press, 1996), p. 326.

⁶⁸ Klaus Hildebrand, German Foreign Policy, From Bismarck to Adenauer, (London: Unwin Hyman Ltd, 1989), p. 201.

⁶⁹ Klaus Hildebrand, German Foreign Policy, From Bismarck to Adenauer, (London: Unwin Hyman Ltd, 1989), p. 202.

without reconciliation. Consequently, Germany often took over the role of a mediator balancing the interests of France and the US.

Half a century later, France is again the strongest promoter of a more independent European defense, this time via the European Union. Since the Cold War did not offer enough scope to develop the French “Third Way”, NATO was the preferred organization to protect France’s national security interests. With the end of the Cold War, France is in a position to resume its pursuit of an independent European defense with strong French influence. The orientations of the ESDP satisfy the longstanding French desire to create autonomous European defense capacities outside of NATO. In contrast, the French considered the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), which was the concept of European defense cooperation within the NATO framework, an “Americanization” of the European Pillar instead of a true path toward an autonomous ESDP. France’s effort regarding the ESDP shows clearly an old pattern of weakening the transatlantic link and especially US influence in Europe in favor of an autonomous European defense.

2. France Still as a Grand Nation; the French “Third Way”

French diplomacy is strongly influenced by the ideology of independence and grandeur.⁷⁰ Grandeur in the French perspective is based not only on the nation’s status as a great European power among others (UK, Prussia, Austria-Hungary and Russia during the 18th-19th centuries), but also on convictions about the universal relevance of French values. In the context of the decolonization of Algeria (1956-1962), for example, President de Gaulle presented France’s revival and recovery of African independence as a symbol for other countries in a pluralistic international system.⁷¹ French foreign policy is seen as a contribution to the enlightenment of the world.

⁷⁰ Michael Harrison, The Reluctant Ally: France and Atlantic Security (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), p. 49.

⁷¹ Ibid., p. 53.

French values were especially challenged by the sudden dominance of the US in military and economic affairs. The dependence on the US was interpreted as a loss of *Frenchness*.⁷² The election of General Charles de Gaulle as president was an expression of France's struggle to regain its former grandeur. The Fifth Republic tried to develop a Third Way (1958-1969) to stay independent in the relationship between the US and the Soviet Union. This development during the Cold War period, which saw some tendencies of anti-Americanism among the intellectual elite, found its infamous climax in the French withdrawal from NATO's integrated command structure in 1966.⁷³ Despite France's rapprochement with NATO's military structures in 1995-1996, a certain reserve is still visible in Chirac's statement that France approaches NATO with an open mind "as long as the European identity can assert itself fully therein."⁷⁴

One important aspect of independence is national defense. Besides the obvious reason for national defense, namely the state's protection against external aggression, it is a symbol of the government's authority and legitimacy.⁷⁵ This notion of national defense leads to an inherently ambiguous understanding of the European Union's security and defense policy. The promotion of the Saint-Mâlo process (1998) may lead to stronger French influence in the ESDP and lessen the extent of US dominance in European security affairs. Reaching this goal implies the containment of arrangements that would "Europeanize" such national military capabilities, as those proposed by Germany.⁷⁶ While Germany has advocated a federalist model for the European Union, France has favored centralized alternatives, which would strengthen EU institutions without limiting French national autonomy.

⁷² Richard Kuissel, Seducing the French (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), p. xii.

⁷³ Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), p. 612.

⁷⁴ Chirac quoted in Charles Cogan, Forced to choose: France, the Atlantic Alliance, and NATO (Westport: Praeger, 1997), p. 120.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 55.

⁷⁶ Michael Brenner, Reconcilable Differences (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2002), p. 122.

France's contemporary policy regarding collective defense is still influenced by its national experience from 1870 to 1945. Its ambivalent status in NATO and its commitment to the European Union's ESDP reflect French national identity. The following two chapters focus on France's interaction with NATO and its military commitment to collective defense.

B. FRANCE'S SPECIAL STATUS WITHIN NATO

1. France and the NATO Integrated Military Structure

Although the importance of independent decision-making was already a characteristic of the Fourth Republic (1946-1958)⁷⁷, the French notion of grandeur is usually connected to the expression of Gaullism. Hence, the most significant impulse to the French approach to national security affairs came during de Gaulle's presidency during the Fifth Republic (1958-1969).

In his first Defense Council meeting as President, de Gaulle addressed France's status within NATO.

Our place in the NATO organization must be reconsidered. The Americans enjoy an overwhelming number of commands in the organization. We are the victims of a completely unacceptable discrimination... We are completely left to one side when it comes to drawing up the plans for the SAC and the British Bomber Command (SACEUR) possess military assets over whose use we have no say whatsoever. We cannot accept such exclusivity concerning nuclear war, especially because our territory would be used.⁷⁸

On 17 September 1958, de Gaulle addressed a memorandum to President Eisenhower demanding that the area of competence of NATO should be enlarged (including France's conflict in Algeria) and that a tripartite directorate separate from NATO should be set up comprised of France, the US and the

⁷⁷ Anand Menon France, NATO and the Limits of Independence (New York: McMillan Press LTD, 2000), p. 8.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 10.

UK.⁷⁹ De Gaulle was not successful in persuading Eisenhower with his memorandum and began to reduce French participation in NATO.⁸⁰

De Gaulle's main objective was to create a French sense of common purpose through national symbols and consequently to create united France.⁸¹ In his view, the control of military power was one of the decisive principles of sovereignty. The French armed forces fought under French authority for the nation of France. Such an integrated command structure as NATO "deprived the military of its sense of supreme responsibility to France, thereby damaging its reliability and usefulness to anyone."⁸² De Gaulle's alliance policy was consequently based on national freedom of decision. His concept was that the alliance as an instrument of statecraft should serve national aims and that sovereign nations should be free to undertake independent actions if this suits their interests. Nevertheless, France was certainly able to make compromises to achieve its goals. In 1950 France advocated the creation of a unified command for NATO in the form of a tripartite chief of staff ("Standing Group"), because this would increase French influence in Anglo-American strategic planning. In addition, French direct participation in NATO's strategic planning would serve France's interests in postponing the urgent question of German rearmament.⁸³ Soon, the French disapproved the concept of integrated military command, since it placed a sizeable proportion of French troops under the supreme command of a US officer.⁸⁴

With de Gaulle's presidency this condition became unacceptable, taking the already mentioned notion of French sovereignty into account. In 1959 France refused the deployment of US tactical nuclear weapons on its soil. In the same

⁷⁹ Ibid., 11.

⁸⁰ France withdrew on 6 March 1959 its Mediterranean fleet from NATO command AFMED; in June 1963, its Naval forces from ACLANT and ACCHAN.

⁸¹ Michael Harrison, The Reluctant Ally: France and Atlantic Security (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), p. 53.

⁸² Ibid., p. 56.

⁸³ Charles Cogan, Forced to choose: France, the Atlantic Alliance, and NATO (Westport: Praeger, 1997), p. 95.

⁸⁴ Ibid., p. 121.

year France withdrew its Mediterranean fleet and 1963 its Atlantic fleet from the NATO command. Most NATO members interpreted this move as only the prelude to a French proposal for a transfer of decision-making authority to the European members. Instead, in March 1966 de Gaulle announced the complete withdrawal of French forces from the integrated NATO command structure and demanded the removal of NATO headquarters as well as US and Canadian soldiers from French soil.⁸⁵ Those decisions stressed French sovereignty, but not a break with NATO overall. France still remained on NATO's political councils. Basically, this move had more impact on the political cohesion of NATO than on its military strength. The integrated military structure placed relatively little authority into the hands of the SACEUR during peacetime. Only certain forces, as communication forces, standing naval forces, Airborne Early Warning or nuclear weapon systems on quick reaction alert were under the SACEUR's peacetime command. Most of the forces of NATO members remained under national control. Additional forces were placed under NATO command only through an explicit transfer of authority from the national command to NATO.⁸⁶

In addition, the French withdrawal from NATO's integrated military structure had to be seen in the context of the development of French nuclear forces. France's strategy was to buy time until its nuclear arsenal was operational, on the assumption that this would enable France to discuss organizational changes in NATO on more equal terms.⁸⁷ During the Cold War the French nuclear forces were never part of NATO cooperation and always created a factor of uncertainty. France was certainly aware of the fact that its forces, including its nuclear capabilities, were autonomously not able to defend France against a Soviet threat. The withdrawal from NATO's military structure established a special role for France in NATO. France achieved a high level of independence from NATO without greatly jeopardizing its security. A poignant

⁸⁵ William Keylor, The Twentieth Century World (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 332.)

⁸⁶ David Yost, NATO Transformed, (Washington: U S Institute of Peace Press, 2000), p.59.

⁸⁷ Charles Cogan, Forced to choose: France, the Atlantic Alliance, and NATO (Westport: Praeger, 1997), p. 125.

example is after its withdrawal, France refused to accept the responsibility of defending a specified sector in the combined defense effort of NATO forces on the East/West divide and emphasized that French contributions to the forward battle in Germany would not be automatic.⁸⁸

France's disappointing experience with its US and British allies during World War II led to the Ailleret-Lemnitzer agreements⁸⁹, which saw France as an ally rather than a part of an integrated military force. This included the national freedom to judge the conditions in which France would contribute forces.⁹⁰

While de Gaulle's alliance policy became characteristic of France, beginning in the 1980's, it became obvious that France's political leaders were deadlocked with the "Gaullist legacy". The apparent impossibility to abandon this false appearance of consensus and risk a crisis in French domestic policy led to a period of stagnancy called "Immobilisme".⁹¹

The changed security environment after 1990 made clear that France's policies toward NATO were increasingly out of touch with the changed European security system. Although France recognized the need for a new impulse to take a larger role in European security, it could only achieve more international influence through the resources of the NATO structures. France, for example, welcomed the Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) concept as a short-term solution to take part in NATO-led missions without giving up independence. Following a series of agreements regarding cooperation between France and NATO, France announced in 1995 as a symbolic and substantive step its return to the NATO Military Committee and its attendance at NAC meetings involving defense ministers. Unfortunately, this French rapprochement with NATO's IMS

⁸⁸ David Yost, *France* in Douglas J. Murray and Paul R. Viotty, eds., The Defense Policies of Nations, (London: John Hopkins University Press, 1994), p. 237.

⁸⁹ The agreements were held in almost complete secret to support France's public manner to distance itself from NATO. De Gaulle declared that the agreements did not imply political obligations and were merely technical. Public statements regarding the agreements were supposed to give the impression that France and the US would negotiate as military equal partners. Paris was for several years unwilling even to admit the existence of the Ailleret-Lemnitzer agreements. (22 August 1967)

⁹⁰ Anand Menon France, NATO and the Limits of Independence (New York: McMillian Press LTD, 2000) p. 21.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 196.

came to a sudden stop in fall 1996, when the negotiations of Jacques Chirac and its Prime Minister Alain Juppe over the French demand for the position of CINCSOUTH failed.

An example of accepting NATO's role as a vehicle to increase Europe's influence on the international scene is the Kosovo conflict in 1999.

Even if there were doubts in the mind of some French, German and Italian policy-makers about the nature and means to resolve the Kosovo conflict, they were not inclined to distance themselves from the line pursued in London and Washington for fear of missing an historical chance to realize a more independent European defense.⁹²

France, whose opposition to the Iraq war in 2002-2003 damaged its relationship with Washington, now sees NATO as the only vehicle to project its own military and political power and repair its ties with American. In January 2004, the US quietly welcomed two French one-star generals into NATO's command, one at alliance headquarters in Mons, Belgium, and the other in Norfolk, USA. NATO's supreme commander in Europe, General Jones, pushed hard for the administration to grant the French request so that the two generals be placed, but the issue was so divisive that the US president himself had to make the final decision.⁹³ In his memoirs de Gaulle noted that his aim was not to disengage France from NATO, but from the integration under American command.⁹⁴

2. French Participation in NATO-led Operations

The changed security environment after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact gave France the chance to increase its political influence without the former constraints of the East West confrontation. France had to recognize that NATO

⁹² Giovanna Bono, NATO's Peace-Enforcement, (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2003), p. 128.

⁹³ NATO daily enlargement brief, (22 Feb 2004); available from NEDB@Latvia-USA.org; internet.

⁹⁴ Jacquelyn Davis, Reluctant Allies & Competitive Partners (Herndon: Brassey's Inc., 2003), p. 22.

was and still is the most effective organization to deal with security affairs in the Euro-Atlantic region. French support for the CJTF concept as well as the idea of a European defense identity within NATO was a way to take a defining role in European security and at the same time minimize US influence. Nevertheless, French participation in NATO missions has been far from accepting US dominance.

French participation during the Bosnia missions (1995-1996) and the Kosovo missions (1999) demonstrated how differently France and the US approached the conflict. Differences became visible over the general framework and form of the intervention as well as over the extent of the involvement.⁹⁵ In 1993, France and other European countries called for US forces to intervene militarily in Bosnia since UNPROFOR was not adequately prepared for the situation. At the same time, France and other European countries tried to constrain the US forces with the legal framework of the United Nations.⁹⁶ France's 1995 announcement of rapprochement with NATO was a result of the obvious military limitations of the European defense capabilities. France needed NATO's capabilities as a vehicle for its role as one of the leading European powers.

France has not been part of NATO's military command structure since de Gaulle, on a campaign to assert France's military autonomy, withdrew from it in 1966. Now, with about 2,000 troops in the first rotation of the 6,000-troop NATO Response Force, France is the force's largest contributor of troops.⁹⁷

⁹⁵ Jacquelyn Davis, Reluctant Allies & Competitive Partners (Herndon: Brassey's Inc., 2003) p. 91.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 94.

⁹⁷ NATO daily enlargement brief, (22 Feb 2004); available from NEDB@Latvia-USA.org; internet.

C. FRANCE'S MILITARY CONTRIBUTION TO NATO AND TO EUROPEAN DEFENSE

1. Bilateral Commitments with Germany

France and Germany's way to overcome their traditional antagonism was to pursue close cooperation on many levels. The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC)⁹⁸ in 1950 was as much a mutual security system as an economic arrangement. Giving control over important war industries to a supranational agency the ECSC was limiting the possible threat of German war preparation.

The ECDC can be seen as the first step of an intensive development of the Franco-German defense and security cooperation. The intensity of relations between Germany and France regarding the promotion of a European defense has varied as a reaction to developments in transatlantic ties. The US change from the strategy of massive retaliation to Flexible Response during the Kennedy administration was perceived in Europe as a weakening of the US pledge to deter a Soviet conventional attack with nuclear retaliation.⁹⁹ In the shadow of this discord, West Germany attempted to improve its security cooperation with the nuclear power capabilities of France. In 1963, France and West Germany signed the Elysée treaty, which was supposed to be the foundation for a special bilateral relationship.¹⁰⁰ This bilateral agreement focused on regular defense meetings, the exchange of military personnel and the cooperation in arms production.¹⁰¹ Despite the French aspiration of isolating European defense from the US, the West German government did not ratify the treaty without a preamble, which expressed West Germany's unwavering commitment to NATO. The French saw in this preamble a betrayal of the European concept they had

⁹⁸ Mark Kesselman, European Politics in Transition (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2002), p. 48.

⁹⁹ William Keylor, The Twentieth-Century World (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 328.

¹⁰⁰ Klaus Hildebrand, German Foreign Policy, From Bismarck to Adenauer, (London: Unwin Hyman Ltd, 1989), p. 203.

¹⁰¹ William Keylor, The Twentieth-Century World (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), p 331.

intended to promote. The succeeding chancellor Ludwig Erhard promoted a much closer relationship with Washington and established German influence in NATO's nuclear doctrine through the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG).

Although the expectations associated with the Elysée treaty were high, it was overshadowed by the French "two battle" concept. France made a clear distinction between the forward battle on the territory of West Germany in which the French conventional forces would act as a reserve for NATO and the battle for France, which was obviously the decisive defense for France. This battle for France would include French nuclear defense. Even the bilateral military staff talks between Germany and France agreed upon in the Elysée treaty did not change this French strategy.¹⁰²

It was not until the late 1970's and early 1980's that Franco-German defense cooperation made progress again. One major reason for French cooperation with West Germany was its fear that West Germany could fall victim to growing pacifist, neutralist and anti-nuclear movements. Under Kohl and Mitterrand the defense clause of the Elysée treaty was implemented. This included the establishment of a Franco-German Commission on Security and Defense.¹⁰³ In 1988 a Defense and Security Council was established. An even clearer sign of intense cooperation was the French creation of the Force d'Action Rapide (FAR).¹⁰⁴ This 47,000 strong force was intended to improve the French capability to act more cooperatively with NATO in the forward defense of West Germany. The compatibility with German forces was tested during a large bilateral exercise in 1987 called *Kecker Spatz*. France insisted on conducting the exercise on a strictly bilateral basis without NATO observers, even though this

¹⁰² David Yost, *Franco-German Defense Cooperation* in Stephen F. Szabo, eds., The Bundeswehr and Western Security, (London: McMillian, 1990), p. 219.

¹⁰³ on ministerial level; deals with threat assessment, arms control, exercises, logistics and training

¹⁰⁴ Anand Menon, France, NATO and the Limits of Independence, (New York: McMillian Press LTD, 2000) p. 94.

scenario was highly artificial. The exercise revealed problems regarding compatibility, logistics and the French application of NATO plans and procedures.¹⁰⁵

In 1987 the Franco-German defense cooperation led to the establishment of a 4,200 man Franco-German brigade under the command of the French-German Defense Council. Although this force had questionable military capabilities, it represented the French objective to improve its status regarding European defense through an alternative to NATO. Despite France's official commitment to NATO, the French rhetoric contained the message that Paris wished to improve the influence of NATO's European Pillar through an enhanced French role. "France must play a more active role at the heart of the Atlantic Alliance in order that the latter can become an Alliance between equals."¹⁰⁶ France's chance to play a larger role resided in the strengthening of European military structures.

In 1987 German chancellor, Helmut Kohl, and French president, François Mitterrand, agreed on the formation of a Franco-German brigade to be stationed in southwest Germany, but with headquarters in Strasbourg, France. While the Franco-German brigade was France's way to compensate for conventional military deficiencies through its West German partner in the Cold War scenario, the establishment of the Euro-Corps was, in contrast, a way to adapt to the new security environment. While the UK, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and Denmark rejected the idea of a stronger link between the WEU and the EU, France and Germany hoped that the expansion of the Franco-German brigade, formed in 1987, would improve military cooperation between the WEU members, develop a role for the WEU and build a European crisis intervention force.¹⁰⁷ France and Germany sought to make the WEU subordinate to the EU.

¹⁰⁵ David Yost, *Franco-German Defense Cooperation* in Stephen F. Szabo, eds., The Bundeswehr and Western Security, (London: McMillian, 1990), p. 229.

¹⁰⁶ Anand Menon France, NATO and the Limits of Independence, (New York: McMillian Press LTD, 2000) p. 122.

¹⁰⁷ Giovanna Bono, NATO's Peace-Enforcement, (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2003), p. 45.

In May 1992, Kohl and Mitterrand announced the establishment of the Euro-Corps. All the states of the Western European Union were invited to participate. Three possible missions were identified, first, the deployment under NATO control in time of war, second, peacemaking and peacekeeping operations under WEU command in places outside the NATO treaty area which were subject to constitutional limits on German troop deployments and third, employment for humanitarian purposes abroad.

The problem was no longer solely French deficiencies in conventional forces, but an entire European military deficiency in all aspects of modern warfare. It is certainly no coincidence that the purely European Euro-Corps was established at the same time NATO adjusted itself to the new challenges with the creation of the multinational Allied Command Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) under a British commander (June 1991).¹⁰⁸ The creation of the ARRC had significant advantages for the UK since it could maintain its military presence on the continent, modernize its forces and withstand further cutbacks of British forces.

French and Spanish officials saw in the development of the ARRC as an attempt by the UK and the US to use the Alliance for their own out-of-area operations and thus reassert their dominance with the organization.¹⁰⁹

The Euro-Corps was based on multinational force assignments by France, Germany, Spain, Belgium and Luxembourg. The Corps numbers approximately 60,000 soldiers. The multinational staff is led by a commander who post rotates between the contributing countries. A French official responded to the US reproach of trying to get rid of NATO by saying,

¹⁰⁸ Giovanna Bono, NATO's Peace-Enforcement, (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2003), p. 25.

The ARRC was to include a multinational reaction force, consisting of an IRF and an RRF. The first was to be made up of a 5,000-strong brigade with supporting air elements and was to be available at 72 hours notice. The RRF was to consist of elements drawn from all three services, land, sea and air, but the core was to be a British-led 70,000 force. It was to build around two British divisions and a multinational division composed of German, Dutch and Belgian units.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 26.

The US administration cannot have it both ways: it cannot demand that Europe shoulder more of the defense burden and take more military risks and, simultaneously, insist that the driver's seat belongs exclusively to NATO and Washington.¹¹⁰

As leading partners of the Euro-Corps project, neither Germany nor France wanted to get rid of NATO. This was quite clear in a statement made on November 30, 1992,

France and Germany announced that the Euro-Corps could be placed under NATO command, in the case of an attack on the alliance or of a decision by NATO governments to dispatch a peacekeeper force outside alliance territory. On January 21, 1993, an official agreement was signed on the terms of cooperation between NATO and the Euro-Corps, thus ending fears that the Euro-Corps would undermine NATO.¹¹¹

Nevertheless, a certain French and German reluctance to the strong involvement of the UK in the ARRC concept remained, due to longstanding relationships previously established in NATO.

The concept had a notion of being reaffirmation of the traditional Anglo-American special relationship and its hegemonic role in NATO. Partly for these reasons, France and Germany sought to enhance the EC role in defense by arguing that the EC should develop a European defense identity by integrating in its treaty some of the functions undertaken by the WEU.¹¹²

A significant symbol of Franco-German defense cooperation was the 1986 declaration by Mitterrand that France would consult West Germany in case of the potential use of nuclear weapons. Although he noted that such a decision cannot

¹¹⁰ Anand Menon, France, NATO and the Limits of Independence, (New York: McMillian Press LTD, 2000) p. 126.

¹¹¹ Robert Hunter, The European Security and Defense Policy, (Santa Monica: RAND, 2002), p.17.

¹¹² Giovanna Bono, NATO's Peace-Enforcement, (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2003), p. 142.

be shared, he assured the chancellor that France would consult West Germany on the deployment of nuclear weapons on German territory.¹¹³

2. The French Nuclear Forces

The French desire for nuclear weapons was always the expression of an aspiration for an autonomous defense capability. France as a permanent member of the United Nation Security Council was expected to obtain nuclear weapons due to domestic pressure.¹¹⁴ France claimed the right to an independent national nuclear deterrent policy and during the Cold War its nuclear capability was often seen as a source of legitimacy for its claim to be the third world power besides the US and the USSR. The US did not support the nuclear weapons program in France since those nuclear forces were not compatible with the Flexible Response doctrine. Allied nuclear forces were seen as expensive, not credible as a deterrent, and usable only as a first strike option.¹¹⁵ The doctrine of Flexible Response led to uncertainties among European countries. While massive retaliation against any Soviet aggression would involve the US directly, Flexible Response could lead to a European conventional battlefield without a strategic nuclear exchange. The result could be the destruction of Europe. The European countries could be subject to the mercy of American strategic decisions.¹¹⁶

In 1964 a report of the National Defense Committee of the French National Assembly stressed that France wanted “to be able to deny the great powers the delights of conventional war on the soil of Western Europe.”¹¹⁷ Due to the increased doubts in Europe concerning Kennedy’s Flexible Response and

¹¹³ David Yost, *Franco-German Defense Cooperation* in Stephen F. Szabo, eds., *The Bundeswehr and Western Security*, (London: McMillian, 1990), p.223.

¹¹⁴ David Yost, *France* in Douglas J. Murray and Paul R. Viotty, eds., *The Defense Policies of Nations*, (London: John Hopkins University Press, 1994), p. 236.

¹¹⁵ Michael Harrison, *The Reluctant Ally: France and Atlantic Security*, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), p. 76.

¹¹⁶ Charles Cogan, *Forced to choose: France, the Atlantic Alliance, and NATO* (Westport: Praeger, 1997), p. 124.

¹¹⁷ Michael Harrison, *The Reluctant Ally: France and Atlantic Security* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981) p. 127.

the credibility of the US nuclear commitment to European defense, the concept of a Multilateral Force (MLF) was proposed to establish allied nuclear participation under Washington's direction. The final proposal for the MLF in 1963 consisted of a multinational manned fleet of 25 surface ships armed with nuclear Polaris missiles. Although those ships would have been under SACEUR's command, the decision to fire the missiles would have been made in consensus by the participating countries.¹¹⁸ Certainly, France did not appreciate the perspective of German nuclear capabilities through MLF.¹¹⁹ The French concerns were brought directly to Kennedy's attention regarding the risk of a German desire to become a nuclear power. The French perceived the MLF proposal as more or less directed against France. The French newspaper *La Nation* already suggested in 1964 that France's reaction could be to withdraw French forces from NATO.¹²⁰

The French notion of nuclear weapons as a guarantee of strategic independence still exists today. Today's French concept of nuclear deterrence does not include the usage of these weapons as a mean of coercion. Nuclear weapons are political instruments intended to provide "existential deterrence" in contrast to the French Cold War strategy of "pre-strategic" options, which was close to the concept of Flexible Response.¹²¹ French nuclear capability has not been directed against any country in particular since the fall of the Berlin Wall, but the French considered it an additional attribute of the EU's power. Extensive coordination was conducted with the UK on a common strategic doctrine. From 1995 to 1997, France used the expression "concerted deterrence" to emphasize its interest in European collaboration. A clear definition of how such a European strategy would have influence over French nuclear weapons is missing. The increasing speed of European defense unity in the form of the ESDP will sooner or later tackle the question of a common European nuclear capability.

¹¹⁸ Ibid., p. 84.

¹¹⁹ Anand Menon, France, NATO and the Limits of Independence (New York: McMillian Press LTD, 2000), p. 32.

¹²⁰ Michael Harrison, The Reluctant Ally: France and Atlantic Security (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), p. 84.

¹²¹ Jacquelyn Davis, Reluctant Allies & Competitive Partners (Herndon: Brassey's Inc., 2003), p. 122.

D. CONCLUSION

The relationship between France and NATO was ambiguous from the beginning. France's notion of its former grandeur as one of the great European powers was damaged by the German occupation during World War II and its obvious weakness in the post-war period. France was completely dependent on the collective defense guarantee by the US. On the other hand, the French perception of national sovereignty was not able to accept the resulting dominance of a US influence over the alliance.

French weakness became even more unbearable since its former enemy Germany was able to achieve a significant role in NATO's defense. For decades France has been fighting a battle on two fronts. France considers itself a sovereign power equal to the US. Consequently, it is in a continuous struggle to balance US dominance in security affairs. Neither a seat as a permanent member of the UN Security council with veto power vis-à-vis the other nuclear powers nor the presidency of the former World War II General de Gaulle helped to develop the French strategic culture in a more realistic framework. In addition, France sees itself as the leading continental European power. Not only does France have to balance the US influence in European affairs, it also has to balance the rising influence of Germany in Europe. Although the German recovery was tolerated, France's objective was and still is to control its powerful neighbor.

France's ambiguous relationship with NATO over the past 55 years demonstrates the French realization that NATO is the only guarantee for collective defense and currently the only military organization for France to participate effectively in European security. Since the French proposal for EDC, France has used the idea of an independent European defense to minimize US influence in Europe and control German power. The French withdrawal from NATO's military structure, the development of nuclear weapons and the French opposition to the US-led "coalition of the willing" are examples of France's objective. It is remarkable that France obviously finds a perfect balance of

pushing its independence from NATO while never fundamentally jeopardizing the transatlantic guarantees. Periods of French opposition have been followed by French-NATO rapprochement.

France is not able to create a European substitute for NATO all by itself, and its European partners are unwilling to support a duplication of NATO's military capabilities. Consequently, France will continue to play its role as a reluctant ally, but will ensure that the transatlantic ties are not severed.

IV. GERMANY

A. NATO AS GERMANY'S GUARANTEE FOR SOVEREIGNTY AND UNITY

Together with France, Germany led the opposition to the invasion of the Iraq 2003. Germany's chancellor Gerhard Schröder, leader of the Social Democrats (SPD), used the question of German participation in the US-led operation as a main topic during his reelection campaign in 2002¹²². Although the German public opinion was divided on this subject addressing this issue was sufficient enough to win the election with a slight advantage. The public opinion in Germany was clearly in favor of a peaceful solution to the Iraqi problem without the use of military means. However, a Gallup poll, one month after the election, showed a change of public opinion in favor of the Christian Democratic opposition (CDU-CSU), which supported the US.¹²³

US diplomats like the Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld harshly criticized this German opposition to an intervention in Iraq. Despite some European opposition, the US was able to build a "coalition of the willing" including some of the new NATO members like Poland. Certain rhetoric was used to play down the opposition of the two dominant countries in Europe. To avoid the impression that Europe as a whole was opposing US plans, US Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld called Germany a part of the "Old Europe"¹²⁴.

Germany's decision against a military intervention in the Iraq and its decision to accept the risk of irritating the US have to be seen in context with Germany's historical background. Germany's experiences during and after World

¹²² See "Was Schröder sagt, meint er auch so", Darmstädter Echo, 11 Sep 2002,

¹²³ Bundestagswahl 22 Sep 2002: SPD 42%, Gruene 5,6%, CDU-CSU 41%, FDP 5,8%

Gallup poll 18 Oct 2002: SPD 36%, Gruene 9%, CDU-CSU 45%, FDP 6%, (ZDF-Politbarometer)

¹²⁴ In an interview 22 January 2003, Secretary Rumsfeld said: Germany and France represent "old Europe," and NATO's expansion in recent years means "the center of gravity is shifting to the east," (Rumsfeld: France, Germany are 'problems' in Iraqi conflict, CNN, 23 January 2003)

War II, the special relationship with the US and the special friendship with its former archenemy France were the precondition to mobilize German opposition against any unilateral military action on the international scene.

Despite the US-German discord, Germany's position towards NATO as the primary organization for security in Europe remained unchanged.

From a German perspective, opposition to the war in Iraq reflects a legitimate, but limited disagreement with the United States. It is a policy issue and does not affect the German-American friendship. There are many reasons why Germany is so reluctant to use military force, the strongest being its history of warfare and militarization, and ultimately German responsibility for World War II and the Holocaust. The post war generation in Germany thinks of any kind of war as a catastrophe.¹²⁵

To be included in international structures has been a main objective of Germany and German policy since the end of World War II. Further European unification, which consequently includes a unification of the ESDP are seen as a parallel and supportive development to NATO. Germany's policy is based on close international relations and international institutions to prevent any form of unilateralism by Germany itself or any other nation.¹²⁶

This perception of international relations makes it difficult for Germany to join so-called "coalitions of the willing". This was evident during the Iraq crisis of 2002-2003 with the absence of a clear consensus within NATO or the United Nation's Security Council. Even under circumstances with a clear consensus within NATO or the UN, Germany needed a long time to develop a more realistic policy regarding the use of military force. After the Cold War, Germany was repeatedly pressured to take more responsibility in "out of area" operations.

¹²⁵ Dieter Dettke, U.S.-European Differences Are Many, but Manageable, (Washington DC: European Institute, 2003). *Dieter Dettke has been Executive Director of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation since 1985. Previously, he was political counselor of the SPD Parliamentary Group of the German Bundestag*

¹²⁶ John Duffield, World Power Forsaken, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), p. 65.

Although an important shift in German security policy has taken place since 1991, a substantial reservation to its growing military role has remained. This reluctance was supported by the prevailing interpretation of the Basic German Law that the German armed forces can only be used in defense of Germany or its allies or in humanitarian operations. The “out-of-area” discussion was especially taboo in German political culture.¹²⁷

In Bonn there was a belief that no policies should be pursued that could arouse suspicions in the Soviet Union and in East Europe that Germany was seeking to expand its military capabilities. For these reasons German government officials did not express an opinion toward the NATO’s out-of-area issue during 1990.¹²⁸

It took until July 1994, when the Federal Constitutional Court agreed on a new interpretation of the Law.

German leaders will continue to place particular emphasis on the search for non-military solutions, insisting that the Bundeswehr be deployed only as a last resort. Where Germany does intervene militarily, it will do so only as part of a multilateral coalition and only where a clear international mandate exists. And such actions will be justified many more often than not in terms of Germany’s responsibilities and obligation rather than its national interests.¹²⁹

The following chapters illustrate the origin of Germany’s desire for close partnership in European defense, namely ESDP, without jeopardizing the US commitment to Atlantic security, which has characterized Germany’s development since 1945.

¹²⁷ Giovanna Bono, NATO’s Peace Enforcement, (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2003), p. 20.

¹²⁸ Giovanna Bono, NATO’s Peace Enforcement, (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2003), p. 32.

¹²⁹ John Duffield, World Power Forsaken, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998) p. 174.

1. West-Germany's Armament; NATO, EDC and the WEU

The German post war period encountered a movement for the strong rejection of military force. The experience of World War II represented the most striking lesson of the German use of military force. Anti-militarism and pacifism acquired strong roots in Germany.¹³⁰ In September 1950, the US Secretary of State Dean Acheson demanded German rearmament as a precondition for continuous US military commitment in Europe, not only many Europeans, but a significant proportion of Germans opposed his proposal.¹³¹ Parts of the German population were reluctant to engage in military commitments or even to contribute to armed forces. In contrast to German politicians like Kurt Schumacher leader of the SPD, who demanded a neutral and unified Germany, the first post war chancellor Konrad Adenauer (CDU) was realist enough to foresee Germany's future in a strong western alliance with the western powers. Adenauer was able to use Germany's economic and military potential to bargain for German sovereignty regarding the division of Germany and its significance to the developments of the Cold War.

The US recognized the necessity to integrate the occupied western part of Germany partly due to economic reasons, but also as military resource against the rising Soviet threat. The events in Korea (June 1950) demonstrated the urgency to reinforce conventional military defense in Europe. It became obvious that a similar process of communist aggression as in Korea could happen in Germany and jeopardize Europe as a whole. The still young NATO organization was not strong enough yet to counter the superior Soviet conventional forces. The US argued to integrate Germany into NATO in order to enforce a Western European defense with German divisions¹³². The French government, which saw a sovereign armed Germany as an equal threat compared to that of the Soviet Union, emotionally rejected this plan. To discredit the establishment of German

¹³⁰ John Duffield, World Power Forsaken, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), p. 63.

¹³¹ Constantine Menges, The Future of Germany and the Atlantic Alliance, (Washington, DC: The AEI Press, 1991), p. 25.

¹³² John Reed, Germany and NATO, (Washington: National Defense University, 1987), p. 43.

national divisions the French Prime Minister Renè Pleven proposed in October 1950 the idea to integrate German forces on the battalion level in a European army without a German General Staff and not under national German control.¹³³ The modified plan was called European Defense Community (EDC) and was accepted by Germany as well as by the US. On the 27th of May 1952 the EDC treaty was signed and expected to be ratified by France, Germany, Italy and the Benelux countries. Despite this support in August 1954, the French national assembly ultimately rejected the ratification of EDC.

Nevertheless, Britain was able to convince France to accept German military contribution by proposing the Eden package¹³⁴ 1954, which included certain restrictions to German armament like the production of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). An important aspect to the French approval was the British commitment to keep British forces in Germany. As a result West Germany became a member of the Western European Union (WEU) and consequently a member of NATO in 1955.

West Germany's commitment to integrate into western alliances guaranteed its restoration as a semi-sovereign state after World War II. European defense structures were seen as constituent of transatlantic defense. An example for this basic attitude was the German amendment to the Elysée treaty in January 1963. The intention of the Franco-German Elysée treaty was to improve the defense cooperation of the two countries. However, the simultaneous tension in the transatlantic relations regarding NATO's strategy to change Flexible Response suggests the interpretation that France especially was searching for alternatives to NATO to balance the US domination in European security affairs.¹³⁵ The German parliament insisted on a preamble to the treaty, which presented Germany's special commitment to NATO in spite of German participation in other bilateral relations.

¹³³ John Harper, American Visions of Europe, (Cambridge: University Press, 1996) p. 301.

¹³⁴ Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), p. 515.

¹³⁵ Anand Menon France, NATO and the Limits of Independence (New York: McMillian Press LTD, 2000) p. 25.

2. German Reunification; Resurgence of a Great Power?

Somewhat similar to Germany's fate after World War II was the question over the future of a reunited Germany during the events in 1989-90. Germany's integration in military defense structures were a key issue during the negotiations among the big four countries. While in 1955 West Germany's sovereignty depended on its membership in NATO, in 1990 its membership in NATO as a unified nation created initially difficulties. The Soviet Union feared NATO's enlargement, aimed at the east and refused until the summer 1990 its approval of a German membership in NATO. The positive relationship between the German chancellor Kohl and the Russian president Gorbachev played a significant role during the negotiations and finally made an agreement possible. On the 12 September 1990 the foreign ministers of Britain, France the US and the Soviet Union signed a treaty towards German unification.

Nevertheless, Germany's unification was not taken for granted. Even neighbors close to Germany had great reservations concerning a reunited Germany.¹³⁶ The US diplomat Baker explained that the US preferred a united Germany integrated into NATO, "because it was not sure that a neutral Germany would remain non-militaristic"¹³⁷.

Even after a half century of peaceful relations between Germany and its neighbors, Germany's integration into military alliances seems to be a guarantee against a potential rise of German military power. Klaus Hildebrand speaks of a special "German unrest" encouraged by Germany's exposed central position in continental Europe.¹³⁸

The German strategic foreign policy takes those reservations against Germany as a leading power into consideration by emphasizing its multilateral

¹³⁶ Ronald Asmus, Opening NATO's Door, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), p. 4.

¹³⁷ Ibid., p 4

¹³⁸ Klaus Hildebrand, German Foreign Policy, From Bismarck to Adenauer, (London: Unwin Hyman Ltd, 1989), p. 246-8.

integration. When Schröder used the expression a “German Way”¹³⁹ during the Iraq crisis, he was immediately criticized from all sides of the German political spectrum.

Germany, which has already taking a dominant economic role among the European countries, is reluctant to decouple European security commitments from the Transatlantic Alliance. Decoupling European security from the US would place Germany in a dominant position in Europe challenged only by France. Such a position is not in accordance with Germany’s policy of integration since World War II.¹⁴⁰ The ESDP is seen as the European contribution to security instead of a substitute to NATO.

B. THE GERMAN SPECIAL RELATION TO FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES

1. Germany as a Link between France and NATO

France and Germany’s way to overcome their traditional antagonism was to create close cooperation on different levels. Close cooperation seemed especially important in the production of coal and steel. Giving control over important war industry to a supranational agency was limiting the possible threat of German war preparation.

Although France, as well as Germany, continuously tried to promote close partnership, the intensity of relations between Germany and France regarding the promotion of European defense varied as a reaction to the transatlantic ties. The US change from the strategy of massive retaliation to Flexible Response during the Kennedy administration was received in Europe as a weakening of the US pledge to deter a Soviet conventional attack with nuclear retaliation.¹⁴¹

¹³⁹ Speech German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder during Election campaign in Hannover, 5 Aug 02. (The origin of the “Deutscher Sonderweg” is discussed in Klaus Hildebrand, German Foreign Policy, From Bismarck to Adenauer, (London: Unwin Hyman Ltd, 1989), p. 236.)

¹⁴⁰ David Yost Nato Transformed, (Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2000), p. 53.

¹⁴¹ William Keylor, The Twentieth-Century World, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 328.

In the shadow of this discord Germany attempted to improve its security cooperation with the nuclear power France. France and Germany signed the Elysée treaty. This bilateral agreement focused on regular defense meetings, exchange of military personnel and cooperation in arms production.¹⁴² Germany expressed its unwavering commitment to NATO with a preamble to the treaty. This was seen by France as a betrayal of the European concept they had intended. French disappointment with the practical outcome of the treaty became even worse with the German support of the US-sponsored Multilateral Force (MLF). The concept of the MLF was that it should establish allied nuclear participation under Washington's direction. The final proposal for the MLF in 1963 consisted of a multinational manned fleet of 25 surface ships, armed with nuclear Polaris missiles. Although, those ships would have been under SACEUR's command the decision to fire the missiles would have been made in consensus by the participating countries.¹⁴³ Certainly, France did not appreciate the perspective of German nuclear capabilities through MLF.¹⁴⁴ The succeeding chancellor Erhard promoted a much closer relationship with Washington and established German influence in NATO's nuclear doctrine through the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG).

During the 1970's the US changing position under the Carter administration regarding the deployment of the neutron bomb to Germany put a heavy strain on the German-American relationship. Consequently this period created an improvement of Franco-German defense cooperation under Schmidt and d'Estaing in the form of joint contingency planning.¹⁴⁵

The historical as well as the contemporary events show a pattern of transatlantic drifting apart and rapprochement in the German foreign policy regarding its relationship to transatlantic and European defense. German policy

¹⁴² Ibid., p 331

¹⁴³ Michael Harrison, The Reluctant Ally: France and Atlantic Security, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), p. 84.

¹⁴⁴ Anand Menon France, NATO and the Limits of Independence (New York: McMillian Press LTD, 2000) p. 32.

¹⁴⁵ David Yost, Franco-German Defense Cooperation in Stephen F. Szabo, eds., The Bundeswehr and Western Security, (London: McMillian, 1990), p. 220.

demonstrates the way in which democracies behave in the bargaining process of alliance defense. Although Germany is one of the strongest supporters of NATO, it searches for a more multilateral integration into different defense systems. Despite several disagreements with its American ally, German policy never regarded national defense autonomy as a credible alternative to collective defense.

The lesson from Europe's failure to reach a joint decision on Iraq is that European countries should not have to make a choice between their continent and the Atlantic. German foreign policy has so far always succeeded in bridging a commitment to Franco-German reconciliation and cooperation, which is essential for European integration, and Germany's Atlantic orientation. Ever since German Social Democrats added an Atlantic preamble to the Elysée Treaty of 1963, the foundation stone of the post-war Franco-German partnership, a key role for Germany has been to prevent a collision between Europe's foreign policy ambitions and American policy and interests.¹⁴⁶

As a pattern, discord in NATO usually gave the impetus for a stronger German commitment in European defense systems.

2. From US Occupation Forces to Allies in Defense

Although the closest defense in the Transatlantic Alliance exists between the US and Britain, the German-US is linked just as closely in a different way. The misunderstandings between the US and Germany during the Iraq crisis were discussed not only on an objective level but also on an emotional level. The latent question was whether or not Germany owes the US support.

Germany's fate after World War II depended very much on strong external supporters. While continental European countries were still suffering from the results of the German provoked war, little interest was placed on a German recovery. Britain and especially the US recognized the democratic and economic potential in Germany. Without the strong support of US diplomats like Dean

¹⁴⁶ Dieter Dettke, *U.S.-European Differences Are Many, but Manageable*, (Washington, DC: European Institute, 2003). *Dieter Dettke has been Executive Director of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation since 1985. Previously, he was political counselor of the SPD Parliamentary Group of the German Bundestag*

Acheson¹⁴⁷ or farsighted US military leaders like General Norstad¹⁴⁸ it is doubtful which direction Germany and Europe as a whole would have taken.

The US-led airlift campaign during the Soviet blockade of West Berlin¹⁴⁹ 1948 became part of the collective German memory, which understands the US commitment in Europe and US military forces in Germany in a broader sense rather than solely strategic. Common values between both nations formed a partnership beyond a system of collective defense. The contemporary discord between the US and Germany has to be seen in context with diplomatic rhetoric necessary to balance national and international demands.

C. GERMANY'S RESPONSIBILITY TO EUROPEAN DEFENSE

1. Economic Power and Military Responsibility

The German experience during World War II changed the German strategic culture fundamentally and “out of area” missions for German forces were refused until just recently. Germany used its economic power and monetary support of these alliances in exchange for its military contribution and its share of international responsibility.¹⁵⁰ The refusal of German out-of-area operations was legally founded¹⁵¹ and contributed to the expression of Germany as an economic giant but a political dwarf. The international pressure on Germany to participate in collective security with a contribution of armed forces became even greater after the German reunification in 1990.

The process to change the public opinion on this issue was gradually. German minesweepers in the Persian Gulf, the establishment of refugee camps

¹⁴⁷ John Harper, American Visions of Europe, (Cambridge: University Press, 1996), p. 284.

¹⁴⁸ Robert Jordan, Norstad – Cold War Supreme Commander, (New York: Macmillan Press LTD, 2000), p. 168.

¹⁴⁹ William Keylor, The Twentieth-Century World, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), p 271.

¹⁵⁰ During operation Desert Storm January 1991, Germany limited its military contribution to minesweeping vessels and transport access, while supporting the mission with approximately DM 18 billion, or the equivalent of more than one-third of its annual defense budget.

¹⁵¹ John Reed, Germany and NATO, (Washington: National Defense University, 1987), p. 176.

in Iran and Iraq for Kurds and German military medical personnel participating in the UN mission in Cambodia 1992 took place by support of humanitarian missions. In an important decision on July 12, 1994, Germany's highest court, the Federal Constitutional Court, ruled that German troops could take part in UN peacekeeping and peacemaking missions, as long as the Bundestag approves each operation by a simple majority. The court also stated that Germany can assign forces to NATO and WEU operations directed by implementing the resolutions of the UN Security Council.

2. Germany's Share of the Burden of Collective Security

With the escalation in the Balkan crisis Germany became aware of its greater responsibility in collective security worldwide. Despite a latent refusal of the use of military force in situations other than defense, a consensus throughout the political parties, even in the Green Party, has developed that Germany can no longer neglect its growing responsibility as one of the leading countries in Europe. Although seldom recognized, Germany supports collective security with over 7,500 troops, including 2,000 in Afghanistan and 4,500 German troops on the Balkans.

The German public perception of the role of its armed forces in international relations is still so weak that the decision making process for a possible deployment or the necessary increase in defense expenditures is usually discussed very controversially. Since the German policy of European defense states ESDP is separable but not separate from NATO, Germany contributes to both concepts equally. The bilateral agreement with France and Britain to develop mobile combat forces¹⁵² is in German view not inconsistent with Germany's force contribution to NATO's reaction forces. To play its expected military role as a leading power in Europe, Germany has to adjust its armed forces to stay credible. The contemporary strategy in Germany is to

¹⁵² Agreement to establish 6-9 Combat Troops each with 1500 troops, highly mobile, deployable in few days.

reduce the force size in order to improve military capabilities without increased defense expenditures.

D. CONCLUSION

Germany's development after the Second World War is marked by a strong commitment to integrate Germany in European and transatlantic alliances. The establishment of national armed forces as an expression of sovereignty was abandoned and never became a part of German policy. The historical experiences in Germany and its geographic location between two major nuclear powers led to close transatlantic ties.

Although external forces dominated German development, West Germany was able to establish a high level of sovereignty. Germany's relation with NATO is a classic example of democracies that act regarding to their position within an alliance. Knowing very well that NATO is Germany's primary choice as a system of collective defense, its relatively weak position vis-à-vis its American partner promotes complementary arrangements. The German Minister of Defense Peter Struck emphasized in 2004 the need for multilateral cooperation.

Nobody can afford the luxury to rely on a single organization regarding the complex security challenges. We must promote their individual strength. For NATO this means: NATO can be used best the more it is free from tasks, which can be done better by others like UN, OSCE or NGOs. The same is true for NATO's relation to the EU. The main objective is to avoid unnecessary duplication in structures and capabilities. We have only a *single set of forces* and can spend any Euro only once.¹⁵³

The idea to create a European defense system including German forces is as old as the idea to incorporate German forces into NATO. Germany's historical experiences created the belief to approach security affairs on a multilateral level that Germany tries to develop European security systems with the same engagement as transatlantic defense. Germany's multilateral integration in

¹⁵³ Speech by Peter Struck, NATO's Future (40. Munich Conference for Security policy, 7 February 2004); available from <http://www.nato.int/germany/reden/2004/s040207a.html>; internet; accessed 19 may 2004.

Europe including the ESDP is not seen as a substitute to NATO, but as an improvement to the European bargaining position. Today's discord between Germany and the US is neither new nor the end of NATO. It is the logical process of bargaining over NATO's future role. Part of this process is the usage of rhetoric on both sides emphasizing possible unilateralism or European alternatives to NATO. Nevertheless, even the US is subordinate to its internal democratic pressure to shift the burden of worldwide engagement to its NATO partners. During NATO's history, the US, was on several occasions able to act unilaterally, but preferred the consensus with its European partners.

Certainly, Germany will push for further development of the ESDP, but its guarantee for collective defense will stay indefinitely with NATO.

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V. THESIS CONCLUSION

The analysis of the events leading to the development of a European Defense Identity and the understanding of the historical backgrounds of France and Germany suggest the following conclusions.

NATO is still the primary system of collective defense for the European Union. Although the EU's components concerning security and defense have taken shape, the capability to guarantee security for the EU member states does not seem to be a pressing issue. The EU reached certain capabilities to act in international crisis-management autonomously from NATO, but barring military force these means are significantly limited. The diversity of national interests and the reluctance to increase defense expenditures among the EU members hindered the development of critical military assets for meaningful "out of area" operations. The biggest lessons were learned by the EU during the disappointing experiences during the European military involvement in the Balkan crisis in 1994-1996.

The European recognition of its military deficiencies and as a result the inability for credible crisis-management was the impetus for the EU to push the concept of a European defense identity. The UK's involvement regarding the Saint-Mâlo process in 1998 had a strong influence over the development of ESDP. Its proposal in 2003, together with France, to establish special forces highly mobile and equipped to conduct Netcentric Warfare (NCW), is an example of European willingness to improve military capabilities.

The EU's critical deficiencies are the areas of military intelligence, transportation, interoperability and command and control. Although NATO is willing to support EU-led operations in these specific aspects, the EU obviously has also tried to achieve these capabilities.

The analysis of the development of European defense suggests that the EU as a whole does not seek those capabilities to challenge NATO as the primary organization of collective security and defense. On the contrary, the EU emphasized repeatedly its supporting role within NATO. A specific issue in this

context is the EU's duplication of NATO capabilities rather than concentrating all efforts on a significant contribution to NATO's assets. The questions behind the controversy of duplication are whether those duplications are supposed to replace NATO's supreme role and whether those expenditures consume resources, which would otherwise serve NATO and the transatlantic defense as a whole. The analysis of the development of ESDP leads to the conclusion that the answer for both questions is no. Despite official statements, the EU is obviously duplicating certain critical NATO capabilities and this duplication consumes EU resources. But it is doubtful that those resources would have been available for NATO purposes.

Using the EDI in the context of European integration was the most effective way to overcome the reluctance within the EU to modernize forces, and stabilize or increase defense expenditures after the end of the Cold War. The domestic politics demanded a peace-dividend. Duplication of key capabilities is necessary to keep the development of an autonomous but increased European contribution to European defense credible.

To responsibly control the degree of European independence from NATO, it is important to recognize the decision-making mechanism within the EU. The EU policy is mainly directed by the big three, UK, France and Germany. The cooperation between France and Germany as the main continental actors creates a central force within the EU. The UK with its special relationship to the US acts more as a counterbalance to the idea of European integration. Nevertheless, several times it tipped the scales in European defense issues like in Saint-Mâlo.

The ambivalent triangular relationship between France, Germany and the US is the decisive focus of attention. The study of the French and German historical approaches to European defense and the origin of their national identities give a thorough understanding of the motivations regarding their present policies. Learning from the past is a useful tool to evaluate EU future relationship to NATO.

The study of France's approach to European security and defense illuminates a specific pattern of policy, which directly reflects France's present position. French defense policy is a product of its historical experience, ambivalent relationships and influential personality. As one of the great powers in Europe, France developed a specific notion of French grandeur combined with a certain sense of a national mission. This French grandeur was always limited by the former world power, the UK. The rise of the United German Reich threatened its continental domination even more.

Three major wars against Germany, in which France suffered heavy losses, created a deep rooted French desire for military strength and independence. However, the Second World War left France in a position of weakness and dependence. France had hardly the means to establish military power which would guarantee French sovereignty against a future German threat, much less against the concrete Soviet menace. France was completely dependent economically as well as militarily on external powers and especially on the US. In order to balance French aspirations for grandeur with the reality of weakness, France developed a policy of opposition.

The last actual basis for France's status as a great European power was taken away by the US in 1956 during the Suez crisis. Although dependent upon the US security umbrella, France perceived the US engagement in Europe as undermining an imaginary French sphere of influence. This overestimation of the French role regarding international influence was even more underscored by the presidency of Charles de Gaulle. De Gaulle perfected the French policy of opposition. At the same time he made sure never to stray too far from its allies. The French concept of military independence resulting in the French withdrawal from NATO's IMS in 1966 was an enormous victory for French self-confidence, but strategically made no fundamental difference. France still enjoyed NATO's security guarantees without placing French forces at NATO's disposal.

The US was among the strongest supporters of a rearmament of the Western part of Germany. The inevitability of a Cold War with the Soviet Union and the support of the dominant US made it impossible for France to hinder the

resurgence of its archenemy Germany. In contrast, it created the need to develop a French policy, which would tie Germany to France. The apparent result is a close cooperation between France and Germany, even though their respective national objectives are fundamentally different.

France's policy-pattern of opposition and rapprochement to NATO and especially to US influence in European affairs suggest the conclusion that the French support for ESDP is based on similar objectives. France's approach to European defense demonstrated strong opposition to a US domination through NATO. The policy of opposition served the purpose of demonstrating an independent European view, although credible means were missing to act independently. It is probable that France supports NATO as the primary guarantor for security as long as the EU does not have the capability to play an international role. Although France will continue to emphasize the independent development of ESDP, it will not drift apart from the Transatlantic Alliance. In the case that the EU manages to achieve capabilities equal to NATO, the findings of this study do not indicate that France would continue to support NATO.

In contrast, this thesis suggests that Germany will react reluctantly to any policy, which tries to replace the transatlantic tie with an independent European Alliance. Since the end of World War II, Germany has had a vital interest in its multilateral integration. Germany's reconstruction after the war as well as its reunification after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact was heavily dependent on German integration into western structures. Neutrality or the policy of a German Sonderweg was a favored option.

The devastating experience of the war changed Germany's political culture fundamentally. Being responsible for great suffering became part of the German collective memory. As a result, Germany developed reluctance towards the use of military force beyond defense of the German or Alliance territory, even if such an operation was unilateral. Germany had difficulties finding a political agreement regarding its responsibility to contribute to "out of area" missions even with the consensus of the UN Security Council or NATO. The reason for

Germany's change of heart during the mid 1990's was more a result of international pressure than an expression of national sovereignty.

The positive experience in West Germany, in contrast to the suppression in East Germany was the foundation for a deep rooted relationship to the Transatlantic Alliance. Unlike France, Germany never challenged the supremacy of NATO as organization for security and defense. Germany's support for a more independent European defense has to be seen as assurance of the variation in the US commitment to Europe. The Elysée treaty with France, for example, was in part a reaction to the US strategic change to Flexible Response.

ESDP is Germany's tool to achieve more capabilities, despite domestic demands to decrease defense expenditures. ESDP will give Europe and Germany a stronger bargaining position regarding the strategic decisions that influence European interests. Although Germany's engagement in developing ESDP as a credible instrument seems to strive for European autonomy, Germany will not sacrifice NATO in favor of a European single handed effort. Since Germany's commitment to NATO was always a reaction to US policy in Europe, it is probable that the US approach to international challenges will influence NATO strategy and simultaneously Germany's relationship to NATO.

The improvement of the EU's military capabilities will definitely benefit NATO as primary organization to guarantee Europe's peace and security. NATO has adapted to former challenges and will adapt to the growing European influence. A more balanced representation based on the actual share of the defense burden, disposal of relevant capabilities and the political willingness to put NATO's decisions into action will satisfy the majority of the European NATO members. Knowing the risk of duplication, EU countries committed to NATO must establish effective arrangements to integrate European capabilities in the NATO structure as well as to guarantee EU access to certain NATO assets. A consensus regarding a division of labor between NATO and EU-led operations seems to be the most promising way to avoid competition.

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