Analysis of the Salvation Army world service office's disaster relief capabilities

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MBA PROFESSIONAL REPORT
ANALYSIS OF THE SALVATION ARMY WORLD SERVICE OFFICE’S DISASTER RELIEF CAPABILITIES

March 2017

By: Rachel E. Connon

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In the aftermath of a disaster, relief agencies rush to assist the affected population. However, lack of coordination between these agencies often results in poor resource management, which undermines efficacy and efficiency. This report facilitates inter-agency collaboration, particularly between military and non-military entities, by conducting a case study of one non-government organization involved in disaster relief. With the second-highest revenue among major non-government organizations in the United States, the Salvation Army in America—and, by extension, its international arm, the Salvation Army World Service Office (SAWSO)—is an ideal candidate for evaluation. This report evaluates SAWSO’s disaster response capabilities by analyzing its organizational history, operational competencies, and financial resources. The results of this report offer a foundation for military and other humanitarian relief agencies to pursue collaborative efforts and increase the overall efficiency and efficacy of future disaster response operations. This report’s findings indicate that SAWSO is a highly efficient organization from a financial standpoint, and that it offers a variety of relief capabilities that vary by region, with the provision of shelter, settlement, and non-food items among its strongest and most consistent competencies.
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ANALYSIS OF THE SALVATION ARMY WORLD SERVICE OFFICE’S DISASTER RELIEF CAPABILITIES

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION

from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
March 2017

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ABSTRACT

In the aftermath of a disaster, relief agencies rush to assist the affected population. However, lack of coordination between these agencies often results in poor resource management, which undermines efficacy and efficiency. This report facilitates inter-agency collaboration, particularly between military and non-military entities, by conducting a case study of one non-government organization involved in disaster relief. With the second-highest revenue among major non-government organizations in the United States, the Salvation Army in America—and, by extension, its international arm, the Salvation Army World Service Office (SAWSO)—is an ideal candidate for evaluation. This report evaluates SAWSO’s disaster response capabilities by analyzing its organizational history, operational competencies, and financial resources. The results of this report offer a foundation for military and other humanitarian relief agencies to pursue collaborative efforts and increase the overall efficiency and efficacy of future disaster response operations. This report’s findings indicate that SAWSO is a highly efficient organization from a financial standpoint, and that it offers a variety of relief capabilities that vary by region, with the provision of shelter, settlement, and non-food items among its strongest and most consistent competencies.
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<tr>
<td>AAV</td>
<td>amphibious assault vehicle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFRICOM</td>
<td>United States Africa Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AOR</td>
<td>area of responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CENTCOM</td>
<td>United States Central Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COCOM</td>
<td>combatant command</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRED</td>
<td>Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Disease</td>
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<tr>
<td>DNA</td>
<td>deoxyribonucleic acid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EM-DAT</td>
<td>Emergency Events Database</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPI</td>
<td>Expanded Program on Immunization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUCOM</td>
<td>United States European Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIV</td>
<td>human immunodeficiency virus</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>internally displaced person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRS</td>
<td>Internal Revenue Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAGTF</td>
<td>Marine Air-Ground Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEU</td>
<td>Marine Expeditionary Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>MISP</td>
<td>Minimum Initial Service Package</td>
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<tr>
<td>MHE</td>
<td>material handling equipment</td>
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<td>MSC</td>
<td>Military Sealift Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>non-government organization</td>
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<td>NORTHCOM</td>
<td>United States Northern Command</td>
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<td>OMB</td>
<td>Office of Management and Budget</td>
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<td>PACOM</td>
<td>United States Pacific Command</td>
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<td>Salvation Army World Service Office</td>
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<td>United States Southern Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>TWPS</td>
<td>tactical water purification unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAV</td>
<td>unmanned aerial vehicle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPS</td>
<td>United Parcel Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USMC</td>
<td>United States Marine Corps</td>
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USN  United States Navy

WASH  water supply, sanitation, and hygiene promotion
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank my husband, George, for his unfailing support and consistent encouragement, which motivated me and kept me on-task as I completed my research. I also extend my gratitude to my advisors, Bryan Hudgens, Latika Chaudhary, and Aruna Apte, for their invaluable guidance. Their patience and rudder adjustments kept me moving in the right direction and were instrumental in the successful completion of my research.
I. INTRODUCTION

A. BACKGROUND

Natural and man-made disasters exact a high cost in terms of human life and economic damage. Preliminary data in a report from the Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Disease (CRED) indicates that during 2016, 102 counties experienced disasters, with a combined impact of 7,628 deaths, 411 million affected persons, and $97 billion of damage (CRED, 2016). Disasters, both natural and manmade, occur worldwide and often disproportionately affect poor and developing countries. Between 1990 and 1998, 94% of disasters occurred in developing countries; these countries also accounted for two-thirds of disaster-related economic damages (Thomas & Kopczak, 2007).

When disasters occur, particularly in developing countries, the international community responds with a variety of organizations arriving on-site to conduct relief operations. These entities include government, military, and non-government organizations (NGOs), each with unique sets of capabilities and resources. Without a central coordinating element, the efforts of these entities lack cohesion and may suffer from inefficient or redundant use of resources, diluting the effectiveness of their response efforts to aid affected populations. Particularly since the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004, “the overall budget for humanitarian efforts have increased—and this in turn has brought increased attention to humanitarian logistics” (Apte, 2010, p. 3). In fact, logistics expenditures make up 80% of the total overall disaster relief expenditures by aid agencies (Cozzalino, 2012). Effective and efficient coordination requires communication between all involved parties, preferably prior to the onset of a disaster.

Following the 2004 Asian tsunami, disaster relief operations, particularly humanitarian logistics, received increased attention and was established as a distinct field of study. Thomas and Kopczak (2007) contributed to the academic foundation of this topic by defining humanitarian logistics and identifying both internal and external challenges to executing effective relief operations. Apte (2010) expanded on this field of research by providing a classification system for disasters and the corresponding
difficulty of response operations. In their 2012 work, Apte and Yoho further contributed to framing the dialogue for humanitarian logistics by identifying essential services and resources for disaster relief, along with corresponding core capabilities possessed by military and non-military organizations. This led to increasingly focused research on the disaster relief resources of specific organizations, including the United States Navy and Military Sealift Command (Apte, Yoho, Greenfield, & Ingram, 2013), and the United States Marine Corps (Apte & Yoho, 2014; Gastrock & Iturriaga, 2013).

Roberts (2010) and Cozzalino (2012) added to the research on the relationships between disaster relief entities by examining the challenges inherent to civil–military coordination. Both authors emphasized that reducing the friction between NGOs and the military requires the organizations to integrate their efforts prior to, during, and after disaster relief operations. Daniels (2012), Nguyen and Curley (2013), and Harper, Koelkebeck, and Fitz-Gerald (2013) sought to mitigate this friction and facilitate collaboration by compiling a capabilities-based summary of NGOs conducting disaster relief operations in the U.S. European Command (EUCOM), U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM), and U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) areas of responsibility (AORs).

B. MOTIVATION

As the military shifted its focus to address the full spectrum of conflict in the post–Cold War era, friction increased between the U.S. military and NGOs who increasingly found themselves working together for humanitarian relief (Roberts, 2010). The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) reported that between 1979 and 2000, U.S. forces diverted from their original mission 366 times for humanitarian assistance, but only 22 times for combat (Apte et al., 2013). With an increasing focus on building and maintaining relationships that will improve the security environment, it is likely that the military’s involvement in disaster relief operations will remain a constant factor for the foreseeable future. However, the military is often a costly option for disaster relief, adding weight to the already-compelling case for reducing inefficiencies and redundancies in disaster relief operations. If the military possessed greater awareness of the capabilities and resources various NGOs bring to relief efforts in
each COCOM, this knowledge could be leveraged to facilitate a more effective and efficient overall response.

Previous literature contains summary-level data for NGOs involved in disaster relief activities in PACOM, EUCOM, and SOUTHCOM. Compiling this information offers a useful tool for military commanders and other involved personnel to more intelligently manage their resources, but it does not address how an NGO’s capabilities may differ by region. Furthermore, commanders currently lack a detailed and focused analysis of the larger NGOs that have the likelihood and capability to respond to disaster events. An analysis focused on the primary players in disaster relief would provide commanders with a valuable resource for evaluating their areas of responsibility and coordinating efforts within that region.

With the second-highest total annual revenue among major NGOs in the United States, the Salvation Army is an ideal candidate for evaluation as a primary player in disaster relief operations (Apte & Hudgens, 2015). The Salvation Army is an international organization with headquarters in London, England, and a presence in 127 countries as of 2015 (Maxwell, 2015). Two-thirds of overseas support for Salvation Army operations is provided by the U.S. territories through a mix of contributions, donations-in-kind, sales to the public, and other revenue sources. The Salvation Army World Service Office (SAWSO) acts as the international arm of the American Salvation Army by “serv[ing] as a conduit for government and internal funds sponsoring aid and self-help projects in developing countries” (Gariety, 2009, p. 196). Relief and reconstruction services are one of the three program services into which SAWSO channels its efforts and resources. Given its international presence, high level of revenue, and involvement in disaster relief activities, SAWSO is an important player whose disaster relief capabilities should be evaluated to provide commanders and humanitarian logistics professionals with an analysis that facilitates inter-agency coordination and resource management.
C. RESEARCH QUESTION

Coordination difficulties prevent the military and NGOs from effectively and efficiently managing resources during disaster relief operations. While differences in organizational culture contribute to this friction, the lack of awareness of each organization’s unique capabilities also plays a role. This research seeks to mitigate the barriers to collaboration and facilitate effective resource management by answering the following research question: based on its organizational history and financial and operational resources, what disaster relief capabilities can SAWSO employ in each U.S. Combatant Command?

D. RESEARCH METHODS AND SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

This report analyzes the organizational history of SAWSO, its operational competencies, and its financial resources to offer readers a well-rounded evaluation of its disaster relief capabilities. The organizational history analysis examines the Salvation Army’s origins in England and its development in the United States to identify characteristics and values that continue to impact the organization today.

The operational capabilities analysis relies on qualitative data drawn from news sources describing SAWSO’s reaction to various disaster events. This report analyzes the data using the Sphere Project’s minimum standards for humanitarian aid and assigns a corresponding score that indicates SAWSO’s capabilities within each category. This analysis is divided by COCOM to provide greater relevancy and nuance for commanders and interested parties.

A qualitative comparison of SAWSO and the core competencies for disaster relief of a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) provides additional context to assess SAWSO’s capabilities. This comparison uses Apte and Yoho’s 2012 identification of essential services and capabilities for disaster response and qualitative data gathered from news articles to make a comparison between the organizations for each COCOM.

The financial analysis uses the methodology set forth by Nguyen and Curley (2013) to categorize annual revenue sources and expenses with data drawn from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Form 990s and Office of Management and Budget
OMB Circular A-133 Financial Reports covering 2003 to 2015. To provide a region-specific evaluation of SAWSO’s disaster relief spending, this report evaluates data from the financial reports to illustrate how SAWSO distributes funds by both geographic region, as defined by the IRS, and by geographic combatant command, as defined by the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD).

1. **Summary of Findings**

This report’s findings provide useful information for government and non-government agencies seeking to coordinate disaster relief efforts with SAWSO. The Salvation Army’s history highlights a focus on evangelical Christianity as its overarching purpose. While the evangelical elements have received less emphasis over time for the Salvation Army in America, this religious aspect continues to provide its core foundation and influences its values and international works. Additionally, the Salvation Army remains a highly centralized organization, with a hierarchical structure that may be familiar to military personnel. An understanding of these characteristics may assist the military and other agencies in their coordination efforts and identify potential areas of conflict between organizational cultures.

SAWSO’s operational capabilities for disaster relief vary by region. In general, SAWSO demonstrates its strongest capabilities in shelter, settlement, and non-food items, meeting between 0.50 and 0.80 of Sphere minimum standards. AFRICOM is an outlier in this category, as SAWSO demonstrates the ability to meet just 0.20 of the minimum standards in that region. Additionally, while SAWSO provides support in the general area of food security in each COCOM, its highest overall score in food security and nutrition is 0.31 in AFRICOM. With the exception of SOUTHCOM, where it meets 0.42 of minimum standards, SAWSO also scores low in health action overall. These findings offer humanitarian logistics planners the information needed to more efficiently shape resource management efforts and facilitate inter-agency collaboration when responding to disaster events.

Additionally, an analysis of SAWSO’s financial status reveals that it demonstrates high overall budget and mission efficiency, with a majority of its program funding going
to disaster relief operations. This indicates a strong fiscal foundation supporting SAWSO’s operational capabilities; however, this foundation relies heavily on public contributions, which may fluctuate depending on shifts in public opinion and economic conditions. According to SAWSO’s IRS Form 990s, contributions between 2003 and 2015 ranged from a low of $9,366,623 in 2003 to a high of $49,102,347 in 2010. In general, SAWSO’s regional spending tends to match the locations of global disaster events, with significant expenditures in the EUCOM, PACOM, and AFRICOM AORs. SAWSO includes refugee and internally displaced person (IDP) aid under its relief and reconstruction program service, which may result in a decrease in financial resources for other, rapid-onset disasters if a high-volume refugee crisis occurs at the same time.

2. Limitations

A limitation of this report involves the data gathered to analyze SAWSO’s operational capabilities. Most sources used to gather this data are news articles published by the Salvation Army, as third party sources failed to provide the necessary level of detail to make an evaluation. Therefore, this data may contain a level of bias toward SAWSO’s accomplishments. Whenever possible, this limitation was mitigated by using multiple articles for each disaster event, and it is unlikely that the bias extends to the level of completely fabricating core competencies. A second limitation is that both the scoring evaluation for how SAWSO’s capabilities measure up to the Sphere Project’s minimum standards and the MEU comparison are based on the author’s judgment. This involves a level of subjectivity, and other people may reach different conclusions based on the same data. However, the underlying reasoning is sound and provides a useful template for further refinement and research.

E. CHAPTER OVERVIEW

This case study divides its analysis of SAWSO into nine chapters. Chapter II presents a review of related literature and highlights significant works in the field of humanitarian logistics. Chapter III describes the methodology used to gather and analyze the data in this case study. Chapter IV presents a description and analysis of the Salvation
Army’s organizational history to identify how its roots and core characteristics influence the organization’s relationships and operations in the present. Chapter V presents qualitative data collected from various news sources to evaluate SAWSO’s disaster relief operational capabilities, and Chapter VI uses that data in conjunction with the Sphere Project’s minimum standards to present a capability analysis for each COCOM. Chapter VII compares the disaster relief core competencies of SAWSO and a MEU by using the methodology developed by Apte and Yoho (2012), and the results of studies by Gastrock and Iturriaga (2013) and Apte and Yoho (2014) on the MEU’s disaster relief capabilities. Chapter VIII offers a financial analysis of SAWSO, including overall budget efficiency and expenditures on disaster relief by region. Finally, Chapter IX concludes the case study with a summary of findings, implications, and recommendations for future research.
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW

This report focuses on the SAWSO’s capabilities regarding disaster relief operations. Given this specific scope, the literature review examines previous works in a broad-to-narrow sequence. The first section summarizes literature that provides a general overview of humanitarian logistics. The next section discusses works that address the unique characteristics and challenges of civilian–military coordination during disaster relief activities. This leads to a narrower field of literature, which analyzes non-governmental organizations (NGOs) by geographic combatant command. Finally, the literature review concludes with a review of works concerning the United States Marine Corps’ disaster relief capabilities.

A. OVERVIEW OF HUMANITARIAN LOGISTICS

According to Thomas and Kopczak (2007), humanitarian logistics cemented its place as a distinctive field of study following the 2004 Asian tsunami relief operations. The authors define humanitarian logistics as “the function that is charged with ensuring the efficient and cost effective flow and storage of goods and materials for the purpose of alleviating the suffering of vulnerable people” (p. 94). The human suffering associated with natural disasters, combined with increasing economic costs, create a situation where effective logistical operations are imperative. The Munich Reinsurance group reported that on average, real annual economic losses from natural disasters grew consistently between the 1960s and 1990s (Thomas & Kopczak, 2007).

Along with these observations, Thomas and Kopczak (2007) also identify several challenges involved in humanitarian logistics. These include external challenges, such as increasing donor scrutiny and limited transportation capacity due to damaged physical infrastructure. However, Thomas and Kopczak classify the humanitarian community’s internal challenges as more of a threat to effective logistic operations. Internal challenges include failing to recognize the importance of logistics, inability to maintain an experienced staff, “ineffective leveraging of technology,” “lack of institutional learning,”
and insufficient collaboration (p. 98). For instance, aid agencies tend to divide their activities into primary programs and support activities. As Thomas and Kopczak point out, it is easy for many agencies to make the mistake of devoting a majority of their focus to the primary programs, while considering funding and coordination of support activities generally as more of an after-thought. By identifying these challenges and suggesting strategies to overcome them, Thomas and Kopczak help establish humanitarian logistics as a unique field of study.

Apte’s (2010) monograph expands even further on humanitarian logistics as a new field of research. She offers a more detailed definition of humanitarian logistics than Thomas and Kopczak, asserting that it encompasses “that special branch of logistics which manages [the] response supply chain of critical supplies and services with challenges such as demand surges, uncertain supplies, critical time windows in face of infrastructure vulnerabilities and vast scope and size of the operations” (p. 1). Apte points out that the presence of resources such as food, water, and medical supplies means little if these resources cannot be transported in the last mile of distribution, and emphasizes the importance of collaboration between all involved agencies.

She also provides a useful classification of disasters by speed of onset and location with corresponding difficulty of conducting disaster relief operations. Figure 1 provides a visual of the classifications Apte proposes. Dispersed and sudden-onset disasters present the highest difficulty in coordinating a response, while localized, slow-onset events present the lowest difficulty.

One area Apte (2010) does not explore in her monograph is how organizational and regional funding affects the distribution of disaster-relief resources in comparison to her classification scheme. Rapid onset, dispersed disasters may require more funding based on the difficulty of conducting an effective response. However, since funding is often committed to disaster relief efforts ex ante, existing funding streams may lack the flexibility to efficiently re-orient to rapid onset disasters.
Another crucial take-away from Apte’s (2010) monograph is her compilation of organizational issues in humanitarian logistics, gathered from an examination of previous sources including Tomasini and Van Wassenhove (2009). This list includes collaboration between humanitarian entities, training response staff, donor influence, and information and risk management (Apte, 2010). According to Apte, these issues require careful consideration and planning to maximize the effectiveness of disaster response operations.

Apte and Yoho (2012) refine this list of issues into a description of the crucial services and capabilities for disaster response operations. These essential capabilities are displayed for ease of reference in Figure 2. Gathering information and situational awareness must occur before needs can be accurately assessed for the affected population and area. Needs assessment allows the supply chain to decouple, shifting from forecast-based to specific customer demands (Apte & Yoho, 2012). Supply, the third essential capability, “includes procurement, staging, warehousing, and inventory management” (Apte & Yoho, 2012, p. 11). The military is often uniquely suited to the fourth capability: deployment and distribution. Its vertical lift capacity and rapidly deployable ground
transportation assets provide a significant advantage in distribution operations, particularly in the last mile to customers (Apte & Yoho, 2012). Military and non-military organizations seek to prevent loss of life and alleviate pain through health service support. Finally, the capability for collaboration and governance recognizes the need to coordinate between all involved entities, and the requirement for a command and control structure (Apte & Yoho, 2012).

Figure 2. Essential Services and Capabilities for Disaster Response. Source: Apte & Yoho (2012).

Having defined the essential capabilities for disaster response, Apte and Yoho (2012) conclude their work by addressing the military and non-military core capabilities that correspond to each of the six services. Figure 3 illustrates the link between these core organizational capabilities and essential response services. By classifying and categorizing the capabilities for each general type of entity as they relate to primary disaster relief capabilities, Apte and Yoho (2012) assist in framing the dialogue to discuss humanitarian logistics and key players’ capabilities in that arena. They contribute to constructing the general vocabulary and classification schemes necessary to discuss disaster relief operations on an academic level, but a more detailed discussion of
organization and region-specific capabilities is needed in order to place the information in an operational context for military and civilian leaders.

This figure was adapted by Apte and Yoho from Joint Publication 4-0, *Joint Logistics* (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2013).

Figure 3. Humanitarian and Military Core Competencies.
Source: Apte & Yoho (2012).

Apte, Yoho, Greenfield, and Ingram (2013) begin to narrow the scope of research with regard to the humanitarian logistic capabilities of an individual organization, as opposed to a generalized set of entities. In particular, the authors evaluate the capabilities of various ships in the United States Navy (USN) and Military Sealift Command (MSC) against common disaster traits. These traits include large numbers of casualties, population dispersion, demand for basic-level supplies such as food and water, a need for
medical staff, the destruction of infrastructure, and high volume of debris and destroyed structures (Apte et al., 2013). Their research introduces a more specific way of examining asset capability by linking disaster traits to relief requirements and evaluating associated disaster response mission sets against ship platform capabilities (Apte et al., 2013).

Apte et al. (2013) use a different analysis framework than Apte and Yoho’s (2012) list of essential disaster capabilities, but both works emphasize the importance of studying agency capabilities as they relate to disaster response operations. Apte et al. (2013) demonstrate this shared focus by asserting that “identification of the specific competencies and capabilities that are core to the types of organizations will clarify who, what, and when relief is brought to the crisis” (p. 43). The greater understanding agencies have of one another’s capabilities and limitations, the more effectively they can conduct relief operations together, ultimately resulting in a positive impact on the affected population’s welfare and overall economic costs (Apte et al., 2013). A natural extension of Apte et al.’s (2013) work is an analysis of other military services and major NGOs.

B. CIVIL–MILITARY COORDINATION

The previous section summarized a general overview of the classification systems and essential capabilities associated with humanitarian logistics. In keeping with a progression from broad to narrower topic areas, this section considers literature on the characteristics and challenges of civilian–military coordination during relief efforts.

Roberts (2010) argues that the changing nature of warfare following the Cold War and the military’s increasing involvement in operations other than war are the leading causes of turmoil between civilian and military entities. As the boundaries of traditional warfare blur, the military and civilian relief organizations increasingly find themselves forced to work side by side in environments spanning the spectrum from non-kinetic (peace time) to kinetic (open warfare). However, cultural and organizational differences create friction between the two types of players (Roberts, 2010).

For instance, an NGO’s reputation for neutrality often plays a significant role in how effectively and safely it can deliver services to the affected population. By contrast,
military forces are viewed as decidedly non-neutral and may be treated with suspicion and hostility. The organizational tendency to protect the appearance of neutrality often discourages NGOs from openly collaborating with military entities (Roberts, 2010). From the military’s point of view, NGOs appear inefficient and poorly organized without the clear-cut hierarchical command and control structure favored by military forces (Roberts, 2010). Additionally, NGOs resent the military’s view of them as force multipliers, and the military resents the commonly held NGO belief that the military politicizes humanitarianism (Roberts, 2010). While Roberts does not deliberately explore the impact of this friction, it is likely that such attitudes and divisions lead to inefficiencies in the delivery of life-saving services in the aftermath of a disaster. Speaking a similar professional language and understanding other entities’ organizational cultures contributes to reducing inter-agency friction and improving overall response.

The ease of coordination between military and civilian organizations also varies based on external factors. Roberts (2010) illustrates four distinct categories of civilian–military operations defined by the combination of environmental threats and domain consensus. Each of these four quadrants, displayed in Figure 4, offers a unique set of challenges with regard to civilian–military operations. For the purposes of this report, Quadrant II, disaster relief, is the most salient.
Figure 4. Civilian and Military Operations under Varying Conditions of Threat and Domain Consensus. Source: Roberts (2010).

While executing relief efforts, both military and civilian organizations have a high domain consensus and agreement on mission requirements to rapidly provide life-saving provisions and care to affected populations (Roberts, 2010). Roberts (2010) argues that the friction between military and civilian entities is lower during disaster relief operations, due to an acknowledgment of “their mutual dependencies and the complementarity of their efforts” (p. 215). However, she acknowledges that deteriorating relations have a positive correlation to the environmental threat level; as the level of warfare increases, civilian–military coordination becomes increasingly strained (Roberts, 2010).

Both Roberts (2010) and Cozzalino (2012) emphasize that reducing the friction that often accompanies civilian–military collaboration requires integration between the involved entities prior to, during, and after disaster relief operations. Roberts (2010) encourages the spread of self-emergent communities of practice to determine the best
standard operating procedures for both sides to observe in their interactions with one another. Cozzalino (2012) echoes this call for collaboration, but states that “optimizing the logistic performance requires that all the relationships among the actors involved are managed through an integrated approach to efficiency and effectively coordinate inter-organizational performance, eliminate redundancy, and maximize efficiency along the entire emergency supply chain” (p. 6).

In particular, eliminating redundancy is crucial, given that logistic expenditures account for 80% of total overall aid agency disaster relief expenses (Cozzalino, 2012). The United Nations’ Humanitarian Response Review, established in 2005, demonstrates wider recognition of the importance of effective collaboration by the international aid society (Cozzalino, 2012). Overall, these sources establish the challenges of conducting effective coordination between military and civilian organizations. They offer general solutions to the issue, but the wide scope of these recommendations makes them difficult to implement in practice, at least on a large scale.

C. ANALYZING NGOS BY GEOGRAPHIC COMBATANT COMMAND

In response to both an awareness of challenges in coordination between military and civilian organizations, and the military’s increasing focus on the conduct of disaster relief operations, I further narrowed the focus of this review to consider NGO presence and capabilities by geographic combatant command. Geographic combatant commands divide the world into six regions: Africa Command (AFRICOM), Central Command (CENTCOM), European Command (EUCOM), Northern Command (NORTHCOM), Pacific Command (PACOM), and Southern Command (SOUTHCOM).

Daniels (2012), Nguyen and Curley (2013), and Harper et al. (2013) each examined major disaster relief operating in the EUCOM, PACOM, and SOUTHCOM areas of responsibility (AORs), respectively. Daniels (2012) selected 25 NGOs in the EUCOM AOR based primarily on their financial revenues, since revenue is a prerequisite enabling mechanism for the delivery of goods and services. The secondary consideration in selection was the amount of work each NGO conducted in Europe, with an emphasis
on organizations active throughout the region, rather than localized in one country or area (Daniels, 2012).

Daniels (2012) analyzed these NGOs based on five indicators of how the organization operated and where it focused its work. These indicators include “mission/primary focus, capability, religious affiliation, training, and if [the NGOs] liaison with militaries” (Daniels, 2012, p. 6). After analyzing each of these indicators for the 25 NGOs, Daniels (2012) linked each of these factors to six mission sets, and created NGO clusters by mission set. These mission sets include disaster relief, food provision, water sanitation, medical aid, specific focus on women and children, and developing local economies (Daniels, 2012). Daniels (2012) provided a useful basis for comparison by cross-referencing NGOs’ five operational indicators against mission sets. He found that of the 25 NGOs examined, 24 included disaster relief and preparedness in their mission set, 16 included food security and nutrition, and 15 included medical care and/or supplies (Daniels, 2012). However, his work did not consider the impact of revenues and expenses with regard to organizational efficiency.

Nguyen and Curley (2013) addressed this shortcoming when they used Daniels’s five organizational indicators to analyze 27 NGOs in the PACOM AOR, and added a sixth indicator devoted to budget consideration. Budget considerations were based primarily on the IRS Form 990, self-reported financial statements from individual NGOs, or annual reports published by the NGOs. The budget analysis examined each NGO’s sources of revenue, expenses, and compared the use of revenue versus expenses to evaluate the NGO’s efficacy (Nguyen & Curley, 2013). Of note, Nguyen and Curley (2013) improved on Daniels’s (2012) methodology by conducting a general investigation into NGO mission efficiency based on a comparison of mission and support expenses. Similar to Daniels’s (2012) approach, Nguyen and Curley (2013) concluded their research by summarizing NGO capabilities under four core competencies (health care, capacity building, education/training, and disaster response). This sheds light on the capabilities presented by NGOs in the PACOM AOR.

Harper et al. (2013) examined NGOs in the SOUTHCOM AOR in a similar fashion to Nguyen and Curley (2013) and Daniels (2012), but with the important addition
of Sphere Project criteria to judge NGO capabilities against established minimum humanitarian standards. The Sphere Project publishes a handbook that “is one of the most widely known and internationally recognized set of common principles and universal minimum standards in life-saving areas of humanitarian response” (The Sphere Project, 2011, p. 5). Using Sphere Project criteria, Harper et al. (2013) developed a decision-making tool and color-coded commander’s reference card, which afforded commanders the ability to determine each NGO’s disaster response capabilities at a glance. Harper et al. (2013) also worked directly with the SOUTHCOM Partnering Directorate (known by its designator J9), a connection which directed their choice of NGOs for the analysis and lent real-world credibility to their report. With the development of these tools, Harper et al.’s (2013) work represented a significant step forward in facilitating the usability of their research, and established a link between their research and real-world operations.

Earnest, Smith, and Stark (2014) linked Harper et al. (2013), Daniels (2012), and Nguyen and Curley (2013) together by applying the unique parts of each individual work to the 88 NGOs considered in EUCOM, PACOM, and SOUTHCOM AORs. This involved applying both Harper et al.’s (2013) Sphere Project criteria and commander decision-making tools and Nguyen and Curley’s (2013) financial analysis methodology to the NGOs mentioned in each of the AOR-specific reports. After compiling the financial and Sphere criteria information, Earnest, Smith, and Stark (2014) concluded their report by suggesting that individual NGOs be interviewed directly to ascertain a more nuanced and accurate evaluation of their disaster relief capabilities.

D. UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS DISASTER RELIEF CAPABILITIES

While the previous section reviews literature evaluating the disaster relief capabilities of NGOs within various geographic combatant commands, this section summarizes key sources that evaluate the disaster relief capabilities of the United States Marine Corps (USMC). Gastrock and Iturriaga (2013) use the essential capabilities of disaster response compiled by Apte and Yoho (2012) as a framework to evaluate the USMC’s response to three recent disasters. These natural disasters include the 2007 Bangladesh cyclone, the 2010 Haiti earthquake, and the 2011 Japanese earthquake and
tsunami (Gastrock & Iturriaga, 2013). Given the USMC response to these disasters, Gastrock and Iturriaga (2013) also consider the hard and soft assets of the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) to evaluate both how capabilities were applied and which assets may have filled gaps exposed during the afore-mentioned operations.

Gastrock and Iturriaga (2013) found that the MEU’s response typically consisted of providing water distribution and storage, medical care, material handling equipment (MHE), and supply distribution. In particular, they noted that the Marine Corps’ air lift distribution, MHE, and ground transportation capabilities were unique to the Marine Corps and typically in high demand (Gastrock & Iturriaga, 2013). This corresponds to the MEU’s baseline table of equipment, listed in Table 1. The baseline table of equipment lists the equipment with which an MEU typically deploys. Gastrock and Iturriaga’s (2013) work provides a useful document for civilian and military planners alike to use as a quick reference when assigning disaster relief responsibilities and coordinating multi-agency relief efforts. Their research highlights the fact that the Marine Corps possesses unique equipment and associated advantages tied to its military role that may allow it to respond more effectively in some areas than NGOs.
Apte and Yoho (2014) also consider the Marine Corps’ disaster relief capabilities using the essential capabilities framework established by Apte and Yoho (2012). Their work examines the same three disasters as Earnest and Iturriaga (2013). Apte and Yoho’s 2014 research process model is shown in Figure 5.

Figure 5. Research Process Model for Data Collection and Analysis. Source: Apte & Yoho (2014).
Apte and Yoho (2014) agree with Earnest and Iturriaga (2013) that the MEU “excels at deployment and distribution through the use of amphibious and especially rotary wing assets . . . to lift and distribute assets within an austere environment where other organizations cannot” (Apte & Yoho, 2014, p. 20). The two sources also agree that the MEU possesses assets capable of filling gaps along the essential disaster response capabilities identified during the three disasters under scrutiny (Earnest & Iturriaga, 2013; Apte & Yoho, 2014). These sources demonstrate the capabilities the USMC MEU possess with regard to disaster relief operations, and demonstrate their use and efficacy during three real-world events.

E. LITERATURE REVIEW CONCLUSIONS

This literature review reveals that previous works established a sound baseline for analyzing humanitarian logistics and civilian–military coordination while conducting relief activities. The vocabulary and framework to have meaningful discussions for this area of study is in place due to the works described in the Overview of Humanitarian Logistics and Civil-Military Coordination sections. The literature examined in Analyzing NGOs by Combatant Command narrows the research another step by providing a broad overview of various NGOs and their disaster relief capabilities by Combatant Command.

This work magnifies this area of study one step further by focusing exclusively on the Salvation Army World Service Office. Whereas previous studies provided general overviews, my research examines Salvation Army International’s capabilities by region, including an analysis of their financial, physical, and intangible resources. Just as Earnest and Iturriaga (2013) and Apte and Yoho (2014) combined concept with reality to provide an operationally-useful analysis of the USMC’s disaster relief capabilities, this research will provide an authoritative reference for SAWSO’s capabilities and limitations for disaster relief. This work also examines these capabilities in comparison to the MEU’s, providing MEU commanders a viable tool to rapidly evaluate where they may fill gaps or increase response capacity.
III. RESEARCH METHODS

This report utilizes an embedded design, single-case study method to analyze the SAWSO’s disaster relief capabilities. Yin (2009) defines a case study as “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (p. 13). Yin (2009) also notes that case studies are generally appropriate when the researcher asks questions such as “how” or “why,” when the researcher has no power over occurrences, and when dealing with a modern event rooted in reality.

A. ORGANIZATIONAL HISTORY

First, the case study examines SAWSO’s history to identify the underlying organizational culture, trends, and patterns. This involves delving into various literature sources concerning the origins of the Salvation Army in England and its presence in the United States. This section begins with an overview of the Salvation Army’s sense of identity and core beliefs. It examines the Salvation Army’s origins in England, focusing on how the personality of its founder, William Booth, and the organization’s early experiences shaped the its trajectory. Following this trajectory, this section delves into the Salvation Army’s unique history in the United States. It concludes with an examination of the Salvation Army’s modern structure and a description of SAWSO’s origins as the international arm of the Salvation Army in the United States.

B. CAPABILITY ANALYSIS

To collect data for a SAWSO’s capability analysis, this report compiles qualitative data from financial documents and news articles. Attempts to solicit information on disaster relief capabilities directly from SAWSO were unsuccessful. Additionally, SAWSO integrates closely with the Salvation Army’s local organizational infrastructure during the execution of its program services. This coordination with local Salvation Army units makes it difficult to separate qualitative capability data between entities. To mitigate the chance of including data from relief activities that do not involve
SAWSO, this report focuses data collection efforts on disaster relief operations identified in SAWSO’s 2003–2015 OMB Circular A-133 Financial Reports as Temporarily Restricted Net Assets.

This report uses a modified version of the methodology developed by Harper et al. (2013) to assess SAWSO’s disaster relief capabilities using the Sphere Handbook. It applies the Sphere Project’s performance measures to evaluate the SAWSO’s capabilities against “widely known and internationally recognized sets of common principals and universal minimum standards” (The Sphere Project, 2011, p. 5). This evaluation expands on previous research by examining SAWSO’s capabilities from regional standpoints rather than as a monolith organization. Such region-specific information is more useful to military commanders and other humanitarian logistics personnel than generalized data that may or may not apply to each region.

The Sphere Project considers four core competencies essential to the conduct of effective humanitarian operations. These competencies include water supply, sanitation, and hygiene promotion; food security and nutrition; shelter, settlement, and non-food items; and health action (The Sphere Project, 2011). The Sphere Handbook (2011) subdivides each core competency into identifiable standards with related key actions and indicators for evaluation. This report uses these standards as grading criteria to evaluate SAWSO’s disaster response capabilities. Within each category and region, SAWSO receives a score based on the proportion of standards it meets, as indicated by the qualitative data. For example, if SAWSO meets four out of seven minimum standards, it receives a score of 0.57.

C. MEU COMPARISON

Following an evaluation of SAWSO’s operational capabilities for disaster relief, this report compares those capabilities with a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU). The purpose of this evaluation is to identify redundancies, gaps in disaster relief coverage, and potential areas to increase relief capacity through inter-organizational collaboration. This report utilizes the analyses conducted by Gastrock (2013) and Apte and Yoho (2014) to establish a baseline of MEU disaster response-related capabilities and
resources. Apte and Yoho (2012) list core military and non-military competencies and show how they link to the essential services and capabilities for disaster response. This section uses that classification system to categorize and compare SAWSO’s capabilities versus a MEU’s. This involves linking each identified capability to information and knowledge management, needs assessment, supply deployment and distribution, health service support, or collaboration and governance (Apte & Yoho, 2012). The information is further divided into geographic combatant command areas of responsibility. Comparing SAWSO’s capabilities to an MEU’s provides additional context that is useful for regional commanders and logistics planners to identify potential redundancies, capacity expansion, and logistics gaps that may be filled by SAWSO’s competencies.

D. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS

This report conducts a financial analysis of SAWSO using the methodology set forth by Nguyen and Curley (2013). This section begins with a brief overview of literature concerning the Salvation Army’s early practices for financial accountability. It compiles and analyzes data from the IRS Form 990s and OMB Circular A-133 Financial Reports covering the period from 2003 to 2015.

In accordance with the methodology developed by Nguyen and Curley (2013), revenues are divided into the four categories of grants, contributions, investments, and other. Grant revenues are from government sources, whereas contributions include cash and dollar value of in-kind services and goods. Investment revenues largely consist of interest, and other revenues are those that fall outside the previous three categories (Nguyen & Curley, 2013). Expenses are divided into program service expenses, which are directed toward executing SAWSO’s primary mission, and supporting services, which include all expenditures necessary to run a business, but are not unique to SAWSO’s mission.

Using the newly categorized financial data, the report examines SAWSO’s mission efficiency at both the general and regional level. Mission efficiency is determined using the criteria established by CharityWatch, which states that at least 60% of expenditures should be directed toward program services to receive a “satisfactory”
evaluation (CharityWatch, 2016). If 75% or more of expenditures focus on program services, the organization is deemed highly efficient (CharityWatch, 2016). This section also compares relief and reconstruction expenditures by region, and speculates on how disaster events may have influenced SAWSO’s spending between 2008 and 2015.
IV. ORGANIZATIONAL HISTORY

A. THE SALVATION ARMY’S BELIEFS

For many Americans, the Salvation Army calls to mind images of red kettle collections and bell ringing at Christmas or thrift stores catering to the poorer segments of society. Few associate the Salvation Army with evangelical overtures or overtly religious demonstrations. However, an examination of the Salvation Army’s origins and history reveals the organization firmly identifies itself first and foremost as a Christian organization. In 2006, Associated Press writer Richard Ostling defined the Salvation Army not as a charity, but a “small, distinctly conservative Protestant denomination that sponsors a massive and expanding philanthropic empire” (Gariepy, 2009, p. xv). The philanthropy most popularly associated with the Salvation Army is secondary in importance as an extension of its core mission of evangelical Christianity.

The 2008 booklet, *The Salvation Army in the Body of Christ, an Ecclesiological Statement*, emphasizes this religious focus by asserting that the Salvation Army “is an expression of the body of Christ on earth, the Church universal, and is a Christian denomination in permanent mission to the unconverted, called into and sustained in being by God” (Gariepy, 2009, p. 69). The Salvation Army International website proclaims that the organization’s overall mission “is to preach the gospel of Jesus Christ and to meet human needs in his name without discrimination,” with the objective of advancing Christianity and a ministry “motivated by the love of God” (The Salvation Army International, 2016).

What defines the Salvation Army’s identity apart from other religious organizations is the manner in which its adherents exercise their beliefs. Rather than isolating their practices to churches or other sanctified spaces, “the Salvation Army is Christianity in action, Christianity with its sleeves rolled up” (Gariepy, 2009, xiv). An oft-repeated story popular with Salvationists describes the organization’s founder, William Booth, exhorting this active, hands-on mindset. According to Salvationist historians, Booth’s son, Bramwell, returned to the family home in London one night and
lamented over the number of homeless men and women he witnessed sleeping outdoors along the bank of the Thames. William Booth’s exclaimed response, “Go out and do something!” became one of the organization’s guiding values (Gariepy, 2009).

The Salvation Army’s Christian identity and mandate to demonstrate its beliefs through action are key elements in understanding the Salvation Army’s evolution as an organization and its impact on society.

B. WILLIAM BOOTH AND THE SALVATION ARMY’S ORIGINS

An organization’s founders often heavily influence early formation of the group’s characteristics and cultural norms. Their temperament, beliefs, and leadership styles frequently leave near-permanent marks on the organization. The Salvation Army’s founder, William Booth, established the organization’s bedrock of beliefs and guided its trajectory during its formative years.

Born in 1829 in Nottingham, England, Booth’s early experiences with poverty and faith established the beliefs he later used to mold the Salvation Army (Gariepy, 2009). As a teenager, he joined Nottingham’s Broad Street Wesleyan Chapel and by age 17, he led street preaching engagements and traveled long distances on Sundays to preach in the country (Eason & Green, 2012). The 19th-century movement of transatlantic revivalism heavily influenced young Booth’s approach and preaching style. American evangelists who toured London garnered Booth’s attention and admiration with their energetic, dramatic preaching style. Revivalism also encouraged missionaries to “adopt the dress, habitation, and customs of foreign cultures,” tactics employed both in England and abroad (Eason & Green, 2012, p. 132). This wider religious landscape included the growing popularity of Methodism. Booth shared John Wesley’s beliefs on salvation and holiness, which included “unlimited atonement . . . assurance of one’s salvation . . . [and] holy living reflected in love of God and one’s neighbor” (Eason & Green, 2012, p. 17).

However, despite his enthusiastic faith, Booth found himself disappointed by his fellow congregants’ reluctance to demonstrate the tenants of their faith. In 1848, he completed his pawnbroker apprenticeship and found himself unable to find employment.
During this time, despite his obvious financial struggles, “none of the wealthy members of his Wesleyan Broad Street Chapel offered him assistance” (Eason & Green, 2012, p. 4). This experience left an impression on Booth that compounded with later interactions to prompt his commitment to a distinctly active version of his faith, one practiced on the streets and among the poor. After marrying Catherine Mumford, a fellow evangelist, and moving to London, Booth’s commitment to street preaching and evangelism brought him into conflict with the Methodist church. Rather than relent from his full-time evangelism, Booth chose to break with the church (Gariepy, 2009). According to Booth, he experienced a flash of divine inspiration one evening as he passed the “flaming gin-palaces” and heard a voice asking, “Where can you go and find such heathen as these, and where is there so great a need for your labors?” At that moment, Booth decided, “those people shall be our people, and they shall have our God for their God” (Gariepy, 2009, p. 7).

Shortly thereafter, in August 1865, Booth printed an advertisement in Morgan and Chase’s periodical, requesting volunteers to join what he initially called the East London Christian Revival Society (Eason & Green, 2012). This marked the beginning of what eventually became known as the Salvation Army. In the beginning, Booth’s intentions were simply to organize an evangelical effort that would funnel new converts into existing churches, retaining only a few to continue the evangelical effort. However, the lower-class citizens that his organization targeted were both uncomfortable in a formal church environment, and often shunned by those same churches who charged pew rental fees to discourage lower-class penitents from breaching the decorum of their worship spaces (Eason & Green, 2012). By 1867, the movement grew beyond East London, and Booth changed the organization’s name to the Christian Mission.

As the Christian Mission grew, it reflected the cultural trends of Victorian era by adopting overtly militaristic traditions and vocabulary. During this period, the concept of “muscular Christianity” grew in popularity and established the ideal of a soldier-saint, “construed as a defender of the faith who was pious and yet strong, godly, and virile” (Conrad & Sachsenmaier, 2007, p. 34). Not coincidentally, this image involved ties to British imperialism. In 1901, author James George Cotton Minchin praised “the
Englishman going through the world with rifle in one hand and Bible in the other,”
asserting that “if asked what muscular Christianity has done, we point to the British
Empire” (p. 8). Imperialism and muscular Christianity fed off one another to create a
new, distinctly militaristic image of the ideal soldier-saint who spread both salvation and
British dominance.

Booth capitalized on the popularity of this lively image, and by 1878, militarism
“became a defining feature of the organization” (Eason & Green, 2012, p. 19). Evidence
of the beginnings of this trend emerged in 1882 when a formal enrollment document bore
the title, “Articles of War.” Pseudo military terms permeated the organization’s culture,
with prayers referred to as “knee drills,” and the donation of members’ funds in
envelopes called “firing cartridges” (Gariepy, 2009, p. 15). Militaristic tendencies also
influenced the autocratic leadership embraced and promoted by Booth. He elaborated on
this view by declaring that “only with this absolute power over men can there be
regularity . . . this is militarism—a settled, absolute, regular system of using men to
accomplish a settled purpose” (Conrad & Sachsenmaier, 2007, p. 35).

The most obvious evidence of the group’s militaristic character is the final version
of its name. According to Salvationist historians, the Christian Mission became the
Salvation Army thanks to a spontaneous outburst from Bramwell Booth, William’s oldest
son. Editing a draft of the Christian Mission’s annual report, Bramwell pointed to a line
that read, “the Christian Mission is a volunteer army,” and exclaimed, “Volunteer! Here,
I’m not a volunteer. I’m a regular or nothing!” (Gariepy, 2009, p. 9). Upon hearing this,
Booth reached across the table with a pen, crossed out “volunteer,” and replaced it with
“Salvation.” The organization’s title reflected how it viewed its evangelical mission as
active warfare against sin and evil. In a description of the Salvation Army’s intent, Booth
emphasized that in this state of war, there could be no question of each soldiers’ purpose:
“What are you living for? . . . Is it the salvation of souls and the overthrow of the
kingdom of evil, and the setting up of the kingdom of God? . . . If not, you may be
religious . . . but I don’t see how you can be a Christian” (Eason & Green, 2012, p. 50).

The Salvation Army initially focused more on spiritual salvation than the social
reform efforts it would become known for in the future. This focus owed much to the
theological position of millennialism, which argued that “the preaching of the gospel would lead to the triumph of Christianity, thereby ushering in the thousand-year period of blessing and prosperity promised in Revelation 20” (Eason & Green, 2012, p. 44). Booth subscribed to this viewpoint, believing that a strong evangelical movement could bring about a millennium of Christ’s rule on earth. Given this belief, it is understandable that he elevated spiritual warfare as the Army’s primary objective.

However, Booth’s personal experiences with poverty and his emphasis on an active, in-the-trenches faith, eventually led to an increasing involvement in social reform. He and his followers realized that in order to bring the destitute members of English society to spiritual salvation, they must first find ways to relieve their “utter material distress” (Conrad & Sachsenmaier, 2007, p. 37). To address these worldly woes and disparities, Booth proposed an ambitious plan in 1890 in his book, *In Darkest England and the Way Out. In Darkest England* deliberately borrowed from the popular account of explorer Henry Stanley’s exploits, *In Darkest Africa*. Booth drew comparisons between Stanley’s descriptions of heathens and debauchery in Africa, and the sin and sadness encountered on the streets of London. He sought to capture his audience’s attention by asking, “as there is a darkest Africa is there not also a darkest England? . . . The ivory raiders who brutally traffic in the unfortunate denizens of the forest glades, what are they but the publicans who flourish on the weakness of our poor?” and comparing African streams with “the gin-shop stands on every corner with [their] River of the Water of Death flowing . . . for the destruction of the people” (Booth, 1890, p. 14).

Booth identified those in need of saving from the darkest corners of England as the submerged tenth, a term rising from his estimates that at least one tenth of England’s population suffers from extreme poverty, drunkenness, and crime (Booth, 1890). His language describing this population reveals that “even when the Army’s activities were largely confined to British theaters, . . . the epistemological base of Salvationist ideology was significantly shaped by what has been described as imperial technologies of knowledge-gathering” (Conrad & Sachsenmaier, 2007, p. 30). Booth describes Britain’s submerged tenth as savages or heathens, using imperial imagery and rhetoric. *In Darkest England* points out the irony that churches preoccupy themselves with saving “men from
perdition in a world which is to come,” while doing little to change real-world conditions where a London cab horse receives greater care than the thousands of men and women sleeping on the streets (Booth, 1890, p. 16). Booth maintains his position that conversion and salvation are his scheme’s primary intent, but he admits that in order to achieve this goal, “[the submerged tenth] must be put in a position in which they can work and eat . . . and see something before them besides a long, weary, monotonous, grinding round of toil” (p. 257).

Booth proposed an ambition solution to help bring England’s submerged tenth back on their feet, to a less dire position where they would be more receptive to the teachings of Christ. He described in considerable detail the Salvation Army’s plan to establish three colonies: a city colony, a farm colony, and an overseas colony. Each colony would be a “self-helping and self-sustaining community, each being a kind of cooperative society” that provided shelter, sustenance, and work opportunities for the deserving poor (Booth, 1890). Booth estimated that the Salvation Army required approximately £1 million to fund this venture and cover start-up costs, with an additional £30,000 each year thereafter. Anticipating the resistance against supplying such a sum, he pointed out that England “pays out something like ten millions per annum in poor law and charitable relief without securing any real abatement of evil,” whereas his scheme would cost far less and with higher returns for the public welfare (p. 246). *In Darkest England* experienced widespread popularity, and the Salvation Army began receiving a flood of donations.

During this time, the Army’s detractors levied claims that the organization failed to keep accurate accounts of their funds, and that donations intended for the colony scheme were being diverted for other purposes, or even pocketed by Booth himself. To refute these damaging claims, Booth agreed to allow an independent enquiry by a committee of members who were “persons whose judgment would rightly have weight with the community” (Coutts, 1981, p. 91). Their report, filed in 1892, concluded that the claims were baseless, and pointed out that the Salvation Army had made a habit of publishing certified balance sheets and financial statements annually since 1867 (Coutts, 1981). Despite the committee’s validation and flow of donations, Booth’s farm and
overseas colonies were relatively short-lived. The city colonies enjoyed a degree of success, but the more lasting impact of Booth’s *In Darkest England* scheme was its influence on the Salvation Army’s approach to social reform. The scheme resulted in several social programs upgrading “as permanent expressions of the Army’s social work, transforming the Army into a major social as well as evangelical movement” (Gariepy, 2009, p. 55). This transformation notably altered the Salvation Army’s approach to accomplishing its mission, further cementing its identity as a unique organization that waged both spiritual and practical warfare on behalf of the most destitute members of society. Ultimately, the early culture of the Salvation Army developed because of both William Booth’s personality and beliefs, and the cultural trends that permeated Victorian society.

C. THE SALVATION ARMY IN AMERICA

The Salvation Army’s transformation and evolution as an organization continued when it expanded to the shores of the United States in 1880. Though other Salvationists arrived prior to 1880, George Scott Railton and his team of seven Salvationists were the first group officially sanctioned by William Booth to carry the Army’s evangelical mission to America (Winston, 1999). Immediately upon arrival, Railton demonstrated the Salvation Army’s characteristic urban involvement, marching up and down streets and holding preaching session in saloons to reach their audience in a way that traditional churches did not. While religions that are more traditional aimed to protect sacred spaces, such as churches and temples, from secular influence, the Salvation Army operated in a reverse fashion and “sought to saturate the secular with the sacred” (Winston, 1999, p. 4).

Following William Booth’s belief that all publicity was good publicity, Railton and his followers deliberately leveraged the commercial culture following the Industrial Revolution and reshaped society in the latter part of the nineteenth century. The American Salvation Army initially operated from New York City, then the nation’s cultural and commercial center (Winston, 1999). Seizing on the rising popularity and accessibility of entertainment for the lower classes, the Army ran contests to rewrite popular songs with Salvationist lyrics. They erected posters that closely resembled P.T.
Barnum’s, promising “men who were wild as LIONS as savage as TIGERS and as stubborn as old JUMBO” but had been “captured by Army troops and tamed” (Winston, 1999, p. 17). Despite a spike of initial press coverage, overall the Army received a lukewarm reception during its early efforts. These troubles compounded when New York City’s mayor refused to allow Railton to hold open-air meetings in the streets and parks—only ordained ministers were allowed to exercise their religion in such a manner. Railton responded by briefly relocating the American Salvation Army’s headquarters to Philadelphia and St. Louis before returning to Brooklyn in 1882 (Coutts, 1981). Railton forged ahead with unrelenting enthusiasm, exploiting media and commercial trends to keep the Salvation Army in the headlines.

Disputes between Railton’s successor, Thomas Moore, and William Booth resulted in a brief rift and secession of many of the Army’s members and property. Moore wanted to incorporate the Army under New York’s state laws, but Booth worried this would diminish the power of the Salvation Army’s International Headquarters, which oversaw all Army activity from London (Winston, 1999). An autocratic ruler, Booth would not tolerate threats to his centralized power and authority. In response to Moore’s secession, Booth sent his second son, Ballington Booth, and Ballington’s wife, Maude, to take control of the American Salvation Army in late 1886.

The Ballington Booths guided the Army’s work in America from 1887 to 1896. During their tenure, the Salvation Army found acceptance into mainstream society, and the Army increased its involvement in social reform (Winston, 1999). The publication of *In Darkest England* formalized the Army’s social initiatives, and the Ballington Booths enthusiastically pursued “practical religion” that offered material aid in addition to spiritual salvation, notably through men’s and women’s shelters. They also opened food depots and rescue homes for single mothers. By 1895, the Army claimed 40,000 Salvationists in New York, despite competing with other organizations such as the YMCA and institutional churches (Winston, 1999). However, as the Army experienced increasing acceptance into American society, it also synthesized aspects of Army and American culture. The Ballington Booths showed favoritism in promoting American officers, and habitually displayed the American flag next to the Army’s flag, known as
Blood and Fire (Winston, 1999). They chafed under William Booth’s autocratic leadership and anger at the Americanization of the Army, and eventually resigned their post, going on to found the Volunteers of America (Gariepy, 2009).

Again faced with the need to replace the Salvation Army’s American leadership, William Booth sent his daughter Emma and her husband Frederick Tucker to fill the role of Commissioners. Under the Booth-Tuckers’ tenure from 1896 to 1904, the Army continued its shift in orientation to a “religious and philanthropic organization, as opposed to an evangelical mission that also attended to dire physical needs” (Winston, 1999, p. 103). Initial efforts to conduct slum evangelism, with Salvationists moving to the slums, living and preaching among the people, provided lackluster results from the evangelical standpoint; this likely encouraged the pivot toward social reform.

During this time, many in government and charitable institutions worried about the issue of separating the deserving poor—those hard-working folks capable and willing to extricate themselves from their situation if only given a hand up—from the unworthy poor—criminals and lazy folk who took advantage of charitable hand-outs without any desire to better themselves. To address this issue, the Salvationists developed a network of industrial homes, centers that provided necessities to only those residents willing to work for a subsistence wage. In the Salvationists’ eyes, this created a self-sorting system, whereby those willing to work were deserving of assistance, and those unwilling to work were turned away from the industrial home’s benefits (Winston, 1999).

The expansion of social programs and facilities led to a corresponding requirement for the Army to develop more effective funding strategies. Unlike long-established churches that held properties as a reliable source of revenue, the Salvation Army relied heavily on donations and public support during its early life. Thus, maintaining its image and popularity among the people was crucial to protecting its revenue flows. In order to garner greater public support, the Tucker-Booths began emphasizing the Army’s “humanitarian, nonsectarian nature” where “relief was given to all regardless of race, religion, or creed” (Winston, 1999, p. 123). This signaled another shift away from identifying as a purely evangelical organization and toward a focus on social reform. In 1899, the Booth-Tuckers convinced William Booth to allow the
incorporation of the American Salvation Army into the state of New York, under a special act that granted it concessions similar to the Catholic Church and protected the overarching authority of the Army’s International Headquarters (Winston, 1999).

Experiments with fundraising efforts during this period led to one of the most iconic images for the American Salvation Army. In 1891, a Salvationist soldier named Joseph McFee decided to raise money to provide Christmas dinner for the poor in San Francisco. He hung a large crab pot on a busy street with the sign “Fill the Pot for the Poor—Free Dinner on Christmas Day,” and collected enough to feed more than 1,000 people (Winston, 1999). This spontaneous act led to the Booth-Tuckers to deliberately position the Salvation Army as a Christmas charity, seizing on the chance to balance out growing consumerism by providing an easy method for shoppers and theatergoers to assuage uneasy consciences. Another attempt to fund Army operations emerged when the Booth-Tuckers established two for-profit companies: the Reliance Trading Company and the Salvation Army Industrial Homes Company. Each achieved positive flows of revenue, but administration headaches and public criticism of the propriety of running for-profit companies led to their dissolution by 1912 (Winston, 1999).

Evangeline Booth succeeded her sister and brother-in-law as U.S. Commissioner in 1904. She held the position through both world wars, and under her leadership, the Salvation Army matured from a religious movement supported by energetic evangelism, to a philanthropic organization capable of sustaining itself beyond initial fervor. As part of this necessary transition, the Army became more institutionalized, with “the creation of a bureaucracy, a funding strategy, and an organizational ethos” (Winston, 1999, p. 176). Evangeline divided the country into Eastern and Western divisions to facilitate administration efforts and made a concerted effort to acquire properties in order to stabilize the Army’s revenue streams. In 1890, the American Salvation Army owned 27 properties; 10 years later, it owned 159 (Winston, 1999, p. 171).

When the United States entered World War I, Evangeline seized on the opportunity to both serve the public and bring the Salvation Army’s name to the forefront of good-news stories about the war. Young female Salvationists arrived in Europe, ready to do what they could to lift the troops’ spirits. However, instead of overtly evangelizing,
they hit upon the wildly popular idea of baking fresh doughnuts and delivering them to troops as close to the front lines as they could. The media seized on the story of the doughnut gals, and publicity firmly established the Salvation Army’s position as “a religiously inspired organization that provided services that reflected Americans’ most cherished ideals: God, family, and country” (Winston, 1999, p. 189). The Army’s success in World War I placed it on firm ground financially, but the trade-off involved another step toward philanthropy, with less emphasis on evangelism. This trend continued during the Great Depression, when the Army found itself “in a culture becoming ever less comfortable with public expressions of religious particularity” and struggled to balance its evangelical and social aims (Winston, 1999, p. 228).

During World War II, the Salvation Army worked with six other organizations to form the United Service Organization, commonly known as the USO. The organization provided welfare, recreation, and religious services to troops both at home and abroad during the war, and the USO remains one of the largest interfaith programs (Gariepy, 2009). However, this team effort diluted the Salvation Army’s ability to garner publicity with an iconic image as it did during the First World War. As a result, at the conclusion of the war, the Salvation Army was “revered and respected as an American institution,” but “no longer a vital symbol of the nation’s religious and patriotic consensus” (Winston, 1999, p. 242). By 1950, the Salvation Army had achieved success integrating itself into American society, but its identity shifted and evolved as a result.

The Salvation Army now achieved its goal of saving souls less through roadside preaching and more by setting an example through its actions. However, despite this shift, it remained steadfast in its commitment to Christian values, giving up a $100,000 grant to feed the elderly in Harlem, New York in the early 1970s, when city officials demanded that the Army cease the practice of saying grace before meals and singing hymns during dinner (Gariepy, 2009). Another conflict between the secular and the sacred occurred in 2004, when the New York Civil Liberties Union sued the Army over its practice of asking applicants their religious affiliation and frequency of church attendance in order to work in a government-funded social services program for children. The two parties eventually reached a settlement in 2014, designed to protect the Salvation
Army’s “right to practice and promote its religion while ensuring that it will not use government money to discriminate or indoctrinate” (“NYCLU Settlement,” 2014). These conflicts demonstrate that, despite the evolution required to merge with American society, tension still exists between the American Salvation Army’s evangelical Christian mission and an increasingly secular society.

D. MODERN STRUCTURE

Prior to William Booth’s death in 1912, he identified his son Bramwell as his successor. Both William and Bramwell favored an autocratic line of succession, with the current general of the Salvation Army naming his successor. However, when both William and Bramwell suffered injuries from a car accident, high-level staff members convinced them that there was a need for a back-up method of selecting the next leader. This argument resulted in the creation of the High Council (Gariepy, 2009). The High Council, composed of commissioners and territorial commanders, held the power to remove any incumbent general if he or she became unfit to oversee the Army’s operations. Though initially designed as a safety net for emergencies, many Salvationists (including Booth’s daughter Evangeline) felt a growing discontent with the autocratic style of governance. In 1929, after Bramwell refused to consider an alternative to autocratic succession, the first High Council convened and voted to depose him (Gariepy, 2009).

Following this precedent, the next Salvation Army general worked with Parliament to pass the Salvation Army Act of 1931, which formally granted the High Council the sole authority to elect new generals, and placed control of properties and capital assets with a trustee company, rather than in the trusteeship of the general (Gariepy, 2009). This reduced the degree of autocracy at the Army’s highest levels, but did not completely eliminate its centralized structure. As of September 2016, the High Council forms only to hold elections, similar to the College of Cardinals in the Catholic Church; “it is not a governing body of the Salvation Army, and has no continuity between meetings” (Gariepy, 2009, p. 90). There is only one general in the Salvation Army, and he or she serves as the international leader of the entire organization, working out of
International Headquarters in London. Salvation Army officers are fully ordained ministers, commissioned to work full-time for the Army’s interests, and church members are referred to as soldiers (Gariepy, 2009).

The International Headquarters provides overall strategic leadership, supports the general’s intent, and designates international policy. It controls many high-level appointments, and “coordinates the worldwide sharing of financial resources, knowledge, and expertise” (Gariepy, 2009). This centralized coordination is crucial to maintain a unified overall effort since as of 2016, the Salvation Army operates in 127 countries (Maxwell, 2015). However, despite this centralized leadership, administration of individual countries and territories is handled through a more localized chain of command. Salvation Army leaders in charge of countries hold the rank of colonel, although leadership of a larger country warrants the title of commissioner. Most countries are also referred to as territories, although larger countries, such as the United States, may be divided into multiple territories for ease of administration and coordination. The Salvation Army in the United States divided into four territories: Central, Eastern, Southern, and Western. Territories are further subdivided into divisions, and divisions contain corps and community service centers. Corps are community churches, which conduct religious services, Sunday schools, and club meetings, seeking to spread the Army’s spiritual message. Community service centers handle local social reform programs, including emergency assistance, addiction counseling, homeless and domestic violence assistance, and other similar programs (The Salvation Army Australia Southern Territory, 2016). A visual representation of this administrative hierarchy is presented in Figure 6.
E. SALVATION ARMY WORLD SERVICE OFFICE

As the Salvation Army expanded to an ever-growing number of international locations, it slowly shifted from an imperial approach to a more localized method of working within communities to deliver effective social services. Given the tremendous poverty of many of the countries in dire need of the Army’s services, the United States’ National Headquarters created the Salvation Army World Service Office in 1977. In cooperation with the International Headquarters’ International Planning and Development Department, SAWSO worked to provide financial, material, and personnel support to poorer nations (Merritt, 2006). For the first three years of SAWSO’s existence, it relied on a grant from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) to “serve as a conduit for government and internal funds sponsoring aid and self-help projects in developing countries” (Gariepy, 2009, p. 196). SAWSO exists as an independent 501(c)(3) organization, meaning it is tax exempt under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code due to its operations as a charitable organization (IRS, 2016a).

SAWSO’s headquarters reside in Alexandria, Virginia, where its small staff works with the Salvation Army’s “international network of facilities and personnel of 50,000 indigenous Salvation Army officers, employees, and professional staff working in developing countries” (Merritt, 2006). SAWSO acts as the international arm of the American Salvation Army, coordinating operations and funding for a variety of projects.
These projects include capacity building, income generation, education, health services, and relief and reconstruction assistance. In the immediate aftermath of a disaster, SAWSO offers material assistance such as food, clothing, and medical care, and it may also support long-term assistance, including housing reconstruction and income-generation projects (Merritt, 2006). Given that “two-thirds of overseas support [for Salvation Army operations] are provided by the United States,” SAWSO plays a crucial role in coordinating international aid and disaster relief efforts for the American Salvation Army (Gariepy, 2009, p. 113).

F. ORGANIZATIONAL HISTORY CONCLUSIONS

This brief examination of the SAWSO’s organizational history reveals that it is a flexible organization, capable of both influencing and being influenced by societal trends and developments. However, no entity can entirely remove itself from its history. William Booth’s policies and beliefs, combined with trends of the Victorian era, left a permanent mark on the Army’s institutional DNA. This includes a focus on evangelical Christianity, which governs the Salvation Army’s overarching purpose: to preach the Christian gospel and bring salvation to the world, one soul at a time. This religious impetus may give rise to conflict and complications when the SAWSO executes its mission among less-than-receptive audiences. However, the other half of Booth’s legacy, one of philanthropy and social reform, found fertile ground in which to expand, particularly in the American Salvation Army. This devotion to taking action among those most in need of assistance offers a compelling and admirable example of the good a religious organization can accomplish. Over time, as the Army’s evangelical methods attenuated, its social reform programs expanded. Spreading interest in its faith by modeling good Christian behavior is perhaps a more powerful, and certainly more amenable method for SAWSO to carry out its mission throughout the world.

Though William Booth’s version of autocratic rule diluted in the decades following his death, the Salvation Army remains a hierarchical and centralized institution. Government and non-government agencies coordinating with the Salvation Army would do well to take note of this, and ensure they know what authority to
communicate with in order to affect change or execute a mission. In particular, military forces may find a degree of common ground with Salvationists due to their militaristic structure; this is especially applicable to interactions with SAWSO, due to its high degree of financial and material involvement in international aid operations. History seldom remains dormant; its influence extends into the present, shaping actions, decisions, and behavior. Leaders interacting with SAWSO must consider the organization through the prism of history to gain a more complete understanding of the most effective courses of action.
V. DISASTER RELIEF CAPABILITIES DATA COLLECTION

A. DATA COLLECTION NOTES

As of 2015, SAWSO’s operations fall under three program services: health programs, livelihood and anti-human trafficking, and relief and reconstructions services. Per the 2015 Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-133 Financial Report, SAWSO defines relief and reconstruction services as the provision of “material assistance, such as food, clothing, and medical care, in the immediate aftermath of a disaster,” along with promoting and supporting “longer-term assistance such as housing reconstruction and income generation for those affected by disasters.” This includes assistance to refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs).

As the international arm of the Salvation Army in the United States, SAWSO only operates its program services outside the United States (“SAWSO: Serving a world,” 2008). Generally, SAWSO provides funds to less-developed countries in advance of incurred expenses, and those countries apply the funds toward program services (The Salvation Army World Service Office [SAWSO], 2004). The key enabling feature behind SAWSO’s ability to provide its services is the Salvation Army’s international presence, its “existing infrastructure and footprint” that allows integration with local organizational infrastructure (“SAWSO: Serving a World,” 2008). The close integration between SAWSO and local Salvation Army units made it difficult to separate qualitative capability data by organizational entities. To mitigate the chance of collecting data from Salvation Army disaster relief activities that did not involve SAWSO, this report focuses on disaster relief operations identified in SAWSO’s 2003–2015 OMB Circular A-133 Financial Reports as Temporarily Restricted Net Assets. While SAWSO may have contributed resources to other disaster relief efforts, to maintain accuracy, this report collects data from only operations specifically identified in the financial reports.

The following sections of this chapter present qualitative data collected on SAWSO’s disaster relief capabilities, divided by geographic combatant command (COCOM).
B. PACOM

The following disaster events were analyzed to determine SAWSO’s capabilities in the PACOM area of responsibility (AOR): the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami, the 2008 Sichuan earthquake, the 2008 Myanmar cyclone (Cyclone Nargis), the 2011 Japan earthquake and tsunami, the 2013 Typhoon Haiyan, and the 2015 Nepal earthquake.

During the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami, SAWSO funding assisted relief activities in Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and India (The Salvation Army, 2005). The immediate response involved the provision of food, clothing, water, temporary shelter, household supplies, and health care (including medical exams, referrals, and clinics) to 10,000 beneficiaries. This included the construction of five houses, and the repair of 200 structures. SAWSO’s funding contributed to the building of 11 wells and 10 water tanks, which served 3,400 affected persons (The Salvation Army, 2005). Additionally, the Salvation Army conducted health clinics and medical exams. As the focus shifted to long-term recovery, SAWSO became a lead partner on four of seven projects expected to take between three and 36 months, including a “large agriculture and food production project” (The Salvation Army, 2005).

When the Sichuan earthquake struck in May of 2008, the Salvation Army assigned three relief teams to the region to provide an initial response that included the distribution of “food, drinking water, water purification pills, surgical masks, and plastic gloves” (“Sichuan Earthquake,” 2008). Also in 2008, the Salvation Army supported relief efforts following Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar by distributing 6,000 kilos of rice and 3,000 kilos of noodles, along with basic supplies (food, tarps, water, clothing) for 11,000 people (Gleason, 2008).

After the 2011 earthquake and tsunami struck Japan, SAWSO contributed funding to a number of recovery projects. The Salvation Army territorial commander for Japan, Commissioner Makoto Yoshida, emphasized that it would be “more efficient for disaster relief agencies to purchase needed resources locally” through international donations, as opposed to shipping items in-kind (SalArmy, 2011). Initial response efforts involved the
provision of a portable canteen, blankets, pre-packaged meals and bottled water, home
heaters, and bicycles. With a focus on restoring the livelihood of the local economy, the
Salvation Army also donated “300 bicycles, 30 fishing boats, and 550 life vests, rubber
gloves, and boots for fishermen” (“The Salvation Army in Japan,” 2012).

Longer term recovery projects in Japan focused on economic development and
community outreach. Community outreach programs sought to provide emotional and
spiritual support and counseling services, particularly to the more vulnerable members of
society such as children and the elderly (“The Salvation Army in Japan,” 2012). Community
development projects funded by SAWSO included afterschool programs for
children in Onagawa and senior learning opportunities (SAWSO, 2016). SAWSO also
contributed to economic development by providing fishermen’s unions in Kesennnuma
and Onagawa with trucks, forklifts, diving gear, and other equipment (SAWSO, 2016).

When Typhoon Haiyan struck the Philippines in 2013, SAWSO responded with
funding to provide “food, water, shelter repair materials, and medical services” (SAWSO,
2014a). The Salvation Army also conducted an aerial survey with partners such as the
World Food Program to assess the damage (Murray, 2013). SAWSO’s funding enabled
the distribution of 14,000 relief packs to disaster victims in Tacloban, Dulag, and North
Cebu. In coordination with partner NGOs, their efforts included medical care,
vaccinations, counseling, dental care, and hygiene kit distribution to 45 villages
(SAWSO, 2014). Thanks to partnership with UPS, the Salvation Army delivered over
one million meals to survivors; this was largely accomplished through family packs that
feed roughly five people three meals a day for seven days (Murray, 2013). Finally,
SAWSO contributed to long-term sustainability by distributing 223,256 coconut tree
seedlings to 39 villages in Leyte (SAWSO, 2014b).

In 2015, a 7.8 magnitude earthquake struck Nepal. The Salvation Army launched
an assessment team that walked nearly 70 kilometers at high altitudes to conduct a survey
of Nepalese villages that were inaccessible by road (“Salvation Army Response Team,”
2015). Following its assessments, SAWSO funding “supported the development of
temporary housing and learning centers,” as well as the distribution of 3,700 tarps, 881
tents, 208 metric tons of food, and 3,000 gallons of oil to fuel lamps (The Salvation Army
World Service Office, 2015). Their funding also contributed to 3,000 temporary structures for housing and 850 educational packs for children returning to recently repaired classrooms (SAWSO, 2015a). Crucially, SAWSO partnered with other organizations such as The UPS (United Postal Service) Foundation, FedEx, Mountain Child, and Mission Aviation Fellowship to supply household items, construct septic tanks and toilets, manage refugee camps, and travel within the disaster area (SAWSO, 2015b).

C. SOUTHCOM

The following disaster events were analyzed to determine SAWSO’s capabilities in the SOUTHCOM AOR: the 2010 Haiti earthquake and the 2010 Chile earthquake.

Three days after a 7.0 magnitude struck Haiti, the Salvation Army assessment team arrived and coordinated with government and military agencies to obtain clearance for relief flights into the Port-au-Prince airport. Additionally, Salvation Army units established staging areas for supplies in south Florida (The Salvation Army, Australia, 2010). SAWSO’s funding supplied food, water, and medical services. Within one year after the earthquake, the Salvation Army had distributed 7.9 million meals, 1.5 million gallons of fresh water, 83,000 mosquito nets, 8,100 cots, 8,000 cleaning kits, 7,600 personal hygiene kits, 4,000 tarps, 4,000 solar lights, 5,000 tents, and 606 transitional shelters (GiveWell, 2011). Partnership with UPS assisted in at least one major shipment of these items (The Salvation Army, Australia, 2010). The packaged meals were prepared in partnership with Numana, Inc., and consisted of “rice, soya, freeze-dried vegetables with chicken flavoring, and 21 vitamins targeted to help the immune system” (“Ten Millionth Meal,” 2010).

Additionally, the United Nations Shelter Cluster designated the Salvation Army as the lead agency for an IDP camp adjacent to the Army’s compound, and SAWSO provided funding and support for the 20,000 camp residents. This included providing security, clean water, sanitation, and medical care for camp residents (SAWSO, 2010b). Medical care included “exams, lab testing, the provision of drugs, and disease monitoring” (SAWSO, 2010b). Eight Salvation Army doctors from the United States established two surgical rooms to care for major injuries (The Salvation Army, Australia,
2010). Initial aid included setting broken bones, limb amputations, and delivering babies (SAWSO, 2010a). A 10,000-gallon water purification system was utilized in the camp, which as located on and around a large soccer field in Port-au-Prince (The Salvation Army, Australia, 2010).

SAWSO also provided transitional shelters, built through a cash-for-work program that benefited the local economy by training 400 Haitians as carpenters and construction crew-members. Under this program, 45 construction crews built 600 new homes, with most shelters completed within one day (SAWSO, 2010a). During the three years following the earthquake, long-term projects funded by SAWSO included housing reconstruction, vocational training, income generation, and community development programs implemented in 50 Haitian communities (SAWSO, 2014a).

When an earthquake and tsunami struck Chile in February of 2010, SAWSO provided new homes and repair materials to 40 families (SAWSO, 2014a), as well as tents to temporarily house 60 families near Concepcion (“Salvation Army expands,” 2010). The Salvation Army also delivered blankets, mattresses, and food to the affected area; in particular, emergency canteens were dispatched from the United States to serve as mobile kitchens in hard-hit areas (“Salvation Army in Chile,” 2014). The canteens are powered by a generator and onboard propane and water tanks that allow them to operate independently. Each canteen is equipped with a “six-burner commercial stove, two convection ovens, a grill, and two 1,000 watt microwave ovens,” along with a refrigerator and sink, and is capable of preparing up to 3,000 meals a day (Lovin, 2010).

D. EUCOM

This section analyzes SAWSO’s response to the European refugee crisis between 2014 and 2015 to determine its capabilities in the EUCOM AOR. When conflict in Eastern Ukraine forced thousands to leave their homes, SAWSO offered support through three types of food packages, including one with dry food that would support a family for one week, ready-to-eat food for IDPs in-transit, and dry baby food for infants (SAWSO, 2014a). As refugees fled Syria and North Africa, the Salvation Army provided assistance in 14 different countries, including Belgium, France, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands,

In Greece, SAWSO’s funding contributed to a day center with “toilets, shower facilities, basic medical care, and communications services for refugees arriving at the port of Piraeus in Athens” (SAWSO, 2015a). The organization’s efforts in Germany consisted of the establishment of a thrift store in Leipzig, which provided furnishings for refugees’ apartments (“Salvation Army Continues,” 2016).

E. AFRICOM

This section analyzes SAWSO’s response to the East Africa famine in 2011 and the Central African Republic refugee crisis of 2014 to determine the organization’s disaster response capabilities in the AFRICOM AOR. A series of droughts and floods contributed to famine in East Africa in 2011. During its initial response to the crisis, the Salvation Army provided 5,000 affected persons with enough food to last one month, in the form of a 50-kilogram bag of maize and three liters of cooking oil. This initial distribution phase focused on the more vulnerable members of the population, such as the elderly, nursing mothers, and the disabled (Ndeta, 2011). Later phases sought to acquire beans to add to future food packages. To address areas stricken by drought, the Salvation Army used water tanks pulled by tractors and installed rainwater-harvesting tanks to provide water for drinking, cooking, and school sanitation in rural primary schools (“The Salvation Army Is Responding,” 2011).

In response to refugees fleeing to the Republic of Congo to escape conflict in the Central African Republic, the Salvation Army supplied 1,051 women and babies with “canned food, hygiene items, mosquito nets, clothing, and blankets” in coordination with other humanitarian organizations (SAWSO, 2014a).
F. CENTCOM

This section analyzes SAWSO’s response to the 2005 Kashmir earthquake and 2010 floods in Pakistan to determine its disaster response capabilities in the CENTCOM AOR. During the initial response to the earthquake, a Salvation Army team drove over 100 kilometers to bring 92 tents, 250 family packs with rations, plates, cooking utensils, water, and 300 blankets to the affected area (The Salvation Army, n.d.). Follow-up efforts focused on providing 300 winterized shelters, 1,700 additional tents, sewing machines, blankets, and school supplies (“Salvation Army Earthquake Relief,” 2006). In 2010, heavy rains caused flooding, which the Salvation Army responded to by providing quilts, pillows, mattresses, tents, and kitchen utensils to families (“Salvation Army Flood Relief,” 2010).

G. DATA SUMMARY

Table 2 establishes a sense of scale for SAWSO’s relief efforts by presenting the qualitative data collected for each disaster with the number of persons affected and damage caused by each disaster event. For the European refugee crisis, numbers were calculated by adding the number of non-European Union asylum seekers for countries where SAWSO was active in 2014 and 2015, as compiled by the EuroStat Statistics Explained website (EuroStat, 2016).
Table 2. Disaster Scale versus SAWSO Relief Efforts.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CENTCOM</th>
<th>Year(s)</th>
<th>Disaster</th>
<th>Total Affected</th>
<th>Total Damage (USD)</th>
<th>SAWSO Assistance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PACOM</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Japan Earthquake &amp; Tsunami</td>
<td>368,800</td>
<td>$210,000,000,000</td>
<td>Provided 10,000 people with food, clothing, water, temporary shelter, household supplies, &amp; health care (&quot;East Asia,&quot; 2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Provided 5 houses &amp; 200 robots (&quot;East Asia,&quot; 2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Saved 3,400 people by building 11 wells and 10 water tanks (&quot;East Asia,&quot; 2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Lead partner on 4 of 7 long-term recovery projects, including an agriculture &amp; food production (&quot;East Asia,&quot; 2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Typhoon Haiyan</td>
<td>16,106,870</td>
<td>$10,000,000,000</td>
<td>Distributed 14,000 relief packs (The Salvation Army World Service Office, 2014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Provided medical care, vaccinations, counseling, dental care, &amp; hygiene kit distribution for 45 villages (The Salvation Army World Service Office, 2014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Nepal Earthquake</td>
<td>5,639,722</td>
<td>$5,174,000,000</td>
<td>Distributed 225,424 coconut seedlings to 39 villages (The Salvation Army World Service Office, 2014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Distributed 5,700 tarps, 881 tents, 208 metric tons of food, &amp; 1,500 gals of oil for lamps (OMB Circular A-133, 2015)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
|         |         |          |                |                   | 2015
|         | SOUTHCOM| Haiti Earthquake | 3,700,000 | $8,000,000,000 | Distributed 7.9 million meals, 1.5 million gals of water, 83,000 mosquito nets, 8,100 cots, 8,000 cleaning kits, 7,600 personal hygiene kits, 4,000 tarps, 4,000 solar lights, 5,000 tents, 600 transitional shelters (GiveWell, 2012) |
|         | 2010    |          |                |                   | Provided 50,000 IDP camp residents with security, clean water, sanitation, & medical care (OMB Circular A-133, 2010) |
|         |         |          |                |                   | Trained 400 Haitians as carpenters & construction crew members to build 600 new homes (The Salvation Army World Service Office, 2010) |
|         |         |          |                |                   | Implemented long-term projects for housing reconstruction, vocational training, income generation, & community development in 50 communities (OMB Circular A-133, 2014) |
|         |         |          |                |                   | Distributed 3,000 temporary structures & 850 educational packs (The Salvation Army World Service Office, 2015) |
|         |         |          |                |                   | Supplied household items, constructed septic tanks, managed refugee camps (The Salvation Army World Service Office, 2015) |
|         | EUROM   | Chile Earthquake | 2,671,556 | $30,000,000,000 | Provided 40 families with new homes & repair materials, and tents for 60 families (OMB Circular A-133, 2014) |
|         | 2014–15 | European Refugee Crisis | 1,575,985 | N/A | Delivered blankets & mattresses ("Salvation Army in Chile," 2014) |
|         |         |          |                |                   | Distributed 4000 relief packs (The Salvation Army World Service Office, 2014) |
|         | AFRICOM | East Africa Famine | 10,038,007 | N/A | Provided 1,000 people with food for 1 month via 50lb bag of maize & 3L cooking oil (Ndeta, 2011) |
|         |         |          |                |                   | Established a thrift store with furnishings and necessary items ("Salvation Army in Kenya," 2015) |
|         | 2005    | Kashmir Earthquake | 7,152,109 | N/A | Provided 1,001 women & babies with canned food, hygiene items, mosquito nets, clothing, & blankets (OMB Circular A-133, 2014) |
|         | 2010    | Pakistan Floods | 20,363,496 | $9,500,000,000 | Provided quilts, pillows, mattresses, tents, & kitchen utensils ("Salvation Army flood relief," 2010) |

Data for the total affected and total damage for every disaster except the European refugee crisis and Central African Republic Refugee crisis data come from Guha-Sapir, Below, & Hoyois (2016); for total affected by the European refugee crisis, data come from “Asylum Statistics” (2016); and for total affected by the Central African Republic refugee crisis, data come from United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (2016).
VI. CAPABILITY ANALYSIS

A. OVERVIEW

This section of the report analyzes the data gathered in Chapter V to evaluate SAWSO’s capabilities by COCOM. Such an analysis provides military commanders and other relevant parties a region-specific summary of SAWSO’s capabilities. The *Department of Defense Support to Foreign Disaster Relief (Handbook for JTF Commanders and Below)* (DOD, 2011) offers guidance on how to conduct the analysis by noting the importance of using internationally accepted metrics to “capture and demonstrate [the] level of effort/need and measures of performance/effectiveness.” This section applies metrics by adapting the criteria developed by Harper et al. (2013) to assess SAWSO’s disaster relief capabilities using the Sphere Handbook.

B. THE SPHERE PROJECT

In 1997, a group of humanitarian NGOs and the International Red Cross collaborated on a project designed to improve disaster response operations, and hold organizations accountable for their performance. The guiding philosophy behind their efforts rested on two core beliefs: “first, that those affected by disaster or conflict have the right to life with dignity and therefore, a right to assistance; and second, that all possible steps should be taken to alleviate human suffering arising out of disaster or conflict” (The Sphere Project, 2011, p. 4). The fruit of the group’s labor was The Sphere Project Handbook, first published in 2000, which laid out a humanitarian charter and established evidence-based minimum standards in response areas. A benefit of using these standards is that “because it is not owned by any one organization, the Handbook enjoys broad acceptance by the humanitarian sector” and “has become one of the most widely known and internationally recognized sets of standards for humanitarian response” (The Sphere Project, 2011, p. 5).
C. SPHERE PROJECT MINIMUM STANDARDS

The Sphere Project developed a set of qualitative and universal minimum standards that “cover activities which meet the urgent survival needs of the disaster-affected population” (The Sphere Project, 2011, p. 9). In particular, these activities include four lifesaving areas: water supply, sanitation, and hygiene promotion (WASH); food security and nutrition; shelter, settlement, and non-food items; and health action. Appendix B describes these standards in detail per the Sphere Handbook. In general, WASH minimum standards include requirements for WASH and hygiene promotion, water supply, excreta disposal, vector control, solid waste management, and drainage. Food security and nutrition covers assessment, infant and young child feeding, the management of acute malnutrition, general food security, cash and voucher transfers, and livelihoods. Shelter, settlement, and non-food items include shelter and settlement, and clothing, bedding, and household items. Finally, health action minimum standards consist of requirements for health systems, essential health services, control of communicable diseases, child health, sexual and reproductive health, injuries, mental health, and non-communicable diseases (The Sphere Project, 2011).

D. SPHERE ANALYSIS

Using the Sphere Project’s minimum standard criteria as a guide, this section follows modified version of the methodology developed by Harper et al. (2013) to assign SAWSO scores for its disaster relief capabilities in each COCOM.1 SAWSO received a score for each sub-category based on the proportion of standards met. For example, in PACOM, SAWSO met five out of six standards for general food security, translating to a score of 0.83. Each sub-category’s scores were summed and divided by the total number of sub-categories to provide an overall score for each major performance measure that represents the proportion of capabilities SAWSO possesses in each area. This analysis operates conservatively under the assumption that it is better to list only those capabilities

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1 The broader scoring method used by Harper et al. (2013) assigned a score of 1 if an organization met at least 50% of Sphere minimum standards, and a score of 0 if it met less than 50% of minimum standards for each category.
specifically identified in the source data, rather than making overly generous assumptions about SAWSO’s resources.

1. Sphere Analysis Results

The results of the Sphere analysis for SAWSO’s activities are presented in Table 3 and Table 4. Table 3 presents a summary of SAWSO’s scores for each of Sphere’s major areas for disaster relief. For example, in PACOM, SAWSO earned a score of 0.80 in shelter, settlement, and non-food items, but demonstrated a capability to meet less than 40% of the standards for other major areas. This provides an at-a-glance review of SAWSO’s regional capabilities for commanders.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COCOM</th>
<th>Score</th>
<th>WASH</th>
<th>Food Security &amp; Nutrition</th>
<th>Shelter, Settlement, &amp; Non-Food Items</th>
<th>Health Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PACOM</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOUTHCOM</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUCOM</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFRICOM</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CENTCOM</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4 offers amplifying information for SAWSO’s scores by expanding on how the organization fared in each major area’s sub-categories. SAWSO may earn relatively low scores in major areas, such as food security and nutrition, but a more detailed examination reveals that it consistently maintains the capability to provide support in the sub-category of general food security.
2. Sphere Analysis Conclusions

In PACOM, SAWSO received its strongest score of 0.80 in the overall category of shelter, settlement, and non-food items. It earned 0.36 in WASH, stemming primarily from proficiencies in WASH promotion, hygiene promotion, and excreta disposal. While it received a 0.25 in food security and nutrition, SAWSO scored well in general food security and livelihoods. The data failed to provide evidence of an ability to treat acute malnutrition, but SAWSO is well-equipped to distribute basic food packages and support recovery for local produce or fishing economies. Additionally, while SAWSO offers medical exams, clinics, and vaccinations during disaster operations in PACOM, there was
not enough evidence to conclude a health action capability beyond relatively basic care, earning an overall score of 0.33.

In SOUTHCOM, SAWSO again demonstrated the greatest capability in shelter, settlement and non-food items. Of note, its response to Haiti demonstrates a health action capability that includes basic and surgical-level resources, earning it a score of 0.42, the highest health action score achieved among the COCOMs. The data also indicates the capability to provide for general food security through pre-packaged meals and mobile canteens, along with basic hygiene promotion and water supplies.

The capability analysis for EUCOM resulted in relatively low scores of 0.25 or less in each category except shelter, settlement, and non-food items, where SAWSO scored 0.50. However, given that this analysis considers only one disaster event, it is feasible that SAWSO possesses greater capability in the EUCOM AOR; prior to conducting disaster relief operations in the region, it is recommended that further research outside the scope of this report be conducted to determine the full extent of the organization’s capabilities. Additionally, the Salvation Army maintains a strong international presence in Europe, and this may account for the relatively low involvement from SAWSO, since local Salvation Army units operating out of more developed countries may issue less requests for assistance.

In AFRICOM, SAWSO scored below 50% in each of the four main areas of the Sphere Project’s minimum standards. Notably, the Salvation Army demonstrates an ability to provide for general food security and drinking water, but the data failed to indicate a high enough performance in other sub-categories to warrant a higher overall score. Given that only two disaster events were analyzed, it is possible that SAWSO possesses a greater capacity than what was determined in the scope of this report.

The analysis for CENTCOM suggests that SAWSO meets more than 50% of Sphere minimum standards in only the shelter, settlement, and non-food category. Similar to the analysis results from EUCOM and AFRICOM, the low number of events that SAWSO reported funding (and that were subsequently analyzed by this report) suggests that further research may reveal greater capabilities in the AOR.
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VII. CORE COMPETENCY MEU COMPARISON

This section compares SAWSO’s disaster relief capabilities with an MEU’s by examining the core competencies identified by Apte and Yoho (2012). This comparison provides a context for military commanders to determine how SAWSO’s capabilities may complement or overlap with military capabilities during disaster response operations. Based on the data gathered in Chapter V and MEU capability data adapted from Gastrock and Iturriaga (2013) and Apte and Yoho (2014), this section compares how MEU and SAWSO core competencies vary by COCOM.

A. CORE COMPETENCY OVERVIEW

Disaster response operations require aid organizations to provide a variety of services. Figure 7 lists these essential services, as compiled by Apte and Yoho (2012). They tend to build on one another in a sequential fashion during disaster response operations, with information and knowledge management serving as the bedrock to developing an efficient and effective response.

Information and knowledge management applies to competencies that aid in developing situational awareness in the immediate aftermath of a disaster. Developing a clear picture of the disaster’s impact is critical for needs assessment. Needs assessment analyzes available information to forecast demand for the affected population, and develop a plan to meet that demand with available resources. According to Apte and Yoho (2012), “the supply capability involves procurement, staging, warehousing, and inventory management.” In order to actually distribute those supplies to the affected population, the core competency of deployment and distribution must be present.

Health service support involves medical capabilities that run the gamut from the provision of general medical supplies and basic care, to specific requirements based on disaster and population characteristics, such as a requirement for cholera vaccines (Apte & Yoho, 2012). The capability to collaborate and provide governance involves both coordination between agencies, and the establishment of command and control to
establish a degree of order in the affected area (Apte & Yoho, 2012). Recognizing the importance of collaboration, the UN addressed this essential service by developing a cluster approach that established eleven groups, or clusters, of humanitarian organizations (Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2016).

Figure 7. Essential Services and Capabilities for Disaster Response. Source: Apte & Yoho (2012).

Figure 8 links the essential services for effective disaster relief operations to both military and non-military core capabilities. By matching services to core capabilities, Apte and Yoho (2012) provide a useful tool for planners to assess, at a very general level, what skills various agencies may bring to disaster relief operations. This report uses the framework developed by Apte and Yoho (2012) to compare SAWSO’s core capabilities with an MEU’s as they relate to the essential services and capabilities, in order to identify areas of potential redundancy or where collaboration might prove particularly beneficial.
This figure was adapted by Apte and Yoho from Joint Publication 4-0, Joint Logistics (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2013).

Figure 8. Humanitarian and Military Core Competencies.
Source: Apte & Yoho (2012).

B. MEU CORE COMPETENCIES

1. MEU Background

The United States Marine Corps prides itself on the ability to rapidly employ combined-arms teams of air, ground, and logistic assets, known as Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs) to address threats to national security and interest throughout the world. The Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) is the smallest version of a MAGTF, and serves as a highly capable, forward-deployed asset and includes a reinforced infantry battalion, mixed aircraft squadron, and a logistical support group. Traveling aboard the Navy’s amphibious ships, the MEU is completely self-sufficient for 15 days after landing.
ashore. MEUs “are characterized by their sea-based forward presence, expeditionary nature, ability to plan for and respond to crises, combined arms integration, and their interoperability with joint, combined, and special operations forces” (United States Marine Corps [USMC], 2016).

As highly versatile and mobile forces, MEUs often assist in disaster relief operations. Conducting humanitarian assistance falls specifically within the MEU’s mission set, and is defined as “assistance to relieve or reduce the results of natural or man-made disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property” (USMC, 2009). The Marine Corps recognizes the necessity of multi-lateral coordination for disaster relief missions by emphasizing that “the assistance provided is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of host nation, civil authorities, and/or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing humanitarian assistance” (USMC, 2009).

To accomplish its mission, the MEU consists of 2,059 Marines and sailors spread across its ground, logistics, aviation, and command elements. This includes operators for various pieces of transportation and engineering equipment such as bulldozers, an excavator, forklifts, medium and heavy-lift helicopters, tilt-rotor aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), amphibious assault vehicles (AAVs), and medium-lift trucks. The MEU is also capable of fielding portable generators and a tactical water purification system (TWPS) capable of producing 24,000 gallons of potable water per day (USMC, 2016). Table 5 offers a more comprehensive view of the basic equipment load-out for an MEU.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CR</th>
<th>H/L/T</th>
<th>ACE</th>
<th>LCR</th>
<th>NSOC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>MEMSS LAV</td>
<td>(7) LAVs</td>
<td>(12)</td>
<td>CH-46E/MV-22B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(18)</td>
<td>HMMWVs</td>
<td>(15) AAVs/EFVs</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>CH-53E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>JTF Enabler</td>
<td>(4) Tanks</td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>Refuelers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6)</td>
<td>CRRCs*</td>
<td>(3) UH-1N/Y</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>M90A1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(20)</td>
<td>CRRCs**</td>
<td>(6) AV-8B</td>
<td>(18)</td>
<td>HMMWVs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>ACES</td>
<td>(5) A-WMNPADs</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>AAUVs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(16)</td>
<td>MTVRS</td>
<td>(5) HMMWVs</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>5k Forklift</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(8)</td>
<td>81 MMs</td>
<td>(2) KC-130</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>EBFL Forklift</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6)</td>
<td>TOW Launchers</td>
<td>(6) F/A-18</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>D-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(64)</td>
<td>HMMWVs</td>
<td>(1) Excavator</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>TRAM Forklift</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(7)</td>
<td>IFAVs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6)</td>
<td>M327 (BFSS)****</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* CONUS deploying MEUs embark (6) CRRCs
** 31st MEU embarks (20) CRRCs
*** 31st MEU does not embark
**** The BFSS (120mm mortar) may be employed in place of the M777, in conjunction with the M777 (reduced numbers for both), or not at all.
***** An F/A-18 Det could potentially be tethered to a AHU deployment.

2. MEU Core Competencies

Gastrock and Iturriaga (2013) and Apte and Yoho (2014) examined the MEU’s response to three major disasters to determine what demand it met in each of the essential services and capabilities for disaster response. The results of their studies are summarized in Table 6, which describes both demand fulfilled by the MEU, and unfulfilled demand that the MEU possessed the capability to meet. Table 6 provides a summary of the MEU’s core competencies as they relate to essential services and capabilities during disaster response operations.
Table 6. MEU Resources to Deliver Essential Services and Capabilities for Disaster Response. Adapted from Gastrock & Iturriaga (2013) and Apte & Yoho (2014).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Essential Services &amp; Capabilities for Disaster Response</th>
<th>Demand met by MEU</th>
<th>MEU Capabilities to Satisfy Unmet Demand</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Information &amp; Knowledge Management</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unclassified &amp; plain text communications</td>
<td>S2 Intelligence section</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Public affairs liaisons</td>
<td>S6 Communications section</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social media</td>
<td>Rotary wing imagery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rotary wing imagery</td>
<td>Creation of crisis action team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Needs Assessment</strong></td>
<td>Initial HAST</td>
<td>CBRN Detachment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rotary wing aerial surveys/assessments</td>
<td>Reconnaissance platoon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Troop contact and info-gathering with affected population</td>
<td>Force Reconnaissance platoon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Recon teams for remote assessments/HLZ ID</td>
<td>Infantry Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Infrastructure assessment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Supply</strong></td>
<td>Fuel, drinking water, food, medical supplies</td>
<td>(2) Tactical water purifiers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Manpower for sea and air port security</td>
<td>Infantry Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Manpower and equipment for debris clearance</td>
<td>Military Police Detachment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4) Forklifts, (1) Bulldozer, (1) Excavator</td>
<td>(4) Forklifts, (1) Bulldozer, (1) Excavator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(31) MTVR trucks, (105) HMMWVs, (15) AAVs</td>
<td>(31) MTVR trucks, (105) HMMWVs, (15) AAVs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Deployment &amp; Distribution</strong></td>
<td>Air and ground delivery of supplies and personnel</td>
<td>(19) Rotary-wing aircraft, (2) C-130s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Delivery of water purifiers and supplies from USAID</td>
<td>(31) MTVR trucks, (105) HMMWVs, (15) AAVs, (4) Forklifts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Health Service Support</strong></td>
<td>Embedded Navy corpsmen</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Collaboration &amp; Governance</strong></td>
<td>HAST coordination</td>
<td>Civil affairs section</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Establishment of joint HLZs</td>
<td>Public affairs section</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Inclusion of HN and NGOs in planning process</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Civil affairs officer as liaison</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exchange of embedded liaison teams with JSDF</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

C. CORE COMPETENCY COMPARISON

When a disaster strikes and aid agencies arrive on the ground in the affected area, it is not uncommon to encounter coordination difficulties and redundant or inefficient use of available resources. While a portion of this confusion is probably inevitable due to the chaotic nature of disaster response operations, it can be mitigated by encouraging a more well-rounded situational awareness and understanding of each organization’s core competencies. For this reason, a comparison of SAWSO’s regional core competencies and the MEU’s resources offers commanders a useful tool to determine where SAWSO’s capabilities close support gaps or increase capacity. Notably, while this section suggests areas where the two organizations may complement one another, the MEU does not have authority over any element of the Salvation Army or its resources. Rather, this section is intended as illuminating background information for commanders and other relevant
audiences to serve as an informed starting point for collaboration and coordinating efforts.

The following sub-sections conduct a comparison by COCOM, but one of SAWSO’s core competencies exists as a key resource across all locations: its network of local offices and employees. The Salvation Army operates in 127 countries as of 2016, and SAWSO links with local offices and Salvation Army members when conducting disaster relief operations. These offices demonstrate established ties to local communities and knowledge of the area and exist as a significant resource for information and knowledge management, needs assessment, and collaboration and governance.

1. PACOM

Table 7 compares SAWSO’s core competencies in the PACOM area of responsibility to the MEU’s core competencies. Analyzing the table reveals that supply, deployment and distribution, and health service and support are significant areas for coordination purposes. SAWSO’s access to additional food stores and water tanks may increase the MEU’s existing capacity in those areas. Additionally, the MEU’s material handling equipment may be useful to clear an area and assist in erecting SAWSO’s temporary shelters. While the MEU’s organic assets include ground and air transport capabilities, SAWSO offers access to increased distribution capacity through its partnerships with The UPS Foundation, FedEx, Mountain Child, and the Mission Aviation Fellowship. SAWSO also helps close the gap in health service support resources by providing medical exams, vaccinations, dental care, and medical supplies. This capability significantly improves on the MEU’s limited number of embedded Navy corpsmen who are primarily charged with the care of their own troops.
Table 7. MEU and SAWSO Core Competencies (PACOM).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Essential Services &amp; Capabilities for Disaster Response</th>
<th>MEU Core Competencies</th>
<th>SAWSO Core Competencies (PACOM)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Information &amp; Knowledge Management</td>
<td>Unclassified &amp; plain text communications</td>
<td>Local SA offices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Public and civil affairs sections</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social media</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rotary wing imagery/mass distribution of informational materials</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Creation of crisis action team</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S2 Intelligence and S6 Communications sections</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Needs Assessment</td>
<td>Initial HAST</td>
<td>Aerial survey conducted with partners(^a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rotary wing aerial surveys/assessments</td>
<td>Foot-mobile assessment team(^b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Troop contact and info-gathering with affected population</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Recon teams for remote assessments/HLZ ID</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Infrastructure assessment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Infantry battalion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reconnaissance platoon</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CBRN Detachment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supply</td>
<td>Fuel, food</td>
<td>Food (rice, noodles, etc.)(^c)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Manpower for sea and air port security</td>
<td>Temporary shelters(^d)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Manpower and equipment for debris clearance</td>
<td>Household supplies(^d)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2) tactical water purifiers</td>
<td>Structural repairs(^c)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Military police detachment</td>
<td>Water tanks(^d)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Infantry battalion</td>
<td>Water purification pills(^d)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4) forklifts, (1) bulldozer, (1) excavator, (31) MTVR trucks, (105) HMMWVs, (15) AAVs</td>
<td>Lamp oil(^f)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deployment &amp; Distribution</td>
<td>Air and ground delivery of supplies and personnel</td>
<td>Partnerships with The UPS Foundation, FedEx, Mountain Child, and Mission Aviation Fellowship(^g)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(19) rotary-wing aircraft, (2) C-130s, (31) MTVR trucks, (105) HMMWVs, (15) AAVs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Delivery of water purifiers and supplies from USAID</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health Service Support</td>
<td>Embedded Navy corpsmen</td>
<td>Medical exams, referrals, clinics(^d)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Medical supplies</td>
<td>Dental care(^h)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collaboration &amp; Governance</td>
<td>HAST coordination</td>
<td>Hygiene kits(^h)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Establishment of joint HLZs</td>
<td>Medical supplies (masks, plastic gloves)(^f)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Inclusion of HN and NGOs in planning process</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exchange of embedded liaison teams with JSDF</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data for MEU core competencies come from Gastrock and Iturriaga (2013) and Apte and Yoho (2014). a Murray (2013); b “Salvation Army Response Team” (2015); c Gleason (2008); d The Salvation Army (2005); e “Sichuan Earthquake” (2008); f OMB (2015); g The Salvation Army World Service Office (2015); h The Salvation Army World Service Office (2014).
2. SOUTHCOM

Table 8 compares SAWSO’s core competencies in the SOUTHCOM area of responsibility to the MEU’s core competencies. In comparison to the MEU, SAWSO offers significant competencies in supply, deployment and distribution, health service and support, and collaboration and governance. SAWSO possesses resources to increase food and water purification capacity, and fills a supply capability gap for the MEU by providing access to shelter-related materials such as mosquito nets, cots, tarps, tents, and blankets. The mobile canteens SAWSO mobilized in SOUTHCOM to deliver food to affected areas offer an advantage in deployment and distribution, as does their partnership with The UPS Foundation. SAWSO fills another gap for the MEU with health service support competencies that extend beyond the capabilities of embedded corpsmen, to include conducting lab testing, basic surgery and childbirth support, and the provision of pharmaceutical drugs. SAWSO also demonstrated significant collaboration and governance competencies by managing IDP camps, working with local government and military for relief flight clearances, and coordinating cash-for-work construction programs. Collaborating with SAWSO affords the MEU an opportunity to plug into an accomplished coordination network.
3. **EUCOM**

Table 9 compares SAWSO’s core competencies in the EUCOM area of responsibility to the MEU’s core competencies. SAWSO demonstrates capabilities in the essential service areas of supply and collaboration and governance, which may improve the
MEU’s response or fill competency gaps. SAWSO offers food packages that fit specific categories of affected personnel, such as families, IDPs in transit, and families with infants. This level of distinction may meet demand more accurately than the MEU’s generic food supplies. SAWSO also offers temporary shelters and clothing, areas of supply where the MEU experiences a gap. Finally, SAWSO’s ability to provide medical and legal support for IDPs offers a degree of collaboration and governance that the MEU does not possess.

Table 9. MEU and SAWSO Core Competencies (EUCOM).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Essential Services &amp; Capabilities for Disaster Response</th>
<th>MEU Core Competencies</th>
<th>SAWSO Core Competencies (EUCOM)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Information &amp; Knowledge Management</td>
<td>Unclassified &amp; plain text communications</td>
<td>Local SA offices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Public and civil affairs sections</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social media</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rotary wing imagery/mass distribution of informational materials</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Creation of crisis action team</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S2 Intelligence and S6 Communications sections</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Needs Assessment</td>
<td>Initial HAST</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rotary wing aerial surveys/assessments</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Troop contact and info-gathering with affected population</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Recon teams for remote assessments/HLZ ID</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Infrastructure assessment</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Infantry battalion</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Reconnaissance platoon</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CBRN Detachment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supply</td>
<td>Fuel, food</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Manpower for sea and air port security</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Manpower and equipment for debris clearance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2) tactical water purifiers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Military police detachment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Infantry battalion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4) forklifts, (1) bulldozer, (1) excavator, (31) MTVR trucks, (105) HMMWVs, (15) AAVs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deployment &amp; Distribution</td>
<td>Air and ground delivery of supplies and personnel</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(19) rotary-wing aircraft, (2) C-130s, (31) MTVR trucks, (105) HMMWVs, (15) AAVs, (4) forklifts</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Delivery of water purifiers and supplies from USAID</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health Service Support</td>
<td>Embedded Navy corpsmen</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Medical supplies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collaboration &amp; Governance</td>
<td>HAST coordination</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Establishment of joint HLZs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Inclusion of HN and NGOs in planning process</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Public and civil affairs sections</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exchange of embedded liaison teams with JSDF</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Established networks of local offices/members</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Medical and legal support for IDPs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. AFRICOM

Table 10 compares SAWSO’s core competencies in the AFRICOM area of responsibility to the MEU’s core competencies. SAWSO offers additional capabilities in the service areas of supply and deployment and distribution. Like its capabilities in other regions, SAWSO’s ability to supply food and rainwater-harvesting tanks present useful increases in the MEU’s supply capacity. Clothing and blanket supplies also fill a gap for the MEU. In terms of distribution, SAWSO’s tractors may be used to pull water tanks or other supplies. The organization’s demonstrated ability to coordinate multi-phase distribution programs is also a useful coordinating element to aid the MEU in the most efficient and effective distribution of supplies.
### Table 10. MEU and SAWSO’s Core Competencies (AFRICOM)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Essential Services &amp; Capabilities for Disaster Response</th>
<th>MEU Core Competencies</th>
<th>SAWSO Core Competencies (AFRICOM)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Information &amp; Knowledge Management</strong></td>
<td>Unclassified &amp; plain text communications</td>
<td>Local SA offices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Public and civil affairs sections</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social media</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rotary wing imagery/mass distribution of informational materials</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Creation of crisis action team</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S2 Intelligence and S6 Communications sections</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Needs Assessment</strong></td>
<td>Initial HAST</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rotary wing aerial surveys/assessments</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Troop contact and info-gathering with affected population</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Recon teams for remote assessments/HLZ ID</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Infrastructure assessment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Infantry battalion</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reconnaissance platoon</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CBRN Detachment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Supply</strong></td>
<td>Fuel, food</td>
<td>Food (maize, canned food, etc)&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Manpower for sea and air port security</td>
<td>Cooking oil&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Manpower and equipment for debris clearance</td>
<td>Rainwater-harvesting tanks&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2) tactical water purifiers</td>
<td>Mosquito nets&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Military police detachment</td>
<td>Clothing&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Infantry battalion</td>
<td>Blankets&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4) forklifts, (1) bulldozer, (1) excavator, (31) MTVR trucks, (105) HMMWVs, (15) AAVs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Deployment &amp; Distribution</strong></td>
<td>Air and ground delivery of supplies and personnel</td>
<td>Tractors to pull water tanks&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(19) rotary-wing aircraft, (2) C-130s, (31) MTVR trucks, (105) HMMWVs, (15) AAVs, (4) Forklifts</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Delivery of water purifiers and supplies from USAID</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Health Service Support</strong></td>
<td>Embedded Navy corpsmen</td>
<td>Hygiene items&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Medical supplies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Collaboration &amp; Governance</strong></td>
<td>HAST coordination</td>
<td>Established networks of local offices/members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Establishment of joint HLZs</td>
<td>Organized multi-phase food distribution plan&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Inclusion of HN and NGOs in planning process</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Public and civil affairs sections</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exchange of embedded liaison teams with JSDF</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data for MEU core competencies come from Gastrock and Iturriaga (2013) and Apte and Yoho (2014). <sup>a</sup> Ndeta (2011); <sup>b</sup>“The Salvation Army Is Responding” (2011); <sup>c</sup>OMB (2014).

### 5. CENTCOM

Table 11 compares SAWSO’s core competencies in the CENTCOM area of responsibility to the MEU’s core competencies. The supply and deployment and distribution service areas offer the greatest potential for SAWSO to complement the MEU’s disaster relief efforts. While the MEU provides food and water purification
systems, it experiences a gap concerning shelter materials. SAWSO fills this gap by providing winterized shelters, tents, cooking utensils and plates, quilts, pillows, and mattresses in the CENTCOM AOR. SAWSO’s access to trucks also offers the possibility of increasing the MEU’s organic distribution capability, assuming roads are traversable in the affected region.

Table 11. MEU and SAWSO’s Core Competencies (CENTCOM).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Essential Services &amp; Capabilities for Disaster Response</th>
<th>MEU Core Competencies</th>
<th>SAWSO Core Competencies (CENTCOM)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Information &amp; Knowledge Management</td>
<td>Unclassified &amp; plain text communications</td>
<td>Local SA offices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Public and civil affairs sections</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social media</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rotary wing imagery/mass distribution of informational materials</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Creation of crisis action team</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S2 Intelligence and S6 Communications sections</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Needs Assessment</td>
<td>Initial HAST</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rotary wing aerial surveys/assessments</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Troop contact and info-gathering with affected population</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Recon teams for remote assessments/HLZ ID</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Infrastructure assessment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Infantry battalion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reconnaissance platoon</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CBRN Detachment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supply</td>
<td>Fuel, food</td>
<td>Tents, winterized shelters&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Manpower for sea and air port security</td>
<td>Family packs with rations&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Manpower and equipment for debris clearance</td>
<td>Plates, cooking utensils&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2) tactical water purifiers</td>
<td>Blankets&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Military police detachment</td>
<td>Sewing machines&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Infantry battalion</td>
<td>Quilts, pillows, mattresses&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4) forklifts, (1) bulldozer, (1) excavator, (31) MTVR trucks, (105) HMMWVs, (15) AAVs</td>
<td>School supplies&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deployment &amp; Distribution</td>
<td>Air and ground delivery of supplies and personnel</td>
<td>Trucks for SA team to drive over 100 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(19) rotary-wing aircraft, (2) C-130s, (31) MTVR trucks, (105) HMMWVs, (15) AAVs, (4) forklifts</td>
<td>with supplies&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Delivery of water purifiers and supplies from USAID</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health Service Support</td>
<td>Embedded Navy corpsmen</td>
<td>Established networks of local offices/members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Medical supplies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collaboration &amp; Governance</td>
<td>HAST coordination</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Establishment of joint HLZs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Inclusion of HN and NGOs in planning process</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Public and civil affairs sections</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exchange of embedded liaison teams with JSDF</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data for MEU core competencies come from Gastrock and Iturriaga (2013) and Apte and Yoho (2014).<sup>a</sup>“Salvation Army Earthquake Relief” (2006); <sup>b</sup>The Salvation Army (n.d.)
D. CORE COMPETENCY CONCLUSIONS

While SAWSO’s core competencies differ by region, overall it appears that supply, deployment and distribution, health service support, and collaboration and governance are the essential service areas where SAWSO can complement the MEU’s resources. In particular, SAWSO’s access to additional food, water storage/purification, and shelter supplies increase the MEU’s capacity and fill supply gaps. SAWSO’s partnerships with organizations such as The UPS Foundation offer an increase in distribution capacity, and its networks with other NGOs and local governments presents a powerful collaboration resource during disaster relief operations, and may aid in needs assessment as well. Finally, SAWSO’s health service capabilities fill a significant gap in the MEU’s essential service areas by expanding well beyond the resources of embedded corpsmen.
VIII. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS

A. OVERVIEW

To accomplish its goals, an organization must have the financial means to execute them. An analysis of the SAWSO’s disaster response capabilities would be incomplete without examining its financial efficiency. This chapter begins with an overview of literature concerning how the Salvation Army viewed financial accountability during its initial development in England. Due to the difficulty of acquiring financial documents from this time period, this section serves as a useful examination of the organization’s early financial stance and character, rather than a numbers-based analysis.

Subsequent sections use the methodology set forth by Nguyen and Curley (2013) to categorize annual revenue sources and expenses. Financial data was drawn from the IRS Form 990, and the OMB Circular A-133 Financial Report, an independently audited report produced by SAWSO. The analysis considers overall budget efficiency by calculating the ratio of annual revenue to expenditures, and uses criteria established by Charity Watch to consider overall mission efficiency.

The final portion of this chapter offers an analysis of how SAWSO distributes grants and allocations regionally throughout the world. These figures are presented both by geographic region as defined by the IRS, and by geographic combatant command as defined by the DOD, to provide as complete a picture as possible of SAWSO’s worldwide activities.

B. METHODOLOGY NOTES

This report considers data from both the IRS Form 990 and OMB Circular A-133 annual reports covering 2003 to 2015. Copies of the OMB Circular A-133 were not available prior to 2003. From 2003 to 2011, SAWSO reported its finances on a calendar year cycle for both the IRS Form 990 and OMB Circular A-133; during this period, the organization reported its financial data for the year beginning on 1 January and ending 31 December. Beginning in 2011, SAWSO switched to reporting in accordance with the
fiscal year calendar. The 2011 reports cover financial activities from 1 January 2011 to 30 Sept 2011. The 2012 report and subsequent reports up through 2015 cover the normal fiscal year calendar, October to September.

Throughout this analysis, values from the IRS Form 990 were used to create the charts and graphs to remain consistent throughout the evaluation. These values were compared to those reported in the OMB Circular A-133, and any discrepancies were explained by the IRS Form 990 Schedule D, which reconciles differences in revenue and expenses between Form 990 and the OMB Circular A-133. Additionally, the differences between the reports did not produce different results in terms of this report’s financial analysis. Rather, the similarities between the two documents provided a level of redundancy that lends itself to increased accuracy. The source data for figures presented in this section is located in Appendix A and was compiled using the IRS Form 990.

C. EARLY FINANCIAL BACKGROUND

As described in Chapter I, the Salvation Army originated as a “break-away group with no money, no established power base, and no property” (Irvine, 2002, p. 10). Its early ambitions focused on delivering spiritual salvation to the cast-aside sects of British society, and it eventually emerged as an independent religious organization. However, the Salvation Army lacked the established sources of funding and property enjoyed by other major churches at the time. Irvine (2002) notes that churches must be particularly cognizant of society’s expectations for financial accountability when they rely on the public to fund their operations, as was the case for the early Salvation Army. When William Booth published *In Darkest England and the Way Out*, he proclaimed a very public call to action and solicitation of funds from British citizens. Critics alleged that Booth was embezzling funds for himself, and called into question the Salvation Army’s early financial practices (Irvine, 2002). The resulting inquiry vindicated the Army’s fiscal accountability procedures.

This public scrutiny, and the need to establish the young Salvation Army as a legitimate and reputable organization, reinforced the Army’s practice of providing audited financial statements to improve its image. Starting in 1868, when it was still
known as the Christian Mission, the organization published annual, publicly audited balance sheets, and this requirement continued after it became known as the Salvation Army in 1880 (Bale, 1990). These balance sheets were generally included in *The Christian Mission Magazine* and its subsequent rebranding as *The War Cry*. Booth made a point of having the balance sheets audited by firms of chartered accountants, such as Josiah Beddow & Sons and Knox, Burbridge, Cropper, and Co., to legitimize the Army’s operations and promote transparency (Irvine, 2002).

Additionally, Booth established Army regulations that required at least two persons to be involved in any monetary matters, including counting collections for various efforts and verifying receipts for purchases or expenditures (Sandall, 1950). Further detail and guidance on internal control procedures were promulgated by Booth in “The Orders and Regulations for Treasurers and Secretaries” (Howson, 2005). These records indicate a firm understanding of The Salvation Army’s dependency on public support and the need to present a reliable image in order to survive.

Despite this early focus on accountability and transparency, the Salvation Army found itself involved in a financial scandal in 1993. During this time, the Army was unable to account for £6.34 million for nearly two months, until an investigation uncovered fraud perpetrated by two of its officers (Howson, 2005). Howson (2005) speculates that the emphasis of trust and lack of supervision in non-profit organizations may increase the likelihood of fraudulent activities. However, aside from the 1993 scandal in England, the Salvation Army has received accolades for its efficient use of funds. The 2006 USA National Annual Report pointed out that 83 cents of every dollar went directly to program services (Gariepy, 2009), and Ebeling and Lee’s 1998 *Forbes* article heaped praise on the Army’s handling of costs versus returns on expenditures. The following sections examine the Salvation Army’s financial documents to delve further into how efficiently the Army uses its funds.
D. REVENUE AND EXPENSE OVERVIEW

1. Revenue Sources

Using the methodology set forth by Nguyen and Curley (2013), revenue sources are divided into the following categories: contributions, grants, investments, and other revenue. Contributions consist of cash and dollar value of in-kind goods and services from federated campaigns, membership dues, fundraising events, related organizations, and other contribution sources. Grants include revenue from government sources. Investment revenue includes dividends and interest, and other revenue incorporates revenue streams that do not fit in either of the other three categories. For SAWSO, the other revenue category exclusively consists of gains or losses from the sale of assets other than inventory. Figure 9 presents the results of this categorization with the cumulative distribution of revenue sources between 2003 and 2015. Contributions make up the overwhelming majority of SAWSO’s revenue at 86%. This is unsurprising, given that SAWSO’s status as a religious organization and history of relying on public contributions. Its tendency to evangelize while delivering services results in an inability to accept government funding for many projects, hence the relatively small percentage of revenue that results from government grants.

![Figure 9. SAWSO Cumulative Revenue Sources 2003–2015. Adapted from Department of the Treasury, IRS (n.d.).](image)
Figure 10 depicts the changes in total contributions received from 2003 to 2015. During this time period, the greatest number of contributions was received in 2010, and the least in 2003. The fact that SAWSO relies heavily on contributions for its revenue stream may indicate a higher sensitivity to economic conditions and shifts that may influence the population’s donation habits. Any scandals or poor press about SAWSO in particular, or the Salvation Army in general, may also have a disproportionate effect on the organization due to its reliance on public support.

Figure 11 offers a closer look at the sources of those contributions and reveals that, between 2008 and 2015, 83% of SAWSO’s contributions came from related organizations. Per the IRS Form 990 Schedule R for those years, related organizations consist of the Salvation Army USA’s regional territories (South, West, Central, and East), along with the Salvation Army IHQ and Salvation Army National Corporation. This is to be expected, as SAWSO is the international arm of the Salvation Army in the United States, and receives contributions from the territories to fund its overseas mission.
According to data compiled from the Salvation Army USA’s annual reports between 2015 and 2008, 25% of their revenue flows from contributions, and 18% from contributions for split-interest agreements, with a combined 43% of revenue coming from some type of contribution (The Salvation Army, 2016). This supports the observation that SAWSO is potentially vulnerable to shifting trends in contributions, whether they come directly to SAWSO or through the U.S. territories.

2. **Overall Budget Efficiency**

In general, the overall budget efficiency of a nonprofit organization can be determined by examining the ratio of total revenue to expenses. While a nonprofit organization operates similarly to a for-profit organization, it seeks to use those profits to further its program services rather than enriching shareholders. Given this rationale, the ratio of revenues to expenses should be nearly even over time. This assumption holds true for SAWSO, as depicted in Figure 12, which compares SAWSO’s cumulative revenue and expenses from 2003 to 2015.
While revenue and expenses are not an exact 50/50 split, they are relatively close and indicate positive overall budget efficiency. Figure 13 demonstrates how yearly fluctuations may affect the ratio calculation, but over time the flow of revenue and expenses comes close to equalizing. During this time period, average revenues were $26,325,926, and average expenses were $22,766,821.
The spike in revenue in 2010 is tied to an increase in contributions. Although it is difficult to explain the spike based on available information, a possible explanation for this increase is the Haiti earthquake that occurred in January 2010. Society’s desire to aid following the disaster and SAWSO’s involvement in disaster relief may have led to an increase in the amount of public contributions SAWSO received. Similarly, the spike in revenue in 2005 may be related to contributions in support of aid for the Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami that occurred in December 2004. While Hurricane Katrina also occurred in 2005, SAWSO does not fund program services within the United States.

E. MISSION EFFICIENCY

1. Mission and Program Services

While comparing the ratio of revenues and expenses is useful to provide a general idea of budget efficiency, a more pressing concern is how much of a nonprofit’s revenue actually goes toward accomplishing the organization’s stated mission. SAWSO’s mission, as stated in the 2015 IRS Form 990 and OMB Circular A-133 Financial Report, is displayed Table 12.

![Table 12. SAWSO Mission per Financial Documents.](image)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Mission/Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Department of the Treasury (n.d.)</td>
<td>&quot;To support and strengthen The Salvation Army's efforts to work hand in hand with communities to improve the health, economic, and spiritual conditions of the poor throughout the world.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Salvation Army World Service Office (2015a)</td>
<td>&quot;Provide technical assistance and project funding to the International Salvation Army in diverse areas of economic development around the world.&quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To achieve this end, SAWSO channels its efforts into a number of program services. From 2003 to 2011, SAWSO identified four program services in its financial documents: health programs, community development, micro enterprise, and relief and reconstruction services. From 2011 to 2017, SAWSO combined community development and micro enterprise into a single program service: livelihood and anti-human trafficking.
Table 13 lists SAWSO’s program services as of 2015, along with a description of each service as described in the OMB Circular A-133 Financial Report.

Table 13. SAWSO Program Services. Adapted from SAWSO (2012) and SAWSO (2015a).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program Service</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Relief &amp; Reconstruction Services</td>
<td>“Provide material assistance (food, clothing, and medical care) in the immediate aftermath of a disaster. This program also promotes and supports longer-term assistance such as housing reconstruction and income generation for those affected by disasters” (SAWSO, 2012). It includes assistance to refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health Services</td>
<td>“Designed to help end poverty and improve quality of life . . . Serves the poor and vulnerable by initiating programs that increase access to community-based services and enhance health service quality at Salvation Army hospitals and clinics. Program focus areas are: maternal, child, and adolescent health; HIV care and prevention; non-communicable diseases; and community health and health facilities” (SAWSO, 2015a).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Livelihood &amp; Anti-Human Trafficking</td>
<td>“Seeks to improve economic conditions of families through economic, spiritual, and social support of individuals and their families, by helping them acquire the skills and assets needed to be free from oppressive labor, recover from setbacks, and create a better future for the next generation” (SAWSO, 2015a).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Mission Efficiency

To determine mission efficiency, this report uses the standard established by CharityWatch, a charity watchdog originally known as the American Institute of Philanthropy. According to CharityWatch (2016), expenses fall into two categories: program service expenses, and support programs, which include management, fundraising, and general overhead expenses. If an organization spends 75% or more of its expenses on program services, it is considered highly efficient. CharityWatch also considers fundraising efficiency by dividing fundraising expenses by related contributions to determine how much is being spent to obtain contributions. However, given the difficulty of determining which SAWSO contributions were related to fundraising efforts, this report focuses solely on mission efficiency.

Using this metric, an analysis reveals that SAWSO is a highly efficient organization. Between 2003 and 2015, the lowest percentage spent on program services was 93.67% in 2013, with an average of over 96% mission efficiency. Figure 14 provides
a visual depiction of what percentage program service and supporting expenses contribute to SAWSO’s overall annual expenses.

Figure 14. SAWSO Annual Mission Efficiency. Adapted from Department of the Treasury, IRS (n.d.).

This level of efficiency indicates that SAWSO is putting contributions to their intended use as often as possible, as opposed to contributing to overhead and supporting expenses. Given the focus of this report on disaster relief, further analysis indicated that disaster relief made up the overwhelming majority of program service expenses. Figure 15 depicts this relationship, with relief and reconstruction efforts representing an average of 88% of SAWSO’s program service expenses. This conclusion supports the assertion that SAWSO is an important player to consider in relief and reconstruction efforts.
F. REGIONAL ANALYSIS

1. Data Selection

This section analyzes SAWSO’s disaster relief expenditures by region, in order to illustrate how the organization’s disaster relief funds are distributed throughout the world. To accomplish this, the report uses information collected from SAWSO’s IRS 990 Forms between 2008 and 2015. Although regional-level financial data is available between 2003 and 2015, the regional expenditures from the 2005, 2006, and 2007 Form 990s are not categorized by program service. Initial analysis efforts included the full date range, from 2003 to 2015, and resulted in abnormal spikes in spending, particularly in 2007, when the sub-Saharan African region experienced a noticeable increase in program service-related expenditures. Attempts to correlate documented disaster occurrences with this regional increase in spending were unsuccessful. This indicates that expenditures for other program services, such as health programs, altered the data from 2005 to 2007. Since the expenditures are not divided by program service, it is difficult to discern how funds were distributed during that time. Thus, to provide an accurate analysis of regional disaster relief and reconstruction spending, the regional analysis examines financial data between 2008 and 2015.
2. **Data Categorization**

The IRS Form 990, Schedule F, presents overseas expenditures and investments according to the Internal Revenue Service’s (IRS’s) classification of geographic regions. The regions relevant to this report include North America, South America, Central America and the Caribbean, Europe, Russia and neighboring states, sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, East Asia and the Pacific, and the Middle East (IRS, 2016b).

In addition to presenting expenditures and investments by the IRS’s geographic regions, this report also categorizes them by the geographic combatant commands (COCOMs) used by the DOD. Figure 16 is a map of these COCOMs.

![Figure 16. Map of U.S. Geographic Combatant Commands. Source: U.S. Department of Defense (2016).](image)

In general, the COCOMs correlate to the IRS’s geographic regions as described in Table 14.
Table 14. Correlation between IRS Geographic Regions and U.S. COCOMs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IRS Geographic Region</th>
<th>U.S. COCOM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>USAFRICOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South America</td>
<td>USOUTHCOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>USNORTHCOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central America &amp; the Caribbean</td>
<td>USOUTHCOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>USEUCOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia &amp; Neighboring States</td>
<td>USEUCOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td>USPACOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>USCENTCOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asia &amp; the Pacific</td>
<td>USPACOM</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While the Salvation Army International, and by extension SAWSO, divides the world into five geographic zones, this report judges that presenting expenditure information by IRS-designated regions and COCOMs meets the needs of the intended audience without including a third regional classification system.

3. **Expenditures by Region**

Figure 17 presents the cumulative distribution of SAWSO’s relief and reconstruction investments and expenditures between 2008 and 2015. Sub-Saharan Africa receives the most money of any region, at 21.92%. Europe follows with 19.16%, and South Asia comes in third at 17.44%.
Figure 17.  SAWSO Cumulative Relief and Reconstruction Expenditures and Investments by IRS Region, 2008–2015. Adapted from Department of the Treasury, IRS (n.d.).

Figure 18 presents similar cumulative information from 2008 to 2015, but categorizes it by COCOM. This categorization combines the IRS’s geographic regions of South Asia and East Asia and the Pacific into PACOM, which has the second largest cumulative expenditures at 23.82%. Representative disasters that may explain high expenditures in PACOM include the 2008 Myanmar cyclone, the 2011 Japan earthquake and tsunami, and Typhoon Haiyan in 2013. EUCOM garners the largest expenditures for relief and reconstruction efforts at 24.43%. While the PACOM region is typically associated with natural disasters, the fact that SAWSO includes refugee aid under relief and reconstruction services may partially explain why EUCOM received the largest cumulative expenditures between 2008 and 2015, given the influx of refugees seeking to escape conflict in Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, and other war-stricken countries.
Figures 19 and 20 provide a year-by-year view of SAWSO’s relief and reconstruction expenditures by IRS region and COCOM, respectively. Both figures show a noticeable expenditure increase in 2010 for Central America and the Caribbean, which falls under SOUTHCOM. This corresponds to the Haiti earthquake in January 2010.
In order to provide context for these expenditures and offer an explanation for the trends depicted in Figures 19 and 20, this report used the EM-DAT International Disaster Database. The EM-DAT International Disaster Database offers the capability to produce a variety of graphs and charts based on input variables such as type of disaster, number of deaths, and region (Guha-Sapir, Below, & Hoyois, 2016). Figure 21 is one such graph, depicting total deaths related to natural disasters by continent from 2008 to 2015.

When SAWSO’s regional expenditures for relief and reconstruction are re-categorized to roughly match EM-DAT’s continent categorization, their financial trends roughly match the disaster-related fatality trends from Figure 21. Figure 22 depicts these expenditures re-categorized by continent.

Figure 22. SAWSO Relief and Reconstruction Expenditures by Continent, 2008–2015. Adapted from Department of the Treasury, IRS (n.d.).
Both graphs show a spike in their respective measurements for the Americas in 2010, indicating the influence of the Haiti earthquake. That same year, according to EM-DAT, 55,736 people died in Russia as the result of an extreme temperature heat wave (Guha-Sapir et al., 2016). SAWSO’s financial data indicates little change in support as a result of that heat wave. When comparing Figures 21 and 22, it is important to note that disaster relief expenditures that do not generally involve fatalities, such as refugee or IDP aid, will not be reflected in EM-DAT’s information. Comparing these disaster-related deaths and relief and reconstruction funding is not a perfect apples-to-apples comparison, but the level of similarity in general trends between the two aids in providing context and validity for SAWSO’s expenditures.

G. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS CONCLUSIONS

Financial analysis of SAWSO yields several important conclusions. First, its humble origins led to a heavy reliance on public contributions, which continues through 2015. Other organizations who work with SAWSO in disaster relief operations should be aware that this dependency on contributions for revenue may make SAWSO more vulnerable to shifts in public opinion and economic conditions. Additionally, while the Salvation Army internalized fiscal accountability and transparency during its early years, partners should keep in mind that no organization, despite its charitable purpose, may claim complete immunity from individual acts of fraud by its employees.

Regarding overall budget efficiency and mission efficiency, SAWSO performs extremely well, falling within CharityWatch’s program versus supporting expense guidelines as a highly efficient organization. Of particular note for other organizations involved in disaster relief, the majority of SAWSO’s program service funding goes toward disaster relief and reconstruction. This provides a solid foundation for SAWSO’s disaster-related operational capabilities.

Finally, U.S. Combatant Commanders may find it useful to note that SAWSO’s regional disaster relief expenditures tend to track with global disaster occurrences. Based on expenditures, entities involved in EUCOM, PACOM, and AFRICOM may experience a higher likelihood of encountering SAWSO during relief efforts. However, since refugee
and IDP aid falls under SAWSO’s relief and reconstruction program service, adjacent organizations should be aware that a high-volume refugee crisis may decrease funding for rapid-onset natural disasters elsewhere.
IX. CONCLUSION

A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

Chapter IV’s historical analysis of the Salvation Army illuminates an organization with a firm foundation in evangelical Christian beliefs and a hierarchical structure that continue to guide its overarching mission today. However, the Salvation Army’s history, particularly its history in the United States, demonstrates that it is capable of adapting its methods to maintain a connection to the changing face of society by emphasizing program services and spreading their faith by example, rather than relying on street corner sermons.

Chapter VI found that SAWSO’s disaster relief capabilities vary by region. In PACOM, SAWSO met 36% of the Sphere Project’s minimum standards in WASH, and 80% of the minimum standards in shelter, settlement, and non-food items. While the organization scored relatively low on standards for other Sphere Project performance measures, it demonstrated competence in general food security and livelihoods, and the provision of essential health services and injury care. In SOUTHCOM, SAWSO also demonstrated competence in shelter, settlement, and non-food items, and earned the highest score among the COCOMs for health action. Evidence for this category derived largely from its relief operations following the 2010 earthquake in Haiti. In EUCOM and CENTCOM, SAWSO met at least half the minimum standards in shelter, settlement, and non-food items. In AFRICOM, SAWSO failed to demonstrate enough capability to demonstrate proficiency in any of the four major categories, although it did provide general food security and drinking water for affected populations.

Chapter VII’s comparison of SAWSO and a MEU’s disaster relief core competencies revealed that, in general, supply, deployment and distribution, health service support, and collaboration and governance are the most significant services that SAWSO contributes to relief activities. SAWSO’s access to food and ability to distribute water and shelter items expand the MEU’s organic capabilities in those areas. Additionally, SAWSO’s basic health service competencies fill a gap in the MEU’s
existing resources. MEU commanders and other involved agencies should also take note of SAWSO’s partnerships with organizations such as The UPS Foundation, which can improve distribution. Finally, the Salvation Army’s international presence and local offices around the world presents a significant resource for coordinating with host nation entities and conducting needs assessment with personnel familiar with the affected area, culture, and population.

Finally, Chapter VIII confirmed that SAWSO is a highly efficient organization with regard to overall budget and program services, with a majority of program service funding dedicated to disaster relief and reconstruction. Most of the organization’s funding comes from public contributions. SAWSO demonstrates a pattern of matching regional expenditures with the frequency and magnitude of disasters occurring in each geographic area. This indicates a level of flexibility to shift financial resources where they are needed rapidly in response to disaster events.

B. IMPLICATIONS

The fact that spreading spiritual salvation remains the Salvation Army’s primary goal may lead to conflict when dealing with populations or agencies that are not favorably inclined toward Christian evangelism. Potential partner agencies must also consider the Salvation Army’s centralized, hierarchical structure to ensure they understand who in the chain of command possesses the necessary authority to accomplish coordinating activities.

The implications of the operational capability analysis and MEU core competency comparison offer a foundation for the military and other humanitarian agencies to coordinate resource management during disaster relief efforts. The capability score card serves as a foundation for inter-agency collaboration. However, the results of this analysis should always be supplemented with active coordination efforts to confirm current resource availability. In particular, the data for CENTCOM and AFRICOM derives from a low number of disaster events, and SAWSO’s actual capabilities in those regions may extend beyond those determined using the conservative methods of this study. In EUCOM, the Salvation Army maintains a strong presence with well-funded
local offices in Europe, and this may result in a lower number of requests for assistance from SAWSO. Additionally, SAWSO’s inclusion of refugee and IDP assistance activities under its relief and reconstruction program service may result in less resource availability for rapid-onset disasters if a high-volume refugee crisis is in progress at the same time.

SAWSO’s financial analysis reveals that it relies heavily on public contributions. This is relevant for potential partners, as SAWSO’s financial resources may be vulnerable to shifts in public opinion and economic conditions. Overall however, SAWSO’s high levels of budget efficiency and spending on relief and reconstruction activities (relative to spending on its other program services) indicates that it is likely to serve as a reliable partner with regard to fiscal responsibility and resources for disaster response operations. Overall, SAWSO represents a significant asset and valuable partner for the military and other humanitarian agencies to coordinate with in order to increase the efficacy and efficiency of disaster response efforts.

C. RECOMMENDATIONS

Due to resource limitations, this study focuses on SAWSO’s capabilities, but the Salvation Army is an international organization with a presence in 127 countries. A case study focusing on the local offices in each region would provide a more well-rounded and nuanced awareness of the Salvation Army’s full range of disaster relief capabilities. Additionally, it is recommended that further research pursue similar case studies of other major government and non-government organizations involved in disaster relief activities, to build the base of knowledge and facilitate cross-agency collaboration.

The original intent of this report involved a comprehensive report of the Salvation Army International, rather than focusing on SAWSO. However, it became apparent that attempting to collect data from more than 40 regional offices extended beyond available time and resources. An attempt to contact each of these offices met with a less than 5% response rate. Additionally, the original scope presented significant issues for conducting the financial analysis, given that the Salvation Army’s regional offices adhere to the reporting regulations of their host nations, which may or may not involve easily accessible reports as is the case with SAWSO and its publicly-available annual
documentation for the IRS. Future research is recommended to develop a more complete picture of the Salvation Army’s international presence and capabilities.
APPENDIX A. SPHERE PROJECT MINIMUM STANDARDS

This appendix presents the Sphere Project minimum standards for WASH, food security and nutrition, shelter, settlement, and non-food items, and health action, as detailed in the Sphere Project (2011) Handbook.

A. MINIMUM STANDARDS IN WATER SUPPLY, SANITATION, AND HYGIENE PROMOTION

This section describes the minimum standards identified by the Sphere Handbook for the various sections that fall under the WASH category. The intent of WASH standards is to describe the basic right of all humans to access clean water and sanitation (The Sphere Project, 2011).

1. Water Supply, Sanitation, and Hygiene Promotion (WASH)

The WASH standard described in Figure 23 addresses the promotion of “good personal and environmental hygiene in order to protect health” (The Sphere Project, 2011, p. 88).

![WASH standard 1: WASH programme design and implementation](image)

Figure 23. WASH Standard One. Source: The Sphere Project (2011).

2. Hygiene Promotion

The Sphere Project defines hygiene promotion as “a planned, systematic approach to enable people to take action to prevent and/or mitigate water, sanitation, and hygiene-related diseases” (2011, p. 91). Figures 24 and 25 detail the minimum standards for hygiene promotion.
3. Water Supply

Figures 26, 27, and 28 describe the minimum standards for water supply to maintain basic levels of health and dignity (The Sphere Project, 2011).
4. **Excreta Disposal**

Human waste presents a significant health risk and may lead to a number of diseases. Figures 29 and 30 present the minimum standards to address this issue (The Sphere Project, 2011).

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**Water supply standard 2: Water quality**

Water is palatable and of sufficient quality to be drunk and used for cooking and personal and domestic hygiene without causing risk to health.

---

**Water supply standard 3: Water facilities**

People have adequate facilities to collect, store and use sufficient quantities of water for drinking, cooking and personal hygiene, and to ensure that drinking water remains safe until it is consumed.

---

**Excreta disposal standard 1: Environment free from human faeces**

The living environment in general and specifically the habitat, food production areas, public centres and surroundings of drinking water sources are free from human faecal contamination.

---

Figure 27. Water Supply Standard Two. Source: The Sphere Project (2011).


Figure 29. Excrete Disposal Standard One. Source: The Sphere Project (2011).
5. **Vector Control**

Per the Sphere Project, “a vector is a disease-carrying agent and vector-borne diseases are a major cause of sickness and death in many disaster situations” (2011, p. 111). Figures 31, 32, and 33 address the minimum standards to control and mitigate the impact of vectors in a disaster response scenario.

---

**Excreta disposal standard 2: Appropriate and adequate toilet facilities**

People have adequate, appropriate and acceptable toilet facilities, sufficiently close to their dwellings, to allow rapid, safe and secure access at all times, day and night.

Figure 30. Excreta Disposal Standard Two. Source: The Sphere Project (2011).

---

**Vector control standard 1: Individual and family protection**

All disaster-affected people have the knowledge and the means to protect themselves from disease and nuisance vectors that are likely to cause a significant risk to health or well-being.

Figure 31. Vector Control Standard One. Source: The Sphere Project (2011).

---

**Vector control standard 2: Physical, environmental and chemical protection measures**

The environment where the disaster-affected people are placed does not expose them to disease-causing and nuisance vectors, and those vectors are kept to a reduced level where possible.

Figure 32. Vector Control Standard Two. Source: The Sphere Project (2011).
6. **Solid Waste Management**

Similar to excreta disposal, solid waste management addresses “the process of handling and disposal of organic and hazardous solid waste which, if unattended appropriately, can pose public health risks” (The Sphere Project, 2011, p. 117). Figure 34 describes the minimum standard for this area.

7. **Drainage**

Standing water presents a health risk to the surrounding population. Figure 35 describes the minimum standard required to protect against this risk.
B. MINIMUM STANDARDS IN FOOD SECURITY AND NUTRITION

The Sphere Project’s minimum standards for food security and nutrition address the right for each person to have enough food to “be free from hunger” (The Sphere Project, 2011, p. 143).

1. Food Security and Nutrition Assessment

Throughout disaster response operations, responders must conduct on-going assessments of the affected population to determine their needs. Food security and nutrition assessments are particularly important to maintain awareness of threats to proper nutrition (The Sphere Project, 2011). Figures 36 and 37 present the standards associated with food security and nutrition assessments.
2. **Infant and Young Child Feeding**

Young children and infants are particularly vulnerable during disasters, as they generally have specific nutrition needs. In particular, “breastfeeding protection and support” or some alternative formula source is crucial for infants (The Sphere Project, 2011, p. 158). Figures 38 and 39 present the minimum standards for this area.
3. Management of Acute Malnutrition and Micronutrient Deficiencies

Acute malnutrition and micronutrient deficiencies carry a high threat of mortality. Methods to address these issues include supplementary feeding, therapeutic care, and community-based management (The Sphere Project, 2011). Figures 40, 41, and 42 present the standards for addressing these problems.

Figure 40. Management of Acute Malnutrition Standard One. Source: The Sphere Project (2011).

Figure 41. Management of Acute Malnutrition Standard Two. Source: The Sphere Project (2011).

Figure 42. Management of Acute Malnutrition Standard Three. Source: The Sphere Project (2011).
4. **Food Security: General**

In general, “food security responses should aim to meet short-term needs” and avoid introducing coping strategies that may be unsustainable or cause long-term harm to the affected population (The Sphere Project, 2011, p. 175). Figure 43 describes the standard for general food security.

![Figure 43. Food Security General Standard One. Source: The Sphere Project (2011).](image)

5. **Food Security: Food Transfers**

Food transfers involve ensuring secure access to “food of adequate quality and quantity,” with “the means to prepare and consume it safely” (The Sphere Project, 2011, p. 179). Figures 44 through 49 present the minimum standards for food transfers.

![Figure 44. Food Security—Food Transfers Standard One. Source: The Sphere Project (2011).](image)
Food security – food transfers standard 2: Appropriateness and acceptability

The food items provided are appropriate and acceptable to recipients so that they can be used efficiently and effectively at the household level.

Figure 45. Food Security—Food Transfers Standard Two. Source: The Sphere Project (2011).

Food security – food transfers standard 3: Food quality and safety

Food distributed is fit for human consumption and of appropriate quality.

Figure 46. Food Security—Food Transfers Standard Three. Source: The Sphere Project (2011).

Food security – food transfers standard 4: Supply chain management (SCM)

Commodities and associated costs are well managed using impartial, transparent and responsive systems.

Figure 47. Food Security—Food Transfers Standard Four. Source: The Sphere Project (2011).

Food security – food transfers standard 5: Targeting and distribution

The method of targeted food distribution is responsive, timely, transparent and safe, supports dignity and is appropriate to local conditions.

6. **Food Security: Cash and Voucher Transfers**

Unlike food transfers, cash and voucher transfers entail using cash or coupons to purchase food items. In general, these methods use “a market-based approach where beneficiaries are provided with purchasing power” (The Sphere Project, 2011, p. 199). Figure 50 details the standard for cash and voucher transfers related to food security.

7. **Food Security: Livelihoods**

Protecting the economic livelihood of those affected by the disaster lowers their risk of suffering from food insecurity and encourages sustainable recovery. Figures 51, 52, and 53 describe the minimum standards for food security as it pertains to the livelihoods of the affected population.
C. MINIMUM STANDARDS IN SHELTER, SETTLEMENTS, AND NON-FOOD ITEMS

The Sphere Project (2011) asserts that all humans have the right to viable shelter, and uses minimum standards in shelter, settlements, and non-food items to describe the requirements involved in protecting this right.
1. **Shelter and Settlement**

Access to adequate shelter is a crucial factor for the survival of disaster-affected populations. The Sphere Project (2011) advises that, when possible, temporary or transitional shelters should be located near the original homes, although IDP camps may be established when this is not an option (The Sphere Project, 2011). Figures 54 through 58 describe the minimum standards concerning shelter and settlement.

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**Shelter and settlement standard 1: Strategic planning**

Shelter and settlement strategies contribute to the security, safety, health and well-being of both displaced and non-displaced affected populations and promote recovery and reconstruction where possible.

---

Figure 54. Shelter and Settlement Standard One. Source: The Sphere Project (2011).

**Shelter and settlement standard 2: Settlement planning**

The planning of return, host or temporary communal settlements enables the safe and secure use of accommodation and essential services by the affected population.

---

Figure 55. Shelter and Settlement Standard Two. Source: The Sphere Project (2011).

**Shelter and settlement standard 3: Covered living space**

People have sufficient covered living space providing thermal comfort, fresh air and protection from the climate ensuring their privacy, safety and health and enabling essential household and livelihood activities to be undertaken.

---

Figure 56. Shelter and Settlement Standard Three. Source: The Sphere Project (2011).
2. **Non-food Items: Clothing, Bedding and Household Items**

In addition to shelter, non-food items assist in keeping the affected population protected from the elements and meeting basic human needs. Figures 59 through 63 describe the standards to ensure these needs are met.

---

**Shelter and settlement standard 4: Construction**

Local safe building practices, materials, expertise and capacities are used where appropriate, maximising the involvement of the affected population and local livelihood opportunities.

Figure 57. Shelter and Settlement Standard Four. Source: The Sphere Project (2011).

**Shelter and settlement standard 5: Environmental Impact**

Shelter and settlement solutions and the material sourcing and construction techniques used minimise adverse impact on the local natural environment.

Figure 58. Shelter and Settlement Standard Five. Source: The Sphere Project (2011).

**Non-food items standard 1: Individual, general household and shelter support items**

The affected population has sufficient individual, general household and shelter support items to ensure their health, dignity, safety and well-being.

Figure 59. Non-food Items Standard One. Source: The Sphere Project (2011).
### Non-food items standard 2: Clothing and bedding

The disaster-affected population has sufficient clothing, blankets and bedding to ensure their personal comfort, dignity, health and well-being.

Figure 60. Non-Food Items Standard Two. Source: The Sphere Project (2011).

### Non-food items standard 3: Cooking and eating utensils

The disaster-affected population has access to culturally appropriate items for preparing and storing food, and for cooking, eating and drinking.

Figure 61. Non-food Items Standard Three. Source: The Sphere Project (2011).

### Non-food items standard 4: Stoves, fuel and lighting

The disaster-affected population has access to a safe, fuel-efficient stove and an accessible supply of fuel or domestic energy, or to communal cooking facilities. Each household also has access to appropriate means of providing sustainable artificial lighting to ensure personal safety.

Figure 62. Non-food Items Standard Four. Source: The Sphere Project (2011).

### Non-food items standard 5: Tools and fixings

The affected population, when responsible for the construction or maintenance of their shelter or for debris removal, has access to the necessary tools, fixings and complementary training.

Figure 63. Non-food Items Standard Five. Source: The Sphere Project (2011).
D. MINIMUM STANDARDS IN HEALTH ACTION

This section describes the Sphere Project’s minimum standards that express the affected population’s right to health (2011).

1. Health Systems

Health systems involve the integration and coordination of all organizations dedicated to health actions (The Sphere Project, 2011). Figures 64 through 69 provide detail on the standards involved with ensuring health systems are both efficient and effective in their delivery of services.

---

**Health systems standard 1: Health service delivery**

People have equal access to effective, safe and quality health services that are standardised and follow accepted protocols and guidelines.

---

Figure 64. Health Systems Standard One. Source: The Sphere Project (2011).

**Health systems standard 2: Human resources**

Health services are provided by trained and competent health workforces who have an adequate mix of knowledge and skills to meet the health needs of the population.

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Figure 65. Health Systems Standard Two. Source: The Sphere Project (2011).

**Health systems standard 3: Drugs and medical supplies**

People have access to a consistent supply of essential medicines and consumables.

---

Figure 66. Health Systems Standard Three. Source: The Sphere Project (2011).
2. Essential Health Services

Essential health services involve both “preventative and curative health services” delivered to affected populations following a disaster (The Sphere Project, 2011, p. 309). Figure 70 describes the basic standard for prioritizing these services.
3. Control of Communicable Diseases

In the aftermath of a disaster, poor living conditions and difficulty accessing hygiene-related resources may lead to the rapid spread of communicable diseases such as measles, malaria, and diarrhea. Figures 71, 72, and 73 present The Sphere Project’s standards for controlling the spread of these diseases.

| Essential health services – control of communicable diseases
| standard 1: Communicable disease prevention
| People have access to information and services that are designed to prevent the communicable diseases that contribute most significantly to excess morbidity and mortality.

Figure 71. Control of Communicable Diseases Standard One. Source: The Sphere Project (2011).

| Essential health services – control of communicable diseases
| standard 2: Communicable disease diagnosis and case management
| People have access to effective diagnosis and treatment for those infectious diseases that contribute most significantly to preventable excess morbidity and mortality.

Figure 72. Control of Communicable Diseases Standard Two. Source: The Sphere Project (2011).

| Essential health services – control of communicable diseases
| standard 3: Outbreak detection and response
| Outbreaks are prepared for, detected, investigated and controlled in a timely and effective manner.

Figure 73. Control of Communicable Diseases Standard Three. Source: The Sphere Project (2011).
4.  **Child Health**

Children are among the particularly vulnerable population following a disaster, and may require specific health actions. Figures 75 and 75 describe the standards that should guide the delivery of children’s’ health services.

![Essential health services – child health standard 1: Prevention of vaccine-preventable diseases](image1)

**Children aged 6 months to 15 years have immunity against measles and access to routine Expanded Programme on Immunization (EPI) services once the situation is stabilised.**

Figure 74.  Child Health Standard One. Source: The Sphere Project (2011).

![Essential health services – child health standard 2: Management of newborn and childhood illness](image2)

**Children have access to priority health services that are designed to address the major causes of newborn and childhood morbidity and mortality.**

Figure 75.  Child Health Standard Two. Source: The Sphere Project (2011).

5.  **Sexual and Reproductive Health**

Reproductive health, particularly in areas that may have a high occurrence of sexually transmitted diseases such as AIDS, is an area of health action that response organizations must consider. Figures 76 and 77 present standards to address these areas.
6. **Injury**

According to the Sphere Project, “injury is usually the major cause of excess mortality and morbidity following acute-onset natural disasters” (2011, p. 331). Figure 78 describes the minimum standard response agencies should meet concerning injuries.
7. **Mental Health**

Along with physical ailments, the trauma associated with disasters may lead to psychological problems in the affected population. Figure 79 highlights the need to address mental health during recovery efforts.

![Figure 79. Mental Health Standard One. Source: The Sphere Project (2011).](image)

8. **Non-communicable Diseases**

Non-communicable diseases may involve issues such as “existing chronic conditions”, and may be more common in areas with an older population (The Sphere Project, 2011, p. 336). Figure 80 addresses the minimum standard to confront these diseases.

![Figure 80. Non-communicable Diseases Standard One. Source: The Sphere Project (2011).](image)
APPENDIX B. FINANCIAL DATA.

This appendix presents the data used to create the figures and graphs presented in Chapter V: Financial Analysis. The data is compiled from SAWSO’s IRS Form 990s between 2003 through 2015. The data is presented in tables in the order in which figures appear in the chapter.

Table 15. Data for Figure 9, SAWSO Cumulative Revenue Sources, and Figure 10, SAWSO Annual Contribution Revenue. Adapted from Department of the Treasury, IRS (n.d.).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Contributions</th>
<th>Grants</th>
<th>Investments</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>$ 9,366,623</td>
<td>$ 2,591,559</td>
<td>$ 122,146</td>
<td>(206,206)</td>
<td>$ 11,874,122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>$ 10,103,767</td>
<td>$ 1,830,001</td>
<td>$ 128,685</td>
<td>117,143</td>
<td>$ 12,179,596</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>$ 38,517,505</td>
<td>$ 1,952,139</td>
<td>$ 782,760</td>
<td>129,090</td>
<td>$ 41,381,494</td>
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<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>$ 20,783,331</td>
<td>$ 2,655,645</td>
<td>$ 670,189</td>
<td>291,757</td>
<td>$ 24,400,922</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>$ 30,179,538</td>
<td>$ 3,081,857</td>
<td>$ 794,109</td>
<td>2,066,067</td>
<td>$ 36,121,571</td>
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<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>$ 26,862,727</td>
<td>$ 4,050,363</td>
<td>$ 912,498</td>
<td>(724,131)</td>
<td>$ 31,101,457</td>
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<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>$ 19,745,934</td>
<td>$ 3,990,361</td>
<td>$ 673,575</td>
<td>(2,797,569)</td>
<td>$ 21,612,301</td>
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<td>2010</td>
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<td>$ 1,871,566</td>
<td>$ 687,668</td>
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<td>2011</td>
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<td>$ 464,136</td>
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<td>2012</td>
<td>$ 17,561,436</td>
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<td>$ 842,647</td>
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<td>$ 22,607,762</td>
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<td>2013</td>
<td>$ 12,796,646</td>
<td>$ 1,074,794</td>
<td>$ 945,104</td>
<td>1,966,811</td>
<td>$ 16,783,355</td>
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<td>2014</td>
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<td>$ 230,534</td>
<td>$ 896,960</td>
<td>3,276,082</td>
<td>$ 25,718,519</td>
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<td>2015</td>
<td>$ 16,954,525</td>
<td>$ 342,239</td>
<td>$ 1,018,301</td>
<td>3,450,694</td>
<td>$ 21,765,759</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>$ 295,610,059</td>
<td>$ 26,620,853</td>
<td>$ 8,938,778</td>
<td>11,067,347</td>
<td>$ 342,237,037</td>
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Table 16. Data for Figure 12, SAWSO’s Cumulative Revenue and Expenses 2003–2015, and Figure 13, SAWSO’s Annual Revenue versus Expenses. Adapted from Department of the Treasury, IRS (n.d.).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Revenue</th>
<th>Total Expenses</th>
<th>% Revenue</th>
<th>% Expense</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>$11,874,122</td>
<td>$12,668,933</td>
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<td>51.62%</td>
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<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>$12,179,596</td>
<td>$12,746,762</td>
<td>48.86%</td>
<td>51.14%</td>
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<td>2005</td>
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<td>$18,642,888</td>
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<td>2006</td>
<td>$24,400,922</td>
<td>$24,374,823</td>
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<td>49.97%</td>
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<td>2007</td>
<td>$36,121,571</td>
<td>$37,149,725</td>
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<td>50.70%</td>
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<td>2008</td>
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<td>2009</td>
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<td>$24,309,300</td>
<td>47.06%</td>
<td>52.94%</td>
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<td>2010</td>
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<td>$32,515,814</td>
<td>61.50%</td>
<td>38.50%</td>
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<td>2011</td>
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<td>$16,590,159</td>
<td>59.88%</td>
<td>40.12%</td>
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<td>2012</td>
<td>$22,607,762</td>
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<td>2013</td>
<td>$16,783,355</td>
<td>$18,072,423</td>
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<td>2014</td>
<td>$25,718,519</td>
<td>$19,996,741</td>
<td>56.26%</td>
<td>43.74%</td>
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<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>$21,765,759</td>
<td>$20,557,560</td>
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<td>48.57%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>$342,237,037</td>
<td>$295,968,669</td>
<td>53.62%</td>
<td>46.38%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 17. Data for Figure 14, SAWSO Annual Mission Efficiency. Adapted from Department of the Treasury, IRS (n.d.).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Program Service Expenses</th>
<th>Supporting Expenses</th>
<th>% Program Services</th>
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<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>$12,378,225</td>
<td>$290,708</td>
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<td>2004</td>
<td>$12,426,943</td>
<td>$319,819</td>
<td>97.49%</td>
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<td>2005</td>
<td>$18,233,678</td>
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<td>2007</td>
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<td>2008</td>
<td>$35,135,519</td>
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<td>97.92%</td>
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<td>2009</td>
<td>$23,518,876</td>
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<td>$31,575,650</td>
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<td>2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>$19,466,016</td>
<td>$1,091,544</td>
<td>94.69%</td>
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Table 18.  Data for Figure 15, Composition of SAWSO’s Annual Program Service Expenses. Adapted from Department of the Treasury, IRS (n.d.).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Relief &amp; Reconstruction Expenses</th>
<th>Other Program Service Expenses</th>
<th>Total Program Service Expenses</th>
<th>% Relief &amp; Reconstruction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>$11,099,931</td>
<td>$1,278,294</td>
<td>$12,378,225</td>
<td>89.67%</td>
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<td>$1,352,049</td>
<td>$12,426,943</td>
<td>89.12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>$16,097,358</td>
<td>$2,136,320</td>
<td>$18,233,678</td>
<td>88.28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>$20,670,578</td>
<td>$3,183,285</td>
<td>$23,853,863</td>
<td>86.66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>$32,552,460</td>
<td>$4,009,809</td>
<td>$36,562,269</td>
<td>89.03%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>$30,264,043</td>
<td>$4,871,476</td>
<td>$35,135,519</td>
<td>86.14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>$18,944,498</td>
<td>$4,574,378</td>
<td>$23,518,876</td>
<td>80.55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>$28,868,645</td>
<td>$2,707,005</td>
<td>$31,575,650</td>
<td>91.43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>$13,927,777</td>
<td>$2,105,699</td>
<td>$16,033,476</td>
<td>86.87%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>$19,523,581</td>
<td>$2,273,488</td>
<td>$21,797,069</td>
<td>89.57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>$14,863,492</td>
<td>$2,105,256</td>
<td>$16,968,748</td>
<td>87.99%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>$17,166,379</td>
<td>$1,564,708</td>
<td>$18,731,087</td>
<td>91.65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>$17,687,287</td>
<td>$1,778,729</td>
<td>$19,466,016</td>
<td>90.86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>$252,740,923</td>
<td>$33,940,496</td>
<td>$286,681,419</td>
<td>88.16%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 19. Data for Figure 17, SAWSO Cumulative Relief and Reconstruction Expenditures and Investments by IRS Region, 2008–2015. Adapted from Department of the Treasury, IRS (n.d.).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Total Expenditures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>$28,578,746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South America</td>
<td>$9,673,702</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>$6,945,177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central America &amp; the Caribbean</td>
<td>$22,009,023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>$24,973,099</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia &amp; Neighboring States</td>
<td>$6,874,856</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td>$22,735,409</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>$243,280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asia &amp; the Pacific</td>
<td>$8,318,902</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 20. Data for Figure 18, SAWSO Cumulative Relief and Reconstruction Expenditures and Investments by U.S. COCOM, 2008–2015. Adapted from Department of the Treasury, IRS (n.d.).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COCOM</th>
<th>Total Expenditures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USAFRICOM</td>
<td>$28,578,746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USCENTCOM</td>
<td>$243,280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USEUCOM</td>
<td>$31,847,955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USNORTHCOM</td>
<td>$6,945,177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USPACOM</td>
<td>$31,054,311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSOUTHCOM</td>
<td>$31,682,725</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 21. Data for Figure 19, SAWSO Annual Relief and Reconstruction Expenditures and Investments by IRS Region, 2008–2015. Adapted from Department of the Treasury, IRS (n.d.).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Sub-Saharan Africa</th>
<th>South America</th>
<th>South Asia</th>
<th>Central America &amp; the Caribbean</th>
<th>Europe</th>
<th>East Asia &amp; the Pacific</th>
<th>North America</th>
<th>Russia &amp; Neighboring States</th>
<th>Middle East</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>$1,367,920$</td>
<td>$657,688$</td>
<td>$1,290,517$</td>
<td>$530,419$</td>
<td>$475,763$</td>
<td>$636,064$</td>
<td>$424,913$</td>
<td>$206,057$</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>$1,044,823$</td>
<td>$539,366$</td>
<td>$1,262,086$</td>
<td>$848,169$</td>
<td>$1,768,818$</td>
<td>$1,270,635$</td>
<td>$404,766$</td>
<td>$20,582$</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>$2,019,036$</td>
<td>$450,891$</td>
<td>$1,630,133$</td>
<td>$1,470,690$</td>
<td>$581,606$</td>
<td>$908,801$</td>
<td>$489,191$</td>
<td>$231,758$</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>$2,424,591$</td>
<td>$463,502$</td>
<td>$1,661,175$</td>
<td>$588,793$</td>
<td>$933,065$</td>
<td>$1,535,539$</td>
<td>$293,726$</td>
<td>$413,893$</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>$8,110,747$</td>
<td>$1,859,909$</td>
<td>$1,469,276$</td>
<td>$1,119,864$</td>
<td>$1,647,472$</td>
<td>$1,090,518$</td>
<td>$4,765,161$</td>
<td>$413,871$</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>$4,070,453$</td>
<td>$1,941,823$</td>
<td>$1,234,734$</td>
<td>$2,608,815$</td>
<td>$6,805,091$</td>
<td>$2,905,593$</td>
<td>$2,945,990$</td>
<td>$692,847$</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>$1,921,803$</td>
<td>$1,266,882$</td>
<td>$1,573,379$</td>
<td>$1,392,841$</td>
<td>$6,214,007$</td>
<td>$397,584$</td>
<td>$653,326$</td>
<td>$799,152$</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>$6,767,443$</td>
<td>$1,451,518$</td>
<td>$4,038,012$</td>
<td>$11,603,829$</td>
<td>$2,755,142$</td>
<td>$326,484$</td>
<td>$328,606$</td>
<td>$2,063,430$</td>
<td>$141,236$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>$2,890,834$</td>
<td>$1,426,730$</td>
<td>$3,083,229$</td>
<td>$1,201,894$</td>
<td>$1,669,034$</td>
<td>$648,657$</td>
<td>$642,577$</td>
<td>$596,518$</td>
<td>$73,340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>$2,499,984$</td>
<td>$1,114,082$</td>
<td>$3,363,868$</td>
<td>$2,422,322$</td>
<td>$1,176,332$</td>
<td>$247,731$</td>
<td>$499,659$</td>
<td>$749,050$</td>
<td>$28,704</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>$2,249,119$</td>
<td>$531,727$</td>
<td>$3,651,829$</td>
<td>$720,701$</td>
<td>$2,311,348$</td>
<td>$264,484$</td>
<td>$320,021$</td>
<td>$780,816$</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>$3,732,709$</td>
<td>$926,090$</td>
<td>$2,122,328$</td>
<td>$1,092,740$</td>
<td>$1,702,859$</td>
<td>$1,526,291$</td>
<td>$3,040,952$</td>
<td>$573,612$</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>$3,446,401$</td>
<td>$1,014,850$</td>
<td>$1,668,028$</td>
<td>$965,872$</td>
<td>$2,339,286$</td>
<td>$2,002,078$</td>
<td>$514,046$</td>
<td>$619,433$</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Totals 2003-2015 | $43,545,863$       | $13,645,058$  | $30,048,595$ | $26,546,959$                   | $30,381,823$ | $13,760,459$          | $13,322,933$ | $8,161,017$                 | $243,280$
| Totals 2008-2015 | $28,578,746$       | $9,673,702$   | $22,735,408$ | $22,009,023$                   | $24,973,099$ | $8,318,902$             | $6,945,177$  | $6,874,856$                 | $243,280$
Table 22.  Data for Figure 20, SAWSO Annual Relief and Reconstruction Expenditures and Investments by U.S. COCOM, 2008–2015. Adapted from Department of the Treasury, IRS (n.d.).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>USAFRICOM</th>
<th>USCENTCOM</th>
<th>USEUCOM</th>
<th>USNORTHCOM</th>
<th>USPACOM</th>
<th>USSOUTHCOM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>$1,367,920</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>$681,820</td>
<td>$424,913</td>
<td>$1,926,581</td>
<td>$1,168,107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>$1,044,823</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>$1,789,400</td>
<td>$404,766</td>
<td>$2,532,721</td>
<td>$1,387,535</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>$2,019,036</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>$815,364</td>
<td>$489,191</td>
<td>$2,538,934</td>
<td>$1,921,582</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>$2,424,591</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>$1,346,958</td>
<td>$293,726</td>
<td>$3,196,714</td>
<td>$1,052,295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>$8,110,747</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>$2,061,343</td>
<td>$4,765,161</td>
<td>$2,559,793</td>
<td>$2,979,773</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>$4,070,453</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>$7,497,938</td>
<td>$2,945,990</td>
<td>$4,140,329</td>
<td>$4,550,638</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>$2,921,803</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>$7,013,159</td>
<td>$653,326</td>
<td>$3,970,963</td>
<td>$2,659,723</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>$6,767,443</td>
<td>$141,236</td>
<td>$4,818,572</td>
<td>$328,606</td>
<td>$4,364,496</td>
<td>$13,055,347</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>$2,890,834</td>
<td>$73,340</td>
<td>$2,265,552</td>
<td>$642,577</td>
<td>$3,731,886</td>
<td>$2,628,624</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>$2,499,984</td>
<td>$28,704</td>
<td>$1,925,382</td>
<td>$499,659</td>
<td>$3,611,599</td>
<td>$3,536,404</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>$2,249,119</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>$3,092,164</td>
<td>$320,021</td>
<td>$3,916,313</td>
<td>$1,252,428</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>$3,732,709</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>$2,276,469</td>
<td>$1,040,952</td>
<td>$3,648,619</td>
<td>$2,018,839</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>$3,446,401</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>$2,958,719</td>
<td>$514,046</td>
<td>$3,670,106</td>
<td>$1,980,722</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals 2003-2015</td>
<td>$43,545,863</td>
<td>$243,280</td>
<td>$38,542,840</td>
<td>$13,322,933</td>
<td>$43,809,054</td>
<td>$40,192,017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals 2008-2015</td>
<td>$28,578,746</td>
<td>$243,280</td>
<td>$31,847,955</td>
<td>$6,945,177</td>
<td>$31,054,311</td>
<td>$31,682,725</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 23. Data for Figure 22, SAWSO Relief and Reconstruction Expenditures by Continent, 2008–2015. Adapted from Department of the Treasury, IRS (n.d.).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Africa</th>
<th>Americas</th>
<th>Asia</th>
<th>Europe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>$4,070,453</td>
<td>$7,496,628</td>
<td>$4,140,329</td>
<td>$7,497,938</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>$2,921,803</td>
<td>$3,313,049</td>
<td>$3,970,963</td>
<td>$7,013,159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>$6,767,443</td>
<td>$13,383,953</td>
<td>$4,505,732</td>
<td>$4,818,572</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>$2,890,834</td>
<td>$3,271,201</td>
<td>$3,805,226</td>
<td>$2,265,552</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>$2,499,984</td>
<td>$4,036,063</td>
<td>$3,640,303</td>
<td>$1,925,382</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>$2,249,119</td>
<td>$1,572,449</td>
<td>$3,916,313</td>
<td>$3,092,164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>$3,732,709</td>
<td>$3,059,791</td>
<td>$3,648,619</td>
<td>$2,276,469</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>$3,446,401</td>
<td>$2,494,768</td>
<td>$3,670,106</td>
<td>$2,958,719</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (2013). *Joint publication 4–0: Joint logistics*. Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff.


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