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A conceptual framework for the analysis of civil-military relations and intelligence

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ABSTRACT

The article argues that current conceptual approaches in civil-military relations are deeply flawed resulting in its irrelevance in analyzing major issues including war and the collapse of democracy. After highlighting major flaws in the work of the late Samuel Huntington and those who follow his approach, the article argues that other conceptual approaches, including Security Sector Reform, are also flawed, or in the case of the “military effectiveness” literature, largely irrelevant. In explaining the main causes of the flawed conceptual literature, the article highlights the absence of good data and challenges in methodology. While arguing that military forces are very unlikely to engage in armed combat, it highlights the roles and missions which in the world today are implanted by these forces. As it is virtually impossible to prove effectiveness of the armed forces in these roles and missions, the article proposes a conceptual approach based on requirements.

KEYWORDS

Civil-military relations;
military effectiveness;
Security Sector Reform

My goal in this essay is to present a conceptual framework for the analysis of civil-military relations (CMR) that is also useful for the analysis of intelligence systems. As an essay it is not a fully developed article with extensive empirical data. Rather it is intended to explain the main things to be studied – the key factors, concepts, and variables – and the relationship among them.¹ The framework will be described and illustrated later in the essay. My hope is that other scholars will see the value of the conceptual framework and develop research projects that seek to identify the presence, or more likely absence, of what I posit as requirements in CMR. In my opinion, the current approaches to CMR are not useful, are in fact misleading, and the framework I advocate here can also apply to intelligence systems. While there is a great deal of literature on various aspects of intelligence systems in the so-called Five Eyes (The US, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand), there is very little in the newer democracies where intelligence, which in most cases was mainly dedicated to state security and was militarized, has yet to overcome the stigma of its identification with human-rights abuses, in the previous non-democratic regimes. Further, intelligence, or state security, and its reform, or better creation under democratic civilian control, is very similar to the challenges of reforming CMR. However, even in the case of the US, but for Amy Zegart, and to a lesser degree,

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Mark Lowenthal, the literature on intelligence focuses on specific components of an intelligence system, rather than intelligence as a system.²

While the main focus is on CMR in new democracies, the essay deals tangentially with the United States, mainly because the experience in the United States, and scholarly literature somehow related to it, has an undue impact on analysis in new democracies. The catalyst for writing this essay is my having read recently two important books. The first is Lawrence Freedman *The Future of War: A History* in which this highly credible scholar of strategy and war includes virtually no mention of the officers and soldiers who fight wars or the civilian decision-makers who send them to war.³ This striking absence is analogous to writing about education and not including professors and teachers, of medicine without including doctors and nurses, or a legal system without including lawyers. Military officers are professionals, and the absence of including the professionals who wage war, and the civilian decision-makers who send them to war, is startling.⁴ The second book is *How Democracies Die* by Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt which in the context of analyzing the potential death of democracy in the United States, is accurate in emphasizing political parties and civil society, but completely ignores the role of the military.⁵ In the context of their book, although they do not include a mention, this role may be positive in that Generals Mattis and Kelly have helped maintain some relative stability in the role of the United States in international security. The absence of reference to the military is even more important in their analysis of the death of democracy via coups in countries such as Chile and Peru, or the role of the military in keeping President Nicolás Maduro in power in Venezuela. Unfortunately, military coups, most recently in Egypt and Thailand remain a common mechanism to terminate a democracy.⁶

The absence of any focus on civil-military relations in these two recent and excellent books is for me evidence that the contribution of the sub-discipline of Comparative Politics that is civil-military relations theory is negligible. I believe, however, that fighting wars, and other roles and missions of military professionals, is important, and that those who implement the guidance of civilian decision-makers and their relations with these decision-makers is worthy of analysis. In my opinion, the problem is that the mainstream literature on civil-military relations is both heavily normative rather than empirical and consequentially does not provide a suitable basis for scholars to include the military and civilian decision-makers in analysis. If this literature has any conceptual framework, and this will be dealt with later in this essay, it is wrong (Huntington), undifferentiated (SSR), or not fully relevant (military effectiveness). This is a fact, despite the work of several scholars currently making substantial contributions to the literature.⁷

Current CMR theory: impediments to analysis

The current frameworks for the analysis of CMR are very seriously flawed, as with Huntington's "normal theory," undifferentiated and inconsistently defined as is Security Sector Reform (SSR), or not quite to the point as with the literature on military effectiveness.

Huntington and control

The most often cited framework on CMR in the United States and abroad is that of Samuel Huntington and his followers. It is with authority that Peter Feaver, one of the leading experts on US CMR, wrote in 2003,

Why bother with a model [Huntington's] that is over forty years old? The answer is that Huntington's theory, outlined in *The Soldier and the State*, remains the dominant theoretical paradigm in civil-military relations, especially the study of American civil-military relations. ... Huntington's model is widely recognized as the most elegant, ambitious, and important statement on civil-military relations theory to date. Moreover, Huntington's prescriptions for how best to structure civil-military relations continue to find a very receptive ear within one very important audience, the American officer corps itself, and this contributes to his prominence in the field.⁸

In *Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime*, Eliot A. Cohen refers to Huntington's book as the "normal" theory of civil-military relations, "... the accepted standard by which the current reality is to be judged."⁹ Indeed, the 2007 Senior Conference at West Point took as its theme, "American Civil-Military Relations: Fifty Years after *The Soldier and the State*."¹⁰

Despite the prominence of Huntington's theory, in his major book, *Armed Servants*, Peter Feaver attempts to use his theory to explain how the United States prevailed in the Cold War and concludes, "The lack of fit strongly suggest that Huntington's theory does not adequately capture American civil-military relations."¹¹

Huntington's main focus in *The Soldier and the State* is the distinction of subjective and objective civilian control. Subjective control attempts to limit military power, both materially and in the officer corps' capacity to wield its influence in the political and social spheres. According to Huntington, this type of control makes the military more civilian by turning them into the mirror of the state, which in turn brings about a decline in military professionalism. Objective civilian control, in contrast, is oriented towards the recognition of autonomous military professionals by trying to establish an independent military sphere. It is assumed that a highly professional military corps of officers will have the ability to subordinate themselves to the decisions and orientation of a legitimate state authority, regardless of its political orientation.¹²

There are three main flaws with Huntington's work that render it, and those who follow it, useless for empirical analysis of civil-military relations. First is the tautological nature of his argument; second is his use of selective data; and third is his exclusive focus on civilian control of the armed forces. Together, these methodological weaknesses are virtually insurmountable obstacles to scholarship that, although acknowledged by American and other experts on CMR, have not been remedied.¹³

First, at its core Huntington's framework is a tautology – it cannot be proved or disproved. Huntington focuses on what he terms "professionalism" in the officer corps, and bases his argument on the distinction between what he terms "objective" and "subjective" control. As Bengt Abrahamsson wrote 45 years ago,

Essentially, a "professional" officer corps is one which exhibits expertise, responsibility, and corporateness. "Professionalism," however, to Huntington also involves political neutrality; as a result, "professionalism" and "objective control" are inseparable as theoretical concepts. The immediate consequence of this is to rule out the empirical possibility of establishing the relationship between the *degree* of professionalism and the *degree* of political neutrality. Huntington's thesis becomes, in Carl Hempel's words, "a covert definitional truth." In other words, professional officers never intervene, because if they do, they are not true professionals.¹⁴

Peter Feaver, who was Huntington's student at Harvard, more delicately than Abrahams-son, analyzes Huntington's chain of causation, which in his words has bedeviled the sub-field from the beginning.

The causal chain for Huntington's **prescriptive theory** runs as follows: autonomy leads to professionalization, which leads to political neutrality and voluntary subordination, which leads to secure civilian control. The heart of his concept is the putative link between professionalism and voluntary subordination. For Huntington, **this was not so much a relationship of cause and effect as it was a definition**: "A highly professional officer corps stands ready to carry out the wishes of any civilian group which secures legitimate authority within the state." (Huntington 1957, pp. 74, 83-84). A professional military obeyed civilian authority. A military that did not obey was not professional.¹⁵ (Emphasis added.)

A second problem with Huntington's approach is the selective choice of data, that of the military as a profession, as the key explanatory variable. "Professionalism," similarly to "culture," is not a fixed or solid fact. The qualities that make up professionalism, identical to culture, are subjective, dynamic, and changing. Indeed, a fundamental goal of the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 was to promote joint professional military education, a goal that has been largely achieved across the US armed forces. The US Congress compelled the military services to educate and utilize their officers jointly and in so doing transformed the culture of the US armed forces, something that Huntington assumed to be largely static. Whether the change of culture has resulted in increased combat effectiveness is a separate issue. Other countries, including Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Spain, are currently changing their professional military education in order to transform the culture of the military. In short, the meaning of military professionalism is not static; it can be, and has been, changed through intentional programs of incentivized education.

In 1962, five years after Huntington published *The Soldier and the State*, Samuel E. Finer, in his book *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics*, criticized Huntington's approach by observing that "professionalism" in and of itself has little meaning, and, "... in fact often thrusts the military into collision with the civil authorities."¹⁶ One has to dissect and analyze "professionalism" to determine its relevance. This is what Alfred Stepan did a decade after Finer, in his classic research on the Brazilian military and the coup of 1964. Stepan coined the term "The New Professionalism," which he described as a new paradigm based on internal security and national development, in contrast with the "old professionalism" of external defense.¹⁷ In complete contradiction to Huntington's theory, Stepan demonstrated empirically that rather than keeping the military out of politics and under civilian control, the new professionalism politicized the military and contributed to role expansion which resulted in military rule in Brazil between 1964 and 1985.¹⁸

More recently, in his 2007 book on the history of the US Army, *The Echo of Battle: The Army's Way of War*, Brian M. Linn raises fundamental questions about the way Huntington simplifies and glosses over major variations in the US military profession.¹⁹ What for Huntington was a unified officer corps in Linn's analysis were in fact several schools of thought and individuals competing for ascendance within the US Army. In explicitly contradicting Huntington's interpretation, Linn states "But as a historical explanation for the evolution of American military thought between 1865 and 1898, the thesis [of Huntington] imposes a false coherence upon an era of confusion and disagreement, of many

wrong turns and mistaken assumptions.”²⁰ The point here is that Huntington defined as largely static and readily identifiable a quality that was in fact dynamic and nebulous. Professionalism, as a static concept, is definitely not a basis on which to build an argument about democratic civilian control of the armed forces.

A third problem in Huntington’s approach is its exclusive focus on control, to the detriment of all other dimensions of civil-military relations. In the introduction to *The Soldier and the State*, he writes,

Previously the primary question was: what pattern of civil-military relations is most compatible with American liberal democratic values? Now this has been supplanted by the more important issue: what pattern of civil-military relations will best maintain the security of the American nation?²¹

Nowhere in the rest of the 534-page book, however, does Huntington return to this issue of military effectiveness. By contrast, he devotes an entire chapter to the topic of control, where he posits the putative objective and subjective models of civilian control of the armed forces. In sum, Huntington’s focus on civil-military relations is exclusively on democratic civilian control.

Similarly, control is the exclusive focus in the overwhelming majority of literature on US civil-military relations. Dale R. Herspring, a respected American expert on strategy, defense, and civil-military relations writes,

As I surveyed the literature on civil-military relations in the United States, I was struck by the constant emphasis on “control.” A common theme was that the United States had to guard against any effort by the American military to assert its will on the rest of the country.²²

In a 1999 review article, Peter Feaver states that,

Although *civil-military relations* is a very broad subject, encompassing the entire range of relationships between the military and civilian society at every level, the field largely focuses on the control or direction of the military by the highest civilian authorities in nation-states.²³

In that publication, and others, he utilizes the concept of *problematique*. Most recently, Feaver, in a review essay of three recent books on civil – military relations emphasizes again and again control. At the beginning of his review he states approvingly

Each of the studies shows that it is possible to offer fresh insights on an issue as enduring as the civil-military *problematique*: how to make the military an effective defender of the state without also making the military a capable threat to the state.²⁴

I am not suggesting that we ignore the importance of democratic civilian control, particularly in newer democracies, but the sole focus on it in the United States is misplaced and distracts from the other dimensions. Furthermore, it is empirically wrong. The US Constitution is the oldest written constitution in the world, and, as Richard Kohn demonstrates, the framers devoted a great deal of attention to the need for a military, how to make the military effective, and how to keep it under control.²⁵ These three points – need, effectiveness, and control, were, and remain, at least for me, the key dimensions of civil-military relations. Better, they should be, but in the US literature, and by the influence of American literature in much of the world, the only issue is control. This seems ludicrous today when most observers of politics in the United States welcomed

the stability provided by Generals Mattis and Kelly to the mercurial President Trump. As Eliot Cohen stated in his testimony to the Senate Armed Services committee in support of General Mattis obtaining the waiver necessary for his becoming Secretary of Defense.

I have sharply criticized President Obama's policies but my concerns pale in comparison with the sense of alarm I feel about the judgment and dispositions of the incoming White House team. In such a setting, there is no question in my mind that a Secretary Mattis would be a stabilizing and moderating force, preventing wildly stupid, dangerous, or illegal things from happening over time, helping to steer American foreign and security policy in a sound and sensible direction.²⁶

The exclusive focus on control, to the neglect of all other possible dimensions of CMR, one of which – effectiveness – is included in my framework described below, can result in a statement such as the following:

The democratic imperative insists that this precedence applies even if civilians are woefully underequipped to understand the technical issues at stake. Regardless of how superior the military view of a situation may be, the civilian view trumps it. Civilians should get what they ask for, even if it is not what they really want. In other words, civilians have a right to be wrong.²⁷

When President Donald Trump bragged about his nuclear button being bigger than Kim Jung-Un's, who he insisted on calling "Little Rocket Man," as he did in early January 2018, before meeting with him on 12 June 2018 and among other things, providing him with "security guarantees," the concern of Eliot Cohen rings true.²⁸

Despite the serious shortcomings of Huntington's *The Soldier and the State* it is still cited extensively and approvingly, mainly but not only in the United States. This cannot be due to its serving as a model for empirical analysis or accuracy. Rather, I believe it has two main reasons: First, as noted by Feaver in the quote above, the US armed forces welcome Huntington's notion of "objective control" as it legitimates them to manage their own affairs; the United States, and other country's armed forces treasure Huntington as his writing gives them a fig leaf to govern themselves; to enjoy autonomy. Second, also noted by Feaver as *prescriptive theory* Huntington's book is normative political theory, an effort to state what should be, and clearly not an empirical study whose findings could be replicated. Unfortunately, the prescriptive or normative dimension pervades most of the US literature on CMR. The result is, as Paul Bracken states

... the study of civil-military relations as it has developed in the United States is that it has petrified into a sort of dogma, so that conceptual innovation and new problem identification earn the reproach of not having applied the theory correctly.²⁹

Security sector reform

Security Sector Reform (SSR) was developed as a reaction to the limitations of CMR in which Huntington was the main proponent.³⁰ Its proponents conceptualize SSR to include, on the one hand, a more comprehensive "security community" in the process of democratization, civil-military relations, and conflict prevention rather than only the traditional armed forces. On the other hand, they also hope to inspire a more thorough understanding of today's security environment.³¹ Proponents of SSR argue that, because human security and development matter as much as defense against external and internal

threats (of both a military and non-military nature), armed forces cannot, alone, deal with these challenges. They further argue that ensuring security requires a collaborative approach among a wider array of military and civilian institutions, which they term the “security sector.”

For its proponents, at a minimum the security sector encompasses all the organizations that have the authority to use, or order the use of force, or the threat of force, to protect the state and its citizens, as well as those civil structures that are responsible for their management and oversight. These include: the military; specialized peace support operation forces; intelligence agencies; justice and law-enforcement institutions; the civilian structures that manage them; and representatives of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the mass media.³² At the maximum, the security sector includes all of the above, plus other militarized non-state groups that play a role, even negative, in security issues, such as guerrillas and liberation armies.

SSR has made conceptual contributions as it fills in some of the gaps in the *normal* concept of CMR, while not specifically dealing with the details of this *normal* concept.

First, the SSR agenda moves away from considering the military to be the sole security provider of a nation, and proposes a broad concept of a uniformed/ non-uniformed “sector” or “community” whose members must work together to achieve security.

Second, it takes into account the interchangeable roles and missions of security sector components. These include, for example, armed forces performing police and diplomatic tasks, as well as social development work, while police and other law-enforcement bodies perform military tasks to safeguard society against external threats, in particular after terrorist attacks. The concept also includes the internationalization of the security agencies (international/multinational peace support operations and/or police forces; international anti-terrorism cooperation among intelligence agencies).

Third, SSR conceptualizations explicitly link security sector reform directly to broader efforts toward democratization, human-rights promotion, conflict prevention, and post-conflict reconstruction. It seeks to connect to wider political, economic, social, and cultural transformations that accompany democratization, as well as taking into account civil society which is expected to be involved in influencing policymaking, violence reduction and conflict prevention.

Problems with the SSR conceptualization

Despite claims that SSR better suits the contemporary security and political environment, it does not even begin to meet minimal requirements for a consistent conceptual framework.

First, there is a total lack of consensus among SSR proponents about what the security sector encompasses. This is a problem since, according to Timothy Edmunds, an early and leading proponent of SSR, if a security sector is too broadly defined it jeopardizes understanding of the security sector and hence what is needed to reform it. For example, to include non-military bodies (such as the health care system) which, although it may undoubtedly play an important role in the provision of a nation’s security, takes us beyond the key responsibility of the security sector which is the legitimate use of force.³³ In addition, conceptualizing the security sector so that it includes all the organizations that use force, whether or not they are part of the government (for instance,

guerrillas and liberation armies) also jeopardizes the utility of SSR as they have no affiliation with the state.³⁴

Second, there is no basic understanding of what SSR stands for, or what its agenda, features, challenges, and effects are.³⁵ In my research on SSR, I have found a huge variety of definitions, at least a dozen, ranging from “the provision of security within the state in an effective and efficient manner, and in the framework of democratic civilian control” to “the transformation of security institutions so that they play an effective, legitimate and democratically accountable role in providing external and internal security for their citizens,” which “requires broad consultation and includes goals such as strengthening civilian control and oversight of the security sector; demilitarization and peace-building; and strengthening the rule of law.”³⁶ In this sense, while the SSR concept has been formally adopted by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and various states in their official foreign policy documents, the ways countries supposedly implement it differ greatly.³⁷ In addition, although several security programs were implemented as part of a SSR agenda, they dealt with only limited SSR components (e.g. police or armed forces reform, including pensions), while not embracing its vaunted holistic characteristics, thus failing to comply with a crucial element of the SSR normative model.³⁸

Third, and most importantly for my purposes in this essay, SSR lacks a consistent conceptualization, which necessarily follows from the diverse definitions. It is instead put forward as either a long “checklist” that countries’ aid agencies need to complete for policy reasons (such as strengthening the armed forces, police, and judicial bodies’ capabilities; improving civilian management and democratic control of the security sector; and promoting respect for human rights and transparency);³⁹ as a “context-dependening” situation (for example, developmental, post-authoritarian or post-conflict);⁴⁰ or as different, but possibly overlapping, “generations” (the first generation of reforms that focuses mainly on control, or the second generation of reforms that includes effectiveness and efficiency).⁴¹ Of all the many conceptualizations we reviewed, the approach Timothy Edmunds proposes is both most useful and similar to what I suggest in this essay.⁴²

In short, while its proponents claim that SSR replaces the standard, in Cohen’s terms, *normal* conceptualization of civil-military relations, in the absence of a basic and consistent conceptualization, it does not suffice. Rather, it is primarily a justification for states’ and international organizations’ development assistance programs, which requires multiple and malleable definitions to support the funding.

Military effectiveness

The burgeoning academic field of military effectiveness is by far the most analytical within the field of civil-military relations, and includes an emphasis on “Big Data.” The main contributors work in the field of International Politics rather than Comparative Politics, let alone the sub-field of civil-military relations. The authors utilize hypotheses and construct variables for measurement of military effectiveness.⁴³ The literature can be divided into arguments about how states choose winnable wars (“selection” arguments) versus arguments about how well states prosecute the wars they fight (“warfighting” arguments). Selection arguments focus on characteristics of a state’s institutions – such as regime type or civil-military relations – that make it good or bad at selecting winnable wars.

Warfighting arguments focus on variables that prevent states from fielding effective military forces or that hinder the performance of those forces on the battlefield. One important argument is that coup-proofed militaries are unlikely to fight well against external opponents given that they are oriented towards providing internal security and systematically purged of capable (and hence threatening, to the leader) officers. Even though the dependent variables in this literature are usually things like war outcomes, battle outcomes, loss-exchange ratios, territory gained/lost, etc., many of the independent variables are not particularly “military.” Two of the most important variables are political regime type (democracy vs. autocracy, and, increasingly differences among various types of non-democracies) and CMR. For example, Risa Brooks’s book *Shaping Strategy*, which uses the level of preference divergence and the balance of power between military and civilian officials to explain “strategic assessment,” the process through which relations between political goals and strategies, and military strategies, are evaluated and decided.⁴⁴ Another is Caitlin Talmadge’s *The Dictator’s Army*, in which she analyzes how leaders prioritize different threats affects how they structure their militaries. Armies that are optimized for coup-prevention are unlikely to be able to fight well against other militaries, for example.⁴⁵ The findings in this literature, however, are not particularly relevant since it focuses on armed conflict, mainly interstate wars, and less than two – dozen countries have in one way or another been engaged in interstate warfare since 1946.⁴⁶

Interstate wars are indeed a rare phenomenon in the post-WWII world – both before and after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Correlates of War Project collects data on four basic types of wars: (I) inter-state wars; (II) extra-state wars (including “colonial wars” and “imperial wars”); (III) intra-state wars (civil wars, regional internal wars and inter-communal wars); and (IV) and non-state wars, conducted by non-state actors.⁴⁷ Of the 655 wars in the period 1816–2007, only 89 were interstate wars; that is, armed conflicts that have had sustained combat involving regular armed forces on both sides and 1000 battle-related fatalities among the states involved. In the period 1946–2007, there were 38 international wars, of which nine – including the US-led invasions of Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003) – were fought after 1989. For instance, the last interstate wars in Latin America were the Chaco War between Bolivia and Peru (1932-1935) and the so-called Football War, a brief war fought between El Salvador and Honduras in 1969. In sub-Saharan Africa, there have been only four interstate wars after 1946.

The problem of methodology

As I reviewed the literature ostensibly on civil-military relations and found it wanting, I had to ask myself how this could be? One would hope that the “facts” would not allow the sub-field to go so wrong. I thus had to examine the “facts;” how we know what we know, and have identified three serious problems in methodology that could impede the development of the sub-field. The first is that there is no quantitative data on the main issues in civil-military relations and even more so for intelligence. That is, the “multilaterals” (including World Bank, International Monetary Fund, Inter-American Development Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, etc.) are not allowed to collect and publish data with regard to military matters. What they would collect, if they could, is of course a further challenge. Therefore, the data that political economists take for granted is simply unavailable. In the conceptual approach I present below, the only

variable on which there is any data at all, defense budgets, is decent when taken from *Jane's Defense Budgets*.⁴⁸ On intelligence this data is mainly unavailable, and when it is available, as in Brazil, it is impossible to know what is included and excluded, making comparisons impossible.

Second is the general lack of survey data that is at all credible. I became aware of this when I was in Mali in 2010 and 2011 which Freedom House listed as “free” with positive ratings, but it was clear to me from interviews with informed civilians and military officers that even before the coup in 2012 Mali was not “free.” Later, I was asked to participate in a global (15 million data points across 173 countries from 1900 until 2012) survey of democracy, which included no variables regarding the armed forces and intelligence. This data is available at <https://www.v-dem.net>. The only credible data I have seen is from the Bertelsmann Transformation Index, found at <https://www.bti-project.org/en/index/> which has been used by Professor Aurel Croissant and his colleagues for a very useful article on control.⁴⁹

Third, as anybody who has ever attempted to develop data bases knows, data in and of itself has to be defined as such by a researcher and given a value, in numerical form. That is, facts do not speak for themselves. The main data bases that I have reviewed, including the Correlates of War (COW) project, are all are susceptible to the critique of Lawrence Freedman regarding not only war, but also the instruments of war – military forces – and even more so the relationship between these forces and civilian decision-makers.

But instead of understanding war as part of the stream of history, so that particular instances could be understood in context, past conflicts were itemized and categorized in an artificial manner in order to facilitate comparisons that only had any validity at a high and often banal level of generality.⁵⁰

I have reviewed eight data bases, many of them used in articles ostensibly dealing with civil-military relations, and find that they may be useful for regime change, including military coups, but do not deal adequately with the military, let alone decision-makers, as actors.⁵¹ There is absolutely nothing that includes different functions and agencies of intelligence in this Big-N data methodology.

Need for a new concept of CMR

For all of the reasons outlined above – a flawed Huntington formulation and single – minded focus on control, SSR that means everything and nothing, military effectiveness which does not capture what most militaries do, and the absence of useful “data” leads me to conclude the need for a reconceptualization of CMR in terms of institutions that provide capacity or capabilities. What contemporary militaries are mainly (with some notable exceptions) involved in are peacekeeping, fighting terrorists and insurgents, supporting civilians in natural and man-made disasters, and military diplomacy. This *is* what they do, or are prepared to do, regardless of what they or the civilians say they are doing.⁵²

Roles and missions

In light of what most militaries really do in most of the world most of the time, we summarize their roles and missions in the following categories:⁵³ combatting insurgents,

countering terrorism, peace keeping, supporting police in countering gangs and organized crime, and military support to civilian authorities in the face of natural or man-made disasters. Later, I will stipulate the minimum requirements for implementing these roles.

For example, even France, that is engaged in armed combat in North Africa, and is a nuclear-armed country, currently has deployed between 7500 and 10,000 troops within the country in support of counter-terrorism missions.⁵⁴ As of June 2017, there were 96,853 military and police personnel from up to 127 countries engaged in peacekeeping operations in 16 (post-) conflict countries. In Afghanistan, from August 2003 to December 2014, the NATO-led, UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) at its height was more than 130,000 strong, with troops from 51 NATO and partner nations. Since January 2015, the non-combat Resolute Support Mission (RSM) is attempting to train, advise and assist Afghan security forces and institutions with 13,576 troops from 39 NATO and partner nations (as of May 2017). Between June 2004 and April 2017, the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) contained 3707 uniformed military and police personnel, mostly from Brazil and other South American nations, who were engaged in various efforts in disaster recovery, reconstruction and stabilization. In many other regions, especially in Central and South America and South and Southeast Asia, military forces either support or, currently in the case of Mexico and Timor-Leste, supplant police forces in operations combating drug-trafficking and street crime.

Further, in countries as different as Bolivia, Colombia, Mexico, Malaysia, Pakistan, and the Philippines, the police fulfill military functions.⁵⁵ Furthermore, since threats span the spectrum from global terrorism, national and international drug cartels, to street gangs, militaries and police forces rely heavily on intelligence agencies to identify threats and plan missions. Finally, especially in South and Southeast Asia, the militaries' roles and missions diversified and expanded over time. Although national defense formally remains the primary function of the armed forces and the depth of their involvement in political and civilian affairs varies among individual countries, many Asian militaries took on a multitude of secondary roles, engaging in commercial activities, local administration, social development and civic action projects, and putting down internal insurrections.⁵⁶

The most obvious common feature of these real, versus rhetorical, roles and missions is that there is no easy way to declare victory; no way to demonstrate military effectiveness. In combatting insurgents, with even the most successful and recent cases being Colombia, Nepal, and Sri Lanka there are long-term political reasons for these insurgencies, if and when negotiations begin they go on and on, there are set backs, and there are severe issues of foreign monitoring and meddling. Like the political dynamics behind them, they are very complicated and confused. In countering terrorism the main challenge is that terrorists have the advantage and if there is not a terrorist incident it cannot be proven whether it was due to military and other security actors' readiness or that the terrorists decided not to strike. With peacekeeping, again there are historical and political reasons for the deployment of military forces under the UN, EU, or NATO, and peacekeepers can help, by separating insurgent forces and providing stability; but "success" however it is defined, is evasive and fleeting. When it comes to providing support to the police and supporting civilians in man-made or natural disasters, criminals will never disappear nor will earthquakes, fires, hurricanes and the like ever be abolished. That is, what all of these roles and missions have in common is that the military are

deployed to deal with a very complicated situations, and success is all but impossible to define let alone achieve.

In my study of intelligence, particularly in the new democracies, we see similarities in the intelligence system with the real (vs. supposed) roles and missions of the military.⁵⁷ That is, intelligence must deal with not only known unknowns but also “unknown unknowns.” Success, should it exist, can generally not be acknowledged, and it is often partial. Further, intelligence has other similarities to military issues. The military and intelligence have the same overall goal – to ensure a state’s security. While secrecy is paramount in intelligence, it also applies to the military, particularly in terms of “operational security” or OPSEC. Access, for outsiders to both the military and intelligence agencies is very difficult, and their operations are opaque at best. In much of the world, and clearly in non-democratic regimes, intelligence was highly militarized, but not necessarily part of the armed forces.⁵⁸ Indeed, even in the United States but for the FBI, all intelligence was under the military until after WWII and the creation of the CIA. Even today, some 80% of the intelligence budget in the United States goes to the agencies within the Department of Defense.⁵⁹

Whereas in the Five Eyes on which there is a huge amount of literature, one can focus on a large variety of issues. However, even in the United States, and clearly necessary in most of the world, intelligence should be seen as a system and not a random assortment of issues including counter-intelligence, covert operations, oversight, etc. From my research the author that most consistently and effectively deals with intelligence, in this case in the United States, as a system is Amy Zegart who looks at both institutions and includes, as necessary, its political dimension.⁶⁰

The requirements

My analytical framework, rather than focusing on results, which the combat effectiveness framework focuses on, or the confusion of the previously discussed frameworks, is to focus on requirements. That is, to determine what is necessary in terms of institutions, for the military to be under democratic civilian control and for it to be effective in the roles and missions that it actually seeks to achieve. And, what is required for an intelligence system to be able to provide accurate and timely information to civilian and military decision-makers. In my experience, particularly in most of the newer democracies, I can readily identify the absence of these institutions. This may not be politically correct, and those in the know are loath to acknowledge these facts, but candor could provide decision-makers, and foreign sponsors with an agenda for action, should they be interested.

It can to be stated bluntly and up front that democratic civilian control of the military, and for that matter intelligence agencies, is easily achieved, should civilians be interested in achieving it (which, for a variety of reasons they may not be). At its simplest, the civilians take control of the budgets and management of personnel; mainly promotions and retirements.⁶¹ However, to achieve effectiveness is extremely difficult, as will become clear from the requirements I identify for countries that strive for effectiveness in different roles and missions. That is, not all good things – democratic civilian control and effectiveness in roles and missions – go together. It is probably for this reason, plus the pernicious influence of Huntington, that the overwhelming focus in newer democracies is on control.⁶² Control is relatively easy to achieve, and is politically correct internationally

and with most international and domestic academics, NGOs, think tanks, and policy-makers.

In what follows I will very briefly describe and discuss the institutional requirements for both democratic civilian control of the military and for an intelligence system that serves the needs of the civilian and military decision-makers.⁶³ My colleague and I have in fact been successful in the application of this framework for both the military and intelligence.⁶⁴ Here I will provide examples of the institutional requirements for both democratic civilian control and effectiveness of both military and intelligence organizations or agencies. These institutions are the core of our conceptual framework. Their presence, and functioning, can be determined through research, as we have done and in most cases published on, in at least 20 countries on four continents.⁶⁵

The requirements control

In order for any control mechanism at all, there must first be a legal basis for that control. This may be found in a constitution, organic laws, or any variety of laws that vary tremendously from country to country. Then, we have found that there are three main institutions that have been developed to provide control by democratically elected civilians over the armed forces and intelligence agencies. The most preferred and immediate means to control the military today is a civilian-led ministry of defense (MOD) in which the democratically elected president or prime minister either appoints on his or her own, or subject to the approval of a legislature, a minister. A real and robust MOD must have power in the areas of budget, personnel, strategy, and policy. For the control of intelligence, the currently preferred institutions are intelligence agencies run by individuals similarly appointed or nominated by the chief executive. In both cases, regarding the military and intelligence, the institutions provide guidance.

One thing is the role of the executive power over the military and intelligence services or agencies. Another thing is to ensure that they are in fact doing what the executive and/or the legislative body intends for them to do. Institutions have thus been created to conduct oversight. In the executive this can be via inspector generals and general counsels. In the legislative bodies it is by means of committee hearings and audits. Very often, both sets, in the executives and the legislatures, they are stimulated by civil society, most often in the form of the media, NGOs, and think tanks. The oversight mechanisms apply to the military, but are even more elaborate in intelligence where there is an even greater emphasis on secrecy than in the military.

While the institutions engaged in guidance and oversight are immediate, another set of institutions seeks to control in advance, through education. There is a great amount of literature on professional military education (PME), the reform of which has been successfully undertaken in not only the United States, but newer democracies such Argentina, and Brazil. And, there is some attention in the literature to the education and training of intelligence professionals. As in much else, the greatest attention, and possibly even advances, has been made in this area of education in the United States.⁶⁶ For example, the National Intelligence University has been accredited as a PME institution, with inspections and audits. However, in other countries, ranging, in our personal experience, from Argentina to Portugal to Romania, the intelligence academies have undergone reform in which the education and training in tradecraft has been married to an emphasis on control and ethics more generally.

Effectiveness

As with control, there are three main requirements for effectiveness.

The first is a policy or plan which defines a goal and the means to achieve it. In most cases in terms of the military and defense there is an understanding of national security policy, objectives, and priorities. It should be noted that in the United States the executive is directed by law to produce annually a national security strategy (although during the George W. Bush and Barak Obama administrations there were only two during eight years). Other important examples of countries that produce national security strategies are Colombia and Australia. Some are more realistic than others. In regard to intelligence, some countries, including the United States and with Brazil the most recent, publish a National Intelligence Strategy. Even in the absence of a published strategy for intelligence, countries might utilize the so-called Intelligence Cycle to define and achieve the information they require for intelligence to be effective. In regard to intelligence cycles, the one we have found most useful is Mark Lowenthal's formulation highlighting a linear process with continual feedback loops.⁶⁷ His concept is clear and amenable to comparison across cases. In his formulation, the intelligence cycle consists of seven steps.⁶⁸

Whereas MODs and the intelligence agencies are designed and utilized to provide democratic civilian control, it has become evident in countries throughout the world that if countries want their militaries to be effective, they complement the civilian – led MODs, which are most often created to ensure control, with military-led joint or general staffs.⁶⁹ At a minimum, these institutions provide a means for mutual education, particularly of senior military to civilian decision-makers so that the latter better understand what is possible. And, in the case of intelligence, national security councils (NSC) at a national level and fusion centers at a lower level, are created to coordinate the collection and dissemination of intelligence.

It is no secret that it requires resources, in the first instance money, which can be converted into personnel, education and training, equipment, and operational expenses for a military to be able to do anything; to be effective. It is in this regard that it is perfectly obvious that most countries are not serious about military effectiveness as they dedicate a very small percentage of GDP or national budgets to national defense and the military. These data are easily found in IISS's Military Balance, Jane's Defense Budgets or SIPRI. With regard to intelligence, with the exception of a few countries (including Brazil) it is virtually impossible to obtain complete information.

In sum, and to reiterate, the focus in this essay and in my approach to analysis is on the institutional requirements for control and effectiveness. In most instances, it is the absence of these institutions which defines if a country is serious, or not. All of these institutions can be identified and evaluated by a competent researcher. The methodology demands that the researcher comes armed with a series of questions, defined by the conceptual framework presented here, and conduct interviews. There is no other, easier, way to obtain the required information.⁷⁰

Conclusion

Maybe it would be best if I finished this essay as I began it, with reference to the two books that stimulated me to write. My point is to insist on the importance of including the military dimension, commonly termed civil-military relations. In reference to Lawrence

Freedman in his *The Future of War* I would call his attention to my 2017 article “Security Providers: Obstacles to Effectiveness in Democracies,” in which I argue that the George W. Bush administration failed in Iraq in large part due to an absence of clear policy and a functional inter-agency process that could coordinate the US effort at what ultimately became nation building. In reference to Levitsky and Ziblatt I would call their attention to my “Challenges in building partner capacity: Civil-military relations in the United States and new Democracies” in which I argue that the challenges in the so-called new democracies to consolidate democracy are radically different from what we face in the United States.⁷¹ In short, and in conclusion, my argument is that the armed forces are a key element of stability, or instability, in a country, and the conceptual framework provided here can assist serious researchers to identify key requirements for the implementation of different roles and missions of both the armed forces and intelligence agencies, mainly, but not only, in newer democracies.

Notes

1. On conceptual frameworks see for example https://www.sagepub.com/sites/default/files/upm-binaries/48274_ch_3.pdf.
2. See in particular Mark M. Lowenthal, *Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy*, 4th ed. (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2009) where he defines, on page 8, intelligence as process, product, and organization. That is, “Intelligence can be thought of as the units that carry out its various functions.” Even more to the point is Amy B. Zegart, *Flawed by Design: The Evolution of the CIA, JCS, and NSC* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999) and *Spying Blind: The CIA, the FBI, and the Origins of 9/11* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007). Obviously, in the US intelligence is so huge and diversified, with 17 different agencies, that the task of evaluating all parts of it is impossible. In newer democracies, however, I believe the task is feasible.
3. New York: Hachette Book Group, 2017.
4. This absence was also noted in the review of Freedman’s book by Mara Karlin in the *H-Diplo/ISSF Roundtable X*, no. 14 (2018): 13.
5. New York: Crown, 2017.
6. The absence of reference to the military is particularly striking in contrast to Juan J. Linz’s treatment of the breakdown of democratic regimes in his classic *Crisis, Breakdown, & Re-equilibration* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978).
7. Here I include myself, especially in my *Patriots for Profit: Contractors and the Military in U.S. National Security* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011), Aurel Croissant and David Kuehn, ed. *Reforming Civil-Military Relations in New Democracies* (Berlin: Springer, 2017), David Pion-Berlin and Rafael Martinez, *Soldiers, Politicians, and Civilians* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017), and Harold Trinkunas, *Crafting Civilian Control of the Military in Venezuela: A Comparative Perspective* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005). We have, however, despite these books and other books and articles leading up to them, yet to win out in scholarly literature. I am hoping that with this essay my approach to CMR, which can also include intelligence, will receive attention.
8. Peter D. Feaver, *Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003), 7.
9. Eliot A. Cohen, *Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime* (New York: The Free Press, 2002), 226. Cohen debunks this “normal” theory throughout his book.
10. The annual Senior Conference, United States Military Academy at West Point, 31 May–2 June 2007. The book from the conference was published in late 2009. See Suzanne C. Nielsen and Don M. Snider, editors, *American Civil-Military Relations: The Soldier and the State in a New Era* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009).

11. Feaver, *Armed Servants*, 38.
12. Here I draw on the very clear and unambiguous description and analysis of Huntington's argument by Ernesto López, 'Latin America: Objective and Subjective Control Revisited', in *Civil-Military Relations in Latin America: New Analytical Perspectives*, ed. David Pion-Berlin (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 90–4.
13. It must be noted that Cohen, in *Supreme Command*, Feaver in *Armed Servants*, and several authors in Nielsen and Snider, ed., *American Civil-Military Relations* find very serious fault with Huntington's formulation. Yet, as Cohen states, it remains the "normal," and dominant, theory in the field. For decades scholars on Latin America have found fault with Huntington's approach. For one of the more recent critiques, with references to earlier critiques, see Ernesto López, 2001, 88–107.
14. Bengt Abrahamsson, *Military Professionalization and Political Power* (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1972), 159.
15. Feaver, *Armed Servants*, 18.
16. Samuel E. Finer, *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics* (New Brunswick: Transaction, 2002. Originally published in 1962), 25–30.
17. Alfred Stepan, 'The New Professionalism', in *Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies, and Future*, ed. Alfred Stepan (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973), see the table, 52.
18. *Ibid.*, 47–65. See also Alfred Stepan, *The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971).
19. Brian McAllister Linn, *The Echo of Battle: The Army's Way of War* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007).
20. *Ibid.*, 41
21. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, 3.
22. Dale R. Herspring, *The Pentagon and the Presidency: Civil-Military Relations from FDR to George W. Bush* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2005), xii.
23. Feaver, 'Civil-Military Relations', *Annual Review of Political Science* 2 (1999): 211.
24. Peter Feaver, 'Civil-Military Relations and Policy: A Sampling of a New Wave of Scholarship', *Journal of Strategic Studies* (2016), 2.
25. As demonstrated in Steven L. Taylor, Matthew S. Shugart, Arend Lijphart, and Bernard Grofman, *A Different Democracy: American Government in a Thirty-One Country Perspective* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014), 64. The US with then 218 years of constitutionalism, has had the same constitution since 1789. And, Richard H. Kohn, in 'The Constitution and National Security: The Intent of the Framers', in *The United States Military Under the Constitution of the United States 1789-1989*, ed. Richard H. Kohn (New York: New York University Press, 1991), 61–94 demonstrates the centrality for the framers of these three issues.
26. Eliot Cohen, 'Civilian Control of the Armed Forces. Testimony Before the Senate Armed Services Committee', 6. https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/download/cohen_01-10-17 (accessed January 10, 2017). See also the testimony by Kathleen H. Hicks, "Statement Before the Senate Armed Services Committee. Civilian Control of the Armed Forces," on the strength of civilian supremacy in the US which is available at <https://defense360.csis.org/examining-new-national-defense-strategy/>
27. Feaver, *Armed Servants*, 6.
28. It is obvious to me that President Trump is attempting to subvert norms of military independence from politics as outlined in Phillip Carter's op-ed 'The Military Is Not a Political Prop', *New York Times*, February 8, 2018. However, President Trump's ploy is equally obvious to all the military officers I know, and in any case they swear an oath to "support and defend the Constitution of the United States," and not the president. For an excellent series of presentations see the Texas National Security Review "Policy Roundtable: Civil-Military Relations Now and Tomorrow," <https://tnsr.org/roundtable/policy-roundtable-civil-military-relations-now-tomorrow/>
29. Paul Bracken, 'Reconsidering Civil-Military Relations', in *U.S. Civil-Military Relations In Crisis or Transition*, ed. Don M. Snider and Miranda A. Carlton-Carew (Washington, D.C.: CSIS, 1995), 146.

30. It is telling that the concept of security sector reform was first put forward to a larger public in a 1998 speech by Clare Short, first Minister for International Development in Britain's newly created (1997) Department for International Development. It also emerged from the development assistance programs conducted by several European donor countries and UN agencies, as well as other international organizations. See Michael Brzoska, 'Development Donors and the Concept of Security Sector Reform', <http://se2.isn.ch/serviceengine/FileContent?serviceID/4DCAF&fileid/4A841CB08-A6E3-5A37-5EF6-5F0E6735CCF7&lng/4en>; and Timothy Edmunds, 'Security Sector Reform: Concepts and Implementation', Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF); http://www.dcaf.ch/cfs/ev_geneva02_papers_edmunds.pdf#search/1/4%22%22SSR%20has%20emerged%20as%20a%20key%20concept%22%22.
31. Mirolsav Hadzic, 'The Concept of Security Sector Reform', in *Internet Sourcebook on Security Sector Reform: Collection of Papers*, ed. Philipp Flluri and Miroslav Hadzic (Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2004), 11–22, <http://www.dcaf.ch/publications/kms/details.cfm?lng/4en&id/419989&nav/1/44>.
32. Hans-Georg Ehrhart and Albrecht Schnabel, *Security Sector Reform and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding* (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2005).
33. Timothy Edmunds, 'Defining Security Sector Reform', in 'Civil–Military Relations and Security Sector Reform in the 21st Century', CMR Network, Issue 3, October 2001, <http://www.bris.ac.uk/Depts/GRC/CMR/CMR%20Network/cmrn3.htm>.
34. *Ibid.* SSR may include non-statutory security force institutions (liberation armies, guerrilla armies, and private security companies); see also Herbert Wulf, 'Security Sector Reform in Developing and Transitional Countries', Bergh of Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, http://www.berghof-handbook.net/uploads/download/dialogue2_wulf.pdf.
35. 'Resource Guide on Security Sector Reform'; <http://www.sfcg.org/programmes/ilr/security1.pdf>.
36. More than a dozen definitions of SSR can be found at the following: Edmunds, 'Security Sector Reform'; 'the efficient and effective provision of state and human security within a framework of democratic governance', David Chutter, 'Understanding Security Sector Reform', *Journal of Security Sector Management* 4, no. 2 (2006), http://72.14.253.104/search?q/4cache:BNwxbDXvrk0J:www.ciaonet.org/olj/jssm/jssm_4_2/jssm_4_2b.pdf p (r)educing p the p size, p budget p and p scope p of p thepsecuritypsectorpandpperformingbitp to p become p more p transparent p and p accountable p to p its p citiz&hl/4en&gl/4us&ct/4clnk&cd/41; Malcolm Chalmers, Christopher Cushing, Luc van de Goor, and Andrew McLean, 'Implementation Framework for Security System Reform (IF-SSR)', DRAFT Document for Discussion at the OECD DAC SSR Practitioner's Workshop, Ghana, December 2005, http://www.africansecurity.org/docs/assn_paper1.pdf#search/1/4%22%22needs%20for%20SSR%20are%20likely%20to%20include%22%22; http://www.iss.co.za/index.php?link_id/431&link_type/412&tmpl_id/42; Special Coordinator of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, Working Table III, Security and Defence Issues, 'Security Sector Reform', Paper for the Regional Conference, Bucharest, 25–26 October 2001, <http://www.stabilitypact.org/reg-conf/011015-ssr.doc>; Michael Brzoska, 'The Concept of Security Sector Reform in Security Sector Reform', BICC Briefing Paper Number 15, Bonn, 2000, 9–11, http://hei.unige.ch/sas/files/portal/issueareas/security/security_pdf/2000_Wulf.pdf; 'Resource Guide on Security Sector Reform' (note 26); <http://www.nisat.org/Small%20Arms%20and%20Development/Obstructing%20Development%20Chapter%204%20SAS.pdf>; 'Security Sector Reform and Governance – Policy and Good Practice', OECD Development Assistance Committee, 2004, www.oecd.org/dataoecd/8/39/31785288.pdf; Greg Hannah, Kevin A. O'Brien and Andrew Rathmell, 'RAND Technical Report on Intelligence and Security Legislation for Security Sector Reform', http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/2005/RAND_TR288.pdf; 'Resource Guide on Security Sector Reform', <http://www.sfcg.org/programmes/ilr/security1.pdf>.

37. Mark Sedra, 'European Approaches to Security Sector Reform: Examining Trends through the Lens of Afghanistan', *European Security* 15, no. 3 (September 2006): 23–38.
38. Ibid. These are called 'partial programs'.
39. Albrecht Schnabel and Hans-Georg Ehrhart, 'Post-Conflict Societies and the Military: Challenges and Problems of Security Sector Reform', in *Security Sector Reform*, ed. Ehrhart and Schnabel (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2005), 7–8.
40. Heiner Hanggi, 'Conceptualising Security Sector Reform and Reconstruction', in *Reform and Reconstruction of the Security Sector*, ed. Alan Bryden and Heiner Hanggi (Geneva: DCAF, 2004), 4–9; http://www.dcaf.ch/publications/bm_ssr_yearbook2004.cfm; and Edmunds, 'Security Sector Reform' (note 20).
41. Timothy Edmunds, 'Security Sector Reform: Concepts and Implementation', Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), http://www.dcaf.ch/cfs/ev_geneva02_papers_edmunds.pdf#search1/4%22%22SSR%20has%20emerged%20as%20a%20key%20concept%22%22.
42. According to Edmunds, 'first generation' refers to the creation of new institutions, structures, and chains of responsibility. 'Second generation' refers to the consolidation of those institutions, while ensuring their effective and efficient functioning, at a sustainable cost for the nation. Timothy Edmunds and Anthony Forster, 'The Second Generation Problematic: Rethinking Democracy and Civil–Military Relations', *Armed Forces and Society* 29, no. 1 (2002). The conceptualization of first and second generation is found in Andrew Cottey. Edmunds' most recent work, in parallel with our approach proposed here, is Timothy Edmunds, *Security Sector Reform in Transforming Societies: Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2008). See also Timothy Edmunds, 'Security Sector Reform', in *The Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relations*, ed. Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei (NY: Routledge, 2013), 48–60.
43. This section draws heavily on information provided to me by Professor Alexander Downes who teaches on the topic of military effectiveness at The George Washington University. In addition, I have validated the main points from reading much of the literature and communications with international relations experts in US academia. See also Allan R. Millett, Williamson Murray, and Kenneth H. Watman, 'The Effectiveness of Military Organizations', in *Military Effectiveness Volume I: The First World War*, ed. Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murray (Boston: Allan & Unwin, 2010).
44. Risa A. Brooks, *Shaping Strategy: The Civil-Military Politics of Strategic Assessment* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008).
45. Caitlin Talmadge, *The Dictator's Army: Battlefield Effectiveness in Authoritarian Regimes* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2015). In this excellent book she analyzes wars between North and South Vietnam and Iran and Iraq.
46. On different roles and missions of the armed forces, which shows that war fighting is undertaken by a very small number of countries, see Paul Shemella, 'The Spectrum of Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces', in *Who Guards the Guardians and How*, ed. Thomas C. Bruneau and Scott D. Tollefson (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2006), 122–44.
47. www.correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/COW-war.
48. *The Military Balance* of the International Institute of Strategic Studies is also of some use.
49. Aurel Croissant, Tanja Eschenauer, and Jil Kamerling, 'Militaries' Roles in Political Regimes: Introducing the PRM Data Set', *European Political Science* (2016).
50. Lawrence Freedman, *The Future of War: A History* (New York: Hachette Book Group, 2017), 123. See also Freedman's rebuttal to Joshua Rovner's review in *H-Diplo/ISSF Roundtable X*, no. 14 (2018): 18–21.
51. In a forthcoming textbook that Aurel Croissant and I are editing we have a chapter by Eschenauer and Kamerling that reviews the data bases.
52. I am pleased to see that several scholars working on CMR in other regions are also focusing on different roles and missions. These include Croissant and Kuehn 2017, Egnell, 2008, Matei, 2013, and Pion-Berlin and Martinez, 2017. See Shemella, 2006 for an enlightening discussing on roles and missions.

53. Ibid.
54. See Rémy Hézec, 'The French Army at a Crossroads', *Parameters* 47, no. 1 (Spring, 2017): 111.
55. On 15 December 2017 the Mexican Congress passed a law that strengthens the military's role in fighting organized crime. See Elisabeth Malkin, 'Mexican Congress Bolsters Military's Role in Drug War, Outraging Critics', *New York Times*, December 16, 2017.
56. Aurel Croissant and David Kuehn, 'Introduction', in *Reforming Civil-Military Relations in New Democracies. Democratic Control and Military Effectiveness in Comparative Perspectives*, ed. Croissant and Kuehn (Heidelberg: Springer, 2017), 1–21.
57. We have argued for a similar approach to the analysis of intelligence to CMR in *Reforming Intelligence: Obstacles to Democratic Control and Effectiveness*, ed. Thomas C. Bruneau and Steven C. Boraz (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2007), xiii–xv.
58. Even in Marxist-Leninist regimes I have found that the intelligence professionals held military ranks.
59. For a recent description of the funds allocated to the intelligence function and the Department of Defense in the US see Michael E. De Vine, 'Intelligence Community Spending: Trends and Issues', Congressional Research Service, June 18, 2018.
60. In addition to the previously cited books – *Flawed by Design* and *Spying Blind*, see as well her *Eyes on Spies: Congress and the United States Intelligence Community* (Stanford, Hoover Institution Press, 2011), and her chapter 'The Fort Hood Terrorist Attack: An Organizational Postmortem of Army and FBI Deficiencies', in *Insider Threats*, ed. Matthew Bunn and Scott D. Sagan (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2016), 42–73. She, like I, uses a new institutionalist approach, as exemplified in the source in note 63 below, which emphasizes politics and institutional continuity.
61. This was the strategy of civilian decision-makers in, and clearly the Kirchners, Nestor and Cristina, between 2003 and December 2015. See Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Crisiana Matei, 'Asserting Civilian Control: Argentina', in Bruneau and Matei, 2013, 151–7, also, in Hungary, where the budget was also used as a cudgel, see Matei, 'The Impact of NATO Membership on Military Effectiveness: Hungary', in Bruneau and Matei 2013.
62. I have dealt with the challenges of achieving military effectiveness in my 'Security Providers: Obstacles to Effectiveness in Democracies', *Democracy and Security* (2017): 1–27. And, as Thomas-Durell Young demonstrates in his recent book, *Anatomy of Post-Communist Defense Institutions: The Mirage of Military Modernity* (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2017), this is also the case in the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe.
63. I follow Peter A. Hall's and Rosemary C.R. Taylor's seminal review article, "Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms." in which they highlight the following themes: First, institutions are understood broadly as "... the formal or informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions embedded in the organizational structure of the polity or political economy." Second, institutions originate from the goals and motivations of the actors that create them, and we live in a world replete with these creations. Third, it must constantly be borne in mind that the process of creating and implementing institutions is all about power, and institutional power relations therefore are a primary concern of both New Institutionalism. Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C. R. Taylor, 'Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms', *Political Studies* XLIV (1996): 938.
64. I consider that the following articles demonstrate the success of the conceptual framework we employ. On CMR see, for example, Thomas C. Bruneau and Scott D. Tollefson, 'Civil-Military Relations in Brazil: A Reassessment', *Journal of Politics in Latin America* 2 (2014): 107–38 and Thomas C. Bruneau, 'Civil-Military Relations in Two 'Third Wave' Democracies: The First and a Follower', in *Reforming Civil-Military Relations in New Democracies: Democratic Control and Military Effectiveness in Comparative Perspectives*, ed. Aurel Croissant and David Kuehn (Berlin: Springer, 2017), 62–82. On intelligence see for example Florina Crisiana Matei and Andres de Castro Garcia, 'Chilean Intelligence After Pinochet: Painstaking Reform of an Inauspicious Legacy', *International Journal of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence* 30 (2017): 340–67; Florina Crisiana Matei, 'Balancing Democratic Civilian Control with Effectiveness of Intelligence in Romania: Lessons Learned and Best/Worst Practices

- Before and After NATO and EU Integration’, *Intelligence and National Security* 29, no. 4 (2014): 619–37; and, Florina Cristiana Matei, ‘The Media’s Role in Intelligence Democratization’, *International Journal of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence* 27 (2014): 73–108.
65. Beginning with Thomas C. Bruneau and Scott D. Tollefson, eds, *Who Guards the Guardians and How: Democratic Civil-Military Relations* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2006), and focusing specifically on intelligence in Thomas C. Bruneau and Steven C. Boraz, ed. *Reforming Intelligence: Obstacles to Democratic Control and Effectiveness* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2007), we more recently published Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei, ed. *The Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relations* (New York: Routledge, 2013) in which we attempt to focus on control and effectiveness vis a vis different roles and missions.
66. See, in this regard, Stephen Marrin and Jonathan D. Clemente, ‘Improving Intelligence Analysis by Looking to the Medical Profession’, *International Journal of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence*, 18 (2005), 707–29 and John A. Gentry, ‘The ‘Professionalization’ of Intelligence Analysis: A Skeptical Perspective’, *International Journal of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence*, 29 (2016): 643–76.
67. Mark M. Lowenthal, *Intelligence from Secrets to Policy*, 364.
68. First, agencies prioritize which problems they will be addressing and the required information they need. Second, intelligence is collected. Third, the gathered data must be processed before it is given to analysts. This may require the data to be converted from a foreign language or decrypted. Fourth, the material needs to be analyzed and developed into reports. Fifth, the parsed information is transferred to stakeholders. Sixth is the use of intelligence by relevant actors to take actions if necessary. And seventh there is a feedback phase where consumers inform the producers of how the knowledge will be used or how the intelligence gathering process can be further targeted and improved upon.
69. For an excellent analysis of how this does not work in East and Central Europe see Thomas-Durell Young, ‘Can NATO’s ‘New’ Allies and Key Partners Exercise National-level Command in Crisis and War’, *Comparative Strategy* 37, no. 1 (2018): 9–21. For an example of how it can work, in the case of Portugal, see Thomas C. Bruneau, ‘Civil-Military Relations in Two “Third Wave” Democracies: The First and a Follower’, in *Reforming Civil-Military Relations in New Democracies: Democratic Control and Military Effectiveness in Comparative Perspectives*, ed. Aurel Croissant and David Kuehn (Berlin: Springer, 2017), 62–82.
70. In some of my writing I have also dealt with the institutions required for efficiency, by which I mean the most output for the least amount of resources. I have argued that the presence of supreme audit institutions, or SAI, such as the GAO in the United States, which “follow the money” are about as far as we can go with the concept of efficiency in civil – military relations since the roles and missions must be defined before efficiency can be assessed. In addition to the website of the international organization of SAI – INTOSAI – I have found the following two books very useful. Roel Janssen, *The Art of the Audit: Eight Remarkable Government Auditors on Stage* (The Netherlands Court of Audit, 2015) and Jacob Sols, *The Reckoning: Financial Accountability and the Rise and Fall of Nations* (New York: Penguin, 2015). While the main focus in Sols’ book is accounting, he also deals to some extent with accountability, which gets us into control in our conceptual framework.
71. *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 26, no. 3 (2015): 429–45.

Disclosure statement

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