A strategic planning process for NATO for the 1990s

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**ABSTRACT**

This thesis deals with the possible shifts in NATO's strategy for the rest of the 1990s. It uses a strategic planning model to explore these possible shifts in strategy. Strategic planning is a systematic process of defining the mission and the objectives and creating action plans, policies and resource allocations to achieve them. Every organization should initiate strategic planning in order to address the evolving needs of its stakeholders. NATO, which was founded as an organization in 1949, has to do the same thing. The general mission of NATO was to protect the freedom and the well-being of its member people. During the period of 1949-1989 NATO faced a massive Soviet threat and so defined objectives and formulated strategies to contain it. NATO's environment has radically changed since 1989. Although the general mission of NATO has not changed, it needs to identify new objectives and formulate new strategies in order to cope with the current and potential threats, and to exploit these opportunities afforded by the new environmental shifts.
A STRATEGIC PLANNING PROCESS
FOR NATO FOR THE 1990s

by

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This thesis deals with the possible shifts in NATO’s strategy for the rest of the 1990s. It uses a strategic planning model to explore these possible shifts in strategy. Strategic planning is a systematic process of defining the mission and the objectives and creating action plans, policies and resource allocations to achieve them. Every organization should initiate strategic planning in order to address the evolving needs of its stakeholders. NATO, which was founded as an organization in 1949, has to do the same thing. The general mission of NATO was to protect the freedom and the well-being of its member people. During the period of 1949-1989 NATO faced a massive Soviet threat and so defined objectives and formulated strategies to contain it. NATO’s environment has radically changed since 1989. Although the general mission of NATO has not changed, it needs to identify new objectives and formulate new strategies in order to cope with the current and potential threats, and to exploit these opportunities afforded by the new environmental shifts.
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I. INTRODUCTION

A. BACKGROUND

The general area of this research covers the changing role of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Specifically the thesis studies the changing political and military environment in Europe, the diminishing Russian threat, instability in former Soviet Union and countries of Eastern Europe, the effects of trouble in other areas such as the Middle East on the Alliance, and the effects of all of these factors on the strategy of NATO. The thesis also summarizes the environment that NATO faced in the past with the strategies developed to manage it.

B. OBJECTIVE

Literature sources on strategy and strategic planning processes are reviewed in order to develop a model and come up with useful tools to facilitate the process. This model then is applied to NATO during its first 40 years in order to illustrate the usefulness of it in the strategic planning of the Alliance. The model is again used to develop a new strategy for NATO in today's circumstances.
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

1. Primary question

As a result of the changing military and political environment in Europe and in other troubled areas, the strategy of NATO must be re-examined. How is the existing strategy likely to change in light of these shifts in NATO's relevant military, political and economic environment?

2. Subsidiary Questions

a. What is strategy and what is a suitable model to formulate strategy?

b. How was the military and political environment when NATO was founded?

c. How did NATO's strategy evolve during its first 40 years?

d. What has happened in the past three years that is relevant to NATO's future?

e. In light of the changes in the environment what should be the new strategy of NATO?

D. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS

1. Scope

This thesis deals with strategy formulation for NATO through a general model for this purpose. It provides a useful model for strategic planning and applies it to NATO. The intention is to familiarize the reader with the strategy development process and show how this process can be applied
to NATO to formulate its strategy in this changing environment.

In the environmental assessments, in-depth political analyses are not presented, since those analyses are outside the scope of this thesis. Only the related information that is essential in the strategy formulation process, is presented. Environmental analyses are confined to the former Soviet Union, the Eastern Europe, the Middle East and the North Africa, since these are the primary places in which the developments have a direct impact on NATO. Other areas which have very little or no impact on NATO are kept outside the research.

2. Limitations

There is a vast amount of literature about strategy and strategic planning. The strategic planning model which is presented here is only one of the models in the literature. This model is chosen due to the characteristics of the organization under study. It is modified somewhat before being applied to NATO.

The cut-off point for the events mentioned in this thesis is March 1992. Events after this date are not mentioned in this study because of the time table for thesis completion.

3. Assumptions

The membership, organization and decision making bodies of NATO are assumed to stay relatively constant in this
study so as to provide a stable framework for examining strategic planning specifically.

E. LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODOLOGY


A broad literature was reviewed to understand the environment during the formative years of NATO and to understand the strategies developed to manage it. This literature includes the books published about this subject and articles in newspapers and the periodicals. Congressional documents were also reviewed. Researcher conducted a serious of interviews with the National Security Affairs Faculty of Naval Postgraduate School to analyze the current environment and forecast the future developments. Those interviewed included Kennedy R. Minnot, former Ambassador, Dr R. Laba a Russian
expert who has spent six months in Russia recently, Kamil T. Said who is a Middle East expert and teaches courses about the region. Newspaper microfilms and periodicals were examined covering the period from 1989 until March 1992. Major periodicals were Time, Newsweek and the Economist and the major newspaper was the New York Times. But, material was also gathered from other periodicals, Rand research reports, books and broadcasting media. Analysis of all these material brought about the current environmental analysis. Possible future developments are subjective and furthermore, the author's judgments. But they are also judgments based on the analyses of the experts and comments in the publications and the broadcasting media and the testimonies of high ranking officials such as the director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff before the congressional committees. The author also gathered a vast amount of material from the publications written by the military and political experts such as the Secretary General of NATO, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, Commander of Allied Forces Southern Europe, Chairman of the Military Committee about the future direction of NATO. The author also examined the press communiques, which summarize the main issues discussed in the North Atlantic Council meetings and released by NATO press service. All these he used to formulate a strategy for NATO.
E. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS

This thesis consists of seven chapters beginning with chapter I which provides an introduction to the subject, objectives of the research, the research questions, the scope, limitations and the assumptions, literature review and methodology and organization of thesis. Chapter II furnishes the reader with useful information about strategy, strategic planning and strategic decisions and presents a model for strategic planning along with some useful tools. This chapter also contains information about NATO’s decision making bodies. Chapter III outlines the NATO’s history through the strategic planning model presented in chapter I. Chapter IV presents the current environmental analysis while chapter V deals with the possible future directions of current events that may affect NATO. In chapter VI, mandates, mission and the strategy of NATO are re-examined and revised. Chapter VII offers conclusions and some recommendations.
II. STRATEGY AND STRATEGIC PLANNING

A. INTRODUCTION

A wise person once said, "If you don't know where you are going, any road will take you there." [Ref. 1:P. 3] The person who first said this may not have realized it at the time, but he or she captured in a nutshell the importance of an organization's strategy. With a well-defined goal and an effective plan to get there, an organization can overcome even the most vexing obstacles to succeed greatly. Without these, however, even the most wealthy and talented organization is likely to fail miserably. The importance of a sound strategy cannot be overstated.

It is also true that sound strategies are not formed by accident. In almost every case, successful strategies are the results of hard work and disciplined investigation, undertaken in a systematic way. Not surprisingly, many methods for developing strategies have been developed by those who study organization science. Many others have used these existing methods to analyze their own organizations. This thesis, a systematic analysis of the evolution and formulation of the strategy of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), falls into the second category.

By examining NATO's past strategies and how they were made, some useful conclusions may be reached regarding NATO's
future strategic planning, especially in today's radically changing environment of Europe.

Before applying the principles of strategic planning to NATO, however, these principles should be defined. In this chapter the terms strategy, strategic decision and strategic planning are defined and a model for strategy formulation is presented. Also some tools and techniques for strategic planning are listed which will later be applied to NATO. In particular, those decision making bodies of NATO responsible for strategy formulation are examined.

B. DEFINITIONS

Strategy is an ancient concept. The word "strategy" comes from the Greek "strategeia", which meant the art or science of military command. Effective army generals knew that leading an army, winning a battle, holding territory, protecting a city from invasion, and destroying the enemy each required a somewhat different plan of action and a different deployment of resources. They developed broad but detailed plans which enabled them to reach their objectives. Developing strategies today works essentially in the same way.

There are several definitions of strategy. According to one, strategy embraces those managerial activities associated with defining a purpose or mission, working out a comprehensive master plan for the organization, marshalling necessary resources, and directing the organization in the pursuit of
chosen goals and objectives. In another, it is the broad program defining and achieving an organization's objectives. Strategy can also be defined as the organization's response to its environment over time, or the pattern or plan that integrates an organization's major goals, policies, and actions into a cohesive whole. A well-formulated strategy helps to marshal and allocate an organization's resources into a unified and viable posture, taking into account its strengths and weaknesses, anticipating changes in its environment and being aware of possible moves by its competitors or opponents.

Each organization should have an effective formal strategy--one that lists the most important goals to be achieved, the most significant policies guiding or limiting action, and the major action sequences or programs to be used to accomplish the defined goals within the limits set. The most effective strategies are developed around a few key concepts and around thrusts, in which the concepts are acted out. Strategies created in this way are more likely to have cohesion, balance and focus. Strategies must deal with the unpredictable and also with the unknowable. The unknowable are those areas which cannot be observed or measured. The parts of a large and complex organization may each have their own strategies in addition to the overall plan, but each of these should be mutually supporting.
Strategic decisions are those which determine the overall direction of an organization and its long-term viability in the presence of change, both predictable and unpredictable. These decisions closely shape the goals of the organization. They define the broad limits within which the organization operates and dictate how resources will be allocated. They also determine the overall effectiveness of the organization; that is, whether it has made good use of the resources available to it.

Strategic planning is a disciplined effort to shape and guide what an organization is, what it does, and why it does it. Strategic planning involves gathering information, exploring alternatives and carefully examining the future implications of present decisions, all on a broad scale. Strategic planning is important, because it helps to develop a clear-cut concept of an organization. This, in turn, makes it possible to formulate the plans and carry out the activities that will bring the organization closer to its goals. Strategic planning also enables managers to prepare for and deal with the rapidly changing environment in which their organization operates.

C. A MODEL FOR STRATEGIC PLANNING

Many models have been developed which describe the process of strategic planning. The following six-part model contains the essential elements of strategic planning for a
In order to develop an effective strategic plan, the organization must:

1. Identify its mandate(s).
2. Clarify its mission and values.
3. Assess its external environment: opportunities and threats.
5. Identify the central issues it faces.
6. Formulate plans to manage the issues.

In the next section, each of these steps will be examined in detail and Figure 1 at the end of the section illustrates the process.

D. EXPLAINING THE MODEL

1. Identifying organizational mandates

The formal and informal mandates placed on the organization are those things it must not fail to do. Formal organizational mandates are usually listed in laws, charters and contracts. Informal mandates are those things that are generally expected of an organization by those with whom it deals. For example, a police force is formally charged with enforcing specific legal statutes but is also expected to support community activities as well. Additionally, in this step those things which the organization must not do are specifically listed. This gives the organization boundaries
within which to work. This is also known as the unconstrained field of action.

There are at least two benefits derived from having clear mandates. First, the organization's goals will not conflict with the basic purposes of the organization. Second, when the people in the organization know the mandates clearly, it becomes more likely that those mandates will be fulfilled.

2. Clarifying organizational mission and values

Peter Drucker said that "without a sense of purpose we are quite literally lost." [Ref. 2:P. 95] The organization's mission provides that sense of purpose. The desired outcomes of this step are a stakeholder analysis and a mission statement.

a. Stakeholder analysis

A stakeholder analysis is a very important step because the success of an organization depends mainly on satisfying those it serves. If an organization does not know who its stakeholders are, then the organization will not be able to decide either where it should be going or what it should do. A stakeholder analysis is a detailed examination of those who benefit from the organization. There are three parts to this analysis. First, the organization identifies exactly who its stakeholders are. Second, it finds out how the stakeholders measure its success. Third, the organization may rank its stakeholders according to their importance.
b. Mission statement

A mission statement contains the distilled essence of the organization's purpose. The statement should answer the following questions.

1. Who are we?
2. What are the basic needs we exist to meet or what are the problems we exist to solve?
3. Specifically, how can we best meet these needs and solve those problems?
4. How can we best satisfy our key stakeholders?
5. What is our philosophy and what are our core values? (We remember that only strategies in harmony with that philosophy and core values are likely to succeed; strategies that are not are likely to fail.)
6. What makes us distinctive or unique? (If there is nothing unique or distinctive about the organization, perhaps it should not exist.)

We will gain a number of benefits from clarifying organization's mission and core values. First, the mission statement draws the attention to the points which are truly important. Second, it clarifies the organization's purpose. Third, explicit attention is given to philosophy and values. An organization which does not understand its philosophy and values is likely to make serious errors in strategy formulation (step 6 of the model). They may choose strategies not consistent with their values and philosophy and as a result may fail.
3. Assessing the external environment: opportunities and threats

Organizations cannot escape being affected by outside forces. In many cases, outside events are so significant that an organization may not survive if it does not prepare for them. Unanticipated threats may doom an organization. Likewise, the cost of missed opportunities may be so great that the organization may be abolished or dismembered by its stakeholders. It is no accident that so much effort is placed by the world's governments into obtaining information.

Organizations should monitor the political, economic, military, social and technological forces and trends in the external environment. When this step is completed the organization should be able to answer the following questions:

1. What major external opportunities do we have?
2. What major external threats do we face?

4. Assessing the internal environment: strengths and weaknesses

This step complements step three. In this step each organization examines its own strengths and weaknesses. Every organization has its own strengths and weaknesses. Since the organizations seek to maximize their strengths and minimize their weaknesses, it is important first to know exactly which are which. Upon completion of this step organization should be able to answer the following questions:

1. What are our major internal strengths?
2. What are our major internal weaknesses?

To answer these questions organizations can monitor resources, current strategy and performance.

5. Identifying the central issues facing an organization

Together the first four elements of the process lead to the fifth, the identification of the central, or strategic issues which address fundamental policy questions. A statement of a strategic issue should contain three elements: first, the issue should be framed as a question that the organization can do something about. If the organization cannot do anything about it, it is not an issue for the organization. Second, the factors that make the issue a fundamental policy question should be listed. The organization should ask, "How does this issue affect our mandates, mission, values, or internal and external environment?" Third, the consequences of failing to address the issue should be defined.

There are a number of benefits from identifying the strategic issues. First, attention is focused on what is truly important. Second, when the issues are well-defined, the answers will address the problem more effectively. Clouded issues can easily create conflict. Third, identifying the issues usually creates the kind of constructive tension necessary to prompt organizational change. Organizations do not change unless they feel a pressure or tension that requires change. Fourth, identifying strategic issues should
provide useful clues about how to resolve these issues. This step therefore is aimed at focusing organization’s attention on what is truly important for its survival and effectiveness.

6. Formulating strategies to manage the issues

The purpose of this step is to create a set of strategies that effectively link the organization and its constituent parts to the external environment. These strategies are articulated in various strategy statements which are also the desired outcome of this step. Typically these strategies will be developed in response to the strategic issues. Upon completion of this step an organization will have a clear picture of how to meet its mandates, fulfill its mission and deal effectively with the situations it faces. The organization will have a clear idea of why it should act, where it is going and how it will get there.

Strategy development begins with identification of the alternatives. Once the alternatives are developed the effectiveness of each should be evaluated. Effectiveness can be measured by two criteria: how realistic the alternative is in terms of the goals and resources of the organization and how well the alternative will help in solving the problem or satisfying the key stakeholders. An alternative may seem logical, but if it cannot be implemented, it is useless. By the same token, if the stakeholders are not satisfied, the problem has not been solved.
Figure 1: Strategic Planning Process
Source: Ref. 2:pp. 50-51
After choosing the alternatives and evaluating them, the alternatives best suited to the organization's capabilities should be selected. An effective strategy must be technically workable, acceptable to key stakeholders and must accord with the organization's philosophy and core values.

E. MODIFYING THE MODEL

As a defensive organization, NATO was formed in response to the external threat posed by the powerful Soviet Union and to the potential internal threat of political disunity, both of which will be examined in Chapter III. Because of this, the mandates and mission of NATO, steps 1 and 2 of the model, cannot be completed until the external threats, internal threats and strategic issues, steps 3 through 5, are defined. Therefore, the mission and mandates of NATO will first be stated in general terms in steps 1 and 2. Next, steps 3 through 5 will be completed. After this, steps 1 and 2 will be revisited. Finally, strategies will be formulated in step 6.

Another approach could have been to renumber the steps of the model to fit precisely the order in which NATO is analyzed, as described above. This is undesirable, since using an application of a model to define that model weakens the model significantly.

Over the course of time, tools have been developed to help when analyzing organizations. The next section describes
one such tool which, by providing a method of looking into the future, will help in implementing steps 3 through 5 of the strategic planning model.

F. FORECASTING

By definition, strategic planning involves looking into the future. Indeed, it is very hard for organizations to produce sound strategies without understanding future events. Forecasting is the systematic process of predicting future trends and events. These are then used to assess the environment in which the organization will operate and to identify the strategic issues which it will face.

There are two types of forecasting, quantitative and qualitative. Quantitative forecasting refers to numerical techniques which operate on "hard" data specific enough to describe accurately the relationships between variables. This data is usually collected or consolidated by specialists from a variety of fields. Like the input, the output or results of quantitative forecasts are numbers which are then interpreted for decision makers. For example, we can forecast the demand for our product in the future by examining the demand figures for previous time periods. Qualitative forecasting, on the other hand, is used when hard data is scarce or is difficult to find. Without numerical data, qualitative forecasting necessarily relies more on subjective judgments than does quantitative forecasting. In this technique the qualities of
intuition, analytical thinking and broad knowledge of the areas involved are very useful.

The end results of forecasting are called alternative futures. An alternative future may be defined as a possible future state of events relating to the planning object. A possible future state of events is one which is feasible or, more simply, reasonable to expect. A planning object is simply the organization being analyzed. For example, a farmers' cooperative may be interested in weather patterns. In this case, the planning object is the farmers' cooperative and a possible future state may be three years of drought. Given this and similar alternative futures, the farmers' cooperative should be able to make more informed decisions.

Different organizations will naturally concentrate their looks into the future in only those areas which are relevant to them. For example, the relevant aspects of the future for a travel agency is quite different from those of a treaty organization like NATO.

There are many known methods of forecasting, such as trend extrapolation, simulation modeling and scenario building. One which is particularly suited to this thesis is the method of scenario building. According to Hermann Kahn,

[Scenarios are] hypothetical sequences of events constructed for the purpose of focusing attention on causal processes and decision points. They answer two kinds of questions: (1) Precisely how might some hypothetical situation come about, step by step? (2) What alternatives exist, for each actor, at each step, for preventing, diverting, or facilitating the process? [Ref. 3:p. 76]
Organizations cannot predict the future with certainty, but by designing a number of plausible future developments they can construct a possible future whose implications can provide insight into present decisions.

Scenarios may be quantitative or qualitative or a mix of both. Under the heading of qualitative scenarios there is an approach termed the Verbal Description of future events. All forecasting done in this thesis uses this approach. Given the complexity of the European military, social, economic and political landscape, this technique is especially attractive because it is so flexible. This flexibility, however, brings with it a limitation that must be recognized: building useful qualitative scenarios using verbal descriptions relies heavily on the judgment and creativity of the individuals involved. Accordingly, to strengthen the effectiveness of this analysis a significant effort has been made to include elements of scenarios already established by military and civilian planners. These can be found in the literature available on this subject and in the references listed in this thesis.

G. NATO'S DECISION MAKING BODIES

This chapter has been devoted to laying the foundation for analyzing how a public or non-profit organization should make strategic decisions. Therefore, a brief description of NATO's four major decision making bodies is in order. Figure
2 at the end of this section illustrates the organization of NATO.

1. North Atlantic Council

The most important decision making forum within the Alliance is the North Atlantic Council, established by the governments of the member states under Article Nine of the treaty. This article sets up the council:

The parties hereby establish a council, in which each of them shall be represented, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this treaty. The council shall be so organized as to be able to meet promptly at any time. The council shall set up such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary; in particular it shall establish immediately a defence committee which shall recommend implementation of articles 3 and 4. [Ref. 4:P. 18]

The Council is the supreme authority of the Atlantic Alliance and is the principal political and consultative body of the alliance. It is responsible to establish general policy, prepare the budget and to formulate the broad political directives used in military planning. The Council meets at three levels: permanent representatives, foreign ministers and heads of state and government.

When the Council meets at the permanent representatives level it is known as the Council in Permanent Session. The representatives have the rank of an ambassador and directly represent their governments. They focus upon the political questions affecting the alliance. The Council also meets twice a year at the foreign minister level. Ministers meet to review the world situation, make decisions and issue
directives for the next six months. The Council only occasion­ally meets, however, at the level of heads of state or government. The heads of state or government meet to make decisions regarding a specific issue or to plan out broad policy.

2. The Defense Planning Committee

The Defense Planning Committee (DPC) makes decisions regarding NATO's integrated defense structure. The DPC is chaired by the Secretary General and is composed of permanent representatives from all those nations participating in the NATO integrated defense structure. The DPC meets at two levels: ministerial and representative. The defense ministers of each country meet twice a year, while the representatives remain in permanent session. All decisions of the DPC are unanimous.

3. The Nuclear Planning Group

The representation of the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) is the same as on the DPC. The NPG also meets at both permanent representative and ministerial levels. Here the Alliance's nuclear policies are reviewed. The council makes recommendations concerning current nuclear defense issues and the alliance's future nuclear defense needs to the DPC.

4. The Military Committee

The Military Committee (MC) is the highest military authority in NATO. It is responsible for the overall conduct of the military affairs of the alliance. It is under the
political authority of the Council and the DPC, which it advises on measures it considers necessary for the common defense of NATO. The Military Committee meets at two levels: the permanent military representative and chief of staff levels. Permanent military representatives are military officers appointed by their respective chiefs of staff, and they form the permanent session of the committee. The chiefs of staff of the member countries meet twice each year.

H. SUMMARY

Organizations must have sound strategies if they are to survive and meet the needs of their key stakeholders. An organization’s strategy contains both its purpose and the ways it can achieve that purpose. The soundest strategies result from a careful and a systematic process, and in this chapter that process has been defined in detail using a six-step strategic planning model. The useful tool of forecasting using qualitative scenarios in the form of verbal descriptions was also examined. Finally, a brief description of NATO’s decision-making bodies is given, which will be useful in Chapter VI.

The following chapter applies this strategic planning model to the formation of NATO and to the challenges it faced in its first forty years.
Figure 2: NATO's Civil and Military Structure
Source: Jane's NATO Handbook, 1989-90, p. 66
III. THE HISTORY OF NATO

A. INTRODUCTION

NATO was founded in 1949 as a response to major external and internal environmental factors which were perceived to threaten the security of Western Europe. The process by which these countries responded is an excellent case study in strategic planning. This chapter, a detailed examination of how NATO was formed and how it responded to its changing environment, will serve to validate the model described in Chapter II. It will show that although NATO planners did not consciously follow this model step by step, their plans included all essential elements of each step.

B. MANDATES AND MISSION (STEPS 1 & 2)

After the end of World War II it soon became apparent that the countries of Western Europe were in real danger from the Soviet Union and its allies. The countries of Western Europe realized that a military and political alliance was needed to enable them to keep their freedom and recover economically from the devastation of the war. The mandates and mission of this new organization would center on deterring any attack on Western Europe and, if attacked, on providing a successful defense.

As mentioned in the last chapter, the mandates and mission of NATO, a defensive organization, cannot be developed
in detail without first describing the internal and external environments and the strategic issues that led to NATO's creation. Accordingly, this general statement of the mandates and mission will be fleshed out after steps 3 through 5 are completed.

C. THE EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT IN 1949 (STEP 3)

The external environmental factors which led to the formation of NATO consisted of the perceived threats and the perceived opportunities the Western nations faced after the end of World War II. There were two main threats: The Soviet threat to Central Europe and the Soviet threat to Northern and Southern Europe.

1. The Soviet threat to Central Europe

On June 6, 1944, British, American and Canadian forces landed in France and opened the long-awaited second front. By the end of the year, France had been liberated and the final preparations for the invasion of Germany itself were underway. On the eastern front, Soviet armies had crossed the border into Germany. At this time several critical issues came to the forefront: the future of Poland and of Eastern Europe, the division of Germany, the role of the Soviet Union in the war against Japan, the coordination of the final assault on Germany and the preparations needed to establish the United Nations. To reach agreement on these issues, the
"Big Three" (Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin) met at Yalta early in 1945. [Ref. 5:p. 34]

Stalin arrived at Yalta with some distinct advantages. By this time Soviet forces were crossing the Oder deeper into Germany and were preparing to launch the final attack on Berlin. The Red Army controlled nearly half of Europe and Tito's pro-Moscow communists dominated Yugoslavia. Stalin's foremost concern was to use these advantages to expand his sphere of control as far as he could. Security through expansion was a principle that had motivated the Kremlin for centuries, and Stalin was no exception. To Stalin and his government, expansion meant control of neighboring countries and control in turn meant that the regimes in those countries must obey Moscow without question. [Ref. 5:pp. 34-38] Thus the security which the Soviets pictured meant not only an extension of their military power westward into the center of Europe but also a radical transformation of the existing social, economic, and political order in the countries under Soviet control. At Yalta and later that year at Potsdam, Stalin assured the allied leaders that he had no ambitions toward Europe. Subsequent events, however, told a different story.

The Kremlin started in earnest the "Sovietization" of Eastern Europe late in 1946. Police action systematically removed opposition parties until elections could safely return large Communist majorities, as occurred in Rumania in November.
1946 and in Poland in January 1947. At home, Soviet theoreticians launched a new doctrinal line in October 1946. They published articles which encouraged Western European socialists and the "proletariat" of other nations to revolt against their governments. [Ref. 6: pp. 41-42] This action of Moscow created an internal threat in the Western European countries, especially in France and Italy where the Communist parties were powerful. France and Italy saw that unless they acted to prevent it, the events in Rumania and Poland could be repeated in their own lands. That was, in fact, what Stalin hoped to see. The Soviets also directly helped the communists in the Greek civil war, threatened Turkey by demanding territory and caused a similar crisis in Iran in the same year. All three of these events will be examined closely in the next section when the threat to Southern Europe is examined.

Early in 1947 the Soviet Union signed nonaggression treaties with Italy, Finland, Hungary and Romania. However, the Soviet government immediately began to ignore the provisions which guaranteed a democratic process in these countries and moved to strengthen its hold in Eastern Europe. Stalin pursued his principal political and strategic objectives in Eastern Europe with a singleness of purpose. He sought to eliminate all Western influence from the area and to establish Soviet hegemony. These 1947 treaties legalized most of Stalin's territorial acquisitions in Eastern Europe: from Finland, the ice-free port of Petsoma and territory which
expanded the Soviet frontier to Norway; from Poland, 70,000 square miles of eastern territory; from Czechoslovakia, the province of Ruthenia; and from Romania, northern Bukovina and Besarabia. These territorial acquisitions extended the "legal" borders of the Soviet Union westward to include the areas under Soviet control. Also the Soviet annexation of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania gave it control of the eastern shore of the Baltic Sea. [Ref. 5:p. 45] In June 1947 the Soviet Union imposed a communist government in Hungary, a country where relatively free elections had been held less than two years before in the fall of 1945. U.S President Henry Truman expressed his feelings about Hungary in a press conference by saying, "I think it is an outrage. The Hungarian situation is a terrible one." [Ref. 7:p. 190] In Hungary as in the rest of Eastern Europe, Stalin further consolidated his power.

On June 5, 1947, Secretary of State George C. Marshall spoke at Harvard University and expressed America's willingness to help rebuild Europe, inviting the European nations to draw up a list of their needs. Under the leadership of British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin and French Foreign Minister George Bidault, a conference of all the European nations, including the Soviet Union, was convened in Paris on June 27. Two days later, Moscow unexpectedly issued a statement denouncing the conference and its proposals. By July 2, Moscow had withdrawn from the conference and forced
all the East European countries to follow suit. [Ref. 5:p. 52]

After its departure from the Paris conference Moscow initiated a series of moves to tighten Soviet control within the East Bloc. In response to the Marshall plan, Moscow established the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) in June 1947. The purpose of the Cominform was to consolidate control of Eastern Europe and to prevent the Eastern European countries from joining the Marshall plan. Large amounts of Soviet aid began to flow into Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria to push ahead with industrialization and to increase Soviet authority.

In February 1948 Czechoslovakia fell to the communists. In the 1946 Czech elections the Communist Party had obtained 38 percent of the vote, the largest percentage of any party. A coalition government had then been formed in the country. Through 1947 the Czech government had tried to maintain a balance between East and West, remaining keenly interested in the Marshall Plan but at the same time bending to pressure from Moscow. The Cominform had instructed Czech communists to secure their power by eliminating the other independent parties. In mid-February Soviet armies began camping on the Czech border. The cabinet broke up and the communist leader issued an ultimatum for a new government which would be under his exclusive control. When the Czech president resisted, a Soviet mission led by top Foreign Ministry officials flew to Prague to demand that the president
withdraw his opposition. The president was unable to resist their efforts and on February 25 signed over control of the government to the communists. Truman described the sentiment of the West, saying, "this coup sent a shock throughout the civilized world." [Ref. 6:p. 64] Furthermore, after devouring Hungary and Czechoslovakia, Moscow's appetite for more conquest seemed greater than ever. A critical question loomed before the West: where will the Soviets stop? A telegram sent from General Clay to Washington D.C. at this time illustrates this tension:

I have felt and held that war was unlikely for at least ten years. Within the last few weeks, I have felt a subtle change in Soviet attitude which . . . gives me a feeling that it may come with dramatic suddenness. [Ref. 8:p. 378]

Later that year another crisis occurred. On June 24, the Soviet Union imposed a blockade on the Western sectors of Berlin, which lay 110 miles inside the Soviet zone of Germany. By doing this they hoped to gain prestige for the communist cause in the world and especially in Western Europe and to increase their control over Germany. The blockade was eventually lifted in May 1949 when it became apparent that it had failed to achieve these goals. But Moscow's efforts continued: in October 1949 Moscow set up the German Democratic Republic (GDR) as a response to the establishment of the Federal Republic of Germany in the Western zone in May 1949.

Even as Moscow continued to flex its political muscles the Soviet Union was also becoming a formidable
military power. In May 1948 the New York Times published a summary of a report written by General Sibert, The Assistant Director of the Washington D.C.-based Central Intelligence Group. This article illustrated the growing Soviet military might:

The Soviet Union spent more than $1,225,000,000 on atom bomb development and other military research in 1947 . . . [and] laid out at least $9,000,000,000 in 1947 for new equipment. The USSR kept more than 500 German scientists at work on guided missiles and other new weapons, among them a new tank which probably is the largest ever built . . . . [Soviet] demobilization was on a systematic and selective basis, with basic infantrymen quickly released while technicians and armored force troops were retained. The result gave the Soviet Union an army with special skill in armored warfare. [Ref. 9:p. A-19]

Hanson W. Baldwin made a similar assessment in the New York Times in March 1949:

Russia is the greatest land power in the world, and all of Europe can be reached by land. The Soviet States maintain a peacetime army built around the structure of 180 to 200 divisions, although many of these divisions are cadre only. To this huge army must be added the conscript masses of the satellite powers, forces which are more distinguished by quantity than quality, but which probably add the equivalent of some 90 divisions. [Ref. 10:p. E-5]

This force was huge compared to the total militaries of the Western European countries and would have been hard to resist. The situation worsened when in September 1949 the Soviet Union exploded their first atomic bomb. The Western countries had never equaled the Soviet Union in terms of conventional forces but it was thought that Washington's monopoly over the atomic bomb would deter Moscow from taking advantage of its numerical superiority. Now this possibility
was fading. In 1949 free Europe lay in the shadow of a huge Soviet threat. The Soviets had placed themselves in a position to overrun Europe with ease.

2. The Soviet threat to Northern and Southern Europe

In late 1945 the Soviet government informed Turkey, which had remained neutral throughout most of the war, that it would not renew the 1925 treaty of neutrality and nonaggression when it expired on November 7, 1945. As the price for a new treaty, Moscow insisted on the return of Turkey's northeastern districts of Kars and Ardahan. These districts had been taken from the Ottoman Empire by Russia in 1877 but given back by the Bolsheviks in 1918 in the Treaty of BireskLitovsk. Their return to Turkey had also been reaffirmed in the Soviet-Turkish treaty of 1921. Now, however, Moscow wanted them back and also demanded military bases in two areas of Turkey: the Turkish Straits, the maritime link between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean Sea, and on the Aegean Sea at the port of Dedeağaç (pronounced deh-DEH-ah-ahtch), which is in the European part of Turkey near the Greek port of Alexandroupolis. Turkey had presented no threat to the USSR, but the Soviets continued to apply intense pressure to Turkey by diplomatic means and by sharp propaganda, both accompanied by the massing of Soviet troops on the Turkish border. [Ref. 5:pp. 41-42]

The Soviets began pressuring Iran similarly. Iran had been occupied by the Soviet Union and Britain during the
war in order to safeguard the flow of supplies to the Soviet Union. When the war ended, however, Soviet troops did not evacuate Iran as Moscow had promised. During their occupation, the Soviets had strengthened the local Communist Party named Tudeh. In December 1945, the Soviets announced the creation of several new communist governments in Northern Iran. Iranian troops trying to enter the northern provinces of Iran were resisted by the Soviet troops still occupying them. American and United Nations efforts to solve the problem were rejected by the Soviets. This crisis continued until late 1946 when the Soviets finally evacuated Iran. Soviet forces remained, however, on the Iranian border. [Ref. 5:p. 43]

During this time a communist rebellion was in progress in Greece. The Soviets, through the other Balkan communist countries, supported the rebellion forces. If the communists were to succeed, the Soviets would dominate all of the Balkans and in turn be control the Mediterranean.

There was also a Soviet threat to the Scandinavian countries of Northern Europe. In March 1948, Finland's president received an ominous letter from Stalin. In this letter Stalin wrote:

I assume that Finland, not less than Rumania and Hungary, is interested in a pact of mutual assistance with the USSR against possible German aggression . . . . Wishing to establish conditions for a radical improvement in the relations between our countries, . . . the Soviet government proposes the conclusion of a Soviet-Finnish pact. [Ref. 11:p. 29]
Finns who remembered recent events in Prague correctly guessed what Stalin meant by "conditions for radical improvement." According to the proposed treaty Moscow would decide when Soviet troops were needed in Finland to "protect" that country. It was not clear, however, exactly whom they would be defending Finland against. Germany was under occupation and Norway and Sweden showed not even the slightest intention to attack. The Soviet plan of action in Finland was the same as it was in Eastern European countries: move troops into the country, strengthen the local communists, help to seize power and then consolidate the country under Soviet control. The Soviet-controlled press at work on Finland attacked Norway and Sweden in the same way. [Ref. 11:p. 29]

All of these developments heightened fears in Western circles that Soviet aims were not limited to Central and Eastern Europe. Few in the free countries could sympathize with Moscow's stated desire for "security". Moscow's demands and territorial gains had clearly exceeded its security needs and in fact had exceeded even the czars' ambitions. The free countries concluded that the Soviets' real intention was to dominate Europe and impose its regime by destroying the democratic process. From its very early days the Soviet regime had been oriented toward worldwide domination; now after the war it was finally in a position to put thirty years of planning to profitable use. Stalin had never sensed so great an opportunity to expand his control as that afforded by
the postwar conditions in Western Europe. He held half of Europe and the other half of the continent lay unexpectedly before him, politically demoralized, economically devastated, militarily defenseless. The hunting would be better and safer than even he had anticipated.

3. Opportunities for the West

Stalin was not the only one who saw opportunity in these circumstances. Stalin's threat gave the Western European countries themselves an unexpected one: the eager involvement of the United States. Isolationism, formed in part to prevent the U.S. entering into onerous alliances with the European countries, had been the American foreign policy since 1826. However, in the face of the massive Soviet threat, the U.S abandoned this policy and committed its resources to the recovery and the defense of the non-communist European countries. President Truman announced the new policy:

It must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities and outside pressures.

One of the primary objectives of the foreign policy of the United States is the creation of conditions in which we and other nations will be able to work out a way of life free from coercion . . . . The seeds of totalitarian regimes are nurtured by misery and want. They spread and grow in the evil soil of poverty and strife. They reach their full growth when the hope of a people for a better life has died. We must keep that hope alive. [Ref. 12: pp. 178-180]

The U.S. Congress readily approved the policy, and aid to non-communist European countries started immediately.
A second opportunity for Western Europe lay in the Soviets' political and economic weaknesses. Economically, the Soviet bloc had not been able to recover as quickly as it had hoped. The shortage of capital equipment both in the Soviet Union and in the satellite nations was a serious handicap. Russian oil and steel production was still less than prewar levels. So even while attacking the Marshall Plan, the Kremlin was seeking to increase trade with the West. When possible, Moscow signed trade agreements with the Western countries and tried to obtain machines, machine tools and heavy equipment to ease its economic problems. Politically, the Soviet Union also suffered the adverse effects of its own policies of oppression at home. The thought of war was as terrifying to the ordinary Russian as it was to a citizen of any other country. As a result the Soviet peoples' nerves were on edge. Also, the forceful establishment of communist regimes in the satellite countries was bitterly resented by the people of these countries, creating a powerful hatred of Russia. [Ref. 13:p. E-3] By increasing rate of their own economic growth and deliberately leaving the Soviet Union to deal with its own problems, the Western countries hoped to build an economic and strategic "buffer" as their modernization would slowly leave the Soviets behind.

In a few other matters the Soviets were equally unsuccessful. In Greece, despite the continuation of the devastating civil war, with Western help the Greek non-
communists were resisting the communists successfully. In Italy the communists did not get as many votes as they had hoped and Western ideology was on the increase. When the Soviets put pressure on Turkey, the U.S. reinforced the American naval presence including a marine force which had been sailing in the Mediterranean, and deployed the USS Franklin D. Roosevelt, the most powerful American aircraft carrier, to the area. These moves caused the Soviets to ease their pressure on Turkey considerably. Also during the Berlin blockade, an airlift was started by the West and continued resolutely without any sign of weakening. When Stalin saw that the blockade accomplished nothing and only endangered his forces he lifted it. These setbacks for the Kremlin presented opportunities to the West, for they showed that with resolve and unity the non-communist countries could stop Soviet expansion.

D. THE INTERNAL ENVIRONMENT IN 1949 (STEP 4)

The internal conditions of the Western European countries also give insight to the questions of why and how NATO was formed. These conditions, collectively termed the internal environment, are made up of the strengths and the weaknesses of the Western countries during the postwar era.

1. Internal strengths of the Western countries

U.S. aid gradually increased the economic and military strength of the non-communist European countries.
Two purposes of American aid were to build up Greece and Turkey and to give relief to the peoples of the other countries devastated by the war. This aid helped them to reconstruct their economies. The U.S. also stood ready to support Western Europe militarily, particularly with its tremendous strategic bombing capability. It could launch air assaults into the Soviet Union with both conventional and nuclear weapons. Although the Soviets knew how to make nuclear weapons, the U.S. was still the only power that could deliver them effectively. Besides the U.S., Britain's Royal Air Force did have a limited offensive capacity outside the British Isles in addition to their considerable defensive strength. The Western countries also had the advantage at sea. Beyond this, another major strength of the Western countries was their unity. The Western countries were resolved to stick together no matter what happened. This cohesiveness gave them the strength to act decisively. They formed the West European Union in 1948 and eventually signed the North Atlantic Treaty which linked both sides of the Atlantic Ocean. The North Atlantic countries thus formed a stout barrier to Soviet expansion.

2. Internal weaknesses of the Western countries

In 1945 Europe was a wasteland. It is estimated that the war claimed the lives of 35 million people and displaced 50 million more. The material damage was catastrophic as well. Nearly 1700 cities were destroyed, communications were
almost completely disrupted and production facilities were destroyed. [Ref. 14:p. 3] The countries of Western Europe--England, France, the low countries of Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg, Italy and Germany--could not by themselves recover from this devastation quickly enough to resist Soviet expansion. There was not even enough food to provide a basic diet in any of these countries. Further, industrial production was too scant to earn foreign currency to supply these countries' vital needs. And in all but Britain, there were strong communist parties which exercised significant authority and were in a position to exploit the situation. [Ref. 15:p. E-1]

Militarily the situation looked equally poor. The West could field only 12 divisions and most of these were poorly equipped and poorly trained. They were deployed not for defense, but for occupation. They lacked armor and the supply, engineer, and heavy artillery forces which give an army its mobility and striking ability. There were few prepared defensive positions and not enough ammunition in the whole theater to last more than a few weeks. Supply lines for both the British and the Americans ran not perpendicular to the front but parallel to it, an undesirable strategic situation. Further, there were not enough airfields in the proper positions to support tactical air operations. [Ref. 16:pp. 14-15]
The approach that planners took toward these problems could today be described as scenario building, resulting in alternative futures. This is how the environment may possibly change in the future. Three of these scenarios were particularly important.

The first alternative future was a scenario where the Soviets would mount a simultaneous attack on Central, Southern and Northern Europe. Given the massive land forces of the Soviet Union and its satellites described in the last section, this presented a grave threat to Western Europe. The scenario was envisioned as follows: the Soviets would begin by invading Central Europe. Western troops would form a defensive line on the Rhine River, but with only twelve divisions would probably be unable to hold it, especially since the Soviets forces' center of gravity would lie on this axis. Although the creaking Soviet economy would not be able to support as great a war production as the United States, the Red Army would attempt, by moving west only a few hundred miles from its present position, to crush the Western defense line and engulf West Germany, the world's greatest potential war production center outside the U.S. They would simultaneously launch an attack towards the Turkish straits, thereby dominating the Mediterranean and ultimately part of the Atlantic Ocean by means of the Soviet Navy. In these areas they would attack vulnerable lines of communications and, by overwhelming Iran,
would reach the oil-producing areas of the Middle East. They would also launch air attacks against the British Isles in order to prevent the United Kingdom from being used as an effective allied base of operations. The Soviet Union might also be able to prevent any allied "Normandy type" amphibious operations intended to force a reentry into the continent of Europe. After completing the initial campaigns and consolidating its positions in the Western Europe, the Soviet Union would then conduct simultaneous full-scale air and limited sea operations against the British Isles and invade the Iberian and Scandinavian peninsulas. Soviet forces would also conduct an airborne operation in Alaska. Using air bases in Alaska, Soviet bombers would be within striking range of the huge U.S. industrial areas in and around Detroit. Even without Alaska, the Soviet position in the Kurils and Sakhalin Islands put them in a position to bomb much of the Western U.S., including the nuclear weapons production plant at Hanford, Washington.

A quantitative forecast was also conducted at that time. According to that forecast the Soviet Union was projected to have the following numbers of atomic weapons in the years indicated:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Atomic Weapons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>By mid-1950</td>
<td>10-20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By mid-1951</td>
<td>25-45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By mid-1952</td>
<td>45-90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By mid-1953</td>
<td>70-135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By mid-1954</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Soviet Union was also developing aircraft able to deliver these atomic bombs. When the Soviet Union’s atomic stockpile
increased, it would be able to damage the Allied cause in three significant ways: laying waste the British Isles, thus depriving the Western Powers of their forward base; destroying the vital centers of Western Europe and its communications, thus preventing effective defense by the Western powers; and delivering devastating attacks on certain vital centers of the United States and Canada.

The second scenario was the domination of Italy by the Communist Party and the deployment of Soviet troops to that country. Soviet control of Italy would mean that Soviet aircraft and submarines could hinder and even deny to the U.S. access to North Africa, Turkey and Syria. These areas would be critically needed as bases for the U.S. to mount an air attack on the Russian heartland. Deeper bases in Saudi Arabia, the Sudan and Kenya would also be menaced by a communist Italy.

The third scenario saw the Soviet Union stirring up the Arab countries against the West, thereby disrupting the all-important flow of oil to Western Europe and the U.S. [Note: these scenarios adapted from Refs 17 and 18]

F. THE STRATEGIC ISSUES (STEP 5)

Based on the analysis of the present and future environments above, two strategic issues remained paramount. These were the same as the ones first identified as NATO’s mandates and mission.
The first strategic issue these countries faced was how to defeat a Soviet attack and defend their territory successfully. If an organization was to be formed, its main objectives, then, must be to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of the peoples of these countries and to develop plans to take joint military action if necessary. Failure to address this issue could mean the overrunning the Western territory by the Soviet forces and the resulting destruction of the Western institutions.

The second strategic issue was perhaps even more important: how to deter the Soviets from attacking in the first place. One of the most important tasks of the organization would be to create a powerful deterrent to any nation or group of nations threatening Western Europe. Stability and well-being in Western Europe could only be achieved by capable deterrence. If war occurred, this objective was lost; Western Europe could not afford another war.

G. MANDATES REVISITED (STEP 1 COMPLETED)

All of these factors brought first twelve, then sixteen, nations together to pledge their efforts toward collective defense and toward the preservation of peace and security. These ideas at last took shape in the North Atlantic Treaty, signed on April 4, 1949, in Washington D.C. By establishing clear mandates, objectives and principles, the treaty laid the
foundation for the strategic planning which followed. In Article 1, the treaty states this overtly:

The parties undertake, as set forth in the charter of the United Nations, to settle any international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. [Ref. 4:p.17]

From the start NATO's mandate has been clearly defensive: NATO will go to war only if attacked, and then only after peaceful means proved insufficient. Article 6 codifies this:

An armed attack on one or more of the parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the territory of any of the parties in Europe and North America . . . or on the vessels or aircraft in this area of any of the Parties. [Ref. 4:p. 18]

This article draws the boundaries of the area in which NATO can act and reiterates that NATO will act only if an attack is made against one or more of its members. The mandate is even more fully defined in Article 7:

This Treaty does not affect, and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations under the charter of the parties which are members of the United Nations, or the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security. [Ref. 4:p. 18]

According to this article parties must obey the principles of the United Nations and are not authorized to assume the responsibilities of the U.N. Security Council.
H. MISSION REVISITED (STEP 2 COMPLETED)

Likewise, NATO’s mission, though not overtly stated, was clearly implied. First, the elements of a stakeholder analysis were completed. By default the member countries and their populations were the main stakeholders, since their peace and prosperity, even their very existence, depended on the success of NATO to deter war or to win if deterrence failed. The stakeholders had just endured a terrible war and they saw success as peace and freedom while seeing failure as war or foreign domination. NATO’s mission was to bring about the hopes of these stakeholders.

While the founders of the Alliance did not create an official mission statement for NATO, if they had written one it might have read as follows (The reader may find it helpful to refer to the elements of the mission statement in Chapter II, section D):

The parties agree to this North Atlantic Treaty. The treaty exists to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. The organization will achieve this by coordinating, in time of peace, member nations' military and economic strengths in order to create a powerful deterrent to any nation or group of nations threatening them. The organization will develop plans for war, which will provide for the combined employment of military forces available to the Alliance nations to counter enemy threats and to defend and maintain the peoples and home territories of the Alliance nations. Members will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence, or security of the parties is threatened. Our aim is to promote the stability and the well-being of the Alliance area.
Members will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, and by bringing about better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded.

An armed attack on one or more of them shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently, if such an armed attack occurs, all parties will assist the party or the parties attacked including the use of armed forces if necessary to restore and maintain the security of the Alliance area.

This treaty broke new ground. Never before had both sides of Atlantic pledged themselves to cooperate in peace and war. Thus, NATO filled a unique role which benefited all its stakeholders. [Note: this mission statement adapted from Refs 4 and 19]

I. THE STRATEGIES TO MANAGE THE ISSUES (STEP 6)

In order to manage the strategic issues mentioned above NATO planners developed three defense plans: the Short-Term Defense Plan, the Medium-Term Plan and the Long-Term or Requirements Plan.

The Short-Term Plan was an emergency plan whose purpose was principally to save as many troops as possible in the event of a sudden war. It assigned withdrawal routes and gave authority to commandeer ships in British and Allied ports to be used for evacuation. This was the plan for the immediate future, the period in which the Allied troops would remain badly outnumbered on the ground. [Ref. 16:p 14]

The Medium-Term Defense Plan looked forward to the day when the allies would have enough troops to perform both
logistical back-up and to deploy in combat in the front lines. The first task therefore was to improve the logistical infrastructure by shifting the supply lines perpendicular to the front, building new airfields in the proper tactical positions, establishing supply dumps and hospitals, and fleshing out the corps and army supporting troops. When these steps were complete, the NATO forces could be redeployed to positions from which they would move to battle and offer a credible fight, even before they reached full strength. What planners envisioned was a withdrawal behind a screen of mechanized cavalry units to positions behind the Rhine, since, if war came during this interim period there was still little chance of holding at the Rhine. [Ref. 16:pp. 14-15] Whereas the Short-Term Plan was one of rapid evacuation, the Medium-Term Plan involved an orderly fighting retreat.

The Long-Term Plan was a requirement-driven one, in other words an analysis of the forces required to defend Europe in a major war without needing to retreat. There were three different requirements to be considered. First, forces were needed to cover the major approaches. Second, forces were required which could screen the intervening areas between the approaches. Third, a reserve had to be provided of roughly one-third of the total force. Calculations were made for the whole front and the result was 96 divisions. These recommendations were officially approved at the Lisbon meeting of the North Atlantic Council in 1952. Even as they voted, most of
the members knew that there was only one way for NATO to reach this number—by rearming Germany. Most European countries were very reluctant to do this, but the communist attack on South Korea convinced them that the Soviets were eager to use military force to achieve their ambitions. Accordingly, they decided to rebuild Germany’s military force within the context of NATO. Although this decision was made in 1950, pressure from France and a few other member countries delayed Germany’s membership in NATO until 1954.

The addition of Germany in NATO would allow them to raise additional divisions, but there were two more critical needs. First, a new infrastructure would have to be built including headquarters, communication networks, airfields, fuel pipelines, radar stations, and port facilities, all of which stand behind a modern army. Second, a doctrine acceptable to the front-line states of Germany, Denmark and The Netherlands. Understandably, these countries would have little incentive to fight if NATO plans included withdrawing from all but the extreme western parts of their countries. The answer to this concern was the concept of "forward defense." This was a promise to the Germany, Denmark and the Netherlands to hold the line at the Rhine, or as far east as possible. A further reason for forward defense was that with the advent of the atomic bomb it would be hard to conduct Normandy-type landings to liberate Europe again. Therefore, the enemy invasion would have to be stopped short of complete occupa-
tion. [Ref. 16:pp. 15-19] This forward conventional defense, with 96 divisions positioned as far east as possible, was the main NATO strategy for managing the strategic issues during the early 1950s.

J. MODIFIED STRATEGIES RESULTING FROM ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGES

By 1954 it became apparent that with even Turkey, Greece and the Federal Republic of Germany as members of NATO it would be impossible for the alliance, given the economic strength and political will it had at the time, to reach these force goals. Excessive military expenditures by the alliance countries could endanger their economies and achieve for the Kremlin its objective of destroying the West through economic collapse. [Ref. 14:p. 59] Thus the two main weaknesses of the Alliance, besides its continuing numerical inferiority to the East Bloc ground forces, were economic and political. At the same time, however, the United States was strengthening NATO by rapidly expanding its own nuclear capability beyond its modest stockpile of first generation atomic bombs. The availability of smaller, more efficient nuclear weapons, the development of the hydrogen bomb and the existence of long-range bombers able to deliver these weapons deep into Soviet territory constituted a major strength of the Alliance. [Ref. 20:pp. 3-4] Although the threat remained the same, the death of Stalin and the Soviet Union's lack of a comparable long-range effective nuclear capability created an opportunity for
NATO. It could catch up more quickly to the East as Moscow's expansionism waned and the Alliance enjoyed a large nuclear advantage.

Taking into account the new internal and external environmental factors mentioned above, the new primary strategic issue became how to maintain and improve the deterrent and defensive strength of the Alliance at a more manageable cost.

The planners formulated the "massive retaliation" strategy to manage this issue. Ministers in 1954 accepted that the future strategy of the Alliance would depend on nuclear weapons and so reduced the requirement for the number of first-line divisions from 96 to 30. [Ref. 20:p. 5] Under this new strategy member nations would not have to maintain conventional forces at a politically and economically unrealistic level. The basic idea of the strategy was that an attack on NATO's territory would be met with a worldwide full-scale nuclear war in which the Soviet Union receive incalculable damage. This would make any move on Europe so costly that the aggressor would never attempt it. U.S Secretary of State John F. Dulles announced this new strategy, saying, "We will seek to deter the Soviet aggression by having a great capacity to retaliate instantly, by means and at places of our own choosing." [Ref. 20:p. 4] In December 1956 massive retaliation became NATO's official strategy. The role of NATO's reduced ground force was to hold the line as far forward as
possible until the massive nuclear retaliation could take place. [Ref. 20:p. 5]

In the late 1950s and the early 1960s the environment in which NATO operated changed again. By this time the Soviet Union had already tested the hydrogen bomb, developed long-range and medium-range bombers comparable to the B-47 and B-52 and developed an intermediate ballistic missile capability. And in October 1957, the Soviet Union launched the Sputnik, the first man-made earth satellite. This event made it clear that the Soviets were about to develop intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM). Such missiles had the capability of delivering devastating nuclear strikes against major European and American cities. [Ref. 20:pp. 5-6] This created a great uneasiness among the member states. A massive nuclear strike against the Soviet Union would for the first time bring a comparable attack on the West. A hypothetical war game in Europe named "Carte Blanche" showed that in an all-out nuclear war the Western countries, especially Germany, would suffer extensive civilian casualties. Publication of the casualty figures aroused widespread fears about the consequences of NATO's strategy of massive retaliation [Ref. 14:p. 95]. Thus a new strategic issue arose: how to deter the enemy and defend NATO's territory without compelling the enemy to use his strategic nuclear forces.

In the mid-1960s NATO planners reexamined the policy of massive retaliation in light of this new strategic issue. By
this time NATO had developed effective conventional forces. There were 28 divisions on the Central Front, well equipped and well trained. NATO's tanks, which included the M-60, the Leopard and the Chieftain, were better than the main Soviet Bloc tanks, the T-54 and the T-55, although they were still outnumbered. Also NATO had developed accurate antitank weapons. Studies performed at the time showed that NATO's tanks and antitank weapons had a high kill ratio against Soviet bloc tank forces. In addition, NATO had estimate a high kill ratio in tactical aircraft and armed helicopters. [Ref. 21:pp. 148-149] Furthermore, NATO had also developed an impressive infrastructure for command and logistical support. All of these together gave NATO considerable conventional power. Given the increasing external nuclear threat and its new internal strengths, NATO no longer felt forced to rely on the policy of massive retaliation. Under pressure from its stakeholders, the member nations' governments and peoples, NATO adopted the policy of "flexible response".

Flexible response was a compromise between local conventional resistance, graduated nuclear response and massive nuclear retaliation. The essence of the new strategy adopted in December, 1967, was summarized by J. Michael Legge:

This strategy seeks to deter aggression by the maintenance of conventional, theater nuclear and strategic nuclear forces that would enable the Alliance to respond to any attack at an appropriate level. The initial response would be direct defense, seeking to defeat the aggression on the level at which the enemy has chosen to fight. If the aggression could not be contained, the Alliance would
be prepared to conduct a deliberate escalation, raising but where possible controlling the scope and intensity of combat, with the aim of making the cost and risk disproportionate to the aggressor's objectives and the threat of nuclear response more imminent. The ultimate objective, if deterrence failed, would be to convince the aggressor of the unacceptable degree of risk involved, thus causing him to cease his attack and withdraw. Finally, in the event of a major nuclear attack, NATO would maintain a capability for a massive strategic nuclear response. [Ref. 20:p. 9]

K. SUMMARY

This chapter has shown that NATO planners followed the essential elements of each step of the strategic planning model described in Chapter II as they formed and guided NATO through its first forty years. The incredible events of the last three years, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the unshackling of its satellites, have served to validate NATO's strategy in a way that tens of thousands of strategic planning documents could not. NATO achieved peace through strength, and its strength was the result of sound planning and determined work. By implication this model, which emulates this planning process, is also sound, and can be successfully used again to meet the new challenges NATO faces today.

In the remaining chapters this is exactly what will be done. Steps 1 through 6 of the model will be applied to NATO's current situation, resulting in a new strategy for the 1990s and beyond.
IV. THE ENVIRONMENT OF NATO IN 1992

A. INTRODUCTION

In the last three years NATO's external environment has changed more radically than at any time since the end of World War II. Significant changes have occurred in the internal environment as well. NATO must understand these changes in order to respond to them. This chapter briefly considers the mandates and mission of NATO and then examines in detail these important internal and external environmental changes.

B. MANDATES AND MISSION (STEPS 1 & 2)

NATO's mandates and mission remain essentially the same as before the collapse of the Soviet empire—to defend the countries of Western Europe against armed attack and to promote the stability and well-being of the Alliance area. However, in a new multipolar world rather than the bipolar world of the Cold War era, NATO must reexamine its narrow geographic limits in responding to threats. As before, these two steps will again be revisited in Chapter VI, after the present environment of NATO and possible future developments have been analyzed.
C. THE EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT IN 1992 (STEP 3)

1. Opportunities

The changing situation in the USSR and in its East European satellites have given opportunities to NATO that were unimaginable in the past. These opportunities are principally the result of political and military developments that have occurred in the USSR and in the Eastern European countries since 1989. First, NATO can now begin to achieve its primary objective of ensuring its countries' security through political reforms in the countries which were its enemies by creating a useful dialogue with them. Second, now that the major threat of a surprise attack has vanished, NATO can channel many more of its resources to benefiting its citizens and building its economic base instead of maintaining a large military machine. Third, since the new united Germany has remained in NATO and it will eventually be much stronger, the rest of the alliance will eventually have to shoulder less of the burden of NATO's defense. The first two parts of this section describe the developments which made these opportunities possible. The third and final part summarizes the implications and benefits of these events for NATO.

a. Political changes in the USSR and Eastern Europe

In March 1985 Mikhail Gorbachev became the General Secretary of the Communist party of the Soviet Union and so assumed the highest post in the country. Sovietologist
Sewerny Bialer describes the situation of the USSR at that time:

The universe in which Gorbachev took the reins of the Soviet Union was one in which his country had no major friends and was strapped with an unruly and economically and politically sick 'alliance' of satellites and semi-satellites. The evaluation of the existing situation by the new leadership led to the beginning of major revisions and Soviet thought and actions with regard to their security and foreign policy. [Ref. 22:p. 457]

Several factors drove the Soviet leadership to adopt the new policies of "perestroika", an economic and political restructuring plan, and "glasnost," a policy of openness to cut through the layers of smothering bureaucracy and corruption and allow innovation. First of all, the Soviet Union was in an economic crisis. In the 1980s economic growth rates and productivity growth declined sharply. The resulting economic situation was gloomy. The performance of the Soviet economy in the early 1980s has been accurately described as "stagnant", "decaying" and "faltering". Shortages were commonplace; consumers had to wait several hours in long lines to buy basic goods such as food and clothing. The few consumer goods that were available were of poor quality and very expensive. The food harvest had been poor and there were various shortfalls in industrial production as well as tremendous problems in the distribution system. [Ref. 23:p. 266] Soviet central planning, production quotas and artificial prices served well enough to rebuild heavy industries after World War II, but the system failed to adjust to a
consumer economy and to promote creativity for a high-technology world [Ref. 24:p. 40]. To make matters worse these domestic economic crises coincided with the development of the Third Industrial Revolution abroad. This explosion of technological growth in America, Europe and Asia widened the economic and technological gap between the USSR and the capitalist world at an ever-increasing rate.

The USSR's problems were not just in the economy, however. There were also political, social, ideological and cultural crises as well. The political system was in a state of breakdown. The flow of authority from the center outward and the flow of information from the peripheries to the center were seriously disrupted. Nearly all segments of the population had serious complaints about the regime. The professional and middle classes were being ignored and were denied access to power. Thus, there was a void of skilled professionals in the decision-making bodies of the country. Also there were grave social problems such as alcoholism, corruption, a shortage in medical services and a decline of the work ethic. [Ref. 25:p. 292]

Soviet authorities understood well that only fundamental reforms would allow them to cope with these problems. The main barrier to them lay in securing the necessary resources to perform the restructuring. The Soviet government realized that the country must reduce its international commitments, eliminate the tension and confrontation
with the West and reduce arms spending. The USSR could no longer afford the strategic arms race, which required a huge military at home and abroad.

At the same time similar conditions existed in the satellite countries. Like Soviet citizens, the people in these countries blamed the communist system for their problems and wanted to get rid of it. To Gorbachev the satellites merely compounded his problems as they were a military and economic drain and a source of political instability. He decided to cut his losses by letting them go their own way. [Ref. 24:p. 40] In 1988 he declared his intention in a speech to the United Nations, saying, "freedom of choice is a universal principle." [Ref. 26:p. 42] This began a process of political revolution in Eastern Europe which went forward at a dizzying speed. The effects of Gorbachev's reforms in Eastern European countries were immediate and took one of two forms. In some countries the top levels of government acknowledged the fundamental shortcomings of the system and initiated democratic reforms. In others, reform came from the bottom up. The common people bravely called attention to the crimes perpetrated by the system and by public demonstrations urged the ruling elite to accept democratic reforms. In the past this kind of popular uprising would have been brutally suppressed by Soviet forces as occurred in Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968. But this time Gorbachev promised
not to intervene. This promise became a virtual invitation to revolt.

Gorbachev handled each of these two situations differently. Where the governments had initiated reforms, as in Hungary, Gorbachev gave public approval to their plans. Where the communist governments resisted change, as in Poland, Gorbachev withdrew his support from those governments and urged them to recognize the will of the people. In a Warsaw Pact meeting in Bucharest in July 1989, Gorbachev canceled the Brezhnev Doctrine which had stated, "When forces hostile to socialism seek to reverse the development of a Socialist country whatsoever... this [becomes] the concern of all socialist countries." [Ref. 26:p. 42] Gorbachev instead said, "Each people determines the future of its own country and chooses its own form of society. There must be no interference from outside, no matter what the pretext." [Ref. 26:p.42] Extraordinary events in Eastern Europe soon unfolded.

On January 11, 1989 in Hungary, a country in which the communist party was the only legal party, parliament voted to allow independent parties. On January 15 in Prague, Czechoslovakia, thousands of demonstrators gathered to condemn the suppression of the 1968 Czech uprising. The next month in Warsaw, Polish officials met for the first time with Solidarity, the banned independent trade union. One month later in Budapest, the communist justice minister stated that the
Hungary was ready for democracy and for free elections, adding that he was drafting a Western-style constitution which would secure the freedoms of speech, association and private property. On April 18 in Warsaw, the talks between the government and Solidarity ended and the government legalized the union and agreed to hold open elections. In June Solidarity won overwhelmingly the East Bloc's first contested elections in 40 years. The morning after the Polish election communist leader Jaruzelski admitted, "Our defeat is total." [Ref. 27:p. 26] Within three weeks Solidarity's representatives took their seats in parliament. Solidarity quickly consolidated its victory by declaring the first non-communist government in Eastern Europe. In an ironic reversal, one-time political prisoners became government ministers overnight. And in the most stunning development of all, on September 10, Hungary suspended its 20-year border agreement with East Germany which required Hungary to block the passage of East Germans to the West. And so The Great Escape from the East to the West began as the Iron Curtain was swept away. Thousands of "vacationing" East Germans poured across the frontier, seeking new lives in West Germany. East German Communist Party chief Eric Honecker was forced out of office and replaced by a moderate leader, Egon Krenz. On November 9, Egon Krenz at last opened the East German border. Moments after the announcement, people converged on the Berlin Wall, which had divided the city since 1961, from both sides of the
city. At 11:17 p.m. Checkpoint Charlie, the symbol of the East-West division in Europe, was thrown wide open and masses of East Berliners flooded through the gate to the West. Soon after, more checkpoints were opened and eventually the wall was completely demolished.

At the same time in East Germany a new group opposed to communist rule named the New Forum had been formed and begun issuing manifestos. In October Hungary’s communist party had formally changed its name, omitting the word "communist" and adopting the new name Hungarian Socialist Party. The hard-line party chief was soon ousted and the new party leadership decided to remove the red star from all official buildings. On October 23 Hungary declared itself an independent republic. These events did not bypass Czechoslovakia. In December more than half a million Czechs took to the streets each day. They carried banners, shouted and honked their car horns to show their desire to oust the oppressive communist government. Within eight days they achieved their main objective and communist party leader Milos Jakes resigned with all the members of the politburo. Meanwhile the people continued their demonstrations in the streets for more reforms as a government in which the communists were in the minority was formed. Czech President Gustav Husak, who took over after the Soviet invasion in 1968, resigned. In the last days of December, playwright Vaclav Havel, who had spent years in prison because of his anti-
communist ideas, was elected as president by the Czech parliament. In his New Year message Havel voiced the essence of the peoples’ complaints when he stated, "The state which calls itself the state of the working people is humiliating and exploiting the workers." [Ref.28:p. 37192] He also declared that free elections would soon be held.

Bulgaria and Romania were not left out either. Bulgaria’s hard-line leader Todor Zivkov was suddenly ousted. Zivkov had especially repressed the Turkish minority in the Eastern part of the country, forcing ethnic Turks to change their names and placing severe restrictions on religion. In the summer of 1989 he expelled nearly 300,000 ethnic Turks to Turkey. His ouster represented a major victory for the people of Bulgaria. In Romania, dictator Nicolae Ceaucescu was overthrown and executed after bloody clashes between Ceaucescu loyalist and reformers. A party called the National Salvation Front took power in Romania in the early days of 1990 and promised free elections.

By any measure 1989 had been an astonishing year. By year’s end no hard-line communist government remained in power in all of Eastern Europe. In 1990 democratic and economic reforms continued in the Eastern European countries. 1990 has been called the year of free multiparty elections in Eastern Europe. Elections were held in March and April in Hungary, in May in Romania and in June in Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria. In all these countries but Bulgaria non-
socialist parties won the elections. In Bulgaria’s elections, the Socialist Party (formerly the communists) won the elections but for the first time ethnic Turks gained a voice in the government as they won 23 seats in the parliament.

The most momentous event of the year, however, was the reunification of Germany. With the communist East German government finally out of power, reunification was possible for the first time. By late 1990, the Soviet-imposed artificial division of Germany was almost dissolved. The one roadblock to formal reunification was Soviet resistance to giving up its precious military bulwark in East Germany. But Gorbachev’s non-interference policy had made the Soviet decision for them and the Soviets soon acceded to this as well, promising to withdraw their troops by 1994. West German chancellor Helmut Kohl vigorously advanced the reunification issue and gained support for it in both Germanies. In the March 18th East German general election the Alliance for Germany, which favored reunification, won a majority of seats in the East German parliament. Talks immediately began between the East and West German governments and the four victorious Allied powers of the second World War (France, England, the U.S. and the Soviet Union) came together to reunite the two Germanies. These were named the Two-plus-Four talks. Initially there was strong Soviet opposition on this issue, with the Soviet Union insisting that the united Germany
must join no alliance. But the Western countries including Germany itself wanted Germany to remain in NATO.

In July West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl met with Soviet President Gorbachev in Stavropol. Gorbachev finally agreed to NATO membership for the united Germany by announcing, "The united Germany, sovereign in every way, will say to which bloc it wants to belong." [Ref. 29:p. 37659] In return, Germany would assist the ill Soviet economy in various ways, including the sharing of technology. On October 3, 1990, unification at last took place by the accession of East Germany under Article 23 of the West German Basic Law, and the rights over Germany of the four victors of World War II were terminated. In December All-German general elections were held, the parliament of the united Germany was convened and Helmut Kohl became the new country's first chancellor. This event ended 45 years of artificial division of Europe and with it the ever-present East-West confrontation. As 1990 ended democracy was taking root in Eastern Europe.

The year 1991 witnessed unprecedented change in the Soviet Union. The Baltic Republics had already declared their independence and proclaimed the supremacy of their laws over Soviet law. At first Moscow refused to recognize this movement as legitimate, in fact declaring it unlawful. In 1991 other republics, however, also took the same path and declared their independence. Even the Russian Federation declared its independence from the Soviet Union. The Soviet
central government was facing enormous economic problems, and now major political problems compounded the trouble. Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev tried desperately to find ways to ease the economic problems while keeping the Union together. Gorbachev even went to London where the world's seven greatest capitalist countries were meeting and demanded Western economic help. Gorbachev envisioned a reformed Soviet Union which would be a loose confederation of sovereign states under communist guidance. With this plan, however, Gorbachev landed in the unenviable position of satisfying neither side. The hard-liners took their turn first as the Communist Party of the Soviet Union engineered a coup in Moscow, seizing power for 72 hours in August 1991. The people of Moscow as well as the people across the Soviet Union took to the streets and protested the coup. The coup leaders ordered a crackdown, but this time the Soviet military did not obey. Commanders of key units such as the Air Force, the Air Force Paratroopers, the Baltic fleet and the KGB Alpha anti-terrorist group simply ignored the coup leaders. As a result the coup failed and the coup leaders were arrested. On August 29, because of the party's role in the failed coup, Soviet lawmakers suspended the Soviet Communist Party's activities nationwide and froze its bank accounts. Soviet Communism, which had been the cause of tens of millions of brutal murders and incomprehensible human suffering, had breathed its last.
Now it was the reformers' turn and events moved quickly. Russia and Ukraine bypassed the Kremlin to form a military and economic alliance. On September 2, the Congress of People's Deputies approved a plan to reduce the Kremlin's authority in the Soviet Union. Three days later, Soviet lawmakers approved an interim government to usher in a confederation of sovereign states; the next day the Soviet Union officially recognized the independence of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. On November 16, Russian President Boris Yeltsin took control of the Soviet money supply and its stocks of oil, gold, diamonds and foreign currency. In December, Ukraine voters approved a referendum declaring independence. Russia, Ukraine and Byelorussia formed a "Commonwealth" and declared Mr. Gorbachev's government dead. [Ref. 30:p.A-8] On December 25, truly a Christmas to remember, Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev resigned from his post and the Soviet flag was replaced by the Russian flag on the roof of the Kremlin. So the Soviet Union, a gigantic state which had attempted to dominate the whole of Europe, passed into history, its ideology as bankrupt as the economy it had destroyed.

b. Military changes in the USSR and Eastern Europe

The Soviet Union had signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty with the U.S. in 1987, as a result of which the Soviets destroyed 1766 medium range and 668
shorter range missiles together with 819 launchers and 37 missile bases. As described above, Gorbachev desperately needed resources to rebuild the bankrupt Soviet economy. Since more than 25 percent of his spending was going into defense, he decided he must cut military expenditures. He then introduced two security policies to do this—"reasonable sufficiency" and the "defensive doctrine" [Ref. 31:p. 19]. In an interview in 1989, Soviet Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev outlined the new Soviet military policy:

We proceed from the position that the foreign policy of the Soviet Union is based on demilitarization. The use of force is ruled out, except when someone confronts the Soviet Union from a position of strength. [Ref 32:p. 60]

Marshal Akhromeyev connected the two concepts:

The defensive charter of Soviet military doctrine manifests itself in the fact that the Soviet Union resolutely advocates maintaining the balance of military forces at the lowest possible level, reducing military potentials to levels of sufficiency necessary for defense. [Ref. 31:p. 67]

Another Soviet Army General, A. D. Lizichev, stated:

[The] defensive doctrine . . . is a principle of reasonable sufficiency. What does it consist of? It consists of . . . general purpose forces being maintained at the minimum level which will enable us to preserve political stability and make our country safe from the strike of an aggressor. [Ref. 31:pp. 67-68]

Soviet Colonel G. Ionin summed up the new Soviet doctrinal thinking, saying, "Soviet military doctrine . . . is thoroughly defensive in nature. This means that we will not begin military operations if we are not subjected to armed attack." [Ref. 31:p. 71]
Soviet propaganda had always proclaimed the defensive nature of their forces while their actions went into building massive offensive forces. Now, however, the Soviets immediately put this new policy into action by cutting their military spending and reducing the number of their troops. By October 1989 the Soviets withdrew the following forces from Eastern Europe [Ref. 33:p.1050]:

3 tank divisions
3 tank training regiments
1 air regiment
1 helicopter regiment
2 SAM brigades
4 assault battalions

With the fall of all the communist governments in Eastern Europe, this withdrawal accelerated significantly. Moscow agreed to withdraw all forces from Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, and by June 1991, this was completed in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Troop withdrawals from Poland are not yet complete but the troops that remain there are not strategically significant. Moscow also agreed with the new united Germany to withdraw its remaining 370,000 troops from the former East Germany by 1994. On April 1, 1991, the Warsaw pact, created in 1955 as Moscow's counterbalance to NATO but soon the instrument of Soviet control over its satellites in Eastern Europe, was dissolved. Deep cuts have been made in Soviet forces stationed at home and the new Commonwealth of Independent States (C.I.S.) plans to cut military personnel by 700,000 and to reduce the number of tanks and river crossing
equipment in each division. Furthermore, talks are in progress between the U.S. and Commonwealth members to reduce the number of multiple-warhead ballistic missiles.

TIME Magazine describes well the current situation of the former Soviet military:

Conscription has broken down in some areas, and the desertion rate is rising. Pay is so meager that soldiers have resorted to selling military equipment on the black market. Fuel shortages are so dire that many ships and submarines have been forced to return to their home ports. Planes, ships and tanks are being cannibalized for spare parts. Thousands of demobilized troops from Eastern Europe are stranded without adequate housing and benefits in shabby tent cities. Morale is at nadir. [Ref. 34:p. 28]

Dr. R. Laba of the Naval Postgraduate School visited the former Soviet Union from June 1991 to January 1992. Dr. Laba's comment was perhaps the best description of all: "The Red Army as we know it is dead."

c. Implications for the West

All of these events have created a climate tremendously favorable for the West, which faced down with the Soviet bloc for 45 years. The ideological and political threats from the East which loomed so large for so long have dissolved completely and the military threat, while not gone completely, has receded greatly. Most significantly, by pulling out of Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union lost its base from which it could launch a surprise attack on Western Europe. Before, 19 to 20 Russian divisions in East Germany were ready to march west within a few hours' notice.
There were 11 more Russian divisions stationed in Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia to augment the first line troops. The Eastern European countries had placed 17 divisions at the disposal of the Russians, and they were ready to march immediately. Thus NATO would have faced 47 divisions which could storm across its borders within 24 hours. In the days following the initial assault, the Russians could have brought 60 more divisions from the western parts of the USSR. Soviet combat forces and logistical units could have used the transportation systems in the Eastern European countries without resistance. Added to this grim picture were short-range and medium-range nuclear missiles deployed in Eastern Europe. Within a week or so of the beginning of a surprise attack, more than 100 divisions could have crossed into Western Europe. Now, however, there is no possibility of a surprise conventional attack. Substantial numbers of former Soviet troops have left Eastern Europe and a forward launching area for Russian forces no longer exists. Since Russia has no longer any control over Eastern Europe, they no longer have unopposed access to the logistical facilities in these countries. If Russia or any other Commonwealth members attempt to attack NATO, they will have to bring most of their forces hundreds or even thousands of miles. In this they will face at least some resistance from the Eastern European countries. All this adds up to a warning time which has increased from hours to about six months. Further, Russian
medium-range nuclear weapons are no longer deployed in Europe and it is doubtful that the government of Russia could mobilize civilian and military personnel for war. A general war in Europe is unlikely, certainly less likely now than at any time in NATO's history.

NATO's new opportunities spring directly from these favorable events. By encouraging its former enemies to solve their disputes by political means, NATO can have a great and long-lasting democratizing influence, which will yield long-term security benefits. Resources which were poured into military defense may now be channeled into civilian economic growth. And with a powerful new United Germany now in NATO, the other members' defense burden will ease.

2. Threats

The greatest former threat to NATO, a surprise Russian attack simultaneously on all of its fronts, has vanished. However, political and economic instabilities and other uncertainties, along with the danger of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, have created new threats which NATO must consider.

a. Instabilities in the former Soviet Union

One of the areas of greatest potential problems for NATO is the former Soviet Union itself. Although this once massive state has collapsed and the "republics" which once formed the Union have actually gained their independence, there are power vacuums everywhere as military and political
authority breaks down. The economic situation is grave. The people have great difficulty getting food, housing and medicine, and as a result the standard of living is declining sharply. In the areas where defense industries are located, the populace is uneasy because these factories may close. In some areas this is critical as the economies of entire cities are based on military spending. Scientists employed in the defense industries are facing the loss of their jobs and cuts in military personnel levels have caused yet another problem as soldiers return to their homes with little chance of finding jobs. In the Russian Federation, the largest of the former republics, President Yeltsin has little control over all these matters. To make things worse, increasing ethnic violence within the Russian Federation and even more splintering of this state is probable. Some right-wing extremists may be able to exploit Yeltsin's weak position and mount yet another coup. If this happens, given current economic hardships, the probability of success of a coup is now much higher than ever before. Added to all this are political conflicts and the real possibility of armed clashes between the members of the Commonwealth. Armenia and Azerbaijan are engaged in a bloody war which has claimed thousands of lives. The Commonwealth meanwhile seems powerless to act. In the meeting of the Commonwealth's heads of state in March 1992, leaders were unable to reach an agreement on how to begin to solve the Commonwealth's pressing problems, including military
issues. Russian Federation President Yeltsin announced in late March that the Russia would form its own military and it is quite possible that the other former republics will follow suit. If these states, many still equipped with modern Soviet military hardware including tactical nuclear weapons, should collapse politically, the danger to NATO would be grave. New leaders who might be irresponsible, inexperienced and adventurous could reconstitute a serious direct military threat to NATO in a short time. Also, if an internal war breaks out in the Commonwealth, it would likely be more violent than any the region has ever known. This kind of war could spill over to NATO in short order.

b. *Instabilities in Eastern Europe*

As if the potential threats from the former Soviet Union were not enough, Eastern Europe provides many of its own. Because Eastern Europe by definition is so close to Western Europe, the threats here may be even greater than the threats from the former Soviet Union. Each country in Eastern Europe has a host of internal and external problems.

Internal economic problems are severe. There is antipathy among unemployed workers, demobilized troops and many others whose personal welfare is endangered. There is questionable loyalty among senior military officers and an uncertain relationship between civil and military authorities. The officers corps and the leaders in the military-industrial complexes of these countries have long desired to control
national security policy. The people distrust, even despise, politics and the politicians in general, which hinders the democratic process even more.

Adding to the internal problems is the splintering of these countries which began with the end of Soviet control. Yugoslavia witnessed a bloody civil war between its two states of Croatia and Serbia. A cease fire has been holding intermittently and U.N peace keeping forces have been deployed, but in spite of this scattered military clashes are still occurring. Because of the mixed ethnic composition and corresponding unstable politics in the region, the same sort of thing may occur in the other countries of the region as well.

The end of Soviet control has created external problems as well. There is a dispute between Poland, Byelorussia, Ukraine and Lithuania over the territories Poland lost after World War II. Polish nationalists are keeping this issue alive while former Soviet republics continue to reject Polish claims. Another problem exists between Hungary and Romania. Hungary claims that 1.5 to 2.3 ethnic Hungarians in Romania Transylvania have been denied their rights. Romania denies this and interprets this as interference in its own internal affairs. There are similar problems between Yugoslavia and both Albania and Bulgaria. In the first case, ninety percent of the population of Kosova, an autonomous province of Serbia that borders Albania, is composed of ethnic Albanians
who are denied political autonomy and victims of social and economic deprivation. Serbs charge that Albania is conspiring with Kosova’s Albanian majority to annex the province. In the second case, there has been pressure for the government of Yugoslavia to recognize Macedonia as an independent Republic. In March 1992, Macedonia proclaimed its independence from Yugoslavia. Some analysts believe that Bulgaria may try to incorporate independent Macedonia or that a resurgent Macedonia could claim parts of Bulgaria.

Ethnic conflicts on such as these which occur on international borders are particularly inflammatory since large military forces are often present and international politics becomes involved. Border disputes, revolutions and wars could spill over into NATO countries or involve outside powers, which changes the power equation in the region. Added to this is the prospect of tens of millions of refugees fleeing to Western Europe. NATO must consider each of these threats. [This section is adapted from Ref. 35:pp. 137-158]

**c. Instabilities in the Middle East**

The Middle East has rightly been described as a giant powder keg ready to explode into war at the slightest spark. Although an analysis of the region’s political and military conflicts is far beyond the scope of this thesis, some brief comments are in order, since nearly all NATO member countries depend on Middle East oil and Turkey, a NATO member, shares a border each with Syria, Iraq and Iran.
Several factors contribute to instability in the region. The first is that most of these countries have little or no experience in democracy. A quick glance at the recent history of the region shows why. The Middle East was ruled by Ottoman Turks for 400 years. After World War I when the Ottoman Empire collapsed, the region was dominated by the French and British. Foreign forces evacuated the region after World War II and the countries at last gained full independence, but democracy never took root in Arab countries of the region. In 14 Arab countries there have been 81 military coup attempts, 24 of which were successful. The three largest Arab states of the region--Egypt, Syria and Iraq--are each ruled by one strongman; there are also monarchies in two other major Arab states, Saudi Arabia and Jordan. Since these rulers answer to no one, these governments do not have the stability inherent in a democratic government with checks and balances. As the events surrounding the recent Gulf War showed, it is hard to predict what these rulers will do, and this unpredictability undermines stability in the region.

The second factor contributing to instability in the region is the division of the Arab world. Under the facade of "Arab Unity" each strongman in the region is eager to dominate the entire Arab world and a few are willing to take great risks to do it. When Saddam Hussein of Iraq calculated that he had enough power to realize this dream, he did not hesitate to act by invading Kuwait. Any other leader
in the region might conceivably do the same thing. Aside from the ambitions of their leaders, the Arab countries do not all share the same basic goals or methods of reaching them. The Arabs seem unable to unite in anything with just a few exceptions, the primary two being opposition to Israel and the desire to maximize their oil revenues.

The third and probably the most destabilizing factor is the Arab-Israeli conflict. When the State of Israel was formed in 1948, the Arab nations did not recognize the existence of this state and went to war with Israel four times: in 1948, 1956, 1967 and 1973. Each time they hoped to annihilate the Jewish state. Four sound defeats of the combined Arab armies by a tiny Jewish State, coupled with the festering Palestinian problem, have increased the animosity between the Jews and Arabs, if that were possible. At any time another Arab-Israeli war could break out. Despite U.S. initiatives to limit arms transfers to the region, China and North Korea have continued to ship arms to Iran and Syria, two of the most unpredictable countries, in exchange for needed hard currency. The transfers from China reportedly include missiles to Syria and nuclear reactors, nuclear weapons technology and chemical weapons to Iran. Likewise, North Korea is reportedly selling Scud missiles to Iran and Syria. These versions of the Scud can carry larger warheads over a longer range than the missiles used by Saddam Hussein in the Gulf War. The combination of mutual hatred, close proximity
and huge military forces equipped with the latest hi-tech weapons is enough to frighten anyone.

The fourth factor lies in the influence of two major Arab countries in North Africa: Libya and Algeria. The governments of these countries are also unstable and unpredictable. Libya is ruled by Colonel Muammar Kaddafi, certainly no friend of the West. His sponsorship of international terrorism, illustrated by the bombing of Pan-American flight 103 in 1986, is well known. Kaddafi can be expected to contribute to any instability in the region to achieve his own ambitions. Under his direction, Libya is importing chemical weapons from China and manufacturing some of its own. Because of Libya's immense oil wealth, any move by Libya can threaten the entire Mediterranean area. Libya's neighbor to the west, Algeria, is most noted in the West for its growing Islamic fundamentalist movement. Islamic parties won recent elections but the president of Algeria ignored the results and imposed military rule. The situation is still tense. If Islamic fundamentalists do succeed in gaining control of Algeria's government, they may cause trouble with the West, especially since no major Western countries spoke out against the military crackdown. China is reportedly supporting an Algerian nuclear weapons development program by building a nuclear reactor in that country. An unstable Algeria with nuclear weapons is a great danger in the region.
The fifth major factor is Iran. After Islamic fundamentalists gained power in Iran in 1979, Iran became thoroughly hostile to the West. Iran’s aim is to export government by Islamic law to its neighbors. This may create a direct conflict with NATO since Iran’s ambitions include Turkey which is a NATO member and has a secular government. Iran is now building a large military with the help of China and North Korea and there are reports that Iran is buying military equipment from Russia. CIA director Robert Gates revealed the Iranian military buildup before the House Armed Services Committee in March:

Iran’s burgeoning, foreign-made arsenal includes advanced warplanes, aircraft missiles and some extended-range Scud missiles. . . . The country has also contracted to buy at least two Russian submarines. . . . [We are] estimating that the total cost of foreign-made weapons acquired by Iran between 1990 and 1994 will reach $10 billion. That is a substantial sum for the country, particularly in light of its struggle to repair damage done by the 1980-88 war with Iraq. . . . Iran is [also] trying to acquire a nuclear weapons capability. . . . Another Iranian weapons effort—the development of poison gas warheads to place atop Scud missiles—is likely to succeed sooner. The country’s relatively crude chemical weapons program is expected to produce such warheads within a few years. We also suspect that Iran is working toward a biological warfare capability. [Ref. 36:p. A-1]

With Iraq economically and militarily devastated, Iran may try to fill the power vacuum in the region by exerting significant political and military pressure. Any Iranian move in the region will create instability and will pose a threat to NATO’s Southern Flank.
As is easily seen, peace in this region is very fragile and susceptible to many threats. Any crisis in the region can directly affect NATO by disrupting the flow of oil to the West and by creating instability in its Southern Flank. Countries on NATO's Southern Flank could also be drawn into war. Thus, even though no NATO member is located in the Middle East, the threats in this region could effect NATO politically, economically and militarily in a major way.

d. Nuclear proliferation

The almost unimaginable destructive power of nuclear weapons places this threat in a class by itself. Five nations have declared themselves to be nuclear powers, defined as those countries that can deliver nuclear weapons to a desired target. These are the U.S., the Commonwealth of Independent States (the former Soviet Union, four of whose republics have strategic nuclear weapons under unified command), China, France and Great Britain. The stated policy of each is not to share nuclear weapons technology with other countries who are not in the nuclear "club". Naturally, allowing nuclear weapons to fall into the hand of a madman harms everyone, especially these five major nuclear powers. Accordingly, these countries have established the strictest control on their weapons and weapons material as well as tight controls over nuclear weapons-related technology. Disclosures made in the last five years have shown that these controls are inadequate and as a result it is becoming more and more likely
that nuclear weapons will fall into irresponsible hands. This represents the gravest threat to NATO, and it comes from several directions.

The first is the former Soviet Union. The C.I.S. has 27,000 nuclear weapons, 12,000 of which are long-range. Although the current leaders of the C.I.S. have promised to maintain the security of these weapons and dismantle whole classes of them, weakened governments will probably not be able to do this adequately. Given the devastated economies and the sorry plight of military personnel who don't even have enough to eat, a significant possibility exists that tactical missiles, warheads, components or materials might be sold on the black market to anyone willing to pay for them. [Ref. 37: p. 33] Economic chaos has fostered a "sell-anything-you-can-get-your-hands-on" mentality in the Soviet military and some commanders may sell nuclear weapons as well. Another threat is that unemployed Soviet atomic scientists and weapons designers may sell their bomb-building skills to those foreign countries eager to become nuclear powers. [Ref. 38:p. 41] Chairman of the U.S Senate Armed Services Committee Sam Nunn pointed out the significance of this threat:

We are on the verge of either having the greatest destruction of nuclear weapons in the history of the world or the greatest proliferation of nuclear weapons, nuclear materials and the scientific know-how to make these weapons. [Ref. 38:p.40]

Currently the C.I.S.‘s nuclear weapons are under unified command but the possibility exists that control may devolve
into four or even more different authorities. This would make it much more difficult for NATO to defuse a tense crisis or to limit a nuclear exchange.

The second direction of this threat is from China. Holding out in one of the last bastions of communism, the government of China is committed to advancing this ideology. Saddled with a backward and pathetic economy largely brought on by this ideology, this government has sold nuclear weapons technology to extremist states such as Iran and North Korea in return for the hard currency it so desperately needs. The Bush administration has attempted to exert pressure on Beijing to stem the flow of nuclear technology by establishing economic links between the U.S. and China but has not had any real success to date.

The third direction of this threat is, ironically, from the West itself. Lax enforcement of technology transfer prohibitions and the naked greed of private individuals and companies have allowed sophisticated technology, machines and knowledge to flow into countries around the world. It seems that Lenin, now universally discredited, was right in one respect: a capitalist will sell you the rope to hang him with.

The fourth direction is from several countries around the world which are aggressively researching how to make nuclear weapons. Encouraged and equipped with information and material from China and West, many countries have
embarked on massive programs to develop nuclear weapons. It is generally known that Israel, India and Pakistan have nuclear weapons. Many more countries are working to obtain them, including Brazil, Iran, Iraq, North Korea and Algeria. Of these, Iran, Iraq and Algeria are of the greatest concern to NATO.

Of these three, Iran would be perhaps the greatest danger to NATO if it obtained nuclear weapons. Facing stalemate in the 8-year war with Iraq, in 1987 Ayatollah Khomeini personally authorized a full-scale renewal of a nuclear-bomb program that the Shah had begun. The program is still continuing and the government of Iran is not hiding its intentions. In a conference in Teheran, Iranian Vice President stated, "Since Israel continues to possess nuclear weapons, we, the Muslims, must cooperate to produce an atom bomb, regardless of U.N. attempts to prevent proliferation." [Ref. 39:p. 47] Iran is receiving help from China and some analysts say Iran could have the bomb by year 2000.

Almost as dangerous is Iraq. U.N. inspectors found a gigantic nuclear weapons program in Iraq and even now do not know the extent of the program. Much material may still be safely hidden, preserving Baghdad's may bomb-building ability. Likewise, Algeria has built a reactor capable of producing nuclear weapons and U.S. intelligence has also reported rumors that Iraq provided Algeria with critical nuclear technology. If this cooperation continues there is a
distinct possibility that any weapons they develop might be sold to other countries as well. [Ref. 39:p. 48] It should also be mentioned that there are reports that North Korea has built an underground nuclear weapons research and production facility. North Korea now produces missiles that can carry nuclear warheads, not just for its own use but also for export. [Ref. 39:p.47] North Korean nuclear missiles may soon find their way to the Middle East, where along with weapons produced by Iran, Iraq and Syria or obtained from the C.I.S could present a direct threat to NATO. Figure 3 illustrates the nuclear proliferation.

D. THE INTERNAL ENVIRONMENT IN 1992 (STEP 4)

1. Strengths

NATO's most valuable asset is its unity which stood the test of time and won the Cold War. Working side by side, sixteen like-minded nations stopped Soviet expansion and joined their resources to narrow the military gap with the Soviet bloc. In this, the multi-committee structure of NATO and the exemplary cooperation which grew up in these committees have proven to be very effective in making and implementing strategies. Indeed, this has grown into one of NATO's key strengths. These sixteen countries built a strong economic base by implementing efficient economic policies and by cooperating in the Organization Economic Cooperation Development (OECD) and the European Economic Community (EEC). They
SCRAMBLE FOR THE BOMB

Figure 3: Nuclear Proliferation
Source: Time, 16 December 1991, p. 47
exploited their advantage in technology and counterbalanced the massive Soviet advantage in military forces. Indeed, the well-planned and well-coordinated use of high technology production brought an end to the Cold War as the Soviet effort to keep up finally broke their economic back.

This unity did not come easily, however. It was a lesson that took Europe centuries to learn. During the period 1871-1939, a great wave of hyper-nationalism engulfed Europe. Each state was firmly convinced its own rights were absolute and other’s rights were not. Unfortunately, war rather than negotiation was the rule; it took one war after another for the folly of this attitude to sink in. World War I was caused in part by the domination of civilian discussion by military propaganda which primed the world for war. In contrast, the stability of the post World War II period in Europe has been partly due to the remarkable decline of nationalist propaganda. In fact, professional military officers are now nearly as cautious as or even more reluctant than civilians in recommending war. [Ref. 40:pp. 18-28] These two developments, the decrease in ethnic rivalries between Western European states and the reserve now displayed by military and civilian leaders, led to the formation of pluralist democracies in Europe. Germany, which caused two World Wars, has become fully democratic and, somewhat surprisingly, is a fervent supporter of a United Europe. The democracies of Europe have learned that it is more profitable to cooperate economically
and militarily than to try to dominate each other, and this cooperation has paid off. The European economies are formidable now and, when united, will be even more so. Once fierce ideological opponents, all of the former East bloc countries are begging for Western economic and technical help to salvage their economies, destroyed by five decades of communist oppression. These countries look to the West not only for economic and technical help but also for political advice in improving and democratizing their political institutions. As a result of its unity, NATO now finds itself in a position of economic, ideological, and political strength.

Besides these, NATO now enjoys great military strength and a tremendous military advantage over its former worst enemy—the former Soviet Union and its forces positioned on NATO's Central Front. Currently, NATO has 38 divisions, 8050 tanks, 4400 artillery/mortar pieces, 1345 fighter/bombers, 500 interceptor planes and 145 reconnaissance planes deployed on the Central Front. Its weapons are modern and effective. The quality of NATO tanks is the best in the world. The M1A1 of the U.S., the Challenger of Great Britain and the Leopard II of Germany are unequaled throughout the world. NATO forces have excellent antitank weapons such as the Milan, Tow, Dragon and SS-11 missiles, each of which have more destructive power than any of the Russian-made antitank weapons. NATO forces have antitank helicopters, fast and effective infantry fighting vehicles and capable air defense
systems. To increase technical superiority NATO members are forming consortiums to share technology and produce newer sophisticated weapons more efficiently. Against all this is pitted the ragged remnants of the Soviet Red Army, equipped with weapons proved to be inferior during the Gulf War. Morale is at an all-time low and the logistics system and infrastructure which supported the once-massive Soviet military machine have crumbled. In contrast, one of NATO’s greatest military strengths lies in its excellent infrastructure. This includes the following [Ref. 41:pp. 54-55]:

**Airfields:** 230 NATO airfields have been constructed with a full range of operation facilities, including airfield pavements, jet fuel installations, ammunition storage and hardened shelters.

**Command, Control, Communication and Information systems (C³I):** NATO’s C³I uses 50,000 km of landlines, radio links and submarine cables. There is an integrated communication system in place which enables political authorities and various military headquarters to be kept informed of developments in a crisis or war. NATO also has a satellite communication system which is interfaced to a sophisticated and extensive multi-path voice and data network.

**Petroleum facilities:** There is a regional network of NATO pipelines and associated transfer and storage facilities.
This includes 3 million cubic meters of storage capacity and 11,000 km of pipelines.

Air defense systems: A chain of radar sites and associated command and control centers is in place. NATO’s radar network provides sea and high/low air coverage from Northern Norway to Eastern Turkey. Land and sea-based airborne warning radars are part of this system as well.

Miscellaneous: There are also 80 naval bases and many storage facilities, training facilities, headquarters complexes, surface to air missile sites, surface to surface missile sites, ammunition storage sites and forward storage sites.

2. Weaknesses

NATO’s major weakness lies in its Southern Flank. The countries that make up this Southern Flank are Spain, France, Italy, Greece and Turkey. To begin, two of these are not part of NATO’s integrated military structure. France left this structure in 1966, and when Spain joined NATO in 1982 it kept itself out of the integrated military structure. The exclusion of these two creates a gap in the defense of the region. The amount of territory under NATO’s Southern Command is huge and there are many geographic barriers, all of which makes it difficult to coordinate between the three land theaters (Italy, Greek and Turkish Thrace and Eastern Turkey) and the autonomous maritime sub-theater (the Mediterranean Sea). Southern region nations are separated from each other.
by the Tyrrhenian, Adriatic and Aegean seas; maintaining lines of communication effectively is hindered by rugged terrain, and in certain areas, by inadequate infrastructure. In a crisis, these problems could slow or even prevent the reinforcement of forces defending Eastern Turkey. As an example of the vast expanses under NATO control, NATO’s Commander of Allied Air Forces, Southern Europe (COMAIRSOUTH) headquartered in Naples, is tasked with coordinating the defense of NATO airspace along a 3600 km border stretching from the Italian Alps to eastern Turkey. What makes this even more important is that this Southern Flank directly faces the multiple threats from the Middle East. Geographic and other factors related to these threats require that forces in the Southern Flank be maintained at a higher state of readiness than in other areas of NATO and that they be equipped with modern weapons. Unfortunately, the Greek and Turkish militaries have relatively poor equipment and are not sufficiently outfitted or trained to function in an environment of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. They have taken measures, however, to improve their armaments. Turkey established the Defense Industry Development and Support Administration to create an indigenous defense manufacturing capability and Greece similarly established the Hellenic Vehicle and Arms Industries. These efforts have been hindered in some degree by the serious economic problems of both. In Greece inflation has exceeded 20 percent and the budget deficit has risen to $13
billion. Turkey is confronted with hyperinflation and has serious internal security problems in its southern provinces which are diverting resources from NATO commitments. [Ref. 41:pp. 86-90]

The continuing Greek-Turkish dispute which erupted into an armed conflict in Cyprus in 1974 continues to damage the Alliance's operational effectiveness in the eastern Mediterranean. The major problem between the two countries remains the situation in Cyprus. However, there are also disputes over territorial waters, airspace and continental shelf resources around the Aegean Islands.

A second weakness of the Alliance lies in the defense budget cuts in the member countries. If budget cuts continue, the research and development of advanced weapons may cease. With other countries such as China and North Korea eagerly developing, manufacturing and exporting modern weapons, a slowdown in NATO countries' weapons development lessens NATO's technological advantages.

E. SUMMARY

Significant positive changes in the former Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe have created incredible opportunities for NATO. NATO's worst scenario, the ominous threat of surprise attack by a 100-division force, has vanished. All of the Eastern European nations as well as the former Soviet Union itself need Western help and they must stay on good
behavior to get it. However, other threats are arising in Central Europe in different form. Most of these threats stem from political and economic uncertainties in those countries of the region struggling to give birth to democracy. For the moment, NATO's primary military threat has shifted to its Southern Flank. New and growing threats from countries such as Iran, Iraq, Syria and Libya, which were not considered as important in the past, should now be considered seriously. The gravest threat to NATO appears to be from politically unstable countries which are close to acquiring weapons of mass destruction. This threat is so potentially destabilizing and uncertainties throughout NATO's external environment are so great that NATO must make strategic plans so it can cope with future changes in these areas.

While this chapter has been devoted to analyzing present threats and threats in the near future, the next chapter is devoted to taking a good look farther into the future. As stated in Chapter II, scenario building using verbal descriptions is a tool particularly well suited to plan strategically for these uncertainties and instabilities. Accordingly, the scenarios in Chapter V will complete the analysis of the internal and external environments of NATO, steps 3 and 4 of the strategic planning model.
V. FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

A. INTRODUCTION

In the last chapter we looked at the potential threats and tremendous opportunities facing NATO today. One more step is required before strategic plans can be formulated—the construction of possible scenarios. These qualitative forecasting techniques described in Chapter II, are used here to help in developing a strategy for NATO for the next several decades. As possible future events are considered, plans can be developed to prevent or to meet them should they occur.

B. FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE FORMER SOVIET UNION

As explained in the last chapter, instabilities in the former Soviet Union will-have far-reaching effects on NATO. In this section, more background information is presented, followed by descriptions of several likely scenarios and their potential effects on NATO. The first two scenarios envision a resurgent Russia and the second two see a Russia which has dissolved in civil war.

1. Background of scenarios in the former Soviet Union

Today the former Soviet Union faces staggering economic and social problems. As a result of Yeltsin's economic policies prices are soaring in Russia. A kilo of beef costs half a month's pension in Moscow. Agricultural and
industrial production has been declining steadily. Economists predict another 30 percent decline in GNP in 1992. Privatization plans are still only crudely formulated and due to resistance in the Russian Parliament, agricultural reforms can not begin in 1992. There are severe shortages of consumer goods and no provisions have been made to ensure adequate supplies of these goods. Unemployment is also on the rise. Economists predict that 11 million more people will become unemployed in 1992. With no financial support, these unemployed people fill the streets. Accordingly, the crime rate is also increasing just as quickly. Proper health care is not available in the hospitals either. During these difficult times the Russian people are expecting Yeltsin and his administration to do something to ease these critical problems, but so far there has been no significant improvement.

These economic and social problems have created an intense pressure on the democratic reforms that have accompanied recent economic initiatives. These pressures are furthermore personified by right-wing nationalists, who are taking advantage of the situation. As an example, nationalists like Vladimir Zhirinovsky claim that Russia need more authoritarian government to deal with these problems. As the economic troubles continue he and other hard-liners are gaining more and more public support. The key support that they lack is that of the military. To day Yeltsin retains the support of key commanders in the Soviet military, the same
ones whose refusal to obey the August 1991 coup leaders resulted in the coup's failure. These military leaders believe in Yeltsin and in the democratic and free market reforms he has promised to carry out. As the economic chaos continues and the Russian military and even the Russia itself, continues to disintegrate, the military hard-liners may at last side with the right-wing nationalist and assume power. Understandably, this would probably be accepted by the Russian people who are weary of hardships and may view authoritarianism as the only choice left, in the light of the failure of Yeltsin's economic and political reforms.

Another consideration which provides necessary background is the history of Russian domination of Europe and Asia. Since the time of Peter the Great, Russia has exerted military and political pressure on all of its neighbors. Incredible but true, Russia has started more wars in Europe than any other European state. Most recently the center of brutal communist empire, Russia has never been ruled by democratic governments. This is what makes democracy's foothold in Russia so tenuous. President Boris Yeltsin, the first popularly elected leader of Russia ever, has been placed in the unenviable position of being expected to solve all of Russia's serious problems. He is the symbol of democracy in Russia, but his fate, as well as the fate of the democratic and free market reforms he has championed, must improve economic and social conditions to survive.
2. The Scenarios

In light of these background considerations, a rightwing nationalist regime dominated by irresponsible leaders is a distinct possibility. In this first scenario, these leaders consolidate military and political control in Russia and then begin to bully other former Soviet republics and to work toward reentering Eastern Europe. Their main aim is to regain the empire that so recently crumbled. This time, however, it is under nationalist Russian flag instead of the hammer and sickle. Of course, a polyglot empire such as those ruled by the Soviets or the czars can be reconstituted only by military force and by a return to the state of hostility toward the outside world that existed for centuries [Ref. 42:p. 34]. Former U.S. Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger expressed this Russian sentiment after he visited Moscow:

They [a group of Russians] argued that the United States was taking advantage of the current situation and that the term 'new world order' was highly presumptuous because it assumed that Russia would no longer be a significant factor in world affairs.

Above all, Russian nationalism translates into a desire to restore traditional dominance over the other republics. A major personality in Russian parliament told me [Dr Kissinger], 'we would never have put forward the commonwealth if we had thought it possible that Ukraine might actually become independent. I will never accept Kiev as a foreign city.' [Ref. 42:p. 35]

Accordingly, the first thing these nationalists will do is to dominate Ukraine again. As Dr Kissinger observed, Russia has never really accepted an independent Ukraine. Further, there are other major problems between Russia and Ukraine. These
are the control of nuclear weapons deployed on the Ukrainian soil, the ownership of the Black Sea Fleet and who will exercise command and control over conventional weapons. In this scenario, the rightwing dictatorship in Moscow uses these problems as a pretext and militarily overwhelms Ukraine. Ukraine attempts to defend its territory but badly outnumbered and cannot stop the Russian advance. 500,000 troops stationed in Ukraine who are loyal to Moscow, equipped with modern weapons, help the other Russian divisions. After dominating Ukraine, Russia simultaneously attacks Poland, the Baltic Republics and Kazakhstan. There are three different purposes in these attacks. Russia attacks Poland to show the West that it is still a power in Europe. The Russian attack on Baltic Republics serves to demonstrate Russian resolve to revive the old Soviet empire under a new Russian nationalism. Since the baltics were the first to defy the old Soviet Union, they will be the first to be subjugated again. The third attack is a message to the Muslim states. Kazakhstan is the Muslim central Asian Republic which has the most powerful resources among the central Asian republics, and so Russian control of Kazakhstan will bring the rest of the central Asian republics under Russian domination. Russia uses the rights of the Russian minorities living in these countries as a pretext for these attacks. The Russian components of these populations is substantial; 34 percent of Latvia, 9.5 percent of Estonia, 9 percent of Lithuania and 38 percent of Kazakhstan are Russian.
Additional pretexts for invading Poland may be the humiliating situation of the remaining former Soviet forces in Poland or even supposed Polish nationalist attempts to regain the territory that lost to the Soviet Union after World War II. Russia demands that its troops be allowed to stay in Poland and forces the Polish government to sign an agreement favored by Russia. A major factor in all these is Russia's nuclear intimidation.

The second scenario envisions a Russia which overcomes its economic hardships. Russia with the help of the West restores its economy. Increasing industrial production and integrating its economy with the rest of the world's economies. As a result of rapid economic growth, Russia regains its strength, as Gorbachev had envisioned in the mid-1980s. This resurgent Russia then chooses not to break from the western camp and again becomes a superpower. This Russia is ruled by a highly centralized government which is neither completely democratic nor completely totalitarian. At the same time the Eastern European countries and the other former Soviet republics cannot recover fully from economic disaster. Russia does not carry out a policy of military aggression but instead dominates its former republics and satellites economically. By providing economic aid to these countries, Russia pulls them back into its orbit. Following this, Russia also forms a military alliance with them and reaches agreements which allow Russia to deploy forces to Eastern European
countries to protect them from a powerful Germany. In this way, Russia prevents the western powers from interfering with Eastern European affairs and indicates clearly that it is ready to use military action to enforce this. Russia also ignores its treaty obligations with the West and begins arming itself again with sophisticated nuclear and conventional weapons. This scenario is essentially the revival of the old Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, but under a different ideology.

The third scenario, envisions civil war in the Russian Federation itself. The former Soviet Union's mixed ethnic composition was well known, but some do not realize how fragmented is the ethnic composition of the Russian Federation. The population of 150 million people is composed of at least 39 nationalities and scores of distinguishable ethnic groups within these nationalities. Predominantly Muslim and oil reach Chechen-Ingush and Tatar republics are restless. Chechen-Ingush declared independence in November 1991 and Tatar held a referendum in March 1992 in which the sovereignty and equal status with Russia was approved. In this scenario, other Russian Federation provinces attempt to do the same thing. As the Russian government opposes this, armed clashes break out. This results in a Yugoslavia-like civil war in the Russian Federation, except in this case the secessionists control tactical nuclear weapons and use them against Russia when the uprising is close to defeat. This scenario could
result in the complete disintegration of the Russian Federation.

A fourth and final scenario involves armed conflict between the republics of the former Soviet Union. In this case, Russia forms its own armed forces and the other republics do the same. An armed conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia again breaks out, but this time the Central Asian republics form an alliance and denounce Armenia. They give Armenia an ultimatum to recognize the status quo in the disputed Nogorno-Karabag enclave. Armenia refuses the demands and as a result the Central Asian republics invade and overwhelm Armenia. The Russian government intervenes in order to show that it is still the leader in the region and has the power to restore order. The Russian intervention, however, creates a major armed conflict in the region in which tactical nuclear weapons and chemical weapons are used, again resulting in the disintegration of the governments of the republics.

3. Effects of these four scenarios on NATO

All of these events have profound impacts on NATO. The first two scenarios, which envision a resurgent Russia, is critically important to NATO’s planning, since an adventurous, hard-liner Russian government means that NATO may have about reducing its defenses may have to be shelved. In scenario one, the threat is most imminent. A Russian reentry into Poland immediately resumes the old confrontation of two forces again, but this time on the Polish-German border (Oder-Neisse)
instead of East-West German border. During the initial days of the crisis Ukraine and later the Baltic Republics and Poland ask for help from the West and specifically from NATO. At this point the West applies economic sanctions to stop Russian aggression, but the Russian government threatens to use nuclear weapons. This time, with an adventurous government in Russia controlling the nuclear weapons, the West cannot predict as confidently where their adversary's nuclear threshold will be. As Figure 4 shows, all of the NATO countries are within range of SS-20 missiles based east of the Urals.

Figure 4: Coverage of SS-20 missiles. Source: Ref. 14:p.113
With such a great danger so close, the West hesitates and Russia sees this as weakness and my continue its aggression even further west. Even though Russian forces are poor in quality, they still control the largest arsenal of conventional weapons in Europe.

In Scenario three, main danger lies in the control of the nuclear weapons by secessionist groups in the Russian Federation. Aside from the all-too-real possibility of nuclear blackmail to obtain the West’s support, there is a significant degree of danger to the environment even from the explosion of a small nuclear weapon in Russia. All of the countries in Western Europe, especially Turkey, experienced harmful fallout from the Chernobyl nuclear reactor incident. An incident more severe than this could have grave effects on the agricultural economies in the area.

In scenario four, there is another dimension to civil war besides a nuclear exchange. A conflict in Central Asia threatens the borders of NATO because Turkey is very close to this region. Because of the historic, cultural, ethnic ties between Turkey and the Central Asian republics, this conflict may spill as Turkey feels forced to intervene on behalf of the other Turkic states. Turkey may face another refugee crisis, this time on her northeastern border, as the people of the Central Asian republics flee from the devastation of war to seek refuge in Turkey.
C. FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS IN EASTERN EUROPE

The scenarios described here for Eastern Europe are similar to those described above for the former Soviet Union. This similarity is to be expected, since for the last fifty years the two have traveled down the same road together as members of the Soviet empire. Likewise, in embracing democracy and market-oriented reforms, their paths have also been much the same. For these reasons, their shared backgrounds and their similar visions of the future, the pitfalls they face are alike as well. In the scenarios that follow the pitfalls facing the Eastern European countries and the implications of each are examined.

1. Scenarios

The first scenario related to the future of Eastern Europe, is the domination of these countries by right-wing military dictators. Economic hardships in these countries are so severe that many people have lost hope in the democratic process and in free market economy to bring about prosperity or even some measure of relief. At the same time many military leaders are becoming convinced that the best way, or even the only way, to solve these problems, is to form an authoritarian government. In this scenario, military and civilian hard-liners from Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and Romania make contacts with their Russian counterparts and decide to assume power. After assuming power in their respective countries they sign an agreement to form an
alliance between them. Russian forces are soon deploying to Eastern Europe again. They blame the West for not giving necessary help to rebuild their economies. Tension with West grows rapidly as these leaders use nuclear blackmail or apply other military pressure on NATO's borders to convince the West to increase aid. This scenario is similar to scenario one in the last section, except that in this case authoritarian governments in Eastern Europe willingly cooperate with Russia and invite Russian forces to their countries to "help" them enforce their rules. In the above scenario, we assumed that a revitalized Russia exists, one which is nationalistic and which believes that the leadership of Eastern Europe belongs to her. The following two scenarios use this same starting point.

Scenario two involves the dispute between Romania and Hungary, described in chapter IV. This dispute centers around the situation of ethnic Hungarians in Romania. Prompted by the government of Hungary, the Hungarian minority in Romania claims more and more rights, but the Romanian government refuses their demands. Finally a breaking point is reached and the Hungarian minority rises up against the Romanian government, receiving help including military supplies from Hungary. Romania vigorously protests the role of Hungary in this conflict and accuses her of interfering in its internal affairs. Diplomatic initiatives are put forward by both countries but prove to be unsuccessful. Border clashes
escalate and Hungary and Romania are drawn into an armed conflict. Moldova, once part of Romania but lost to the Soviet Union in 1940, uses the conflict between Romania and Hungary as a pretext to reunite with Romania and help in the war against Hungary. Ironically, minorities within Moldova, the 14 percent who are Ukrainian and the 13 percent who are Russian, contribute to Moldova's downfall by opposing and requesting—and receiving—assurances of help from the Russian government. Insistent, Moldova again declares itself a part of Romania and joins the war against Hungary. Russia, Ukraine and Belarus warn Moldova to repeal the unification and respect the rights of the Russian and Ukrainian populations but Moldova rejects their demands. Russia, Ukraine and Belarus respond this time with military force. Other Eastern European countries, fearing the involvement of these three Slavic countries, especially Russia, in this conflict and anxious that Russia will use this situation as a pretext to reenter Eastern Europe with the help of Ukraine and Belarus, mobilize their militaries and declare that if Russian forces cross the Romanian border they too will get involved in the conflict. This scenario ends in a major war in Eastern Europe in which tactical nuclear weapons are used.

The third scenario in Eastern Europe has to do with Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovakia is made up of Czechs and Slovaks. In the past there were disputes between these two groups, but under communism these were suppressed. After the
collapse of communism, however, for the first time in many decades they have been allowed full and free expression. Now Czechs and Slovaks have started preparing three constitutions: one Czech, one Slovak and one federal constitution. This effort is still in progress. This scenario projects that as a result of deepening economic problems, the dispute between Czechs and Slovaks flares up and efforts to mediate fail. Slovaks demand to form their own state and secede from Czechoslovakia. The federal government rejects their demand and a civil war breaks out. Poland, Ukraine and Belarus, which are also Slavic countries side with the Slovaks. Hungary, which fears the rise of a Pan-Slavic sentiment, sides with the Czechs. This situation brings about a major conflict in Eastern Europe. Russia at first offers its help as a mediator to find a peaceful solution to the problem. The Czechs, however, ask for help from the West to restore the situation. Russia militates against any Western involvement by deploying troops to Poland to help the Slovaks, while the nations of the west strongly protest the Russian action. Also fearing a new Russian expansionism, Romania demands support from the West and mobilizes its forces. An anti-Western Russian administration curtly states this is a Slavic matter and threatens the West with using military force, including weapons of mass destruction, to stop further Western involvement.
The fourth and final scenario concerns the Balkan peninsula which today contains the countries Yugoslavia, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, Greece and part of Turkey. In addition to disputes between any two of this, as one reviews the history of this region and today observes the political landscape one senses that any dispute could cause a chain reaction involving all the countries in a major war. Before first world war this peninsula was the political hot spot of Europe, and the spark which started that war occurred in the peninsula when Austrian Archduke Ferdinand was assassinated in Sarajavo by a Serb. The Current situation in the region is little better, as described in the previous chapter. Macedonia proclaimed its independence from Yugoslavia in March 1992. In this scenario Macedonia gains recognition from the West and gets economic aid. This resurgent Macedonia starts claiming from Bulgaria territories which had once belonged to Macedonia. Bulgaria strongly rejects this claim and announces that it will use military action to prevent this. Tension boils over and Macedonia and Bulgaria go to war. This situation causes a chain reaction in the following sequence. Romania attempts to incorporate Dobrudja, a territory adjacent to the Black Sea and currently divided between Romania and Bulgaria. Bulgaria resists and the Bulgarian people in Dobrudja rise up against Romania. Romania, trying to use the armed conflict between Macedonia and Bulgaria to its advantage, uses force to annex the region. Bulgaria responds in
like manner, while at the same time resumes repressing the
Turkish minority in response to pressure from Bulgarian
nationalists. This situation creates a sharp dispute with
Turkey. Greece, which had refused to acknowledge that Macedo-
nia exists strongly protests the Macedonian action, which
stirs up further trouble on the Greece’s northern border. At
the same time Albanians living in the Serbian province of
Kosova rise up and try to claim this province for Albania.
The government of Albania supports their efforts and clashes
between Albania and Serbia start. Croatia takes advantage of
this and resumes its attack against Serbia. All of these
events together explode into a major war in the Balkan
Peninsula.

2. **Effects on NATO**

All of these scenarios would affect NATO greatly,
because most of them share at least one border with a NATO
country. There will be two major effects.

The worst situation would be a menacing military
presence, especially Russian, in one of these adjacent
countries, as in scenarios one through three. Any reentry of
Russia into Eastern Europe resumes the old confrontation
between the NATO forces and Russian forces on the NATO’s
eastern border. In all three scenarios Russia is hostile to
the West and threatens to use nuclear forces. Any use of
nuclear forces, even in Eastern Europe, would be an environ-
mental and economic disaster.
Almost as bad as a nuclear threat, and potentially even more destabilizing, would be the huge refugee problems on NATO's borders in the event of a war. Refugees and war go together; NATO would have this situation thrust on it with no choice. As the Albanian refugee exodus to Italy in 1991 showed, economic reasons alone create tremendous pressure on the receiving country to return the refugees. If they cannot be feasibly returned, their presence can destabilize the government. Germany experienced the same problem when East Germans overwhelmed West Germany just before reunification occurred in October 1990. Both crises created troubles for both countries and consumed vast resources. Both of these cases were limited. Italy repatriated the Albanian refugees and re-unification made the German problem manageable. In a major war in Eastern Europe or especially in the Balkans, the refugee problem will dwarf these two examples and could completely overwhelm the abilities of NATO countries to absorb or even temporarily keep the refugees. And the greatest refugee burden may fall on the NATO members least equipped to deal with it: Turkey and Greece. In January 1991, a stream of Albanian ethnic Greeks crossed the Greek border and, in earlier June 1989, more than 300,000 ethnic Turks were expelled to Turkey by the communist government of Bulgaria. Refugees streaming across borders en masse will themselves constitute a security problem for Turkey and Greece by heightening ethnic and nationalist anger in both countries.
Turkey and Greece will have an additional economic problem, since a large part of their economies depends on trade with the other Balkan countries and a war would certainly disrupt this.

D. FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The third geographic area relevant to NATO's security is the Middle East. The efforts of Syria, Iran, Iraq, Libya and Algeria to acquire sophisticated conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction, as well as the unstable politics of these countries, were explained in the previous chapter. This section builds on that discussion by developing three scenarios.

1. Scenarios

The first scenario envisions a radical and militarily adventurous Iran flexing its muscles. Since 1980, when Iran became an Islamic state, Islamic fundamentalists have controlled Iran. In spite of Iranian President Hashemi Rafsanjani's attempts to curb the influence of the mullahs and to initiate market reforms, fundamentalists keep their power and push Rafsanjani to take a more radical line. The fundamentalists see the weak position of Iraq and the turmoil in the former Soviet Union as an opportunity to realize their aim set for them by Ayatollah Humaini: to gather all the Muslims under one Iranian-led banner. In this scenario they amass a huge quantity of military hardware and decide it is time to
They try to influence the former Soviet republics of Central Asia by providing aid to them along with ideological education. They help Azarbaijan in its war with Armenia by sending troops. Iran's interference in Azarbaijan and its shrill propaganda for Islamic fundamentalism threatens to destroy relations between Iran and Turkey. Turkey, the only NATO member with a majority Muslim population, is a secular state and strongly opposes any kind of Islamic fundamentalism. Iran, on the other hand, is doing all it can to cast itself as the world leader of Islam. An example of this is its continual attempt to keep the Palestinian issue on the world agenda. So using the activities of sympathetic Shiite groups in Iraq as a screen, Iran reopens its war with Iraq. Iraq, tries to resist but cannot stop the fast Iranian troops supported by long-range missiles based in Iran.

The United Nations Security Council immediately issues a resolution condemning Iran's action and demands a cease fire and withdrawal of all Iranian forces from Iraq; this resolution is accompanied by economic sanctions. Iran declares that it will not obey the resolution unless Israel withdraws from the occupied Palestinian territories. By framing the issues as a battle of the Islamic faithful against the infidels, Iran increases anti-Western sentiment in the region to gain as much public support as possible. China allows the U.N. sanctions to pass but continues to provide technical expertise and military hardware to Iran in exchange
for hard currency. Iran eventually captures all Iraqi oil fields, holds them hostage, knowing that West cannot afford to loose this oil in the long term. After consolidating its initial gains in Iraq, Iran begins to put pressure on Saudi Arabia for its oil revenues. Saudi Arabia requests Western help. Iran begins to attack Israel by using long-range ballistic missiles, sometimes using chemical war heads. Israel retaliates with chemical then with nuclear weapons. The outrage of the other Muslim countries plunges the entire Middle East into a general war, interrupting NATO’s oil supplies and threatening to involve Turkey at any moment.

The second scenario sees Iraq and Syria as major antagonists working together against Israel. Syria’s Hafez Assad, one of the chief architects of Arab support for the American coalition in the Gulf War, decides cooperation with the West is no longer necessary for the moment. He makes a broad alliance with a rehabilitated Iraqi government which has ousted Saddam Hussein and appears more moderate. Promising democratic reforms the new Iraqi leaders successfully bring an end to sanctions and, along with Assad, tighten their control and continue to arm again. Syrian and Iraqi leaders believe that no solution can be found with Israel through negotiations and they publicly blame the U.N. for using double standard with Arab and Israeli issues. The Iraqi leadership makes a momentous announcement that they will support Syria by all means available should a war breaks out with Israel. Syrian-
backed terrorists intensify their attacks on Israel and Israel retaliates accordingly. Tension between Israel and both Iraq and Syria rises to a fever pitch. King Hussein of Jordan tries to ease the situation but is toppled by Palestinian extremists. Syria, Iraq and Jordan begin launching missiles into Israel and provoking a massive Israeli retaliation on all three countries. A general war follows, with chemical weapons used by both sides. Threatened by NATO bases in Southern Turkey and nursing a grievance from Turkey's assistance to the allies in the Gulf War, Iraq attempts to strike these bases. Syria joins in and claims the Hatay province of Turkey, which by a 1939 referendum was incorporated into Turkey. Syria also accuses Turkey of using water pipelines as a weapon. This situation threatens Turkey's territorial integrity and draws a measured response from Turkey against both Syria and Iraq. These two countries also accuse Saudi Arabia and Kuwait of conspiring with the West during the Gulf War, and attempt to bring these countries' oil reserves under their control using the threat of chemical or nuclear weapons. Attempting next to blackmail the West with an oil embargo, Syria and Iraq draw NATO into the war.

The third and the final Middle East scenario pits Libya and Algeria against NATO. For the last twenty years Libya has been an unceasing irritant to the West. Most recently, Libya declined to turn over two intelligence officers accused of bombing Pan Am Flight 103 in 1986. As a
result the U.N. imposed limited sanctions on Libya. In this scenario, Libya’s continuing intransigence results in full economic sanctions. After these are put into effect, Libya faces an economic crisis. Libyan leader Kaddafi feels he must do something to save face, or just to keep his power. At the same time, Algerian Islamic fundamentalists exploit the situation by stirring up sentiment against the West’s interference in an Islamic nation. As inroads are reopened in the Libyan army and in the Libyan people, Kaddafi gives full support to the Islamic groups in Algeria. The Islamic groups at last are able to assume power in Algeria and at once promise to support Libya in its struggle with the West. What makes this scenario different is that Algeria has acquired nuclear weapons. Libya and Algeria begin to attack to the Western interests. They disrupt NATO’s lines of communication in the Mediterranean with the threat of nuclear weapons and whip up anti-Western sentiment in the other Arab countries of the Middle East with a well-financed propaganda campaign and an attack on Israel. As before, NATO is drawn into a general war in the Middle East.

2. Effects on NATO

In all three scenarios one or more NATO countries are directly attacked. According to the North Atlantic Treaty, "an attack on one or more members is considered an attack on them all." So NATO countries have to support their allies and that will be the first test of NATO in combat. In the general
wars described here, it is highly probable that one or more NATO members will be hit by weapons of mass destruction, resulting in political and economic chaos. The flow of Middle East oil to NATO countries is disrupted, causing further serious economic damage. To make things worse, the lines of communication and transportation come under attack in the Mediterranean, making it difficult to deploy troops and supplies from one theater to another.

E. SUMMARY

In this chapter scenarios about the possible future developments were constructed. It is also important to note that infinite number of events can occur in the future. The scenarios presented here are the probable ones when one takes into consideration the history and the current events. Scenarios presented here were related to former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and the Middle East, three regions in which the developments have an immediate effect on NATO. Also NATO planners should keep in mind the unpredictable emergence of another power which may pose threat in the future. In light of Chapter IV and Chapter V, the next chapter presents the new strategic planning of NATO.
VI. A NEW STRATEGY FOR NATO

A. INTRODUCTION

At this point the strategic planning process is about half done. Steps 1 and 2, which briefly address NATO’s mandates and mission, and steps 3 and 4, which examine the internal environment and external environments in the present and in the future, have been examined. In this chapter the process will be completed. The new strategic issues for NATO, which are based on the preceding analyses of the environments, are presented, thereby completing step 5. Next, NATO’s mandates and mission, steps 1 and 2, are reexamined in light of steps 3 through 5. Finally, a new strategy for NATO is formulated to complete step 6.

B. THE NEW STRATEGIC ISSUES

1. How can we prevent instabilities in the former Soviet Union or in Eastern Europe from developing into major conflicts that threaten the security and interests of our people? How can we maintain stability throughout Europe?

2. How can we deter Russia (alone or with its former allies), hostile Middle Eastern countries or any other country or group of countries from endangering the security and the vital interests of our countries without assigning too many resources to this task?
3. Should deterrence fail, how can we defend the territories and interests of our nations and defeat the aggressor?

4. How can we keep countries with unstable politics and those who are hostile to the West from obtaining weapons of mass destruction? If they obtain them, how can we protect our people from being attacked with them?

5. How can we verify that Russia and its former allies are complying with the arms reduction treaties they have signed? How can we verify that Russia is dismantling its weapons of mass destruction as it promised and is preventing the transfer of these weapons and related technologies to any third party?

The instabilities and their possible developments along with their effects to NATO were explained in the previous chapters. NATO's mission generally states that: "... to promote the stability and well-being of the Alliance area." So, NATO should effectively deal with the potential crises and should prevent them from developing into major conflicts. If NATO fails to deal with them, then major conflicts may spill over into NATO countries and pose the threats mentioned in the previous chapters. That is the essence of the first strategic issue.

Assessment of the external environment showed that a threat may come from the former Soviet Union, alone or with its former allies, and from the Middle East. Another country
or group of countries may emerge in the future which pose a threat to the security of the member countries. NATO should deter all of them from attempting to attack NATO nations. NATO should also defeat any kind of aggression, should it occur, in order to protect its territory and well-being of its people. In light of the new opportunities NATO should do it without putting great burden on the constrained resources. These are the essences of the second and the third strategic issues. If NATO fails to address these issues then the old confrontation may resume in Europe or a resurgent Russia may again bully the West. In the Middle East, any country may calculate that it is not so risky to act against the West, and may threaten the territory and the vital interests of NATO.

Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction puts NATO countries in danger. If any country uses these weapons against NATO, then the destruction in the member country which is hit will be immense. The proliferation of these weapons threatens the very security of NATO countries because of their destructive power and their adverse effects on the environment. External environmental analysis showed that these weapons may be controlled by some irresponsible people in Russia and by some other countries that are also trying to develop such weapons. That is the essences of the fourth and part of the fifth issues. If NATO fails to deal with them it faces the great danger of these kinds of weapons. Russia and its former allies pledged to reduce their conventional
arsenals. But, the Western countries should be sure that they are fulfilling these obligations. The reason of arms reduction is to improve the security environment in Europe by eliminating the offensive capabilities of the armies so that no country can bully another one. If NATO fails to ensure this then an adventurous government in Russia or in an Eastern European country may find an offensive army at its disposal, powerful enough to threaten West again. That is the essence of the fifth issue.

C. MANDATES REVISITED (A BRIEF RETURN TO STEP 1)

There are two points that should be addressed concerning NATO’s mandates. The first is that since the North Atlantic Treaty did not mention the Soviet threat specifically (nor did it mention any other specific threat), no modification to the Treaty is needed now that this once formidable threat has wilted and others are sprouting in its place. Actions taken in response to the mandate of defending NATO countries against any threat are simply redirected toward these new ones. The second point is that Article 6’s strict prohibition against military action outside NATO territories should be relaxed in order to deal with newer, different kinds of threats. A brief review of the history of this prohibition and the reasons for changing it follow.

After helping to put an end to two World Wars in which Europe was the center stage, the United States was stretched
uncomfortably between two necessities. Her inevitable involvement in these two wars despite great efforts to the contrary revealed that she must take an active part in maintaining peace in the world and especially in Europe. Isolationism was dead and the conviction that aggressors must be stopped in their tracks was held nearly unanimously. On the other hand, the great cost of these two wars and the seeming ease with which the countries of the world were drawn into them compelled her to find a way to make getting involved more difficult. This sentiment, shared by other countries in Western Europe, found expression in Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty. This article stated that the Alliance would jointly defend only against attacks on members' own territories, adjacent seas and sovereign islands in the North Atlantic Treaty's area. Predictably, Out-of-Area (OOA) challenges have been a source of friction in the Alliance ever since the Treaty was signed in 1949. During the Cold War the Soviet Union's actions in and through various third world countries kept this issue alive within NATO. [Ref. 41:pp. 25-26]

As the disintegration of the Soviet Union accelerated in 1989 and 1990 many NATO members were glad to put this issue to rest, or so they thought. The invasion of Saddam Hussein's forces into Kuwait awakened NATO with a jolt. This action and the ensuing Gulf War in which Kuwait was eventually liberated demonstrated that certain vital NATO interests worth defending
lay outside the boundaries drawn by Article 6. Allied participation in the Gulf War was highly effective and serves in some ways as a model for future Out-of-Area involvements. [Ref. 41:pp. 25-26]

Even before Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, voices within NATO were recommending that the OOA limitations should be relaxed. Ironically, the United States was one of this view’s most vocal proponents. At a 1991 conference in Washington, D.C., Stephen J. Hadley, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, urged the allies to consider new guidelines in this area:

I hope Europe could now break out of the sterile debate over out-of-area deployments. It is, I think, in some measure ‘old-think’. The world has changed, and I think the events in the Persian Gulf have really shown that the out-of-area has come into the NATO area. As evidence the Iraqi ground threat to Turkey—a NATO member—and the possibility that Middle Eastern ballistic missiles might one day target Western European cities. [Ref. 43:p.452]

U.S. Senator William V. Roth Jr. (R-Del.) said during the Senate’s war debate that "NATO, if it is to be relevant in the world of tomorrow, must play a more significant role where its vital interests are at stake, as they are now in the Persian Gulf." [Ref.43:p. 454]

In spite of these sentiments, however, Article 6 was still in effect. But as the saying goes, "Where there’s a will, there’s a way," and NATO’s members decided to defend their vital interests in the Persian Gulf. This time, however, it was under the banner of the United Nations. Most
interesting was the shift in attitudes throughout the NATO countries.

America, Britain and France contributed the greatest part of the accumulated ground, air and naval forces used in the effort. Given their dependence on Middle East oil and their history of involvement in regional conflicts in the context of the U.N. Security Council, this was not surprising. But other nations formerly reluctant to get involved in this type of action willingly participated this time. Turkey deployed 120,000 troops and 48 fighter planes on the Iraqi border and granted basing rights to U.S. aircraft. Germany, which had objected to the transfer of U.S. tanks from Germany to Israel during the 1973 Yom Kippur War as a violation of NATO's OOA mandate, provided substantial assistance in moving the U.S. Army's VII Corps from Germany to Saudi Arabia. Similarly Spain, who with France had forbidden U.S. aircraft to cross their airspaces to attack Libya in 1986, hosted 15 B-52 bombers that mounted regular raids on Iraq. France also agreed to let B-52s based in southern Britain cross its territory and even land to refuel. [Ref. 43:p. 453] All other members made similar contributions because the situation in the gulf threatened NATO's Southern Flank and all of the members need the vital resource of the region, oil.

The Out-of Area Gulf crisis had posed a serious challenge to the Alliance, and the Western nations met the challenge and passed the test with flying colors. All of the NATO countries
now agree that the probability of a similar crisis occurring again is high and so they are speaking out accordingly.

Though formal debate over Article 6 has not yet begun, cracks in this article are appearing everywhere. Recently the President and the two Vice Presidents of the North Atlantic Assembly stated that "Changed global circumstances demand a changed NATO charter in order to allow the Alliance to confront, promptly and directly, threats to its members' security from wherever those threats emanate." [Ref. 41:p. 26] General John Galvin, Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, said plainly that "Out-of-area activities are going to be . . . something that is definitely part of NATO's future." [Ref.41:p. 26] U.S. Secretary of State James Baker and former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher have also strongly hinted at their dissatisfaction with the Treaty's constraints; other members have similarly called for the broadening of NATO's areas of responsibility. [Ref. 41:p. 26] When the time comes to change the Treaty, Article 12 describes the procedure:

After the treaty has been in force for ten years, or at any time thereafter, the parties shall, if any of them so requests, consult together for purposes of reviewing the Treaty, having regard for the factors that affect peace and security in the North Atlantic Area . . . .[Ref.44 p. 15]

Article 6 should be revised in this way: ". . . in order that NATO take on a broadened role, deterring conflict not only in the member nations' territories but wherever else conflict may
threaten the security of the Alliance members." [Ref. 41:p. 26] NATO’s mandates, then, should be as follows:

1. NATO is, and will remain, a purely defensive Alliance. NATO’s doctrine will continue to be based on measured and timely resistance to attack, from whatever source. NATO will never initiate aggression. [Ref. 45:p. 88]

2. NATO will deter and if necessary defeat an aggression wherever aggression threatens the security of member nations as well as the territories of the member nations and adjacent waters.

3. Military power will continue to contribute toward stability and will remain an essential safety net for the security of the allies. NATO will continue to maintain military forces. [Ref. 45:p. 88]

4. NATO will obey all the resolutions of the U.N. Security Council.

D. MISSION REVISITED (A BRIEF RETURN TO STEP 2)

Like the mandates, NATO’s mission should also be revised. The first part is a stakeholder analysis. The stakeholders are still the people in the countries of Western and Southern Europe which signed the North Atlantic Treaty. This has not changed. What has changed is how the stakeholders will measure success. As before, NATO still must deter any attack on these countries and, if deterrence fails, must successfully defend against the attack. Also NATO still must ensure the
peace and stability of its members. Now, however, NATO must work politically and economically to ensure a stable Europe as well so that military intervention there will not be necessary. To the extent possible, NATO must also foster stability in the former Soviet Union, North Africa and the Middle East. And NATO must do all this on a reduced defense budget. After forty-five years of Cold War and most recently a long recession, the people of the NATO countries want a "peace dividend" and expect their governments to give it to them. Under these pressures all member governments are being forced to reduce military spending to a realistic figure and use their constrained resources in the other areas that need attention. The following revised mission statement for NATO takes all this into consideration:

The North Atlantic Treaty is the political framework for an international Alliance designed to prevent aggression or to repel it, should it occur. The organization exists to safeguard the freedom, security and vital interests of all its members by political and military means in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter.

The means by which the Alliance pursues its main security purpose include the maintenance of a military capability sufficient to prevent war and to provide for effective defense; an overall capability to manage successfully crises affecting the security and vital interests of its members; and the pursuit of political efforts favoring dialogue with other nations and the active search for a cooperative approach to European security, including the field of arms control and disarmament.

To fulfil the needs of its members, the Alliance performs the following security tasks:

I. To provide one of the indispensable foundations for a stable security environment in Europe, based on the growth
of democratic institutions and commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes, in which no country would be able to intimidate or coerce any European nation or to impose hegemony through the threat or use of force.

II. To serve, as provided for in Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, as a transatlantic forum for Allied consultations on any issues that effect their vital interests, including possible developments posing risks for members' security, and for appropriate coordination of their efforts in fields of common concern.

III. To deter and defend against any threat or aggression against territories and interests of the member nations, including proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, disruption of the flow of vital resources.

IV. To preserve the strategic balance within Europe.

The nature of the Alliance embodies the transatlantic link by which the security of North America is permanently tied to the security of Europe.

The fundamental operating principle of the Alliance is that of common commitment and mutual cooperation among sovereign states in support of the indivisibility of security for all of its members. An armed attack on one or more of them shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently, if such an armed attack occurs, all parties will assist the party or the parties attacked including the use of armed forces if necessary to restore and maintain the security of the Alliance area.

There are also other institutions in Europe, however the extend of NATO's membership and of its capabilities gives it a particular position in that it can perform all four core security functions mentioned above. [Note: this mission statement is adapted from Ref. 46]

E. THE NEW STRATEGY FOR NATO

1. Background

Today's strategic issues are quite different from those of the yesterday's. In the past, as it was explained in Chapter III, all the strategic issues were related to the Soviet Union and its system of satellites. Yesterday's threat
was also predictable, an immediate invasion from the Eastern Bloc. So, all the strategies, including the force structures, were developed to manage this main issue in the past. But, today’s issues are not centered on one main enemy, like Soviet Union. Today’s issues are versatile, threat to the Alliance can come from different sources in different forms. What is worse, the environment is very uncertain today. On the other hand, West has a great opportunity today, reduced tension brings about reduced military spending. Instead of building armies, countries can spend their money for the well-being of their peoples. NATO has to take this opportunity. NATO has to take another opportunity which is the achieving Alliance objectives through political means. These two opportunities have already been incorporated into NATO’s mission statement.

There are several alternatives for NATO. The first alternative is that: NATO reduces its forces to a reasonable level while deploying them on its eastern border as before for deterrence. NATO also relies heavily on its nuclear weapons to deter potential threats from weapons of mass destruction against its members. For this purpose NATO initiates a nuclear modernization program. Another alternative is the reduction of NATO’s forces to a minimum level while improving dialogue and cooperation with the former Soviet republics and the Eastern European countries. NATO’s minimum forces’ main mission is the peacekeeping duties. NATO also takes measures for arms reduction treaty verifications and nuclear prolifera-
tion and forms a defense against weapons of mass destruction. The third alternative is similar to the second one. Only difference is that NATO maintains its forces at today's level in this alternative. The fourth and the last one is a hybrid of all of them. In this alternative NATO reduces its forces to a reasonable level, this forces become more flexible to deploy crises areas quickly and more versatile to perform different duties. NATO also improves cooperation and dialogue with the former Soviet republics for crisis prevention and crisis management purposes, takes measures for arms reduction treaty verifications and nuclear proliferation and forms a defense against weapons of mass destruction.

The first alternative uses one opportunity but misses the other. It envisions force reductions but does not deal with crisis prevention and crisis management through dialogue. NATO's mission statement states that one of the objectives of NATO is to create stability in Europe by improving dialogue and cooperation with the other countries. This alternative cannot achieve this objective. Also deploying NATO's forces on its eastern border is a passive approach to the security. Since, in this alternative NATO does not get involved in cooperation and dialogue with the other countries of Europe it may require more effort to contain a conflict if it reaches NATO's borders. It is also a passive approach to rely on nuclear weapons for deterrence against the use of weapons of mass destruction by other countries. That means NATO will
wait for being hit before it uses its nuclear weapons. That may be too late.

The second alternative exploits both opportunities but the minimum force level is not consistent with NATO's two main security tasks: preserve the strategic balance in Europe and defense and deter against an aggression. That force level is not enough to perform these tasks. Otherwise the alternative deals with other strategic issues. Likewise, the third alternative misses one of the opportunities: reduction of forces and delivering the resources to the other areas. This alternative also conflicts with the main issue that the stakeholders want: reduction in military spending. The fourth alternative exploits all opportunities, satisfy the key stakeholders through force reductions without endangering the deterrence and defensive posture and through improving the stability in Europe by way of cooperation and dialogue and provides response to each strategic issue. So the strategy statements should use its main ideas. Strategy statements are as follow:

2. Responding to the Issues (Strategy Statements)
   a. Maintaining stability in Europe (Issue 1)
      As we have seen, NATO's primary aim is to ensure the security of its members without needing to go to war. Consequently, NATO's security is necessarily linked to the stability of the countries surrounding the Alliance. For this reason, diplomatic and political efforts to promote stability
in these countries are extremely important. Particularly by encouraging dialogue and peaceful mediation of conflicts, NATO can contribute significantly to its own peace and stability as well as benefit its neighbors. [Ref. 45: p. 90] Also, if any conflict occurs in former Soviet Union or in Eastern Europe in spite of these efforts, NATO will first, rely heavily on political means to contain the conflict before taking any military action. All of these require that NATO should improve dialogue and cooperation among the parties involved. If required, NATO should send military forces which are purely defensive and multinational to the troubled areas in order to perform peacekeeping duties. This broad policy statement is a response to the first issue which requires the prevention of crisis in the troubled areas before developing further and reaching the territories of NATO and promoting stability in Europe.

b. *Deterring and defending against attack (Issues 2 & 3)*

To protect peace and to prevent war, any kind of coercion and the vital interests of its people, the Alliance should maintain an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces based in the Alliance's territory. These forces should be at a significantly reduced level because of the reduced immediate threat, but they must not be reduced too far. Conventional forces help prevent war by ensuring that no potential aggressor can achieve a quick victory, or territori-
al gain, by conventional means. Considering the many kinds of threats and the uncertainties associated with them, the Alliance must maintain the forces necessary to provide a wide range of conventional response options. [Ref. 46:p. 10] NATO should form the appropriate forces and build the necessary infrastructure for this purpose. If necessary, these forces should be deployed out-of-area to protect the interests and security of the member nations. NATO should concentrate its forces and transfer the reinforcements, if necessary, to the areas under threat at the proper time. However, the Alliance's conventional forces alone cannot ensure peace is preserved. Nuclear weapons make a unique contribution to the deterrence by rendering the risk of any aggression incalculable and unacceptable. [Ref. 46:p. 10] Nuclear weapons must be maintained as a deterrent force but at the same time must be the weapons of last resort. Future forces should be multinational, wherever possible, because of force reductions in member countries. As individual nations commit smaller forces to Europe's defense, today's single-nation formations will be replaced by smaller, less effective and less survivable units. Creating multinational formations is a reasonable solution. This approach permits national force draw downs without causing substantial reductions in effectiveness. [Ref. 47:p. 30] This broad statement is a response to the second and the third issues. How can we deter and defeat the enemy?
c. Preventing nuclear proliferation and protecting against nuclear attack (Issues 4 & 5)

NATO members should cooperate in order to prevent the transfer of nuclear knowledge and equipment to other countries. NATO should assist and monitor the dismantling of the Soviet nuclear weapons. Members of the Alliance should cooperate to form a defense against the weapons of mass destruction. Members should also take special measures to verify the agreed upon arms reductions. This statement is a response to the last two issues.

3. The Strategy: Crisis Response and Reduced Forward Presence

a. Overview

NATO's new strategy can be called as "crisis response" with "reduced forward presence." [Ref. 48: p. 3] Crisis response requires first to eliminate the causes of the crises by confidence building measures, if a crisis occurs in spite of this, settle it with political means before it reaches a high level, and if the use of force is necessary then these forces should be deployed to the area promptly. Today, the range of contingencies are broader than during the Cold War period, at the same time crises could occur more frequently and they could be less predictable. It is also not feasible to plan against one or two major contingencies, in the way that was possible during the Cold War. Rather, it is necessary to develop certain kinds of capabilities in order to
make the tasks of crisis management and crisis response easier in a variety of situations. [Ref. 49:p. 511] Reduced forward presence allows the member nations to reduce their military forces. Since the Soviet troops have withdrawn from Eastern Europe, there is no forward line in the central front. Details of the NATO's new strategy are presented below.

b. Crisis response: political measures

The first element of the strategy is dialogue and cooperation with the former Soviet Union (CIS) and the Eastern European countries in order to prevent a crisis. First thing to do is to improve the dialogue and communication between the CIS (including all of its members) and the Eastern European countries and NATO. As the environmental analyses showed, instability, domestic turmoil, ethnic conflicts, and traditional rivalries are the major threats as opposed to the premeditated aggression by any of the major powers. To prevent them from happening mechanisms that facilitate dialogue and minimize the prospects for misperception or miscalculation should be developed, these mechanisms are very important aspects of both crisis prevention and crisis management [Ref. 49:p. 514]. NATO should work to improve dialogue between the former Soviet republics and the Eastern European countries as well as between these countries and NATO in order to contribute to the peaceful solutions of disputes. In this respect, the Alliance should establish regular diplomatic liaisons and military contacts with the countries of central and Eastern
Europe. Civilian and military authorities of these countries should be invited to NATO meetings to intensify exchange of views and information on security policy issues. [Ref. 50] Through such means, NATO can make full use of the unprecedented opportunities afforded by the growth of freedom and democracy throughout Europe and can create an environment which improves mutual understanding of respective security concerns, reduces suspicion and increases predictability in security affairs. All of these reinforce stability in Europe. This useful atmosphere of dialogue which is created by NATO, provides a foundation for greater cooperation throughout Europe and enhances the ability to resolve differences and conflicts by peaceful means. [Ref. 46:p. 7] The Alliance should pursue cooperation with all states in Europe. NATO then must develop broader and more productive patterns of bilateral and multilateral cooperation in all relevant fields of European security. In this NATO's aim is to prevent crises and, when they arise, to manage them effectively. [Ref. 46:p. 8].

c. Crisis response: military measures

In addition, NATO should establish a multinational, small, highly mobile peacekeeping or disaster relief force capable of being deployed rapidly to the area of instability or conflict. It should be technologically intensive force, equipped not only with airborne surveillance capabilities but with remote sensors capable of detecting
military activities by the fighting parties. [Ref. 49:p.516]

This force should also have disaster relief capabilities which include transportation, medical, engineer, and demolition units [Ref. 51:P. 75]. This unit can be used in NATO territory for disaster relief operations such as in refugee crises or environmental clean-up operations. This force should be deployed out-of-area for peacekeeping duties. The out-of area deployment should take place if an only if an agreement is reached with the CIS and the Eastern European countries and upon their invitation for the purpose of facilitating the management and control of ethnic or nationalist conflict in Eastern Europe.

In order to deter or defeat aggression today, the second requirement of crisis response: reconstitute and transfer the forces promptly to the trouble spot, demands extraordinarily flexible forces. Capacity to reinforce the trouble spot militarily depends on four basic elements: (1) force structure, (2) mobility, (3) host nation support, (4) mobilization. [Ref. 52:p.12]

Force Structure- In order to deter and defeat an enemy, NATO should first have an effective force structure; the right mix of weapons and people. This force structure must be carefully designed to meet the enemy's. That is, the weapons must be superior in quality and the people must be trained and organized to maximize the effectiveness of the technology. [Ref. 52:p.12] With this respect, NATO forces
must be equipped with modern conventional weapons. The wide range of missions that the future reduced forces may have to execute (one example for such missions may be to manage a refugee crisis) requires NATO to conduct modern training which uses up-to-date techniques, at all levels. [Ref. 53:p.7-8] The kinds of forces required by the crisis response strategy are main defense forces, augmentation forces and reaction forces. The bulk of NATO's military forces will be allocated to main defense forces, which at the corps level, will be composed of military units from two or three countries. Each of these composite will be assigned as the primary defense force for a specific country or region. In peacetime, they will be only partly manned. For example, a corps may have only its headquarters and one fully constituted division active in peacetime. The remainder of its divisions and brigades would be at lower readiness or mobilization status with a "core" of active soldiers. [Ref. 45:p.89] The status of readiness of active units depends on location and perceived risk. The units on southern and southeastern flanks must be at higher readiness status than those on the Central Front. Augmentation forces will consist of European and North American formations--at both ready and mobilization status--which will provide the backup to committed main defense forces and reaction forces, wherever a major threat makes this necessary. [Ref. 45:p.89] Reaction forces are multinational forces allocated to major NATO commanders for an early
military response to a crisis. Should crisis management fail, reaction forces would contribute to the general defense posture. "Immediate-reaction forces" will be at the highest readiness status and will be rapidly deployable in order to react to crisis in any region in the area of that major NATO commander. [Ref. 53:p. 4] "Rapid-reaction forces" will be built around a multinational corps that can be deployed either as an early military response to a crisis or, in an escalating situation, as an integrated component of other NATO forces in the deployment region [Ref. 45:p. 89].

**Mobility**- No matter how good the structure, equipment and the training of the armed forces are, they cannot get the desired results if they cannot be in the right place at the right time and in the right numbers. In a word, military forces must be mobile if they are to play a significant role in a crisis. They must be both strategically and tactically mobile. They should be transferred from their peace time locations to the crisis area promptly and then should have the capability of maneuvering effectively on the battlefield. To achieve the strategic mobility, first an effective airlift capability is necessary since, only the speed of modern transport aircraft can transfer a force into a region quickly. But these airlift forces will normally consist of light armor and infantry, with some limited air power. For most contingencies, these light reinforcements show only the resolution to use military force. Airlift alone
cannot ensure the transfer of main battle forces which are made up of large numbers of highly mechanized and armored forces. The movement of the heavy equipment can be accomplished by sealift. The ships that will carry these heavy forces must be prepositioned at the departure ports in order to make the movement from the peace time locations to the crisis area quickly. Prepositioning ships offers valuable logistical flexibility; they cannot, however, provide the on-site reception and further movement necessary to get a force out of the port and onto the battlefield. Reception forces must be either in place initially or be quickly placed into the host country before the tactical deployment of combat forces, in order to receive and deploy follow-on forces. [Ref. 52:pp. 13-14] To achieve the tactical mobility, NATO forces should have the capability of locating, identifying, outmaneuvering and outshooting the enemy forces. In this respect, units should be equipped with the Joint Surveillance Target Radar System and Global Positioning System, should have modern air superiority, multirole aircraft, modern armored vehicles and communication devices. [Ref. 53:pp. 7-8]

Host nation support- Allied logistics organizations must be created with the contribution of the host nation to manage the acquisition and movement of material to the combat forces, especially as these forces become more multinational. Host nation must facilitate the activities of NATO logistics organizations to organize host nation logistics
functions. These organizations must have visibility and control of host nation’s assets during crisis to effectively allocate people, material, and facilities. [Ref. 52:p. 15]

Mobilization- If any decision is made to reinforce a crisis area, it should also be decided whether to mobilize for war. Key factors in a decision to mobilize will include the industrial base and call-up of military reserves. [Ref. 52: p. 15] NATO nations must develop plans to manage mobilization of main defense and augmentation forces rapidly and in an orderly manner. Also plans must be made to reconstitute the necessary industrial base in order to support the war efforts.

d. Reduced forward presence: preventing nuclear proliferation and managing arms reduction

Another element of the new strategy rather than crisis response is to control the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, form an effective defense against such weapons and verify the agreed upon force reductions in Europe, known as Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE). First of all, member countries which possess such weapons technology should ensure that this technology is not transferred to another country, eager to acquire such weapons. Since, it is impossible to eliminate technology trade, member nations should come up with mechanisms to be sure that technology trade does not have adverse impact on security. These mechanisms could be adequate export control systems, on-site
verifications and inspectors from western countries to verify the legitimate use of western technologies. Inspections of industrial facilities should be without restriction and without prior notice. [Ref. 54:p. 258] NATO should form a center as a subordinate unit to the Nuclear Planning Group, manned by international staff in order to coordinate and facilitate these activities. Especially, NATO should send experts to former Soviet Union in order to assist the authorities in the protection and dismantle of its nuclear arsenal.

As for the conventional disarmament in Europe, there are two types of measures: non-cooperative and cooperative measures. In the former category are space-based reconnaissance; airborne stand-of reconnaissance; shipboard reconnaissance; and land based signals intelligence, seismic and environmental monitoring. Cooperative measures include aerial surveys; monitoring of maneuvers, military training and exercises; monitoring exit and entry points; on site routine and on-challenge inspections; perimeter control of barracks and depots; inspection of production and assembly facilities, both in-plant inspection and perimeter control; and monitoring of weapons and equipment deactivation or scrapping. Barracks, airfields, missile positions and depots should be visited at least once a year. [Ref. 55:p. 33] NATO should form a center and through that center should perform both categories of verification activities mentioned above. NATO has to make reduction in its own armament in order to fulfill its treaty
obligations as well. But, doing so NATO also has to protect its most modern equipment. Member nations with excess equipment that would have to be destroyed otherwise, should transfer modern equipment to nations that use older equipment such as Southern Flank countries. The countries which receive the modern equipment would then destroy the older equipment. [Ref. 53:p. 3] This arms transfers will substantially improve the weakness of the Southern region which is exposed to a potential threat now and equipped with older equipment. Also, NATO should shift its financial priorities from the central region to the Southern Flank. This requires cooperation with the developing defense industries of these countries including technology transfer and improvement in the NATO infrastructure in the region to facilitate the timely deployment of the forces to the region and effective supply of them.

   e. Reduced forward Presence: defending against weapons of mass destruction

   Even if member countries, which possess the technology to produce such weapons, take measures to eliminate the transfer of this technology to the third parties, there are other countries which sell their expertise. So, it is impossible to prevent the countries, which are eager to possess these weapons, from getting them.

   As a result NATO should improve its defenses against such weapons. NATO should develop GPALS (Global Protection Against Limited Strikes) system. Possible Allied
needs for such protection and involvement in development programs should be discussed in North Atlantic Council and Defense Planning Committee. NATO should develop joint industrial development programs for research and production of the systems. GPALS would involve three segments: new land-based defensive missiles, tactical anti-air missiles such as an upgraded Patriot or a new longer-range Theater High-Altitude Air Defense System (THAADS) which could be deployed in member countries, and a space based "Brilliant Pebbles" interceptor system. [Ref. 56:p. 793] The first and the third elements of the system may require more research and time to produce and put into service, but until THAADS is developed NATO should make full use of the existing Patriot missiles and related command, control, communication and intelligence systems. These weapons should be positioned on the Southeastern Flank countries immediately to meet potential challenges to the region.

F. SUMMARY

In light of the environmental factors NATO's mandates, mission and strategy should be revised. NATO's mandates should be revised to give the Alliance a broader area of action because the events outside the member nations' territories may directly affect NATO. Second reason for this revision is that, NATO should respond any crisis threatening its security before it reaches to its borders. NATO's mission
should include the elements of promoting stability in the Europe as a main objective since the security of the member nations are closely related to this. NATO's new strategy should first prevent the instabilities from developing into major problems by political means, and if necessary deal with the crises effectively through flexible and versatile forces. New strategy should also deal with arms reduction treaty verifications and nuclear proliferation by technological and other means.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. CONCLUSIONS

1. The review of the literature about strategy revealed that the concept of strategy encompasses the goals, objectives, action plans, resource allocations and policies. Although the content of these components vary from organization to organization, but the basics remain the same.

2. Strategic planning is the whole process of defining the mandates, the goals and objectives, assessing the environment (both external and internal), identifying the central issues and developing action plans, resource allocations and policies to manage these issues. In other words, strategic planning is a systematic process. It is also important that if the organization wants to make minor variations in the existing strategic themes, than it doesn’t have to initiate the whole process. Different authors in the area of strategy offer different approaches to strategic planning, but they all include the basic steps mentioned above.

3. One of the major elements of the strategic planning is the environmental analysis. In fact, environmental analysis is the main source of the strategic issues. Organizations should monitor their external environment in order to find opportunities and to identify the threats. Internal environmental analysis enable the organizations to know their
major strengths and weaknesses. Then the organizations should compare the external and internal environments to see whether the strengths of the organization can exploit the opportunities or the weaknesses worsen the threats. A sound strategy should exploit the opportunities while minimizing the threats.

4. It would be a mistake for the organizations to look at only the current environment. Organizations should make predictions about the future environment in which they may operate. They should create alternative futures and use them first to identify the strategic issues and later to develop the strategies. A sound strategy should deal with both the current and the future situations. Organizations can use quantitative or qualitative forecasting techniques to create alternative futures.

5. NATO's foundation, and its first 40 years hold most of the conclusions about strategy and strategic planning mentioned above. NATO was founded because of a huge and immediate external threat in 1949. European Nations had also opportunities and internal strengths and weaknesses. They exploited the main opportunities, American eagerness to get involved in European matters by providing economic and military aid, Soviet weaknesses and their own eagerness to unite, by signing the North Atlantic Treaty which linked the North America to Europe and left Soviet Union alone in Europe. Their main strength at that time, cohesion and resolution, extended these opportunities. The North Atlantic Treaty
clearly defined the mandates, objectives and the goals. Planners articulated policies, action plans and resource allocations by developing short-term, medium-term and long-term defense plans.

6. NATO continued to monitor the environment after formulating its first strategy and made variations from its first strategy accordingly. NATO shifted from a conventional defense to massive retaliation in 1954, and from massive retaliation to flexible response in 1967. Environmental factors made it necessary for NATO to make these shifts. These environmental factors weren't fundamental, so they didn't necessitate a whole strategic planning process but variations in the strategy which were not major.

7. NATO's external environment has changed fundamentally since 1989. NATO may relax by looking at just the current environment. When we look at the future possibilities, we see that possible events can affect NATO deeply. All of these factors make it necessary for NATO to implement the whole planning process again because the environment necessitates major variations in the strategic themes.

B. THESIS RESEARCH QUESTIONS REVISITED

The primary research question of this thesis is "As a result of the changing military and political environment in Europe and in other troubled areas, the strategy of NATO must be re-examined. How is the existing strategy likely to change
in light of these shifts in NATO's relevant military, political and economic environment?" The whole new strategic planning process outlined in Chapter VI provides one answer to this question. As a result of the new environmental factors along with the possible future developments the mandates and mission of NATO should be revised and new policies, action plans and resource allocations described in Chapter VI, Section E should be approved in order to manage the new issues described in the same chapter.

A subsidiary research question is "What is strategy and what is a suitable model for strategic planning?" Definitions presented in Chapter II, Section B offers an answer to the first part of this question. There are a lot of models in literature about strategic planning. The model presented in Chapter II, Section C is suitable, because it contains the essential elements of strategic planning for public and non-profit organizations.

The second and third subsidiary research questions are "How was the military and political environment when NATO was founded?" and "How did NATO's strategy evolve?" Chapter III, Section C presents the external environmental factors and Section D presents the internal environmental factors when NATO was founded. Chapter III, Section E describes the possible future events through the minds of the NATO planners in 1949. The rest of the chapter presents the first strategy of NATO, a conventional defense and changes in the environment
and the evolution of NATO's strategy from this conventional defense to massive retaliation and flexible response.

Another subsidiary research question is "What has happened in the past three years that is relevant to NATO's future?" Chapter IV, Section C furnishes the external environmental changes which have created new opportunities and threats to NATO. The rest of the chapter furnishes the internal environmental changes which contributed to the strengths of NATO and caused weaknesses. Chapter V constructs scenarios to identify the future developments which are relevant to NATO's future.

The final subsidiary research question is "In light of the changes in the environment what should be the new strategy of NATO?" Chapter VI provides one answer to this question. The mandates of NATO should be modified to give NATO a broader area of activity, its mission should be revised to include non-military means afforded by the new opportunities and the strategy should be changed to include dialogue and co-operation with the former foes to prevent crises and to give NATO flexibility to respond the crises, should they occur. Also the new strategy should provide means for preventing the nuclear proliferation and for verifying the arms reduction.

C. GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS

1. NATO committees should hold regular meetings with the representatives of the former Soviet Republics and Eastern
European countries to discuss security issues. NATO, should also form the multinational peace keeping force immediately and prepare it for possible uses. This force can be used right now in Yugoslavia or in Nagorno Karabag.

2. Negotiations for France's return to the integrated military structure of NATO should be started. France's absence in this structure creates a gap in the defense of Southern Region.

3. As part of the European Rapid Reaction Forces, a standing naval force in Mediterranean should be formed. This force protects the sea lines and flow of land troops on Mediterranean should a crisis occur in the Middle East or in North Africa.

4. Since multinationality is a part of the new strategy then interoperability is very important. Formations composed of units from different nations should communicate with each other effectively and use the same doctrine. For this reason NATO should initiate a standardization program, both technological and doctrinal, to solve interoperability problems.

5. Exercises should be conducted to improve multinational operations and to rehearse the transfer of troops drawn from different regions of the Alliance to a trouble spot.

6. Exercises such as Allied Express, Display Determination, Dragon Hammer, which were conducted on Turkish Thrace to rehearse a defense against Warsaw Pact forces should be conducted on Southern Turkey to make the troops familiar with
the terrain. The scenario should be based on a crisis in the Middle East.

7. Patriot missiles should be provided for the Turkish military which faces long-range missile threat on her Southern border.
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