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**NAVAL
POSTGRADUATE
SCHOOL**

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

**NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY: AN INTEGRATED
HIGHER DEFENSE EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR
DEMOCRATIZATION OF CIVIL-MILITARY
RELATIONS IN NEPAL**

by

Mahesh SJB Rana

March 2018

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**NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY: AN INTEGRATED HIGHER DEFENSE
EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR DEMOCRATIZATION OF CIVIL-
MILITARY RELATIONS IN NEPAL**

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

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(CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS)**

from the

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ABSTRACT

Despite its transition from a constitutional monarchy to a secular federal democratic republic in 2006, Nepal has yet to achieve the ultimate outcomes of the democratic consolidation process—political stability, stable governance, peace, and security. The stalled democratic consolidation process largely results from gaps in civil-military relations (CMR).

In the absence of a higher defense education platform—like the National Defense University (NDU) in the United States—unequal levels of professional competencies among the civilian officials, military leaders, and senior officers of Nepal’s security forces have contributed to ineffectiveness and inefficiency at the policy, strategy, and decision-making levels. In particular, the civilian leadership has demonstrated an inability to effect critical decisions during a recent natural disaster.

In this connection, this research traces the development of professional military education (PME) institutions in Germany and the United States and analyzes the importance of integrating higher defense education to enhance professional competencies, defense capabilities, and democratization of CMR. Based on this analysis, the thesis examines the feasibility of and recommends establishing a unique, country-specific, and interagency integrated higher defense educational institute that promotes PME, civil defense education, and national security education programs under one national institutional umbrella like NDU.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AACSB	Association to Advance Collegiate Schools of Business
ABET	Accreditation Board for Engineering and Technology
ACSC	Army Command and Staff College
ACSS	Africa Center for Strategic Studies
AFIT	Air Force Institute of Technology
APF SC	Armed Police Force Staff College
APF	Armed Police Force
ASEP	Army Strategic Education Program
AU	Air University
AWC	Air War College
BNS	Bachelor in Nursing Science
BOA	Board of Advisors
BOV	Board of Visitors
CASC	Campus Advanced Studies Center
CASL	Center for Applied Strategic Learning
CDE	Civilian Defense Education
CISA	College of International Security Affairs
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CJSL	Center for Joint and Strategic Logistics
CMR	Civil-Military Relations
COA	Center for Operational Analysis
CoAS	Chief of the Army Staff
COIN	Counter Insurgency
CPN (M)	Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)
CPN (UML)	Communist Party of Nepal (United Marxist-Leninist)

CSELS	Command Senior Enlisted Leaders
CSRA	Center for Research and Assurance
CSSR	Collapsed Structure Search and Rescue
CTEVT	Council for Technical Education and Vocational Training
CTISR	Center for Technical Intelligence Studies and Research
DEEP	Defense Education Enhancement Program
DIB	Defense Institution Building
DoD	Department of Defense
DVOT	Distinguished Visitor Orientation Tour
ECTS	European Credit Transfer System
GoN	Government of Nepal
HCSC	Higher Command and Staff Course
HLC	Higher Learning Commission
IHDE	Integrated Higher Defense Education
IMET	International Military Education Training
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organization
INSEL	Institute for National Security Ethics and Leadership
INSS	Institute for National Strategic Studies
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
ISMO	International Student Management Office
JCO	Junior Commissioned Officer
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JFSC	Joint Force Staff College
JMO	Joint Military Operations
JPME	Joint Professional Military Education
LDC	Least Developed Country
MoD	Ministry of Defense

MoE	Ministry of Education
MoFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MoHA	Ministry of Home Affairs
MOOTW	Military Operations Other Than War
NA	Nepalese Army
NAIHS	Nepalese Army Institute of Health and Science
NAIHS–COM	Nepalese Army Institute of Health and Science–College of Medicine
NAIHS–CON	Nepalese Army Institute of Health and Science–College of Nursing
NAMC	Nepalese Army Medical Corps
NAPFS	Nepal Armed Police Force School
NASPAA	Network of Schools of Public Policy, Affairs, and Administration
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NAWC	Nepalese Army War College
NC	Nepali Congress
NCO	Non-Commissioned Officer
NDC	National Defense College
NDU	National Defense University
NESA	Near East South Asia
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NID	National Investigation Department
NISS	National Institute for Strategic Studies
NMA	Nepalese Military Academy
NP	Nepal Police
NPA	National Police Academy
NPS	Naval Postgraduate School
NSA	National Security Affairs

NSC	National Security Council
NSE	National Security Education
OJMC	Office of the Joint Medical Chair
OR	Other Ranks
PCL	Proficiency Certificate Level
PfP	Partnership for Peace
PGDPS	Post Graduate Diploma in Police Science
PME	Professional Military Education
PPBS	Planning Programming and Budgeting Systems
RCNSC	Reserve Components National Security Course
SAARC	South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SECAF	Secretary of the Air Force
SIGS	School of International Graduate Studies
SOP	Standard Operational Procedure
SORD	Strategic and Operational Research
SPA	Seven Party Alliance
TU	Tribhuvan University
TU–IOM	Tribhuvan University–Institute of Medicine
UN	United Nations
UniBw	Universität der Bundeswehr München
UNOCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNPSO	United Nations Peace Support Operations
USAF	United States Air Force
USAWC	United States Army War College
USMA	United States Military Academy
USNWC	United States Naval War College
VUCA	Volatile, Uncertain, Complex, and Ambiguous

WCUC Western Association of Schools and Colleges Senior College and
University Commission

WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction

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DISCLAIMER

The views expressed in the thesis about the establishment of an inter-agency Integrated Higher Defense Educational institution like the National Defense University in the Nepalese context are those of the author and do not represent the policies, directives, and views of the Government of Nepal and its security agencies: Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Home Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nepalese Army, Nepal Police, Armed Police Force, and National Investigation Department.

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I. INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW

Knowledge, particularly in regard to various facets of national security, is perhaps the most valuable tool for members of the defense community. For Nepal, which is surrounded by great powers in a region fraught with geopolitical tensions, such knowledge is urgently needed. Yet, Nepal currently lacks an integrated higher defense educational (IHDE) institution, such as a National Defense University (NDU), to support and enhance the intellectual capacity and the professional competencies of defense community members. Nepal's security environment presents wide-ranging and unique challenges. Its location in the Himalayas puts it at risk for natural calamities, such as, earthquakes, floods, landslides, and avalanches, as well as health hazards from climate change and air and soil pollution. And, although Nepal does not face the threat of direct invasion from its neighbors (China, India, and Bhutan), it does face border encroachment, economic blockades, and spillover effects of global terrorism.

Moreover, Nepal, which has yet to complete the democratic consolidation process, faces forces that undermine its domestic political stability. Such threats include a potential secessionist movement in the southern plains, as well as drug and human trafficking. The array of security problems facing Nepal necessitates a robust platform to educate, prepare, and develop civilian defense leaders, officials, and military commanders and their staffs with broad knowledge and capabilities to deal with both the expected and unexpected security problems.

Against this security backdrop, the research analyzes the prospect of establishing a National Defense University, similar to the higher education institutes devoted to integrated defense and security studies in the United States and other leading powers. The goal of establishing such an institution in Nepal is not only to provide a national platform to investigate and mitigate national security problems, but also to educate and develop prospective leaders and commanders capable of critical decision-making and addressing unforeseen security threat environments, as well as strengthening civil-military relations (CMR), and eventually provide peace and stability. Thus, the present thesis asks: Why and how would the establishment of an integrated higher defense educational institute like the

NDU be instrumental in augmenting the democratization of civil-military relations in Nepal? How can intellectual capacity-building among various Nepalese defense-community stakeholders be instrumental in the overall enhancement of democratic civilian control, effectiveness, and efficiency?

To this end, first, the research examines the relevancy of IHDE in overcoming the professional incompetency observed within the civilian components of Nepal's defense community at the policy, strategy, and decision-making levels. These members include civilian officials and staffs of the Ministries of Defense (MoD), Home Affairs (MoHA), and Foreign Affairs (MoFA); the Nepalese Army (NA); the Nepal Police (NP); the Armed Police Force (APF); and the National Investigation Department (NID). Second, this research establishes the link that promoting IHDE enhances intellectual capacities of leaders and decision makers within the defense community and will eventually augment democratization of CMR. Ultimately, this strengthening of CMR ensures maintaining civilian control of security forces, effectiveness, and efficiency while planning, formulating, and implementing national security policies and goals. Third, the proposed institution provides a broader scope for higher-level defense education, integrating all concerned defense community stakeholders by incorporating joint education under a single educational entity, the NDU.

Finally, this research aims to gain consensus from all concerned defense stakeholders of the Government of Nepal (GoN) to promote a legal basis to establish a unique IHDE institute that can act as a center for national security research and development, facilitate both national and international threat mitigation, and fulfill the national requirement of providing mandatory education for senior officers and officials on a routine basis without having to depend on foreign quotas and grants.

A. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION

Nepal began its transition from a constitutional monarchy to a secular federal democratic republic in 2006. Since then, it has seen the promulgation of its Constitution in

2015 and the 2017 completion of local provincial, federal parliamentary elections¹; however, Nepal has yet to realize the public aspirations of achieving outcomes of democratic consolidation practices—political stability, stable governance, peace, and security. This project recognizes that establishment of a NDU would act as a primary enabler in the field of civil-military relations to enhance the pace of democratic consolidation. This recognition is based on the case of Romania, another nation state that made the successful transition from conflict to peace and security. According to Cristiana Matei, a CMR expert who has studied Romania’s democratic consolidation process and its correlation to the type of education proposed in this research: “Professional Military Education (PME) and Civilian Defense Education (CDE) [has been an] instrumental [factor] for strengthening both democratic control and effectiveness of the security and defense forces.”² Nepal’s need for improved CMR is indisputable. It is illustrated by the ineffective and inefficient civilian leadership response, as confirmed by the Nepalese Army and *LIAISON*,³ to the *Disaster Relief Operation-Sankat Mochan*, conducted during the mega-earthquake of April 25, 2015. The response provided the stark contrast in the level of competencies between the armed forces and civilian authorities of the GoN.⁴

The difference in the level of educational qualifications required of military leaders and their civilian counterparts constitutes an intellectual gap that undermines the effective

¹ Avery Davis-Roberts, “Nepal Parliamentary and Provincial Elections 2017,” in *Election Standards at The Carter Center*, December 8, 2017 (accessed March 11, 2018), <http://electionstandards.cartercenter.org/nepal2017/>.

² Florina Cristiana Matei, “NATO, The Demand for Democratic Control, and Military Effectiveness: Romania,” in *The Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relations*, ed. Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei (New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis, 2015), 325–326; Karen Guttieri, “Professional Military Education in Democracies,” in *Who Guards the Guardians and How: Democratic Civil-Military Relations*, ed. Thomas C. Bruneau and Scott D. Tollefson (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2006), 234; Carolyn Halladay’s “Civilian Defense Education and Training” (unpublished article, August 25, 2017), 3, illustrates the importance of CDE, which provides civilians with necessary expertise and acts as an adjunct to the military proficiency in transmitting overall effectiveness and efficiency within a country.

³ *LIAISON* is a journal of civil-military disaster management and humanitarian relief collaborations. <https://www.cfe-dmha.org/Liaison>.

⁴ “Operation Sankat Mochan,” Nepal Army, accessed September 9, 2017, https://www.nepalarmy.mil.np/upload/publications/special/english_part4.pdf; Nepal Army Headquarters Staff, “Mission First & People Always: The Nepal Army’s AAR on Operation Sankat Mochan,” in *LIAISON* VIII, no.1 (Spring 2016), 13–17, <https://www.cfe-dmha.org/Portals/0/liaison/liaison-2016-VIII-1.pdf>.

practice of CMR between the civilian defense authority and the armed (security) forces. The senior military leadership is well experienced and internationally educated with higher PME and graduate degrees, while the decision and policy makers lack crisis management experience and CDE. In fact, CDE is the bedrock for developing civilian intellectual capacity that enables proficient civilian control over the security forces: formulating policies; providing leadership; and managing, directing, and implementing oversight. In addition, the lack of interagency coordination during the initial response to Nepal's earthquake of 2015 indicates the need to educate further the senior members of the defense community. Hence, in Nepal's case, the necessity for an integrated higher defense education, such as the one provided by an NDU, becomes more urgent in the interests of fostering the democratization of CMR.

To address constantly emerging regional and international security threats (terrorism, ethnic violence, climate change, natural disasters, and pandemics) in a volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous (VUCA)⁵ scenario, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and similar organizations have worked very hard to influence, support, and build defense education systems through the Partnership for Peace (PfP) consortium—Defense Education Enhancement Program (DEEP)⁶ and Defense Institution Building (DIB).⁷ The PfP was created in the 1990s amid the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, when Central and Eastern European nations sought to affiliate with NATO. The general purpose of PfP is to aid the process of reform and, in particular, the contribution of advanced education for security and defense as part of that process. To this end, the PfP works toward bilateral, regional, and global consensus on effective and efficient CMR for

⁵ Judith Hicks Stiehm, *U.S. Army War College: Military in a Democracy* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2002), 186–187.

⁶ Jean d'Andurain and Alan G. Stolberg, "Defense Education Enhancement Program: The NATO Functional Clearing-House on Defense Education," *Connections: The Quarterly Journal* 11, no. 4 (2012): 53–58, <http://dx.doi.org/10.11610/Connections.11.4.06>.

⁷ DIB is a U.S. DoD sponsored program under Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) that helps partner nations as per Partnership for Peace (PfP) efforts to elevate the standards of defense institutions in accordance with "American ideals of democracy and the rule of law, strategic interests, in addition to security cooperation investments." See "Defense Institution Building," Defense Security Cooperation Agency, accessed January 31, 2018, <http://www.dscamilitary.com/programs/institutional-programs>.

nations transitioning to democracy through government-to-government and military-to-military support in defense education development and reforms.

Although many PME institutions around the globe integrate some portions of CDE and NSE, it is still hard to find a single institution that has integrated all the essence of PME, CDE, and NSE into one educational entity, essentially combining all the defense community and inter-agencies simultaneously.

B. LITERATURE REVIEW

Literature on the higher defense educational system at the policy and strategic levels is limited in the Nepalese context in no small part because Nepal lacks a National Defense University and a National Defense College (NDC). (The proposal for the latter, however, is pending approval at the MoD.) Furthermore, on the topic of the historical evolution of PME, CDE, and NSE in Nepal, hardly any literature exists to provide evidence of established institutions of advanced defense education beyond military training. Hence, major research materials for this thesis are based on Western and European scholarly literature, particularly from the United States and from NATO members.

The purpose of this literature review is to analyze the importance of an IHDE, like a NDU, in promoting the democratic consolidation of a nation in the post-democratic transition phase. The review builds on the concepts of PME and CDE and seeks to limit its research scope specifically to the policy, strategy, and decision-making levels. Although this review recognizes the importance of PME at tactical and operation levels, it does not discuss those levels in detail. Finally, in view of the Nepalese context, this section aims to advance the possibility of integrating other national security agencies—NP, AFP, NID, including the civilian senior level officials of MoD, MoHA and MoFA—within a single IHDE system like that of the proposed NDU.

1. Theoretical Aspects of PME in Support of CMR

Most CMR scholars agree that PME plays a key role in professionalizing the armed (security) forces of a nation and ensuring democratic civilian supremacy. Many scholars

concur with Samuel P. Huntington, who emphasizes an “objective civilian control”⁸ mechanism for effective CMR that grants autonomy to the military in terms of executing its mission and in imparting technical training and education—as opposed to “subjective civilian control,”⁹ which emphasizes the micro-management of military affairs by the civilian authority. In contrast, some scholars favor Morris Janowitz’s concept of “citizen-soldier,”¹⁰ which integrates the military within the society in no small part by granting graduate and university level education through the Reserve Officer’s Training Center (ROTC) programs.¹¹ More recent scholars like Karen Guttieri, Thomas Bruneau, and Cristiana Matei concur with Janowitz and Charles Moskos, who claim that in the post-cold-war period, education transformed the officer corps from simple combat commanders into managerial technicians, and to present day “soldier[s]-scholar[s]”¹² well-aware of political, economic, and socio-cultural dynamics affecting national security affairs.

Guttieri claims that PME essentially improves professionalism of the defense (security) forces and augments civilian control in democracies.¹³ However, some scholars are not satisfied with the interpretation of PME and how emphasis is placed on imparting professionalism: training versus education. Guttieri characterizes education as “general [broad] knowledge and skills required for effectiveness”¹⁴ as distinct from training, which

⁸ Samuel P. Huntington, “Power, Professionalism, and Ideology: Civil-Military Relations in Theory,” in *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (1957; repr., Cambridge, MA.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000): 83–85, quoted in Karen Guttieri, “Professional Military Education in Democracies,” in *Who Guards the Guardian and How: Democratic Civil-Military Relations*, ed. Thomas C. Bruneau and Scott D. Tollefson (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2006), 236.

⁹ Huntington, “Power, Professionalism, and Ideology,” 80–83, quoted in Thomas-Durell Young, “Military Profession in Democracy,” in *Who Guards the Guardian and How: Democratic Civil-Military Relations*, ed. Thomas C. Bruneau and Scott D. Tollefson (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2006), 18.

¹⁰ Morris Janowitz, “The Future of Military Profession,” in *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait* (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1960), 421–426. The chapter explains his Constabulary concept where he maintains the importance of being a “Military Intellectual” through early education for career officers.

¹¹ Guttieri, “Professional Military Education in Democracies,” 248–249.

¹² *Ibid.*, 254.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 236.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 235

indicates “preparation to perform specific functions, tasks, or missions.”¹⁵ By contrast, the Israeli historian and veteran of U.S. PME, Martin van Creveld, holds the view that training and education should focus on military history, conduct of war, and the profession of arms in fostering military success rather than emphasizing higher civilian defense education, which does not raise military effectiveness in the conduct of winning conflicts, campaigns, and wars.¹⁶ However, the defense establishments of the leading powers, especially among Western democracies, have not adopted his view.

The 21st century has witnessed the transition of warfare from conventional to unconventional and from interstate to intra-state, often crisscrossing the spheres/spectrum of conflicts, surpassing multiple domains of warfare (land, sea, air, cyber, and space), and assuming more hybrid and asymmetric forms of warfare. Hence the role of armed forces has expanded to military operations other than war (MOOTW)—UN peacekeeping and stabilization missions, humanitarian missions, and rescue missions. The broader roles of the defense force necessitate all concerned stakeholders (civilians from intergovernmental and nongovernmental agencies including security agencies) to work under a joint operational environment.¹⁷ Under such conditions, Huntington’s prescription of PME becomes less effective compared to the one highlighted by John Masland and Laurence Radway, which focuses on military education rather than a general treatment of military professionalism in the United States in the 1950s.¹⁸ The former emphasizes specific technical skills and education for the officer corps to remain professional, apolitical, subordinate, and obedient, and thus, ensures civilian supremacy and control.¹⁹ The latter advocates that senior level military officers should be well versed in policy implementation

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Martin Van Creveld, *The Training of Officers: From Military Professionalism to Irrelevance* (New York: The Free Press, 1990), 102–104. Van Creveld casts doubt on the credibility of short-term advanced learning imparted at the war colleges and emphasizes “producing practitioners capable of running their country’s defense [rather than] engaging in intellectual debates or issue academic publications.”

¹⁷ “CoAS’s Command Guidance-2015,” Nepal Army, 1–5, accessed August 25, 2017, https://www.nepalarmy.mil.np/Command-Guidance/COAS_CMD_GUIDANCE_2072.pdf.

¹⁸ Guttieri, “Professional Military Education in Democracies,” 254.

¹⁹ Ibid.

through joint integrated higher civilian education that supports political legitimacy and ensures democratic civilian control of the armed forces.²⁰

More recently, Judith Stiehm's extensive research in *U.S. Army War College: Military Education in a Democracy* concludes that PME at the United States Army War College (USAWC) is more focused on three curricular requirements:²¹ (i) providing training as opposed to education; (ii) emphasizing the importance of CMR; and (iii) including study on war and peace. Her assumption is that the war college trains students rather than educates them "[to] act effectively in an expanded, changing, and more heterogeneous environment," invoked by the acronym VUCA.²² In contrast, she prescribes the civilian education system and management in the USAWC as a preferable education system because it develops critical and creative analytical thinking among students through a narrower [specialized] field and opens one's mind, raises criticism and curiosity about the topic, and prepares them to deal with VUCA.²³ This view is echoed by NATO experts on PME: "Training is for certainty while education is for uncertainty."²⁴

2. PME: Vice or Virtue?

Although PME is typically viewed as the foundation for military professionalism and democratic civilian control in Western democracies, some departures from this model have been notable. Since World War II, Latin American history provides examples of military juntas, whose members were professionally trained, skilled, and educated, but crossed the democratic norms and subjugated civilian supremacy through military

²⁰ Ibid.; John W. Masland and Laurence I. Radway, "Higher Education in the Armed Forces," in *Soldiers and Scholars: Military Education and National Policy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957), 443–519.

²¹ Stiehm, *U.S. Army War College*, 181.

²² Ibid., 186–187.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Julian Lindley-French, *Connected Forces, Educated Minds: Transformation and Professional Military Education*, WP1225 (Steining, U.K.: Wilton Park, 2013), <https://www.wiltonpark.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/WP1225-final-report.pdf>.

intervention and coups.²⁵ This act of exerting military influence to undermine civilian authority has obviously raised doubts as to the validity of Huntington's and Janowitz's theories on military professionalism as the guarantor of democratic civilian control. Hence, the danger of PME turning to vice cannot be totally overruled.

Samuel E. Finer points out that even when the armed forces are professional and accept civilian supremacy, the general political atmosphere often creates the motive, mood, and opportunity for military intervention.²⁶ He asserts that the motives to intervene arise from the military's nationalist belief, its corporate superiority and autonomy in exercising command and control over security matters, and its reluctance to support the government in times of crisis when the general public is not in favor of the incumbent government.²⁷ Likewise, the mood for military intervention emerges from political grievances and the military's organizational superiority, which leads to disrespect for civilian jurisdiction, blaming the government for political failure and providing the pretext to intervene.²⁸ Just as the opportunity for military intervention is fostered by the civilians' undue reliance on the military, especially during a crisis, it is also supported by the public in opposition to government decisions.²⁹

Finer's analysis indicates that it is not always professionalism and PME that lead to military intervention. He identifies that military intervention takes place due to the developmental level of a state's democratic political culture (mature, developed, low, or minimum) that affords the military to influence, blackmail, displace, or supplant the

²⁵ Narcis Sierra, *The Military Transition: Democratic Reform of the Armed Forces*, translated by Peter Bush (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2010). Sierra explains the military reform required in support of military democratization during transition, after transition, and during the democratic consolidation phase; and Samuel E. Finer describes in detail in his seminal work, *Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics* (New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, 2006) the various circumstances that influence the military to intervene but maintains from the Prussian history that professionalization of the military started with the need for PME and with the development of the General Staff together with priority afforded to higher education (see pages 217–218).

²⁶ Finer, *Man on Horseback*, 23–72.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 25–26.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 61–84.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 72–74.

incumbent government.³⁰ Under such circumstances, Narcís Serra concludes, from his experience as a Minister of Defense in Spain, that these vices emanating from military professionalism demonstrate the need to carry out military [security sector] reforms: formulation of “professional and institutional norms for CMR consistent with democratic principles;”³¹ limitation of military prerogatives enjoyed;³² and assigning new roles and missions for the security forces.

In spite of the various dispositions available for the military intervention, it is noteworthy that the NA has remained apolitical, subservient, and silent during Nepal’s transition from constitutional monarchy to federal democratic republic. Thus, the NA’s abstinence from military intervention bears the hallmark of professionalism, enhanced by PME, in support of democratic CMR.

Positivists in CMR argue that providing higher defense education characterized by civilian style graduate and postgraduate programs to senior levels of the armed (security) forces would promote wider expertise and flexibility across a range of areas”³³ within the officer corps, reinstating democratic practices.³⁴ This intellectual gain is a virtue for all senior civilian officials and security officers at the policy and strategy level in accomplishing their duties and responsibilities in the most proficient manner, but only if followed under the democratic values and norms.

3. CDE as a Solution to CMR Gap or Friction

Unequal levels of professional education between the armed forces and the civilian officials of the concerned defense and security government ministries and departments often create a CMR gap or friction between the two. In a democracy, the assumption is that

³⁰ Ibid.,

³¹ Narcís Serra, “What Is Military Reform,” trans. Peter Bush in *The Military Transition: Democratic Reform of the Armed Forces* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 39–65.

³² Ibid., 61.

³³ Pauline Shanks Kaurin, “Professional Military Education: What Is It Good For?” *Real Clear Defense* (June 22, 2017), https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2017/06/22/professional_military_education_what_is_it_good_for_111647.html.

³⁴ A view posited from the literature analysis of various CMR scholars, i.e., Stiehm, Masland and Radway, Halladay, Abenheim, Matei, and Guttieri.

civilian authority is superior to that of the military, and that it is the duty of military (or armed forces) to obey their civilian masters. However, it also follows that in order for the civilian masters to reign supreme, they need be experts in their respective fields. This view is confirmed by both Matei and Carolyn Halladay, who reinforce that CDE plays an equally vital role in developing the expertise, skills, and competency levels of every civilian working in various ministerial capacities. Halladay claims that “civilian defense forms a necessary adjunct to military proficiency in effective and efficient defense institutions on a sound basis in a state and society.”³⁵ The corollary is that civilian officials and civil servants must gain “expertise, experience, and knowledge on defense and military affairs—national defense policy, strategy, including civil aspects of security operations.”³⁶ Furthermore, civilian leaders should be experts in the fields of “law, accounting, finance, information, research sciences,”³⁷ etc., in order to enforce effective and efficient civilian control over the security forces it commands in any established democracies.

4. Quality versus Quantity in Defense Education

James Carafano argues “quality is becoming a victim quantity,”³⁸ and criticizes that PME, which focuses on fulfilling operational and tactical requirements, leaves little room for qualitative improvement of professional education. On a similar ground, Kevin P. Kelly and Joan Johnson-Freese identify that educational quality is compromised by lack of academic standards, unqualified faculty, and that introducing unwarranted discipline might instigate international condemnation, and corruption in management and finance.³⁹ The duo argues that in order to curb such ambiguities, the education system should define its

³⁵ Halladay, “Defense Education and Training,” 3.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Ibid., 4.

³⁸ *20 Years Later: Professional Military Education: Testimony before the Sub-Committee on Oversight and Investigations, Armed Services Committee, United States House of Representatives*, 111th Cong. (2009) (testimony of James Carafano, Assistant Director of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies and a Senior Research Fellow for the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies at The Heritage Foundation), <http://www.heritage.org/testimony/20-years-later-professional-military-education>.

³⁹ Kevin P. Kelly and Joan Johnson-Freese, “Rethinking Professional Military Education,” *Foreign Policy Research Institute: E-Notes* (October 25, 2013), https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/172407/Kelley_and_Johnson-Freese_-_Goal_in_PME_0.pdf.

goals in terms of “What should be expected from graduating students? What should be taught? And who should teach?”⁴⁰ They insist that if the higher educational institution departs from providing “intellectual agility”⁴¹ to its students and limits itself to promoting the technical, operational, and tactical levels—although it improves professionalism—it will compromise the essence of providing quality education to senior officers and officials at the policy and strategy level.⁴²

Charles D. Allen identifies another situation where the quality of defense education may be downgraded. His conviction is that, on basis of operational necessity, if qualified students, who are potentially fit to take on higher appointments in their future career, are legally allowed to get promoted even when by-passing the mandatory educational requirement, then the legitimacy and quality of that educational institute is likely to be undervalued.⁴³

Some scholars contend that the age limit for higher-level education be maintained at 40 years with a 20-plus years of service experience, but James Carafano advocates that it should be lowered to 30 years to allow for a long-term military professional career.⁴⁴ This view is commensurate with the assumption that most staff officers and officers earmarked for specialized job assignments would be able to acquire their expertise and skills on operational aspects that links to higher strategic and policy level directives, at the right time during their career path. Thus, timely acquisition of highly defense education allows these officers to avail their newly acquired knowledge, expertise, and professional advice to their concerned heads of organization and departments they serve.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Intellectual agility is defined by the U.S. Congress and General Dempsey (former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff), who stated the purpose of PME was to develop broad sets of educational competencies and skills that focus on generating “critical thinking and analysis” in response to VUCA throughout the military career of a professional officer; in Kelly and Johnson-Freese, “Rethinking Professional Military Education.”

⁴² Kelly and Johnson-Freese, “Getting to the Goal in Professional Military Education,” Policy Research Institute, *Orbis* 58, 1 (Winter 2014): 126–128, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orbis.2013.11.009>.

⁴³ Ibid., 124.

⁴⁴ Carafano, testimony, *20 Years Later*.

Emphasis on quantity compromises quality in defense education. If selection for attending higher level education is not merit-based, or if the educational institute allows mass graduation without diligent performance evaluation of students, then it would further the belief held by NATO experts on PME: “courses are [meager] rubber-stamp exercises to legitimize promotion.”⁴⁵ Quantity and quality can only go hand-in-hand if the standards, experience, capacity, and commitment of the faculty members are exceptional. Furthermore, they should be complimented by the latest technology, educational facilities, and resources available to the institution. Otherwise, in most cases, an imbalance between quality and quantity is often manifested.

5. NDU: Prospects for an Inclusive Inter-Agency IHDE

Democratic consolidation of CMR is one among many parameters that nations must meet in transitioning from autocratic to democratic forms of government. It is especially true during the post-transition and consolidation phase, when states often slip back to undemocratic rules and anarchy, mainly due to lack of civilian government control, an ineffective defense and security environment, as well as other contributing factors (socio-economic collapse, corruption, political instability, etc.). Thus, many scholars are of the opinion that emphasis on PME and CDE will actively enhance security sector reform and CMR in maintaining effective civilian control, military effectiveness, and efficiency.⁴⁶

Donald Abenheim, a prolific scholar of defense education in Germany and the U.S., aptly highlights the importance of higher military education, where he identifies the “interrelationship [between] military, democracy, and education” by analyzing the Prussian/German effort to bring about “*Innere Führung*”⁴⁷ or the “inner reform” in the

⁴⁵ Julian Lindley-French, *Connected Forces, Educated Minds: Transformation and Professional Military Education*, WP1225 (Wilton Park, U.K.: Defense Academy of the United Kingdom, May 2013). <https://www.wiltonpark.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/WP1225-final-report.pdf>.

⁴⁶ Matei, “NATO, The Demand for Democratic Control, and Military Effectiveness,” in *The Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relation*, eds. Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei (London and New York: Routledge, 2015), 325–326.

⁴⁷ Donald Abenheim, “A Half Century of Officer Education in the German Bundeswehr: A U.S. View of the German Armed Forces, Its Officers, ‘Transformation’ and the So-Called Revolution in Military Affairs,” in *Soldier and Politics Transformed: German-American Reflections on Civil-Military Relations in a New Strategic Environment* (Berlin: Carola Hartmann Miles-Verlag, 2007), 209–227.

post-World War II federal German Bundeswehr. He argues that “democratic integration and advanced education—in the Bundeswehr”⁴⁸ —were the key factors toward “transforming”⁴⁹ the German armed forces into an army in a democracy, which is a force under the democratic civilian control. His views are found to be credible even in the United States, where CMR friction among the military service branches, Congress, and the Presidency can be observed under the present Trump Administration: the firing of Chief of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, James Comey;⁵⁰ and the resignation amid controversy of national security advisor, retired General Michael Flynn.⁵¹

Due to the uncertainty that lurks in the global security environment as well as national security threats facing Nepal, the need for advanced integrated education in defense and security—precisely for the senior civilian officials, security elites, governmental and non-governmental agencies concerned with security affairs—has become of paramount importance at both the policy/strategic and operational levels. Masland and Radway argue that education for policy roles must overcome the challenges of inter-service rivalry and instead adhere to the concept of joint training and education. Although a big demand in the 1950s, higher defense education on policy and strategy was only effectuated in higher educational defense institutions after the Goldwater Nichols reforms of the 1980s in the United States.⁵² The duo advocates that military education should limit its orthodox doctrine toward “conformity” and “parochialism” and think out of the box syndrome and prepare military leaders to assume policy level responsibilities with a critical open mind to overcome daunting security challenges, and not be stifled,

⁴⁸ Ibid., 225–226.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Michael D. Shear and Matt Apuzzo, “F.B.I. Director James Comey is Fired by Trump,” May 9, 2017, <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/09/us/politics/james-comey-fired-fbi.html>.

⁵¹ “Trump Tweets: Flynn Had Nothing to Hide,” CNN, video, 3:20, December 3, 2017, <https://www.cnn.com/2017/12/02/politics/trump-tweet-flynn-firing-fbi-reaction/index.html>; and Maggie Haberman, Matthew Rosenberg, Matt Apuzzo, and Glenn Thrush, “Michael Flynn Resigns as National Security Adviser,” *New York Times*, February 13, 2017, <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/13/us/politics/donald-trump-national-security-adviser-michael-flynn.html>.

⁵² Masland and Radway, “Soldiers and Scholars,” 511.

while continuing to accept civilian leadership under democratic civilian practices.⁵³ Hence, at the policy level, education should prepare an individual to grasp the VUCA and be able to fashion policies and strategies accordingly, and implement them to fulfill national security goals and aims under civilian leadership.⁵⁴ This view has been strongly institutionalized by the U.S. Congress and the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin Dempsey, for joint education and priority in developing the “intellectual agility” of the officer corps⁵⁵

The analysis of PME and CDE justifies the need for higher education among the defense community in consolidating democratization of CMR. At the same time, this result also demonstrates how most scholars focus their concern on military and civilian staffs in the integration of higher PME, CDE, or national security education (NSE), but unfortunately, have not included the integration of other security agencies, such as the national police, para-militaries, and national intelligence units. Even Carafano, who acknowledges the possibility for “national security education for interagency leaders,”⁵⁶ posits that PME is distinctly separate from NSE, which encompasses the three skills:⁵⁷ 1) knowledge of other inter-service security subjects and experience in inter-agency operations; 2) crisis management at the strategic level; 3) knowledge of national politics, government, economics, domestic/international law, and international relations.

Furthermore, the scholar and U.S. Air Force veteran, Marybeth Ulrich, also highlights the importance of NSE and emphasizes the “strategic education and professional development”⁵⁸ opportunities for all senior members of the defense community—military,

⁵³ Ibid., 503.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 502.

⁵⁵ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Education* (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff July 16, 2012). http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/concepts/cjcs_wp_education.pdf?ver=2017-12-28-162044-527.

⁵⁶ Carafano, testimony, *20 Years Later*.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Marybeth Ulrich, “Developing Civil-Military Competencies Among Senior National Security Practitioners in Democratizing Latin America,” Institute for National Security Studies Research Paper (USAF Academy, Colorado: 2008), 1–12. https://www.usafa.edu/app/uploads/09_DEVELOPING-CIVIL-MILITARY-COMPETENCIES-AMONG-SENIOR-NATIONAL-SECURITY-PRACTITIONERS.pdf

civilian, and defense bureaucrats—to fulfill national security roles and responsibilities. She maintains that NSE-PME supports “normalization”⁵⁹ of CMR practice, with due emphasis on joint enterprises, which eventually reinforces civilian supremacy in decision making and encourages the civilian bureaucrats to take an interest in overseeing defense and military matters, including foreign policy implications.⁶⁰

C. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES

This paper posits the importance of researching the possibility of establishing an IHDE institution, like the NDU, which can include wider stakeholders, as Carafano prescribes for an interagency NSE, existing at the policy and strategic levels. Thus, for a small, least-developed country like Nepal, recently transitioned from constitutional monarchy to full-fledged secular federal democratic republic, this thesis explores the challenge of integrating PME, CDE, and NSE under one educational umbrella; concisely, this development would be a real revolution in civil-military affairs, and it may prove valuable for most democratic nations undergoing the transition and post-transition phase, including Nepal.

Considering the fact that Nepal lacks a higher defense educational institute, like the NDU, to develop the intellectual capacities and professional competency of its defense personnel involved in policy and strategy, management and administration, and training and education, the research work assumes the following hypotheses:

First, because the Nepalese Armed Forces is limited to a single service branch, the Army, it particularly needs continuity of PME. However, the application of Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) in the Nepalese context, where it lacks the Navy and the Air Force, proves impractical. In contrast, the need for joint cooperation, collaboration, and partnership in fulfilling national security goals implies the integration of multiple agencies: namely civilian staffs of MoD, MoHA, and MoFA, and between their respective security agencies—NA, NP, APF, and NID. Hence, the establishment of a NDU

⁵⁹ Ibid., 1–2.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 12.

with an IHDE concept would uniquely demonstrate the synergy necessary for continued democratization of CMR.

Second, this research assumes that there are unequal levels of professional competencies and defense education background between leadership of the armed forces and that of civilian components. In the Nepalese context, the armed forces are more professionally educated and experienced to deal with national defense and security affairs at the policy and strategy level than their civilian counterparts. Hence, the unequal level of defense education together with disproportional work experience, particularly during crisis situations, creates a CMR gap or friction between the experienced security forces and the less competent civilian authorities. Therefore, this research argues the need for advanced CDE among the civilian defense community to bridge the educational gap.

The third assumption is that the three major components of the defense and security sectors, namely the NA, NP, and APF, actively participate in both international and national security missions and roles. For instance, at the international level, participation in UN Peace Support Operations entails deploying personnel at tactical, operational, and strategic levels of command. Similarly, domestic security threats—both natural and manmade—obligate all the security agencies to work under their respective ministries in a joint environment. Examples of military operations other than war (MOOTW)⁶¹ like disaster response and rescue operations, counter insurgency (COIN) operations, and aid to civil authority during domestic civil disturbances, enforce the requirement for joint operation and collaboration at all levels of command. Hence, this spectrum of operations reinforces the need for an integrated higher defense educational institute to disseminate knowledge, develop skills, and impart expertise on overall defense and security matters.

D. RESEARCH DESIGN

The scope of this research limits its study of a higher defense education requirement to the policy and strategic levels for the defense community as a whole. It expands on the

⁶¹ “CoAS’s Command Guidance-2015,” Nepal Army, accessed August 25, 2017, https://www.nepalarmy.mil.np/Command-Guidance/COAS_CMD_GUIDANCE_2072.pdf.

hypothesis and assumptions proposed to verify the importance of establishing an IHDE institute, like the NDU, in the Nepalese context.

This thesis aims to identify the CMR gaps in the higher education system of the defense and security sectors within the GoN. In doing so, the research does not deny the importance of the tactical and operational levels of PME and CDE, but shall focus on the strategic level and not on these two lower levels concerned mainly with the professional training aspects of the personnel.

The research analyzes both the primary and secondary source literature produced by CMR scholars and professionals advocating for a democratic model of standards like those of the United States and Germany.

Finally, the research seeks to advance the hypothesis that an IHDE can be country specific and that the possibility of integrating overall defense, home, and foreign affairs' senior personnel under one defense educational umbrella like the NDU may aptly enhance the democratization of CMR in terms of civilian control, effectiveness, and efficiency.

E. THESIS OVERVIEW

The thesis comprises five chapters. Chapter I is the introduction. Chapter II describes the status of Nepal's PME, CDE, and NSE with regard to security agencies, and a following sub-section highlights the need for higher education in defense studies from a CMR perspective. The sub-section on existing CMR gaps between the MoD and the NA explores those gaps and argues the necessity of establishing an IHDE. Chapter III provides a brief overview of the evolution of defense education in Prussia-Germany and the United States and the current status of PME in the United States and Germany. Chapter IV provides a comparative analysis of PME institutions as models for the establishment of an IHDE like the NDU for Nepal. Having compared the NDU models of Germany and the United States, a subsection proposes a country-specific model of the NDU as an IHDE institute for Nepal. Then another subsection provides a conceptual framework for the establishment of the NDU as an IHDE institution. It proposes the development of an NDU by adopting the best practices for defense organization, management, and planning processes along the lines of established Western democracies. Another sub-section

includes analysis on international and national organizations that provide defense educational assistance—administrative, financial, technical, and legal. For bilateral and multilateral assistance, it explores the possibilities of gaining assistance from United Nations, NATO’s Defense Education Enhancement Program and the Defense Institution Building programs. Finally, Chapter V presents the strategic implications and benefits of establishing an inter–agency IHDE institute like the NDU. It argues why and how such an educational program augments democratization of CMR and the final consolidation of democracy, thereby providing peace, security, and stable governance. The chapter concludes with recommendations for concerned stakeholders.

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II. THE STATUS OF PME, CDE, AND NSE AMONG THE SECURITY SECTORS OF NEPAL AND THE EXISTING CMR GAPS

Nepal is a small, developing landlocked state situated between two powerful neighbors, China to the north and India to the south. Although total war may be a thing of the past for Nepal, low-intensity conflict in the form of a decade-long violent Maoist insurgency (1996–2006), occasional trade wars with India in the recent past, domestic political instability, the threat of a Madhesi secessionist movement in the south,⁶² and the ever-present threats of natural disasters (earthquakes, landslides, avalanches, floods, and hurricanes) continue to pose security challenges to Nepal’s stability and peace. Moreover, the security concerns of the 21st century demand decision makers, policy makers, their staffs, and public officials have a critical mindset, with broad knowledge about defense and security affairs—geo-political, socio-political, economic, and cultural dimensions—in order to provide the best practical, feasible, affordable, and effective security solutions under the VUCA environment.

Unlike the United States and Germany, which can boast some of the world’s most high-tech and state-of-the-art institutions for higher defense education, Nepal barely has higher forms of PME institutions, let alone CDE and NSE platforms, which are totally absent. The lack of such higher defense educational platforms hinders the fostering of qualified, intelligent, and expert leaders, commanders, and civilian staffs at the strategic and policy formulation levels. Nevertheless, like the United States and Germany, Nepal requires leaders who have the capability and capacity to think critically, plan, and manage resources and finances to fulfill national defense and security policies during crisis situations such as internal or external conflicts, trade wars, civil disturbances, terrorist attacks, narcotics and human trafficking, and natural disasters. Bereft of such institutions of higher learning, the GoN depends entirely on foreign grants and quotas from friendly nations to provide higher graduate and postgraduate level education and training for its

⁶² For details on the ethno-cultural evolution of Teria (southern-plain) based Madhesi movement in Nepal see, Nihar Nayak, “The Madhesi Movement in Nepal: Implications for India,” in *Strategic Analysis*, 35, no. 4 (June 21, 2011), 640–660, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2011.576099>.

senior leaders, commanders, and civilian staffs who will assume positions of responsibility within their respective defense and security organizations (MoD, MoHA, MoFA, NA, NP, APF, and NID).

The necessity for such an institution of higher defense education, like the NDU, NDC, and the War College, has been emphasized as one of NA’s key objectives to be accomplished in the near future, as stated in the “CoAS’s Command Guidance–2015.”⁶³ Thus, this chapter illuminates the current status of PME, CDE, and NSE in the Nepalese context and highlights existing CMR gaps and weaknesses resulting from the lack of such defense education as identified from the case study of MoD and NA.

A. PME STATUS WITHIN THE DEFENSE AND SECURITY SECTOR AGENCIES OF NEPAL

This section provides insight into the existing level of PME and NSE within the security forces—NA, NP, APF, and NID—and highlights the inadequate or limited level of PME and NSE capacity to generate a continuous flow of commanders and staff with the desired quality and quantity of professional expertise, specialized skills, and experience to provide necessary advice and decisions at the operational and strategic levels. Furthermore, in order to meet the regular demands of the security forces to fulfill vacant posts resulting from wastage rate (early and normal retirement, casualty, and death), and rotations of staff and commanders as per the respective service laws, regulations, and standard operational procedures (SOP), Nepal needs a country-specific, self-reliant, integrated higher defense educational platform, like the NDU.

1. Nepalese Army

With regard to the evolution of PME, CDE, and NSE in Nepal, there is hardly any literature that provides evidence of such established institutions of PME that involved advanced academic defense education, other than military training. Although training, per se, for the junior commissioned officers (JCO), non-commissioned officers (NCO), and other ranks (OR) was conducted either at the Nepal Army Recruit Training Center

⁶³ Nepal Army, “CoAS’s Command Guidance-2015.”

(Trishuli)⁶⁴ or at brigade headquarters and battalion locations. As far as the officer corps is concerned, they received formal training at the battalions to which they were posted until the establishment of the Royal Nepalese Army. The Nepalese Army School (former Royal Nepalese Army School) located then at Chhauni in 1953 and later at Nagarkot provided formal military training, excluding academic education, to the officer cadets. However, it was only after the establishment of the Nepalese Military Academy or NMA (formerly the Royal Nepalese Military Academy) at Kharipati on December 26, 1986, that actual PME was legally instituted. Bachelor's degrees in the humanities and social sciences, and another in political science, were integrated within the NMA's Officer Cadet Basic Course in the mid-1990s in affiliation with and accreditation provided by the Tribhuvan University (TU). At that time, the NMA program was officially recognized by the MoE.⁶⁵

Currently, the level of PME imparted within the NA in ascending order of military hierarchy is as follows:

- Recruit Training Centers (Trishuli), NCO Academy (Sal Jhandi), and Divisional Training School for ORs, NCOs, and JCOs
- Nepalese Military Academy at Kharipati for the Officer Corps
- College of Combat (Sal Jhandi) for junior and mid-level career and specialization course for all ranks
- Army Command and Staff College (ACSC) at Shivapuri for mid-career officer corps
- Higher Command and Staff Course (HCSC) at the Nepalese Army War College (formerly the Infantry School, Nagarkot) for senior officers

Among these institutions, only the NMA and the ACSC provide academic education in addition to professional military training. The NMA provides bachelor's degree programs in social science and in political science, and emphasizes professional military training for the officer cadets. Through a merit-based selection process, qualified

⁶⁴ "Training in Nepalese Army," Nepal Army, accessed February 6, 2018, <https://www.nepalarmy.mil.np/page/training>.

⁶⁵ "History of the Academy," Nepalese Military Academy, accessed February 5, 2018, <http://nma.mil.np/index.php?page=history>.

mid-level officers undergo one year of PME at the ACSC (Shivapuri) and those who already have their bachelor's degree can graduate with a master's degree in Strategic Studies. Both the bachelor's degree and master's degree programs are conducted at the respective institutions in affiliation with TU in Kathmandu, and are recognized by the MoE. Other than these two defense educational institutes, there are no other higher education opportunities in PME for senior level officers and flag officers. Hence, the NA relies heavily on annual foreign grants and quotas for higher strategic level PME from NDUs, NDCs, and war colleges of friendly countries for senior flag and staff officers.

In addition to the NMA and ACSC, the NA advanced its horizon and outreach, especially in the field of medicine, with the establishment of the Nepalese Army Institute of Health and Science (NAIHS) in 2010—a service oriented non-profit medical institution, financed by the Army Welfare Fund and managed by the Nepalese Army Welfare Planning Directorate.⁶⁶ NAIHS is focused on providing professional medical education that meets international standards for the nation as a whole, and specifically to improve the patient care system within the Nepalese Army Medical Corps (NAMC).⁶⁷ NAIHS consists of two colleges: the College of Medicine (NAIHS-COM) and the College of Nursing (NAIHS-CON). With a plan to initiate postgraduate programs specializing in basic sciences and clinical sciences in the immediate future, NAIHS-COM currently has a 4.5-year-long Bachelor in Medicine and Bachelor in Surgery (MBBS) program, with a year-long internship at the Shree Birendra Hospital (SBS), which is the referral hospital for the NA and the teaching hospital for the NAIHS.⁶⁸ NAIHS-CON, on the other hand, provides Proficiency Certificate Level (PCL) in Nursing, Bachelor of Science in Nursing program (B.Sc. Nursing), and Bachelor in Nursing Science (BNS).⁶⁹ Both the colleges are affiliated with Tribhuvan University, Institute of Medicine (TU-IOM), as well as the Council for Technical Education and Vocational Training (CTEVT), and are recognized officially by

⁶⁶ “College of Nursing,” Nepalese Army Institute of Health Sciences (NAIHS), accessed February 23, 2018, http://www.naihs.edu.np/assets/brochure_naihs_con.pdf.

⁶⁷ “College of Medicine,” Nepalese Army Institute of Health Sciences (NAIHS), accessed February 23, 2018, http://www.naihs.edu.np/assets/brochure_naihs_com.pdf.

⁶⁸ NAIHS, “College of Medicine.”

⁶⁹ NAIHS, “College of Nursing.”

the MoE.⁷⁰ The board of advisors for the NAIHS consists of relevant heads of directorates of the NA under the CoAS.⁷¹

2. Nepal Police

Initially, Central Police Training Center (CPTC), which was established on 1956, was responsible for training the police force.⁷² With the endorsement of the Police Regulation of 1993, CPTC was renamed as the National Police Academy (NPA). Since the selection criteria for the officer level training (i.e., the position of Inspector required a bachelor's degree as a pre-requisite for entry), their basic training did not include any academics. In addition, the NP also lacked the equivalent of NA's ACSC, which provided the master's degree in Strategic Studies. However, in order to professionalize senior police officers, it has introduced the Post Graduate Diploma in Police Science (PGDPS) program in 2005 in affiliation with TU Kathmandu.⁷³ In spite of this diploma program, the NP has no advanced educational institute that provides higher CDE and NSE for its senior ranking police officers at the strategic and policy level nor is there any for civilian defense and security officials (MoHA, MoFA, and NID). Besides getting a few slots in the ACSC and the APF Staff College, the NP, too, depends on foreign quotas and grants for higher CDE and NSE.

3. Armed Police Force of Nepal

Likewise, the APF, which was formed on October 24, 2001 as a paramilitary force in support of the counterinsurgency role against the CPN-Maoist guerrillas, takes in, as a pre-requisite criterion, candidates who already have a bachelor's degree.⁷⁴ Hence, after receiving their basic training at the Nepal Armed Police Force School (NAPFS), the APF

⁷⁰ NAIHS, "College of Nursing."

⁷¹ NAIHS, "College of Medicine."

⁷² "Introduction: Historical Development," Nepal Police, accessed February 6, 2018, <https://npa.nepalpolice.gov.np/index.php/introduction>.

⁷³ "Post Graduate Diploma in Police Science (PGDPS) Program," Nepal Police, accessed February 5, 2018, <https://npa.nepalpolice.gov.np/index.php/trainings/pgdps-program>.

⁷⁴ "Introduction," Armed Police Force, Nepal, accessed February 6, 2018, <https://www.apf.gov.np/pages/introduction>.

officers receive their career promotion to Inspector. For the aspiring APF officer corps, the APF Staff College, which is the equivalent of the ACSC, provides necessary operational level PME for mid-level officers. However, for more advanced national defense and security courses and education, the APF, like the NA and NP, depend on foreign grants and quotas from friendly nations and partner nations.

4. National Investigation Department

The NID officers, like those of their sister organizations (the NP and APF), join with the rank of Inspector, already holding a civilian bachelor's degree. Unlike other defense and security agencies, the NID does not have higher-level defense and security education platforms and relies on special quotas from the ACSC, the APF Staff College, and from the NPA. For strategic and policy level officers, the NID, too, depends on foreign grants and quotas to provide higher-level academic education and professional training for career advancement.

B. CDE STATUS WITHIN MOD, MOHA, AND MOFA

History indicates that lack of appropriate CDE among civilian defense officials and staff weakens civilian control over the armed forces, which then allows for what Finer describes as the “military disposition and mood for intervention in politics.”⁷⁵ The Prussian-German period between 1807 and 1920 amply illustrates how the educated members of the General Staff within the Prussian-German military organization were able to undermine the civilian control of the War Ministry, the War Cabinets, and the Parliament. The weakness of the civilian defense officials and elites in decision and policy making positions was mainly due to lack of defense and security expertise, lack of knowledge about the planning and conduct of the war, and lack of proficiency in their managerial skills.

Hence, any government that pursues democratization of CMR and hopes to consolidate democracy also must emphasize the enhancement of the professional competencies of its civilian defense personnel, including political elites occupying

⁷⁵ Finer, *The Man on Horseback*, 23–72.

decision-making government positions. Superior professional competencies are only possible by awarding these members with higher CDE that supports integration and provides knowledge of the culture, tradition, responsibilities, and capabilities of the concerned security agencies. In turn, this education and the resulting competencies contribute to better CMR and civilian control over the armed forces.

Compared to the individual and organizational professionalism and effectiveness of the defense and security agencies, especially the NA, the civilian counterparts of the MoD, MoHA, and MoFA lack the higher-level civilian defense education qualification necessary for effective and efficient conduct of assigned responsibilities and to maintain civilian control over the security forces.

Unlike the established Western democracies of Europe and the United States, Nepal has not implemented the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) to deal with everyday defense and security affairs.⁷⁶ And due to the lack of an advanced CDE institute on defense planning and management subjects, the civilian defense and security sectors lack expertise on planning, programming, and budgeting, which are key ingredients for successful formulation of concepts, strategy, and the policy and decision-making processes.

C. NSE STATUS IN NEPAL

With regards to NSE, there are few emerging private forums and institutions that specialize in national security issues and also promote civilian qualifications. The National Institute for Strategic Studies (NISS), which is an independent, non-profit and non-partisan national organization, deals with peace, security, democracy, and development (PSDD). The NISS provides the government and security sector communities with a platform to discuss national security issues and help formulate “strategic level papers and policy

⁷⁶ Lectures on PPBS by Professor Thomas D. Young, *NS3246: Comparative Defense Planning*, Glasgow Hall-389, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA (January 2018).

recommendations.”⁷⁷ However, there is no government-sponsored national security educational institution that provides graduate and postgraduate level education on defense and security management as yet.

Because higher education and training for the members of all the security agencies are not only compulsory qualification criteria for individual career promotion, but also to replace and fill various high-ranking staff, command, and flag positions at strategic and decision-making level due to routine annual wastage rate: early and normal retirement and death. Additionally, these higher defense qualifications are required for key security staff positions and advisors with job specific specialties to represent their security branches within the MoD, MoHA, MoFA, and the NSC.

These requirements, therefore, amplify Nepal’s need for a joint IHDE platform akin to the NDU, but with a national scope to accommodate integrated faculty for all three wings of the security agencies under a single educational umbrella. Such an institution would supplement Nepal’s defense capacity in sustaining long-term intellectual capability: think tanks, decision makers, commanders, and staff officers.

Thus, the establishment of an IHDE like the NDU would enable the GoN to

- raise the intellectual capacities of all concerned stakeholders of defense and security organs
- provide continuity to groom high-caliber strategic and operational decision makers
- provide national and regional higher education defense platforms, which can also act as centers for national disaster, relief, and threat mitigation
- provide opportunity for both civilian as well as security agency personnel to gain higher degrees in conformation with their service and specialization

⁷⁷ “About Us,” Nepal Institute for Strategic Studies, accessed February 5, 2018, <http://niss.org.np/about-us/>. NISS provides a forum for “individuals and organizations from the government, political parties, security sector institutions, civil society, and other stake holders”⁷⁷ to participate in seminars, discussions, and programs related to PSDD. In addition, it helps these groups develops “strategic level papers and policy recommendations” through research works, training, and other activities at the national, regional, and international level.

- help enhance democratization of CMR through effectiveness, efficiency, and strengthened democratic civilian control of the security forces

Raising academic qualifications within the defense and security sectors contributes to increased professional capacities between both the civilian and security forces leaders at the policy and strategy levels. In order to develop leaders with the critical mindset capable of dealing rationally, practically, and scientifically with ambiguities, threats, and conflicts, defense and security education needs to focus on Tom Peter's principles as summarized by Todor D. Tagarev:

(i) invest in human capital as much as in hardware; (ii) train entry-level people and then retrain them as necessary; (iii) train everyone in problem solving techniques to contribute to quality improvement; (iv) train extensively following promotion to the first managerial job, then train managers every time they advance; and (v) use training as a vehicle for instilling strategic trust.⁷⁸

D. CMR GAPS RESULTING FROM LACK OF CDE: A CASE STUDY OF NEPAL'S MOD AND NA

Since its transition to democracy in 2006, Nepal has witnessed two rounds of Constituent Assembly elections in 2008 and in 2013⁷⁹ followed by promulgation of the Constitution of Nepal in 2015. These political events provided the basis for the formulation of the National Security Policies in 2016. The recent local provincial election and federal parliamentary elections that took place at the end of 2017 provide proof of Nepal's democratic process advancing toward a consolidation phase. The MoD has reformed its structural organization to fulfill its constitutional role, and, likewise, one would probably imagine it discharging superior civilian control, effectiveness, and efficiency over the NA. In reality, however, the MoD is still midway in fulfilling its overall functions. Nevertheless, for the purpose of identifying the CMR gaps in terms of civilian control, effectiveness, and efficiency of the MoD over the NA, this section aims to find the missing link for realization

⁷⁸ Todor D. Tagarev, *The Role of Military Education in Harmonizing Civil-Military Relations*, (Sofia, Bulgaria: NATO Democratic Institutions Fellowships Program, June 10, 1997), 27, <https://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/95-97/tagarev.pdf>.

⁷⁹ The Carter Center, *Observing Nepal's 2013 Constituent Assembly Election*, Final Election Report, (Atlanta, GA: The Carter Center, 2013), http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PA00JWW2.pdf.

of ideal MoD functioning criteria, as postulated by Thomas C. Bruneau and Richard B. Goetze, Jr.⁸⁰

1. Structural Deficiency and Lack of CDE-NSE in MoD: Negative Impact on Trust Building

The first set of CMR gaps lies within the MoD's structure and the lack of CDE-NSE among its civilian components, which continues to hinder trust-building measures. The structural weakness and inadequate CDE-NSE among the MoD constitutes a major setback in terms of effective and efficient response to CMR between the MoD and the NA. According to Bruneau and Goetze, the purpose of MoD is "to structure the power relationships between democratically elected civilian leaders and the armed forces command."⁸¹ In this regard, as illustrated in the organization structure of MoD in Figure 1, the constitutional hierarchical framework of the MoD justifies, theoretically and organizationally, a balanced power relationship with the NA-HQ. Furthermore, the various integral departments and branches that have oversight roles for the NA promise to enhance civilian control over the armed forces.

⁸⁰ Thomas C. Bruneau, and Richard B. Goetze Jr., "Ministries of Defense and Democratic Control," in *Who Guards the Guardians and How: Democratic Civil-Military Relations*, ed. Thomas C. Bruneau and Scott D. Tollefson (Austin: Texas University Press, 2006), 71–95.

⁸¹ *Ibid.* 78.




Figure 1. Organization of Ministry of Defense (MoD), Nepal.⁸²

However, the drawback in this present organizational structure is twofold. First, although the executive powers lie with the Prime Minister and his Council of Ministers, constitutionally, the President is the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the NA and has the authority to declare the mobilization of the NA under the recommendation of the NSC pursuant to the decisions made by the Council of Ministers.⁸³ This power structure provides checks and balances against the incumbent political government from misusing the NA, but these checks and balances—implemented by a lengthy constitutional decision-making process—can delay the implementation of the executive orders of the democratically elected government. In addition, such “declaration of mobilization of the NA [has to be] ratified by the House of Representatives within one month after the date of declaration.”⁸⁴

⁸² Adapted from “Organization Structure of Ministry of Defense,” GoN, Ministry of Defense, accessed February 15, 2018, <http://mod.gov.np/page/organization-structure.html>; GoN, “The Constitution of Nepal,” Article 266 National Security Council (Kathmandu, Nepal: Nepal Gazette, 2015), 185, <http://www.lawcommission.gov.np/en/documents/2016/01/constitution-of-nepal-2.pdf>.

⁸³ GoN, “The Constitution of Nepal,” Articles 267 (2), and (6), 185–186.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, Article 267 (6), 186.

Second, the whole of MoD is staffed purely by civilian staff components and does not yet include members of the NA. This staffing indicates not only the lack of defense awareness in the MoD's structural organization, but also a misunderstanding of how that structure should be composed to function democratically with inclusive representation from the armed forces. The result of which hinders joint collaborative response to various situations; decision-making processes often occur in isolation from each other, creating mistrust and misunderstanding within the inter-governmental working relationship. This flaw has been identified, and hence, in order to enhance MoD's functional effectiveness and control, a proposal is under consideration to incorporate operational level officers (lieutenant colonels) assigned under respective civilian heads of departments and branches.

The MoD's current organization structure, in theory, is all about functional departments with the potential to demonstrate civilian control over the NA through the routine inspection, oversight, and monitoring of formation HQs, units/sub-units, and UNPSO missions physically in mission areas. In practice, however, the MoD civilian officials are unable to supervise and direct the actions of the NA mainly due to their general lack of CDE. Yet it is CDE that constitutes the necessary skills contemplated by Halladay: "expertise, experience, knowledge, on defense and military affairs,"⁸⁵ and know-how about the strategic, operational, tactical, and logistic aspects of the armed forces, and about national defense and security affairs.

The limitations may stem from improper rather than inadequate academic preparation of the civilian leaders, officials, and staff, who hold academic degrees received from civilian institutions, which do not touch on defense and security studies. Hence, the establishment of an IHDE like the NDU may solve the problem of inadequate higher defense education necessary for the civilian components in addition to building trust through joint collaborative defense education system.

⁸⁵ Halladay, "Defense Education and Training," 3.

2. NA's Expanding Roles: Negative Impact on Combat Readiness and Effectiveness

The second set of CMR fissures lies in the expanding roles of NA in MOOTW as per the national security policy and the limited capacity of both MoD and NA to support the overstretched roles of NA in terms of finance, equipment, and trained manpower, as well as higher defense education for strategic and operational requirements. This limitation impacts negatively on the NA's combat readiness and effectiveness, and on the desired or ideal outcome from the troops on the ground. One key challenge is the difficulty to provide surplus educated commanders and staff officers capable of understanding an operational environment different from the usual one of conventional warfare. MOOTW operations demand a varied set of expertise, skills, and situational and pragmatic awareness among commanders and staff offices at every level of the chain-of-command, which can only be cultivated through advanced PME and training.

NA's ongoing MOOTW contributions include

- participation in 42 UNPSO missions (1958–2017), with a current deployment at various 16 UN missions, making Nepal the sixth-largest troop-contributing country in the world
- participation in nation development, where it has assisted the GoN in the construction of roads and bridges as pilot projects in the remote mountainous/hill terrains of Nepal⁸⁶
- protection to 13 wildlife reserves and conservation projects⁸⁷
- acting as the first responder for Disaster Management, which includes search and rescue missions, medical assistance/evacuation/air rescue, mass evacuation, and flood control⁸⁸

Thus, the tendency to gravitate away from conventional warfare toward unconventional warfare, irregular warfare, or national development efforts, providing

⁸⁶ "Nepali Army beyond Primary Duties," Nepal Army, accessed February 15, 2018, <https://www.nepalarmy.mil.np/page/bpd>.

⁸⁷ Nepal Army, "Nepali Army Beyond Primary Duties." For more details, see subheading "Nature Conservation."

⁸⁸ Nepal Army, "Nepali Army Beyond Primary Duties." For more details, see subheading "Disaster Management."

assistance to civil authorities during internal disturbances and during emergencies like COIN, and disaster and rescue operations, including humanitarian assistance during crisis situations, all necessitate adequate funding, appropriate specific training, and advanced specialized PME and NSE. Nevertheless, with limited budget and resources, together with expanding domestic and international commitments, NA may find itself overstretched. In the long run, this can undermine the capacity and capability to provide national defense and security. Similarly, the challenge for the MoD to finance, train, equip, and educate the NA in order to maintain its combat readiness and effectiveness to fulfill national defense and security policies and goals may equally undermine the MoD's purpose, which is to "maximize the effectiveness of the armed forces,"⁸⁹ as opined by CMR scholars.

3. MoD's Limitation on Implementing Security Policies

The third set of CMR gaps lies in MoD's limited capacity to garner sufficient budget and resources for the NA to fulfill its assigned missions and tasks according to a desired standard in full capacity and scope. Thus, the stringent budget constraints impede the fourth purpose of the MoD, as argued by Bruneau and Goetze, which "is to maximize efficient use of resources (for example, funds, personnel, and equipment) as roles and mission change."⁹⁰ Therefore, the question arises: Has the MoD fulfilled its role in maintaining the combat effectiveness and efficiency of NA to deter external threats (conventional war or attack/invasion) pursuant with defense policy, if the situation does arise? The answer is, perhaps, partially fulfilled. The reason being, in the present context, despite its professionalism, determination, and loyalty to the country, the NA does not possess sufficient means (modern weapons, equipment, transport, and support arms capabilities) to effectively deter or confront direct full-scale invasions from the hyper-modernized military powers of its neighboring countries.

An example of such lack of means was displayed during the disaster rescue and relief response by the NA amid the mega-earthquake crisis of 2015. Ultimately, the nation had to depend on multi-national forces and international support for collapsed structure

⁸⁹ Bruneau and Goetze Jr., 80–81.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 81–82.

search and rescue (CSSR) tools, equipment, and skilled manpower to extract victims from collapsed structures, and to provide airlift transportation and portable bridging equipment.⁹¹ Furthermore, NA's lack of modern military hardware, airlift capabilities, transportation, and armaments points to the MoD's failure to implement the first goal of the constitution and its defense policy in its entirety, which is "to protect the freedom, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Nepal"⁹² against external threats from invasion and attack effectively. Therefore, instead, it relies strategically on UN and international intervention to stop a war, should the situation arise. On the other hand, the MoD could resort to a Delaying Action Campaign (protracted warfare) as outlined in the NA's Military Doctrine.⁹³

Furthermore, because of its stringent budget allocation for defense purposes, the MoD is forced to rely on foreign grants and quotas to provide specialized skills, courses, and higher educational opportunities for the NA. Thus, only a limited number of those lucky flag officers, senior staff officers, and specialists are selected for approved courses abroad, while the majority of eligible officers wait in queue or never get the opportunity to advance their career prospects. Such unintended limitations emphasize Nepal's need for an integrated higher educational defense platform like the NDU. The lack of such an institution has undermined the potential of both the NA and civilian officials' capacity and capability to provide critical decision making, policy making, and other advisory roles and operational functions related to overall defense and security. Thus, under such budget constraints, where the size of the security forces may be inadequate to provide desired security coverage, the importance of an IHDE to build such capacities and capacities is supported by Steven Metz's dictum: "if the military [has] to be smaller, it should at least

⁹¹ "Operation Sankat Mochan," Nepal Army, accessed February 22, 2018, https://www.nepalarmy.mil.np/upload/publications/special/english_part4.pdf.

⁹² GoN, "Constitution of Nepal," (Kathmandu: Nepal Gazette, September, 20, 2018), 30-31. <http://www.lawcommission.gov.np/en/documents/2016/01/constitution-of-nepal-2.pdf>. Article 5 on "National Interest" and Article 51 (a) on "Policies related to national unity and national security," direct the security forces to protect national unity, freedom, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence of Nepal.

⁹³ Nepal Army, "Military Doctrine," 35-36.

be smarter ... [likewise] ... we must cut, but cut wisely.”⁹⁴ Metz further points out poorly educated forces bring greater risk and hazards to the organization.

4. MoD’s Poor Decision Making and Limited Crisis Management Proficiency

The fourth CMR weakness lies in MoD’s poor decision making and limited experience in crisis management. The disaster management and response operations during the mega-earthquake of 2015 demonstrated how scarce resource allocation hampered the NA’s capacity to carry out search, rescue, and relief operations on time, forcing the GoN to appeal to the UNOCHA and international community for humanitarian aid, including CSSR teams. Moreover, the situation also displayed inability and lack of experience on the part of the civilian authorities to plan, manage, and direct disaster relief and rescue operations, for which they had to rely on the expertise of the NA and multi-national military rescue and relief teams, in addition to other international non-governmental organizations (NGO) and international non-governmental organizations (INGO) for management support as highlighted by *Operation Sankat Mochan*.⁹⁵ Lack of timely decisions and policy implementation vividly exposed the weakness of the civilian leadership to think critically and arrive at prompt decisions to solve the VUCA crisis at hand. In contrast to how the GoN responded during the crisis, if the GoN had adequately resourced the NA and security agencies, and should there have been an established higher defense educational institute with a research and development wing with think tanks to facilitate and mitigate crisis responses, the chances of saving more lives would have, perhaps, been possible. Hence, the civilian leadership, officials, and civil servants need a CDE outreach to build intellectual capacity to lead the way during crisis situations.

⁹⁴ Steven Metz, “Strategic Horizon: U.S. Professional Military Education on the Chopping Block,” Strategic Horizon, April 17, 2013, http://www.ndu.edu/Portals/59/Documents/BOV_Documents/2013/Metz--US%20PME%20on%20the%20Chopping%20Block.pdf.

⁹⁵ “Feedback and Recommendation,” Nepal Army, accessed July 15, 2017, https://www.nepalarmy.mil.np/upload/publications/special/english_part4.pdf.

5. Unequal Levels of Defense Education and Professional Competencies

The fifth CMR gap lies in the unequal levels of defense education and levels of professional competencies between the civilian officials and bureaucrats of MoD and the senior flag officers, staff officers, and military advisors. With regard to competencies and external relations, despite MoD's ability to define roles and missions for the civilian staff of the MoD and the NA, and to exercise oversight through its designated departments and branches, the civilian defense staff members still lack competencies compared to their NA counterparts. This difference in competency levels corresponds directly to the unequal level of PME, CDE, and NSE education received by the civilian defense officials and their staffs. The MoD and other ministries concerned with national defense and security lack professional staffs with skills and expertise in force generation and management; acquisition, procurement, and supply; defense budget and resource management; and powerful leaders with decision and policy-making ability within the MoD to lobby for and raise concerns with the other ministries and GoN over defense budget and resources. These are what Bruneau and Goetze term the "lack of institutional foundation and expertise to exercise these [key competencies and bureaucratic competencies] responsibilities."⁹⁶ Harnessing these key competencies and skills is the only way to enhance CMR, which is only possible through CDE. In comparison, the NA fairs well, as it sends its senior flag officers and staff officers for higher defense courses and education abroad on approved grants and quotas. In this way, they possess updated knowledge, skills, and experience to deal with defense and security matters more effectively and efficiently than their civilian counterparts.

In addition, the inability of the MoD officials and staff to formulate a national defense strategy document commensurate with the national defense policy undermines the MoD's capacity and capability to fulfill its purpose and responsibilities, as advocated Bruneau and Goetze.⁹⁷ The absence of this national strategic defense document hinders the effectiveness and efficiency in the employment of Nepal's national army, the NA, in the

⁹⁶ Bruneau and Goetze Jr., "Ministries of Defense and Democratic Control," 88.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 78–80.

contemporary asymmetric threat environment. At the same time, it demonstrates MoD's lack of intellectual capacity to comprehend the broader scope of defense and security affairs inherent in strategic and operational management and thus proves inefficient in providing national directives and guidance on matters related to the same. On a similar note, the absence of a national military strategy highlights the flaws of strategic and operational employment of the NA in accordance with national security policy guidelines. Perhaps an IHDE may provide an answer to the intellectual weakness surfacing within the MoD and the NA to address such strategic security concerns.

6. Lack of Educated Political Leadership

Finally, another CMR gap lies in the lack of educated political leadership within the MoD and the GoN in general. Although the MoD has been able to maintain good internal and external relationships with other executive bodies, as well as with diplomatic and international emissaries, and has maintained substantial civilian control over the NA, this success tends to vary with the personality, political acumen, and knowledge of the individual who presides over as the MoD. In particular, this success rests in how politically powerful he or she is in voicing the concerns of the MoD to the legislative branches and at securing formidable confidence.⁹⁸ The frequent change of political leadership and parties in the government during last couple of decades since the rise of Maoist insurgency has amply demonstrated the incompetency of many incoming and outgoing Ministers of Defense and their respective political parties to sustain democratic stability in governance. Hence, through enhanced CMR, stable governance is possible when the system works as a team under strong democratic leadership, where both civilian defense officials and their security counterparts are on equal intellectual footings and share similar perspectives. As such, the importance of PME, CDE, and NSE in developing individual, group, and organizational competencies cannot be overlooked.

⁹⁸ Ibid., 88–92.

E. CONCLUSION

Except in the medical field of the NA, the PME, CDE, and NSE standard among the security agencies overall is mediocre, barely fulfilling the needs of the security organizations and their concerned civilian ministries and departments. Similarly, the inadequate level of competencies among the civilian officials and staff members within the MoD (which presumably applies also to the MoHA, and MoFA) has been identified with the lack of CDE.

As the global security environment reflects a VUCA scenario, as described by Stiehm,⁹⁹ that keeps changing rapidly, it challenges the traditional methods of resolving defense and security issues. The recent trend toward increased intra-state asymmetric warfare, conflicts, and disputes emphasizes the need for a holistic, joint, and collaborative approach to mitigate and resolve domestic, national, and international security threats emerging in all five domains of warfare (i.e., land, sea, air, space and cyber).¹⁰⁰ Hence, solving such complex security problems through the collaborative effort of all stake holders—government and political party leaders; the various branches and agencies within the defense and security sectors; and civilian organizations like the Human Rights, Red Cross, NGOs, and INGOs—requires stakeholders to share a similar intellectual level and professional approach. As practiced in many Western democracies like the Germany and the United States, higher education in the form of PME, CDE, and NSE not only enhances individual intellectual capacity and capabilities, but also builds personal confidence and fosters organizational trust, thus enhancing democratic CMR best practices. Likewise, in the Nepalese context, it becomes essential for key stakeholders of defense and security to collaborate and incorporate a mix of PME, CDE, and NSE to enhance the competency level of both the civilians and the security forces personnel. Such an achievement may be possible and desirable through the establishment of an integrated interagency IHDE like the NDU.

⁹⁹ Stiehm, *U.S. Army War College*, 186–187.

¹⁰⁰ Marine Corps Operating Concept: How an Expeditionary Force Operates in the 21st Century,” Department of the Navy, September 2016, 8, <http://www.mcwl.marines.mil/Portals/34/Images/MarineCorpsOperatingConceptSept2016.pdf?ver=2016-12-02-073359-207>.

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III. BRIEF HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF MILITARY EDUCATION IN PRUSSIA-GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES

PME is a fundamental tool to enhance the democratization of CMR in order to achieve effectiveness and efficiency, and to maintain civilian control over the armed forces, as postulated by contemporary CMR experts like Bruneau, Matei, Guttieri, and Goetze. By comparison, this chapter explains the historical evolution of PME in Prussia-Germany and the United State. from a CMR perspective from 19th century to the establishment in the late 20th century of the University of Bundeswehr Munich (Germany) and the NDU in the United States. In doing so, it provides a brief comparative study of the current PME status of both countries and how PME supports their respective country's CMR and national security policies. Finally, the analysis in this chapter draws a conclusion as to why graduate-level education is essential for policy development and strategic level decision making related to responding to the VUCA scenario, as postulated by Stiehm and U.S. leadership.¹⁰¹

A. EVOLUTIONARY PATH OF PME IN PRUSSIA-GERMANY AND ITS ROLE IN ENHANCING CMR

This section explains the four crucial periods in Prussian-German history that demonstrate the growth of PME, ultimately giving rise in the 1970s to the establishment of higher defense educational institutions like the Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg/München (UniBw) and the Helmut Schmidt University (Hamburg). Each period illustrates why higher education is important in enhancing the professional competence of the security forces and concerned civilian defense officials in the pursuit of democratizing CMR: promoting effectiveness, efficiency, and civilian control of the armed forces. This survey

¹⁰¹ Stiehm, *U.S. Army War College*, 167–87. She explains why senior military officers require critical thinking capacity to understand the VUCA scenario and be able to respond to such a crisis situation as taught in the USAWC. This notion was also officially expressed by former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Dempsey in *Joint Education: White Paper* (Washington, DC: CJCS, July 16, 2012), http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/concepts/cjcs_wp_education.pdf?ver=2017-12-28-162044-527.

is ambitious in its scope and spans from the end of the 17th century until the late 20th century in a grand sweep.

The first period covers the early Prussian military foundation era (1604–1807) under the Great Elector Frederick William and his successor Frederick William I until the defeat of Prussian Army by Napoleon in 1806.

The second period covers the major military and PME reform period initiated under the Military Reorganization Commission in 1807 and leading up to the World War I. The third period covers the rise and fall of Nazi regime under the dictatorship of Adolf Hitler through the end of World War II, depicting the absence of CDE among the civilian defense community under the Wermacht. The fourth period includes the post-World War II era, comprising the Cold War period to the present day, during which a major transformation within the German armed forces toward democratization takes place, prioritizing the reform policies of *Innere Führung*,¹⁰² paving the path toward the institutionalization of two premier PME institutions under the German Bundeswehr.

1. The Foundation of the Prussian Army and the Reform (1604–1807)

First, the period between 1640 and 1807 illustrates the founding and reform movement within the Prussian Army and vis-à-vis the German State in military matters pertaining to selection, training, and PME of the officer corps, administration and logistics, and finance. In the wake of the Thirty Years War, which laid waste to the Mark Brandenburg in northern Germany, the Hohenzollerns embarked on a military reform of armies in the pattern of the late conflict (a mixture of local forces with comparative weak echelons of command and a reliance on mercenaries and temporarily engaged troops) to create a standing army under the absolutist model. That is, there was a strong court and a strong state with centralizing ambitions. The result was a strong army embedded in a strong state, with an imperative of enlightened absolutism in which training and education in service of the state was a central mark of this new style army. When the epoch of politics

¹⁰² Abenheim, *Reforging the Iron Cross*, 165–174.

and war shifted, however, this strength turned to weakness, which was answered by an important period of reform.

Under Frederick William I, the War Commissariats, comprising the General Directory (established in 1723), were entrusted with political and administrative authority in matters concerning finance, policy, and the management of army. It provided the royal authority of administration over tax collection, mint, postal system, and economic policies directed toward consolidating the state and its military power to execute such policies. The implementation of these policies was possible under the Great Elector Frederick William and his successor Frederick William I through reform policies directed at raising the efficiency, effectiveness, and capabilities of the army's and state's administration. The later formation of the General Staff under the supervision of General Sparr¹⁰³ allowed the Crown to professionalize the army, especially by institutionalizing the educational system of the officer corps. This was accomplished first through the establishment of a cadet corps, with a rigorous system of training and what in later times would be called education as befitted young noblemen and later the *Kriegsakademie*, which were instrumental in imparting advanced professional military knowledge, skills, and education for the strategic and policy aspects of the state and army.¹⁰⁴

Despite the promise of enhanced professionalism and competence signaled by the establishment of pre-modern PME institutions for the officer corps, the Prussian army suffered a humiliating defeat in the battle of Jena and Auerstädt in 1806 against the French army led by Napoleon Bonaparte. This defeat showed that what had been an innovation in the early 18th century had a century later become a hindrance in the face of a military revolution triggered by the French revolution. This military revolution revealed the need to widen the political and social foundation of the army. The Prussian failures can also be attributed to defects in links between the state, society, and the organization itself (its structure and its doctrinal standard operating procedures). Further, this defeat pointed to a lack of training and leadership skills, all related indirectly to modern-day planning,

¹⁰³ Gordon A. Craig, *The Politics of Prussian Army: 1640–1945* (London: Oxford University Press, 1955), 6.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 11.

programming, and budgeting systems (PPBS) within the armed forces.¹⁰⁵ Therefore, the incident only confirms the necessity of PME on the part of armed forces leadership, including the commanders and their General Staffs, as well as the CDE on the part of civilian leaders and officials working for the war commissariats, war cabinets, and diplomatic emissaries. Clearly, the CDE did not contribute to effective CMR nor were leaders able to fulfill their roles and plan for the missions intended for the armed forces under civilian control.

2. Military Reorganization Commission and the Reformers (1807–1914)

The Prussian military reforms of 1807–1840 and 1859–1866 illustrate the efficiency of the armed forces as a professional organization despite the political failures and constitutional impediments to maintain democratic civilian control of the armed forces. The necessity for the Prussian public to overcome the Jena and Auerstädt defeat by Napoleon inspired Frederick William III to grant authority to reformers like Stein, Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Boyen, and Grolman, under the Military Reorganization Commission, to make the following reforms:¹⁰⁶

- “abolition of hereditary serfdom in October 1807 and the institution of local government in cities in November 1808,”¹⁰⁷ allowing public participation in government and politics
- ending the aristocratic domination of Officer Corps selection under the Junker system and providing an opportunity for the middle class to join the armed forces as officers and “make [the] education qualification”¹⁰⁸ the basis for granting commission during peacetime and “exceptional bravery and quickness of perception”¹⁰⁹ during wartime

¹⁰⁵ R.V. Segsworth, “P.P.B.S. and Policy Analysis: The Canadian Experience,” accessed January 21, 2018, <http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/002085237203800406>. Segsworth emphasizes the importance of integrating planning, programing, and budgeting for effective realization of national security policies and strategic concept, plans, and objectives.

¹⁰⁶ Craig, “Politics of the Prussian Army,” 37–40.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 40–41.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 43–44.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

- introduction of a military justice system and abolition of the corporal punishment system

The royal order of 1808 allowed Scharnhorst, an artillery officer and therefore a person open to the need for knowledge to succeed in battle, to implement PME on a national scale. Thus, he established war schools at Berlin, Königsberg, and Breslau to provide basic officer training of nine months.¹¹⁰ To promote the higher educational qualification for selected officers corps, Scharnhorst established a special military academy, the *Kriegsakademie*, in Berlin. The academy offered a three-year specialization course encompassing “military [science] including mathematics, tactics, strategy, artillery, military geography, French and German, physics, chemistry, horse care, and mess administration.”¹¹¹ In addition, the *Kriegsakademie* conducted a more advanced version of PME, the *Selecta*, which represented the staff courses for promoting prospective senior officers to the position of General Staff, including such persons as Clausewitz, Tiedemann, and Moltke.¹¹²

By the late 19th century, the General Staff had become the epitome of Prussian-German military effectiveness and efficiency with regards to the formulation of military strategy, war plans, and policy, including the management and execution of military operations.¹¹³ One has to note, however, that the General Staff had difficulty adjusting to the transformation of war in the 20th century, and despite the level of excellence its graduates may have attained in the operation and especially tactical realms, the *Kriegsakademie* had not prepared them in the aspects of policy and strategy, which were damned to failure in 1916–1918. This failure was followed by an even greater failure, despite their apparent success at the beginning. In World War II, the Western allies proved more adept at command in the higher realms of war. When Germany was re-armed in the 1950s, however, both West and East Germany resumed General Staffs and General Staff education, but on a very different basis than before. The story of World War II, however,

¹¹⁰ Ibid., 45.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² Ibid.

¹¹³ Ibid.

is the most compelling. As a result, the General Staff system not only survived the Nazi era, but also continues under the present-day German Bundeswehr, and has perhaps been the only military system to be emulated by many nations, including the United States.

3. Lack of Higher Defense Education during the Nazi Regime (1920-1945)

Third, the period of World War II under the Nazi regime raises serious questions about military professionalism, education for the higher realms of war, and the epoch of total war that occurred under Hitler's Chancellorship.¹¹⁴ With regard to CMR, the civilian leadership under Nazi rule actively destroyed democratic values and implemented a dangerous national strategy of imperialist ideology in pursuit of Germany's quest for power and dominance in Europe, eventually leading to World War II. The outcome saw the fall of Hitler and his Nazi regime with the humiliating defeat of Germany and its Axis partners (Japan and Italy) by the Allied forces.

Despite the defeat of the German armed forces, the German General Staff continued to garner awe and respect for their military prowess and professionalism, especially among the victorious U.S. Army as it dealt with a defeated Germany in the Cold War. During this period, the inability of both the German civilian elites and the military to prevent Hitler's authoritarian dictatorship illuminates why civilian and military elites, staffs, and advisors needed to have not only moral courage to defy undemocratic and inhumane decisions, but also to possess an educated critical and analytical mindset. This mindset can be developed through higher education that allows individuals and groups to decide under VUCA environment, as explained by Stiehm.¹¹⁵

¹¹⁴ Gordon A. Craig, "Hitler and the Army, 1935-45," in *The Politics of Prussian Army 1640-1945* (London: Oxford University Press, 1995), 468-503. Craig highlights in this chapter how Hitler manipulated and underplayed the military leadership after the death of Field Marshal Hindenburg and concentrated the powers of the President, Chancellor, and the War Minister under him as the *Fuehrer* and *Reichskanzler*, thus accentuating his dictatorial role and undermining the military leadership through his decree of February 4, 1938 that compelled the armed forces to take an oath of allegiance and loyalty to Hitler in person. The result of which authorized him to purge the old traditional military leadership by sacking Fritsch and 13 other high ranking generals, and henceforth, subjugating the total control and obedience of the armed forces.

¹¹⁵ Stiehm, *U.S. Army War College*, 167-87.

4. Post–World War II Reform of the German Armed Forces (1945-Present Day)

Finally, the post-World War II period demonstrates how the West German armed forces were able to unify, consolidate, and progress into a politically and socially accepted, democratically instituted, and constitutionally recognized under the 1948 Basic Law. Eventually, it became a superior professional national army that has confidently and competently defied the negative expectations of its past Allied opponents of World War II and decades old allies.¹¹⁶ The success of the West and then the United German Armed Forces lies in their professional qualities and teachings borrowed from the past General Staffs, as well as their implementation of the *Innere Führung* or leadership and civic education, which reformed the armed forces. One of the key factors of reform has been the importance and priorities awarded to higher defense education and the establishment of Universität der Bundeswehr München (Munich University of the Federal Armed Forces).¹¹⁷

5. Universität Der Bundeswehr München (University of the Federal Armed Forces, Munich)

After two decades of debate and controversy in the new West German military from the early 1950s until the end of the 1960s, various CMR reforms were initiated under the *Innere Führung*, as advanced by Abenheim. Among them were the PME reforms in Germany marked by the establishment of the Universität der Bundeswehr München (UniBw) and the Helmut Schmidt University in 1973 under the leadership of the then-Defense Minister Helmut Schmidt, as an integral part of the German Armed Forces.¹¹⁸ Initially, these universities aimed at producing graduate military officers with a civilian higher education and then preparing them for future civilian careers once they completed

¹¹⁶ Donald Abenheim's books on *Soldier and Politics Transformed*, and *Reforging the Iron Cross: The Search for Tradition in the West German Armed Forces* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988) compliments both the *Innere Führung* or the inner structure and the reforms in education for the professionalism of the Bundeswehr.

¹¹⁷ As explained in Abenheim, "A Half Century of Officer Education in the German Bundeswehr," 209–227.

¹¹⁸ Bundeswehr University Munich." Military Wikia, accessed February 1, 2018, http://military.wikia.com/wiki/Bundeswehr_University_Munich.

their military obligations (a minimum of 13 years of service prior to retirement).¹¹⁹ Both universities have since adopted an integrated approach that now includes civilians from industries and public authorities (since 2001), interagency and inter-service personnel, and international students and are focused on synthesizing training as well as PME.¹²⁰

The UniBw offers a three-year bachelor's degree and an additional year for a master's degree and further provides doctorate degrees and habilitations for university professors.¹²¹ Unlike the semester system of most universities in the United States and elsewhere, each academic year is structured along a trimester concept in order to maximize credit points per year for the students as per the European Credit Transfer System (ECTS) under the Bologna Process established since 2007.¹²²

For a smooth functioning of the UniBw, its organization is composed of a University plus a University of Applied Science headed by the President of the UniBw. The University consists of seven departments comprising: Civil Engineering and Environmental Science; Electrical Engineering and Information Technology; Informatics; Aerospace Engineering; Pedagogics/Sports Science; Political and Social Sciences (established in 1978); and Economics and Organizational Science.¹²³ Likewise, the University of Applied Science is composed of three departments: Business Economics;

¹¹⁹ "The Universität der Bundeswehr München." University of Bundeswehr Munich, accessed January 15, 2018, https://www.unibw.de/praes/universitaet-en/index_html?set_language=en.

¹²⁰ For the purpose of limiting the scope of research, only the UniBw in Germany shall be discussed in this section.

¹²¹ University of Bundeswehr Munich, "The Universität der Bundeswehr München."

¹²² The Bologna Process is a European educational reform undertaken by 29 European nations under the initiatives of French, Italian, British, and German Ministers of Education in May 1998 to arrive at a common acceptable European model for higher education by 2010. For more details, see "Academic Reform and the Bologna Process," The Universität der Bundeswehr München, accessed February 1, 2018, https://www.unibw.de/praes/universitaet-en/index_html?set_language=en; and "Bundeswehr University Munich," Military Wikia, accessed February 1, 2018, http://military.wikia.com/wiki/Bundeswehr_University_Munich.

¹²³ "University Departments," The Universität der Bundeswehr München, accessed February 1, 2018, <https://www.unibw.de/praes/studium-en/fakultaeten-en>.

Electrical Engineering and Computer Engineering; and Engineering.¹²⁴ It also provides 18 inter-disciplinary faculties within these two Universities.¹²⁵

The management and administration of the UniBw is looked after by the two special committees (i.e., the Management Committee and the Extended University Management), both of which are chaired and headed by the President of the UniBw, who in turn, is “elected by the Administrative Council and officially appointed for a period of six years by the Federal Ministry of Defense with the approval of the Bavarian State Ministry of Science, Research and the Arts.”¹²⁶ In addition, there are three Vice-Presidents, two from the University (one representing academics, and the other representing the research department) and one from the University of Applied Sciences. These Vice-Presidents are accountable to the President and are *ex officio* members of both the committees with regard to policy formulations and provide advice to the Senate and the Administrative Council.¹²⁷

In addition to the President, Vice-Presidents, and two committees, the UniBw has an Administrative Council, University Council, and University Secretary to assist in its governance. It houses a strong research wing for both the University and the University of Applied Science, which is further complemented by internationalization of its courses, guest instructors and speakers, exchange programs, and internships and study abroad for both students and instructors.¹²⁸ With regard to quality control, the UniBw has within its integral organization the following departments to oversee that required national and

¹²⁴ “Programs of Study in the College of Applied Sciences (FH),” The Universität der Bundeswehr München, accessed February 1, 2018, <https://www.unibw.de/praes/studium-en/fachbereiche>.

¹²⁵ “The Universität der Bundeswehr München,” University of Bundeswehr Munich, accessed January 15, 2018, <https://www.unibw.de/praes/universitaet-en>.

¹²⁶ “University Governance,” The Universität der Bundeswehr München, accessed February 1, 2018, <https://www.unibw.de/praes/universitaet-en/leitung-en>.

¹²⁷ “The Vice-Presidents,” The Universität der Bundeswehr München, accessed February 1, 2018, <https://www.unibw.de/praes/universitaet-en/leitung-en/vizepraesidenten-en>.

¹²⁸ “Research at the University of the Federal Armed Forces Munich,” The Universität der Bundeswehr München, accessed February 1, 2018, https://www.unibw.de/forschung/forschung-2-en?set_language=en; and “Internationalization at the Universität der Bundeswehr München,” The Universität der Bundeswehr München, accessed February 1, 2018, <https://www.unibw.de/praes/internationales-en>.

international standards are met and are in accordance with the accreditation parameters as laid down by the Bavarian State Ministry of Education and Cultural Affairs under the legal provision of the Bavarian University Act: Department Chairs and the Academic Advisory Board. The former is authorized to ensure quality of both education and teaching standards, which involves all academic curricula and syllabi, and regulations.¹²⁹ The latter involves the Vice-Presidents and the Academic Council holding necessary meetings to account for required updates and quality control supervision.¹³⁰ Finally, in order to advance its long-term goals, UniBw has instituted the Campus Advanced Studies Center (CASC) to facilitate its alumni and future prospective leaders to pursue higher education with the following goal:

The aim of the institute is to incorporate the university's research strengths into continuing education programs and to position the Universität der Bundeswehr München as an institution which offers excellent opportunities for continuing education and professional development.¹³¹

Currently, the UniBw has turned into a center of excellence for imparting higher education to its armed forces, civilians, security-related agencies, and international students. In effect, its educational collaboration and partnership with more than 50 universities (or similar higher educational institutions) from 30 nations spread across the globe has allowed its reputation to spread internationally, advocating for further integration of military, civil society, and international partners with regard to providing education of the highest level for their prospective future leaders and staffs.¹³²

¹²⁹ "Legal Framework," The Universität der Bundeswehr München, accessed February 1, 2018, <https://www.unibw.de/praes/intern-en/rechtsgrundlagen-en>; and "Academics," The Universität der Bundeswehr München, accessed February 1, 2018, <https://www.unibw.de/praes/studium-en/studiumundlehre>.

¹³⁰ "Academic Advisory Boards," The Universität der Bundeswehr München, accessed February 1, 2018, <https://www.unibw.de/praes/studium-en/studiumundlehre/lust>.

¹³¹ "CASC–Institute for Continuing Education," The Universität der Bundeswehr München, accessed February 1, 2018, <https://www.unibw.de/praes/studium-en/weiterbildung>.

¹³² "Partners of the Bundeswehr University Munich," The Universität der Bundeswehr München, accessed February 1, 2017, <https://www.unibw.de/praes/internationales-en/partners>.

B. EVOLUTIONARY PATH OF PME IN THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ROLE IN ENHANCING CMR

This section explains the evolutionary path of PME and defense higher education for both defense civilians and the military personnel in the United States, which has given rise to some of the world’s premier state-of-the-art defense institutions in PME. Unlike the German experience, the history of the United States PME and higher defense education has followed a mostly progressive path. That is, the process has been in tandem with CMR reforms in accordance with the liberal democratic values enshrined in the U.S. Constitution and the national security policies, to uphold, at all times, democratic “objective-civilian control”¹³³ of the armed forces and its professionalization during both peace and war. Hence, the subsequent congressional reforms and acts manifest the making of complex, integrated national security policies and systems that display a liberal democratic civil-military relationship within the U.S. Constitution. This principle mandates that civilian authorities implement effective checks and balances, and at the same time, maintain the desired “objective-civilian control” of the armed forces as theorized by Samuel P. Huntington.¹³⁴ This process has also meant steadily developing a series of initiatives to improve the training and education for the higher policy and strategic aspects of war and the progress of defense institutions in their variety.

1. Early Foundation of PME and CMR Reforms in the United States

The foundation of PME in the United States began in earnest with the establishment of the U.S. Military Academy (USMA) at West Point in 1802 under President Thomas Jefferson’s administration.¹³⁵ The USMA became the center of excellence for training, educating, and professionalizing the U.S. officer corps along the French model of an applied school of military engineering set up by Napoleon Bonaparte.¹³⁶ The core of

¹³³ Huntington, *Soldier and the State*, 83–85, quoted in Thomas-Durrel Young, “Military Professionalism in Democracy,” in *Who Guards the Guardian and How: Democratic Civil-Military Relations*, ed. Thomas C. Bruneau and Scott D. Tollefson (Austin: Texas University Press, 2006), 18.

¹³⁴ Young, “Military Professionalism in Democracy,” 18.

¹³⁵ “A Brief History of West Point,” U.S. Military Academy, accessed February 5, 2018, <https://www.usma.edu/wphistory/SitePages/Home.aspx>

¹³⁶ Abenheim, *Soldier and Politics Transformed*, 218.

engineering and artillery also placed an emphasis on the technical branches, which shaped the education closely to civil norms as a standard for this aspect of the USMA, and had implications for the later development of the whole institution. Along with the advancement in technology and weaponry, in the late 19th century, came progress in training and education in the U.S. Army. This was exemplified in the later 19th century by Emory Upton and William T. Sherman, who were instrumental in the establishment of the Artillery School and the Infantry and Cavalry School, for the advancement of military professionalization in the art of war.¹³⁷ These schools of the branches of the army became, in turn, created a place where reform movements also developed and were essential for the careers of outstanding officers.

At the turn of the 20th century, however, further reform of this system became essential as the management sciences and industrial practices joined with the addition of the European General Staff education in the Anglo Saxon world. As explained by Hammond and Stiehm, the United States began its CMR reforms with the Act of 1903 supervised by Elihu Root (the then Secretary of War) and his staff Major William Harding Carter, giving emphasis to the establishment of the General Staff (GS) in the line of Prussian-German model and the War Department. In the United States today, after a long evolution from 1898 until the 1980s, this is represented as the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) respectively; the latter currently is headed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS).¹³⁸

This system, which evolved in the epoch of total war in the decades after the 1898 war, followed a democratic chain of command per the U.S. Constitution: The President of the United States assumed the highest position of command and authority as the

¹³⁷ Carol Reardon, "Military History: 'The Foundation of Our Art, The Basis of Our Profession,'" in *Soldiers and Scholars: The U.S. Army and the Uses of Military History, 1865–1920* (Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1990), 12–15.

¹³⁸ Paul Y. Hammond, "The Triumph of the General Management Staff: War Department Organization before World War II," in *Organizing for Defense: The American Military Establishment in the Twentieth Century* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1961), 10–20; and Judith Hicks Stiehm, "A History of the Army War College," in *U.S. Army War College: Military Education in a Democracy* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2002), 25–29.

Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of United States;¹³⁹ the Secretary of War represented the President in the exercise of his authority in times of peace;¹⁴⁰ and the Chief of Staff acted as the military advisor to the President and the Secretary of War and executed policies and strategies as per their orders.¹⁴¹

Root's task was to take the practices drawn from the reforms in local politics and city government present in the U.S. state and society at the dawn of the 20th century and join them with an adaptation of practices pioneered in Germany, which was an example in the civilian sector of civil service excellence and a high level of education in public service. In this vein, with this organizational hierarchy, Root's recommendation for reform policy included the establishment of higher defense education, the Army War College (November 1901), which at the time represented the higher version of PME in the United States. Here the Army followed the Navy, since once the United States Navy had reorganized itself in the 1880s for an imperial role amid rapid technological changes, establishing the Naval War College in 1884¹⁴² to provide for the expansion of Alfred Thayer Mahan's naval strategy and naval administration. The War Department under Root followed this line but pushed well beyond the limits of the United States Navy.¹⁴³ Reflecting the impact of air power on war from 1914 until 1945, the Air War College was established in 1946 with the conclusion of World War II and focused on educating officers to perform as "strategic national security leaders."¹⁴⁴

The experience of World War II with the role of maritime alliances and global operations of heretofore unknown complexity indicated the need for senior officers and the staffs of all three services to operate and lead both national and international joint or

¹³⁹ Ibid., 19–20.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

¹⁴¹ Ibid.

¹⁴² Ibid., 52.

¹⁴³ Ibid., 62; Reardon, "Military History" 15, where Root points out the importance of USAWC for both national defense and military professionalization of military's staff and flag officers.

¹⁴⁴ "Air War College Leadership," Air War College, accessed January 15, 2018, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/aa_leadership.aspx.

combined forces within a given theater of war.¹⁴⁵ In order to provide such joint environment training and higher defense education, the Armed Forces Staff College (AFSC) was established under the sanction of the CJSs on August 13, 1946, and was, in October 2000, renamed the Joint Force Staff College (JFSC).¹⁴⁶

2. Legislative Acts to Strengthen CMR and Institutionalize PME

One must keep squarely in mind that these reforms and steps to the present day system were unthinkable without the role of the U.S. Congress, with its constitutional role to provide for the armed forces. Apart from PME, continuous efforts to enhance and democratize CMR through a number of legislative measures were enacted beyond the 1903 Reorganization Act. First, the National Defense Act (1916 and 1920) limited the size and influence of the General Staff to a managerial role, implicitly allowing the Congress greater oversight and control over administrative concerns of the armed forces, giving rise to the Chief-Secretary alliance.

Second, the National Security Act (1947) instituted the unified command concept of the JCS within the War Department, which however, lacked, especially in its first years amid the Cold War, effective CMR and collaborative working environment between the Secretary of Defense and the JCS, giving the latter a characteristic of opaqueness and closed nature.¹⁴⁷

Third, these difficulties of inter-service strife and command in limited war, in Korea in 1950–1953, for instance, were erased with the Defense Reorganization Act (1953) that instituted the Chairman of the JCS and the Offices of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) to instill better civilian control and supervision of the three services in support of a coordinated and coherent programming process to follow.¹⁴⁸ However, the problems of constitutions, knowledge, and command in the Cold War for the U.S. side and its allies

¹⁴⁵ “History,” Joint Forces Staff College, accessed January 15, 2018, <http://jfsc.ndu.edu/About/History/>.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁷ Hammond, “The Triumph of the General Management Staff,” 227–287.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 321–370.

resulted in continued discord between the civilian authorities and the military elite and led to the failure of the U.S. strategy to launch an effective military operation in Vietnam to counter the growth of North Vietnamese Communism. The issue hinged on escalation of limited war in the thermonuclear age, as well as the ill effects of strategic muddle on how to wage a counterinsurgency and regular war in Indochina, where America's main opponents were the Soviet Union and Communist China.

As a result of what Congress and senior military figures deemed to have been the "lessons of the Indo China war," from the perspective of the 1980s, another prominent change in CMR and PME was introduced with the enactment of the Goldwater-Nicholas Department of Defense Reorganization Act (1986). The chief goal of this legislation was the resolution of inter-service rivalry, the original sin of the U.S. armed forces. The Act made it mandatory for all U.S. officer corps to go through a new PME system, a "three-tier system of education separate from the specialty training that defines individual officer career fields."¹⁴⁹ The three-tier system of PME emphasized imparting graduate-level education accredited by legitimate national education authorities as with the NDU's "Capstone, Keystone, and Pinnacle"¹⁵⁰ modules. The Capstone course was created in 1982 to facilitate and educate flag officers with the goal of preparing them for responsibilities related to national security decision making at the policy and strategic level under a joint and combined operational environment, as illustrated in the coalition forces in Iraq and NATO International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) in Afghanistan.¹⁵¹ Likewise, the Keystone module aims to educate "command senior enlisted leaders (CSELs)"¹⁵² and prepare them for future responsibilities at joint and task forces HQs. Pinnacle enables

¹⁴⁹ Kelly and Johnson-Freese, "Getting to the Goal in Professional Military Education," Policy Research Institute, *Orbis* 58, 1 (Winter 2014): 126–128, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orbis.2013.11.009>; Tomislav Z. Ruby and Douglas Gibler, "U.S. Professional Military Education and Democratization Abroad," *European Journal of International Relations Review* 16, no.3 (March 2010): 339–364, SAGE.

¹⁵⁰ "Academics," National Defense University, accessed January 28, 2018, <http://www.ndu.edu/Academics/>.

¹⁵¹ "ISAF's Mission in Afghanistan (2001–2014)," North Atlantic Treaty Organization, last modified September 1, 2015, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_69366.htm.

¹⁵² "Keystone," National Defense University, accessed January 28, 2018, <http://keystone.ndu.edu/>.

future flag officers who have already received Capstone and Keystone courses to assume command responsibilities to lead joint operations at the theater level or above.¹⁵³

3. PME as “Brain Behind the Wheel” to Sustain United States’ Global Leadership Role

Some fundamental assumptions necessitating the refinement and development of the U.S. PME institutions in the late 20th century and in the 21st century can be attributed to the status and the leadership role of the United States since 1989 as the world’s only unipolar superpower. Hence, maintaining this status and prestige as world leader in political, military, economic, and social spheres warrants the U.S. government constantly developing, transforming, and upgrading its diplomatic, political, economic, and war-fighting capabilities, capacities, and platforms in all five domains—land, air, sea, space, and cyber. One key component is the enhancement of the intellectual capabilities of the men and women at arms as well as the defense civilians in their number. This approach accentuates the concept of the “brain behind the wheel,” meaning the ability of humans to bring about efficacy in all aspects of human endeavor—political, military, social, economic, technological, and scientific.

Finally, the challenge to sustain U.S. global leadership¹⁵⁴ means the continued production of well-groomed and intellectually aware decision and policy makers—civilian leaders, military and security agency commanders, and senior staffs and officials—who are capable of critical thinking, and operating effectively and efficiently, while maintaining civilian control under the most trying national and global VUCA environments. In the U.S. context, the enhancement of intellectual capacities and capabilities of leaders was realized through the reform policy in prioritizing PME, which gave rise to the defense higher education establishments like the Joint Force Staff College, the NDU, and the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS).

¹⁵³ “Pinnacle,” National Defense University, accessed February 21, 2018, <http://pinnacle.ndu.edu/>.

¹⁵⁴ “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for the 21st Century Defense,” U.S. DoD, January 2012, <http://edocs.nps.edu/2014/June/QRMR2012.pdf>.

4. PME Status of the United States

The U.S. war experience from the American Civil War, the Spanish-American War, both World Wars, the Cold-War era, and the Vietnam War, and the post-Cold War period, and the period post- 9/11 and the “War on Terror”¹⁵⁵ brought about rapid changes and reforms in the U.S. national and foreign policy with regard to global security stabilization. This section highlights the primary PME institutions of higher learning like the NDU, the war colleges of the three services, the Naval Postgraduate School, and the Air Force Institute of Technology to determine the PME status of the United States.

a. National Defense University (NDU) of United States

The U.S. commitment to playing a global security leadership role prompted the U.S. government to integrate the diverse array of PME colleges within the three services and bring them all under a single hierarchical educational platform, the NDU, which was established in 1976. The NDU became the nerve center for the United States to provide defense higher education for the whole defense and security community, and thereby produce senior leaders, as well as policy and decision makers, who are capable of critical thinking, operating, and providing stability to national and global security under the asymmetric VUCA environment through its “holistic approach and unique combination of curriculum, location, and student/faculty diversity.”¹⁵⁶

The NDU’s organizational structure is composed of following five colleges and six centers and programs: Dwight D. Eisenhower School for National Security and Resource Strategy (formerly the Industrial College of the Armed Forces), National War College (NWC), Joint Forces Staff College (formerly the Armed Forces Staff College), Information Resources Management College (formerly the Department of Defense Computer Institute), and College of International Security Affairs (CISA, established in 2002).¹⁵⁷ The

¹⁵⁵ Anup Shah, “War on Terror,” Global Issues, last modified October 7, 2013, <http://www.globalissues.org/issue/245/war-on-terror#>.

¹⁵⁶ “The History of NDU,” National Defense University, accessed February 4, 2018, <http://www.ndu.edu/About/History/>.

¹⁵⁷ “Colleges and Centers,” National Defense University, accessed February 4, 2018, www.ndu.edu/Academics/Colleges-Centers/.

integrated centers include: Center for Applied Strategic Learning (CASL), Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD Center), Center for Joint and Strategic Logistics (CJSL), Institute for National Security Ethics and Leadership (INSEL), Capstone-Keystone-Pinnacle Courses, Office of the Joint Medical Chair (OJMC), and Reserve Components National Security Course (RCNSC).¹⁵⁸

The mission of the NDU is to produce “joint warfighters and national security leaders”¹⁵⁹ by imparting higher academic education to military/interagency members including civilian leaders concerned with national and international security and strategy. Its vision is to “create strategic advantage by [producing] joint warfighters and other national security leaders [by enhancing CMR] through whole-of-government educational programs, research and engagement.”¹⁶⁰ The NDU’s purpose lies in “educating, developing and inspiring national security leaders,”¹⁶¹ all capable of critical thinking and equally proficient in developing national security policy making and decision making. Its work ethic is guided by the following principles: “academic excellence; academic freedom; diversity; integrity; growth; and collaborations.”¹⁶²

The responsibilities of organizational management, strategic planning, resource management, and other pertinent matters of the NDU, are entrusted to the NDU Board of Visitors as per the Federal Advisory Committee Act (1972). The Board is composed of 12 members from various authorities to provide necessary advice and recommendation to the Secretary of Defense via the CJCS and the President of the NDU.¹⁶³ The Board’s Chairperson and Co-Chairperson are nominated by the Secretary of the Defense on the recommendation of the Board Members in the consultation with the CJCS. In addition to the Board of Visitors, the integral management team composed of the President of the

¹⁵⁸ National Defense University, “Colleges and Centers.”

¹⁵⁹ “Vision and Mission,” National Defense University, accessed February 4, 2018, <http://www.ndu.edu/About/Vision-Mission/>.

¹⁶⁰ National Defense University, “Vision and Mission.”

¹⁶¹ Ibid.

¹⁶² Ibid.

¹⁶³ “NDU Board of Visitors,” National Defense University, accessed February 4, 2018, <http://www.ndu.edu/About/Board-of-Visitors/>.

NDU, the Vice-President, the Provost, and heads of departments, colleges, centers, and programs provide smooth and efficient functioning of the NDU in accordance to its strategic plan.¹⁶⁴ Further, the NDU Foundation, Inc. is responsible for raising funds and resources in support of the NDU's mission of "joint strategic education and leadership development,"¹⁶⁵ through coordination with private-public partnerships (individuals, corporations, and private foundations). In order to maintain the reputation, standards, and quality of joint defense higher education, the NDU maintains a number of academic policies with regards to academic integrity, transfer of credits, grades, academic freedom, graduation certificates, master's degree, research fellowship, Congress-research assistance, faculty and staff development, ethics training, electives, and scholarships.¹⁶⁶

The NDU receives its accreditation for graduate, postgraduate, and doctoral programs from the Middle States Commission on Higher Education, which is officially recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and Council for Higher Education Accreditation since 1997.¹⁶⁷ The joint PME programs are accredited by the Process of Accreditation for Joint Education approved by the DoD through the CJCS. Similarly, for Senior Acquisition Course programs, accreditation is awarded by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, and approved by the DoD. However, for the Information Assurance programs, accreditation is given by the National Security Agency and Department of Homeland Security.

The NDU also hosts a number of outreach programs through its International Student Management Office (ISMO), which includes American Studies and the Field Studies Program; Graduate Writing and Research Course; Sponsor Program; International Visits and Distinguished Visitor Orientation Tour (DVOT); and International Military

¹⁶⁴ "Leadership," National Defense University, accessed February 4, 2018.

¹⁶⁵ "The National Defense University Foundation," National Defense University, accessed February 4, 2018, <https://ndufoundation.org/>.

¹⁶⁶ "NDU Academic Policies," National Defense University, accessed February 4, 2018, <http://www.ndu.edu/Academics/Academic-Policies/>.

¹⁶⁷ "Accreditation," National Defense University, accessed February 4, 2018, <http://www.ndu.edu/Academics/Accreditation/>.

Student Office (IMSO).¹⁶⁸ In addition, the NDU is affiliated with regional centers like the Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS), William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, and Near East South Asia (NESA) Center and supports various security initiatives and regional cooperation to promote peace and stability through the democratic process.¹⁶⁹ Finally, it facilitates research centers, which are supported by CISA and the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), and the NDU Libraries (Merlin) and the NDU Press.¹⁷⁰

b. Service War Colleges

Despite the establishment of the NDU, the three services have maintained their autonomy and patronage over their respective traditional PME and JPME institutions. At the United States Army War College (USAWC) at Carlisle, Pennsylvania, the Army continues to groom and educate its strategic level senior officers, commanders, staff officers, and civilian leaders with graduate programs. These programs are designed to develop students' critical mindset to address the national and international security problems under the "landpower"¹⁷¹ domain and meet the challenges of the VUCA scenario. In addition, USAWC houses the School of Strategic Landpower, the Center for Strategic Leadership, the Strategic Studies Institute, the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, and the Army Heritage and Education Center. Its educational program includes: Senior Level College/MEL1 Education; International Fellows Program, Distance Education Program; USAWC Fellows and CSA Senior Army Fellows; Army Strategic Education Program (ASEP); and National Security Seminar.¹⁷²

¹⁶⁸ "International Student Management Office," National Defense University, accessed February 4, 2018, <http://ismo.ndu.edu/>.

¹⁶⁹ "Regional Centers," National Defense University, accessed February 4, 2018, <http://www.ndu.edu/Outreach/Regional-Centers/>.

¹⁷⁰ "Research," National Defense University, accessed February 4, 2018, www.ndu.edu/Research/.

¹⁷¹ "About the U.S. Army War College," U.S. Army, accessed February 4, 2018, <https://www.armywarcollege.edu/overview.cfm>.

¹⁷² Ibid.

On a similar footing, the U.S. Air War College (AWC), which was established in 1946 at Maxwell Field, Alabama, by the United States Air Force (USAF), continues to provide both training and academic education designed to produce “critical and strategic thinkers able to serve as national security senior leaders,”¹⁷³ and thereby represent itself as the institute for expertise in the realm of “air, space, and cyberspace education and though.”¹⁷⁴ The College consists of the Department of International Security Studies, Department of Leadership and Warfighting, and the Department of Strategy.¹⁷⁵ The Air University (AU) provides the college with a distance-learning program.

Likewise, the U.S. Navy promotes its PME and higher defense education through the U.S. Naval War College (USNWC) and NPS. The USNWC is assigned with the mission to “educate and develop future leaders by building strategic and cultural perspective, and enhancing the capability to advise senior leaders and policy-makers.”¹⁷⁶ Six individual colleges exist under the umbrella of USNWC: College of Naval Command and Staff, College of Naval Warfare, College of Distance Education, College of Maritime Operational Warfare, USNWC, and NPS.¹⁷⁷ Further, it also houses the Naval Leadership and Ethics Center and the Senior Enlisted Academy. Its academic departments consist of International Programs, Joint Military Operations (JMO), National Security Affairs (NSA), Leadership and Ethics, Strategic and Operational Research (SOR), Strategy and Policy, and Wargaming.¹⁷⁸ The research centers associated with the various departments and colleges enhance the quality of defense higher education.

¹⁷³ “Air War College Leadership,” U.S. Air Force, Air War College, accessed February 4, 2018, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/aa_leadership.aspx.

¹⁷⁴ U.S. Air Force, Air War College, “Air War College Leadership.”

¹⁷⁵ “The Faculty-Departments,” U.S. Air Force, Air War College, accessed February 4, 2018, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/tf_departments.aspx.

¹⁷⁶ “Our Mission,” U.S. Naval War College, accessed February 4, 2018, <https://usnwc.edu/About/Mission>.

¹⁷⁷ “Colleges and Academies,” U.S. Naval War College, accessed February 4, 2018, <https://usnwc.edu/Academics-and-Programs/Colleges-and-Academies>.

¹⁷⁸ “Academic Departments,” U.S. Naval War College, accessed February 4, 2018, <https://usnwc.edu/Faculty-and-Departments/Academic-Departments>.

c. NPS and the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT)

NPS, on the other hand, is a versatile defense higher education platform for the U.S. Navy. As such, it is a “naval/defense-oriented research university ... that provides a broad range of high-quality graduate education in support of national and international security.”¹⁷⁹ Its graduate schools consist of Business and Public Policy, Engineering and Applied Sciences, Operational and Information Sciences, and the School of International Graduate Studies (SIGS).¹⁸⁰ These graduate schools consist of 14 departments that provide master’s and doctoral degrees, mainly related to national and global security, engineering and information science, business, and national security affairs.¹⁸¹ NPS receives accreditation from the following: the Western Association of Schools and Colleges Senior College and University Commission (WCUC) for NPS university-wide; the Network of Schools of Public Policy, Affairs, and Administration (NASPAA) for specific public administration and public management degree programs; the Association to Advance Collegiate Schools of Business (AACSB) for all NPS business degree programs, and the Accreditation Board for Engineering and Technology (ABET) for specific engineering degree programs.¹⁸²

Likewise, the AFIT fulfills a dual purpose as “the Air Force’s graduate school of engineering and management as well as its institution for technical professional continuing education.”¹⁸³ This institute, which has seen the historical transformation of its name 11 times since its inception in 1919 as the Air School Application to the present day Air Force Institute of Technology, is committed to providing Airmen with “defense-focused graduate and professional continuing education and research to sustain the technological supremacy

¹⁷⁹ “NPS Vision,” Naval Postgraduate School, accessed February 4, 2018, <http://www.nps.edu/web/guest/vision>.

¹⁸⁰ “Academics,” Naval Postgraduate School, accessed February 4, 2018, <http://my.nps.edu/academics>.

¹⁸¹ Naval Postgraduate School, “Academics.”

¹⁸² “Accreditation,” Naval Postgraduate School, accessed February 4, 2018, <http://www.nps.edu/web/accreditation>.

¹⁸³ “AFIT’s Mission & Vision,” Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT), accessed February 21, 2018, <https://www.afit.edu/ABOUT/index.cfm>.

of America's air, space, and cyber forces.”¹⁸⁴ Similar to NPS, AFIT achieves its educational goals through its four schools: Graduate School of Engineering and Management; School of Systems and Logistics; Civil Engineer School; and School of Strategic Force Studies. Furthermore, it provides its officers with civilian educational credentials from “civilian universities, research centers, hospitals, and industrial organizations” through its Civilian Institution Programs. Overall, six departments, distant learning programs, and four offices (Admissions, Student Services, Registrar, and International Military) provide direct assistance to realizing the objectives and missions of AFIT. In addition, the research wing comprising seven centers—Autonomy and Navigation Technology (ANT) Center, Center for Cyberspace Research (CCR), Center for Directed Energy, Centre for Operational Analysis (COA), Center for Research and Assurance (CSRA), Center for Technical Intelligence Studies and Research (CTISR), and STAT Center of Excellence—augments AFIT's scope and vision implementation.¹⁸⁵ Consistent with its mission, AFIT provides opportunities for higher education in diverse fields of technical specialization in “cyber, directed energy, hypersonics, stealth, navigation and space and consultation and analysis support services”¹⁸⁶ to its officer corps of civil engineers, space, nuclear, acquisition, and logistics professionals.

With regards to governance of AFIT, under the Advisory Committee Act of 1972, the Board of Visitors subcommittee is answerable, per federal military chain-of-command, to the Air University Board of Visitors to which it is legitimately affiliated.¹⁸⁷ The latter provides “independent advice, views, and recommendations on the education, doctrine, research policies, and activities of AU to the Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary of Defense, through the Secretary of the Air Force (SECAF).”¹⁸⁸ NPS maintains close ties with AFIT as the President of NPS is also a member of the Board of Visitors’

¹⁸⁴ AFIT, “AFIT's Mission & Vision.”

¹⁸⁵ “Research & Consulting,” AFIT, accessed February 21, 2018. <https://www.afit.edu/>.

¹⁸⁶ AFIT, “AFIT's Mission & Vision.”

¹⁸⁷ “Board of Visitors,” AFIT, accessed February 21, 2018, <https://www.afit.edu/ABOUT/page.cfm?page=1402>.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid.

Subcommittee of the AFIT.¹⁸⁹ Its internal governance is conducted by the AFIT Strategy Council that assists the achievement of Chancellor's intent as per AFIT Strategic Guidance (2014–2017).¹⁹⁰ Finally, with regards to accreditation, AFIT receives recognition from three organizations: the Higher Learning Commission (HLC), the Engineering Accreditation Commission of ABET, and the Applied and Natural Sciences Accreditation Commission of ABET.¹⁹¹

C. CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the evolution of PME in both Germany and the United States unfolded as the result of several reforms and several legislative acts related to CMR, the military and civilian defense organizations, and their structure. Such reforms were introduced by key personnel like Scharnhorst and Root, who provided accurate supervision and direction in implementing policy changes. In these established democracies, occasional civil-military frictions were often dealt with through a democratic process, which ensured the maintenance of civilian control over the armed forces.

The key observation from the comparative historical case studies of Germany and the United States points to the fact that PME, JPME, and higher defense educational institutions have greatly contributed to enhancing the democratization of CMR and the modernization of their respective armed forces. This has been accomplished through the development of intellectual capabilities and capacities among the military and civilian leaders via imparting strategic and policy level higher defense education. Thus, PME/defense and security education institutions like the military academies, war colleges, and the defense universities have become the bedrock for producing leaders, as well as policy and decision makers, with critical thinking skills and broad knowledge on varied aspects of defense and security affairs that will enable them to resolve problems in the 21st-century

¹⁸⁹ “2016 Air University Board of Visitors,” Air University, accessed February 21, 2018, <http://www.airuniversity.af.mil/Academic-Affairs/BoardOfVisitors/Members/>.

¹⁹⁰ “Air Force Institute of Technology: Strategic Guidance (2014–2017),” AFIT, accessed February 21, 2018, [http://www.afit.edu/docs/AFIT_Strategic_Guidance_\(Final-16Jun2014\).pdf](http://www.afit.edu/docs/AFIT_Strategic_Guidance_(Final-16Jun2014).pdf).

¹⁹¹ “Accreditation,” AFIT, accessed February 21, 2018, <https://www.afit.edu/ABOUT/page.cfm?page=528>.

asymmetric VUCA environment. Overall, the premier defense higher educational institutions have their long-term vision set on joint education that supports integration of defense civilians and defense-related non-governmental agencies along with the military components. The next chapter analyzes the PME, CDE, and NSE status of Nepal and identifies CMR areas where gaps emanating from the lack of higher defense education have stalled the process of rapid CMR democratization intended to improve effectiveness and efficiency, and promote the maintenance of civilian control of the armed forces.

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IV. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF PME INSTITUTIONS AS MODELS FOR AN INTEGRATED NDU FOR NEPAL

The first segment of this chapter provides an analysis of the higher defense educational systems of the Prussian-German model of UniBw, and the United States' NDU, the service war colleges, and the versatile NPS and AFIT. This analysis helps to identify the most common fundamental features of these institutions; the best practices followed in terms of overall organization structure, management, planning, and budgeting aspects, and quality control and accreditation; and variations that provide uniqueness with regard to integration of PME within the inter-services and the civilian counterparts.

The next section highlights the inadequacies in the PME, CDE, and NSE status of Nepal and advocates for a modest, country-specific, interagency IHDE institutional model, like the NDU. Keeping in view Nepal's geo-political environment, the constitutional guidelines, and national security policy guidelines provides legitimacy and directives to all concerned ministries, organizations, and agencies in enhancing the capability and capacity of Nepal's defense and security organizations and agencies as a whole.

The third section provides a detailed outline of a proposal for the establishment of an IHDE institution like the NDU in the Nepalese context focused on: a feasible and workable conceptual framework that helps integrate participation of all the defense and security stakeholders; mutual consensus among key defense and security stakeholders to rally the need to pass national legislation bill in order to legitimize its establishment; institutionalizing strong organizational structure with experienced, qualified, competent, and adept board of visitors (advisors), management team, faculty, administrators, and support teams; providing overall policy and planning parameters, which are accurately analyzed and supported by feasible finance and budget necessary for the establishment and smooth running of a sustainable homegrown IHDE institutional platform.

A. ANALYSIS OF THE HIGHER DEFENSE EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS OF GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES

This section presents critical analytical views about the evolution of PME and the corresponding reforms highlighting the salient features that form the foundation of the following modern-day defense higher education institutions of Germany and the United States: The UniBw of Germany; NDU, USAWC, USNWC, AWC, NPS, and AFIT of the United States. It also presents the commonalities these institutions share and the uniqueness of some institutions that identify their distinction and hence their purposes.

1. German Perspective on Higher Defense Education

The highlights of the Prussian-German experience reflect the legitimate military and other CMR reforms that gave priority to institutionalizing the PME, initially in the 18th and 19th centuries through the establishment of the cadet corps and the *Kriegsakademie*,¹⁹² which not only trained the officer corps but also provided them the necessary knowledge on technical military science and related higher military education. The *Selecta*, which represented the higher strategic and policy level courses for flag officers and staff officers run at the *Kriegsakademie*, became the hallmark for producing one of the world's highly professional General Staffs.¹⁹³ After World War II, as analyzed in Abenheim's work, the need arose to reform the West German Armed Forces and to democratize the nation as a whole. Such reforms as *Innere Führung* prioritized PME as key to develop military leadership, both at the strategic and policy making levels,¹⁹⁴ that would focus on fulfilling the national defense and security policies under the democratic practice of civilian control.

The outcome of this reform is seen in the two renowned higher defense educational institutions in Germany: Universität der Bundeswehr München and the Helmut Schmidt University Hamburg.¹⁹⁵ The salient features of the UniBw are:

¹⁹² Craig, *The Politics of Prussian Army*, 45.

¹⁹³ Ibid.

¹⁹⁴ Abenheim, *Reforging the Iron Cross*, 165–174.

¹⁹⁵ Military Wikia, "Bundeswehr University Munich."

- an integrated approach to higher defense education (PME and CDE) for German armed forces, civilians, related security agencies, and international students in the fields of defense and security affairs
- a focus on imparting both technical and PME in concert with higher CDE system to offer a three-year bachelor's degree plus an additional year for master's degree¹⁹⁶
- an academic year that is uniquely streamlined along a trimester system and adopts ECTS under the Bologna Process¹⁹⁷
- the departments of Political and Social Science, and Economics, and the Organizational Sciences that provide education on PME, CDE, and NSE
- 18 interdisciplinary faculties assisted by well-resourced research wings¹⁹⁸
- a strong management committee headed by the President and supported by the three Vice-Presidents along with the Administrative Council, the University Council, and the University Secretary, including expert and skilled faculty and department heads
- international outreach through courses, guest instructors and speakers, exchange programs, and internships and study abroad for both the students and instructors
- institutionalization of CASC for continuing education and professional development for both the military and the civilian defense officials even after retirement¹⁹⁹
- quality control and evaluation accredited by either the Federal State of Hamburg or the Bavarian State Ministry of Education and Cultural Affairs, both approved by the Federal Ministry of Defense²⁰⁰

This last aspect is unique to NATO allies and is an important assurance of an excellent education that fulfills all needs, military and civilian. Such a standard, however, is not without its critics, as education standards tend to vary with mission, scope, and size from country to country.

¹⁹⁶ University of Bundeswehr Munich, "The Universität der Bundeswehr München."

¹⁹⁷ The Universität der Bundeswehr München, "Academic Reform and the Bologna Process."

¹⁹⁸ University of Bundeswehr Munich, "The Universität der Bundeswehr München."

¹⁹⁹ Universität der Bundeswehr München, "CASC-Institute for Continuing Education."

²⁰⁰ Universität der Bundeswehr München, "Legal Framework."

2. United States Perspective on Higher Defense Education

The history of U.S. PME traverses a parallel institutional development with various CMR reforms implemented by the U.S. government, all in pursuit of democratic values enshrined in the U.S. Constitution. These values underlie the democratic CMR practice of “objective-civilian control,”²⁰¹ as interpreted by Huntington. Although the model of the Prussian-German War Department and the General Staff formed the basic foundation for reform in the high command in the early 20th century, the struggle to improve on this foundation involved key legislative reforms—the 1903 Reorganization Act, National Defense Act (1916 and 1920), National Security Act of 1947, Defense Reorganization Act of 1953,²⁰² and the Goldwater-Nicholas Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. This legislation facilitated the organizational and structural changes toward enhancing CMR, for example the introduction of the JCS and the CJCS within the DoD.²⁰³ These reforms, fatefully enough, also increased the priority of institutionalizing PME, by creating standards and requirements for the intellectual capacity building of the officer corps of the United States.

The rise of the United States as a global leader in the late 20th century accentuated the need to upgrade the quality, standard, and development of leadership in the senior officer corps, as “brain behind the wheel” concept. It was especially aimed at the flag officers and senior staff officers, including civilian defense officials and civil servants at the policy and strategic levels. This concept was to be supplemented with higher PME, CDE, and NSE, and thereby, build critical analytical thinking capacity and capability to address Stiehm’s VUCA scenario and undertake responsibilities at the regional, theater, and global levels under a joint operational and strategic environment in all five domains—air, land, sea, cyber, and space.

Hence, the analysis of U.S. PME finds a diverse range of PME institution models to achieve the stated U.S. national and foreign policy goals. Among these models, three

²⁰¹ Huntington, *Soldier and the State*, 83–85.

²⁰² Hammond, “The Triumph of the General Management Staff,” 321–370.

²⁰³ Ruby and Gibler, “US Professional Military Education and Democratization Abroad,” 339–364.

stand out in promulgating higher national defense and security education in the U.S. case: the National Defense University; the service War Colleges; and NPS and AFIT.

NDU is different from the UniBw in that it aspires to serve the needs of senior and senior most officers, versus young men and women in the process of becoming company grade officers. The United States NDU shares a common long-term goal with that of the UniBw, as outlined in its *Strategic Plan: AY 2012–2013 to AY 2017–2018*, that aspires to bring all the higher defense educational institutions under the single roof of the NDU as “‘One University’ [under the chairmanship of the] CJCS ... focused on advanced joint education, leader development, and scholarship,”²⁰⁴ where “joint” identifies with integration of “[armed forces], government agencies, foreign partner nations, and industries.”²⁰⁵ NDU’s strength as one of the world’s premier PME institutions is attributed to several factors, including: the Strategic Plan specifying mission, vision, core values, and guiding principles directed in achieving four major goals (education and leader development to produce national security leaders; scholarship to “create, preserve, and disseminate knowledge;”²⁰⁶ institutional enablers in support of JPME; and overall university improvement targeting “institutional collaboration and integration.”²⁰⁷

Furthermore, NDU boasts a strong central unifying organizational structure consisting of five colleges and three centers; among them the College of International Security Affairs (CISA) plays a critical role in enhancing CMR at the strategic level.²⁰⁸ Also noteworthy are NDU’s high-tech infrastructure facilities, research centers, and state-of-the-art technology. A powerful Board of Visitors chaired by the CJCS legitimizes the United States Government’s ownership, which provides direct access to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) in terms of management and policy stipulations of the NDU

²⁰⁴ “Strategic Plan: AY 2013–2013 to 2017–2018,” National Defense University, January 22, 2013, http://www.ndu.edu/Portals/59/Documents/BOV_Documents/2013/NDU%20Strategic%20Plan%20-%20Final.pdf.

²⁰⁵ National Defense University, “Strategic Plan.”

²⁰⁶ Ibid.

²⁰⁷ Ibid.

²⁰⁸ “Mission,” College of International Security Affairs, accessed March 10, 2018, <http://cisa.ndu.edu/About/>.

and is vested with the authority to advise the Secretary of Defense in matters of national defense and security issues.²⁰⁹ Administratively, the President of NDU, assisted by the Vice-President, Provost, department heads, colleges, centers, and programs ensures the quality and standards of higher defense education within the entire NDU,²¹⁰ while external quality control and accreditation are provided by Middle States Commission on Higher Education, DoD, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, and by the National Security Agency and Department of Homeland Security, depending on the type of PME programs.²¹¹ Furthermore, NDU provides outreach programs like the ISMO, DVOT, IMSO, together with affiliated regional centers like the ACSS, and NESAs.²¹² Finally, to support achievement of NDU's mission, an active NDU Foundation helps raise funds and resources.²¹³

Unlike the NDU, the war colleges are run independently by their respective services, which exercise autonomy and patronage over the type of PME and JPME preferences. This autonomy is a key part of the diversity of the U.S. Armed Forces, which, in a sense is a mirror of state and society in the United States. Nevertheless, the service war colleges are all geared toward developing and educating their prospective future operational and strategic level senior officers, staffs, and commanders, with the broad knowledge, critical thinking capacity, and awareness of national and international strategic security environments. The U.S. Army War College is focused on producing officers capable of assuming national and international roles pertaining to the land-power domain.²¹⁴ Likewise, the U.S. Air War College concentrates on producing competent "critical and strategic thinkers able to serve as national security senior leaders,"²¹⁵ and is capable of providing airmen with expertise and leadership in the air, space, and cyber

²⁰⁹ National Defense University, "NDU Board of Visitors."

²¹⁰ National Defense University, "Leadership."

²¹¹ National Defense University, "Accreditation."

²¹² National Defense University, "Outreach."

²¹³ "The National Defense University Foundation, Inc," NDU Foundation, accessed March 10, 2018, <https://ndufoundation.org/ndu-foundation-summary>.

²¹⁴ U.S. Army, "About the U.S. Army War College."

²¹⁵ U.S. Air Force, Air War College, "Air War College Leadership."

domain. On a similar note, the U.S. Naval War College, too, focuses on educating and generating future naval commanders and leaders with a strategic and cultural awareness that enables their senior leaders, staff, and flag officers to provide valuable input into policy-making and strategy-making decisions.²¹⁶ Although different in organizational structure and leadership, each war college is overseen by its own powerful Board of Visitors or Advisors. The internal management of these institutions is led either by the President of the War College (Navy), or Commandants of the War College (Army and Air Force), assisted by a panel of experts from the academic departments, administrative units, research and development wings, ensure the maintenance of quality and standards of PME. Additionally, library and resources including modern scientific technology support the internal management in fulfilling academic requirements. These institutions are financially supported by their respective services and civilian partners. Educational quality control and accreditations are provided by regional accreditation organizations approved by relevant governmental and service authorities. In addition, they all field online or distance learning opportunities and excellent outreach programs, including scholarships and international integration. Finally, similar to UniBw and NDU, these service institutions, too, accommodate civilian defense officials and interagency senior officers as a JPME scheme.

Similar to the War Colleges, the NPS and the AFIT are higher defense educational institutions operating under the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Air Force, respectively. Both possess strong organizational structures, leadership, and management, including a Board of Advisors or Board of Visitors, as well as capable administrative staff, and sound quality assurance and accreditation systems. However, unlike the War Colleges, and like the UniBW, they stand out as unique and versatile institutions of defense higher learning in the sense that these two are based on civilian university models and provide a diverse range of interdisciplinary curricula and electives. NPS and AFIT boast highly qualified faculty and support well-resourced research wings and foundations, through their various schools, colleges, centers, and programs. Like other PME institutions, NPS and AFIT both offer distance learning and have excellent outreach programs and partnerships with other defense

²¹⁶ U.S. Naval War College, “Our Mission.”

educational institutes around the nation and the globe. Similar to the NDU and the UniBw, these two institutions also provide continuing higher defense education for their respective officer corps, interagency senior personnel, and civilian defense officials and civil servants. Both NPS and AFIT confer master's degrees and doctoral degrees to their students even after retirement from their respective government services.

Overall, the analysis emphasizes the importance of providing high quality higher education in defense and security to the senior members of the armed forces, civilian defense officials and civil servants, including interagency personnel and civilians from the industrial sector. The purpose of such education is to develop and prepare future leaders, commanders, and staff officers who will assume critical responsibilities under the asymmetric VUCA environment. The PME, CDE, and NSE programs provide the prospective senior strategic and policy level civilian leaders, as well as military and security agency commanders, with broad knowledge and critical thinking skills to address and mitigate both national and international defense and security issues. Thus, these higher defense education programs not only enhance the individual and group capacity and capability to implement both national and international defense and security policies, but also augments the level of joint cooperation, collaboration, and synergized civil-military relations in pursuit of democratic values that helps to bring about peace, stability, and security within the national and international spheres.

B. ANALYSIS OF NEPAL'S PME, CDE, AND NSE STATUS

This section analyzes the current level of higher education within the defense community sectors of Nepal. The first section highlights the inadequate level of PME within the NA, NP, APF, and NID. The second throws light on the necessity of CDE for civilian defense officials and the staffs of MoD, MoHA, and MoFA in order to elevate their level of competency to that of their counterparts in the security forces. The final section on NSE highlights the presence of a private institution, like the NISS, that supports the government and concerned security stakeholders in formulating plans and recommendations related to national security issues.

1. Analysis of Higher Defense and Security Education Among the Security Forces

In so far as Nepal lacks even the most modest form of an advanced PME institution like the NDU, it barely displays signs of effective PME. Therefore, the NA relies on only two existing PME institutes: The Nepalese Military Academy at Kharipati, which provides a bachelor's degree, and the Army Command and Staff College at Shivapuri, which provides a master's degree. Both institutions offer these degrees in affiliation with and accreditation from Tribhuvan University.²¹⁷

On the other hand, since 2010, the NA's technical capability and capacity has picked up pace with the establishment of NAIHS, which comprises two medical and nursing colleges, namely the NAIHS-COM and the NAIHS-CON, and provides a bachelor's level MBBS degree and bachelor's in nursing.²¹⁸ Although the *CoAS's Command Guidance-2015*²¹⁹ envisions the establishment of a National Defense College, that project currently lies on hold pending approval from the MoD. Thus, the annual requirement for qualified higher defense education for the NA's senior flag officers and staff officers is insufficiently met by sending a limited number of the officer corps for courses and academic credentials abroad on a quota and grant basis. This prevents the majority of NA's officers from gaining access to higher defense education despite their qualification through rank, service tenure, and incentive for continuing higher education after retirement. Although the foreign quotas on higher defense education help develop and prepare a minimal number of senior flag officers and staff officers to assume advisory roles at the policy and strategic levels, it is not sufficient enough to maintain the annual requirement of qualified, skilled, and educated officers with the intellectual capacity and capability to rotate and fill vacant posts.

²¹⁷ Nepal Army, "Training in Nepalese Army."

²¹⁸ NAIHS, "College of Medicine;" NAIHS, "College of Nursing."

²¹⁹ Nepal Army, "CoAS's Command Guidance-2015."

Similarly, the Nepal Police provides a Post Graduate Diploma in Police Science in affiliation with Tribhuvan University.²²⁰ However, it too lacks a higher defense educational platform that entails an interagency approach to sustaining long-term viability for CDE and NSE.

Like the NA, the APF also relies on its Nepal Armed Police Force Staff College as the mid-level PME and NSE institutional platform in affiliation with Tribhuvan University. For advanced academic defense and security education, it too, depends on foreign quotas and grants. With regards to the NID, it totally relies on special quotas from the ACSC, APF SC, and from NPA. Finally, the overall picture of the PME, CDE, and NSE confirms the need for a country-specific, inter-service IHDE institute like the NDU to cater to the needs of qualified defense and security sector personnel.

2. Analysis of CDE Status within the MoD, MoHA, and MoFA

Lacking a defense and security higher educational institute, like the NDU, the civilian defense officials, staffs, and civil servants of the MoD, MoHA, and the MoFA are comparatively less aware of national defense and security issues than their security force counterparts. Since the basic education received by these civilian officials and civil servants is primarily academic it is irrelevant for national defense and security. As such, this lack of CDE and NSE among its civilian members tends to increase the CMR gaps emanating from inadequate knowledge, awareness, and expertise on defense and security matters. Ultimately, these CMR gaps increase the risk of security forces to undermine the civilian oversight mechanism and civilian control of the security forces in some circumstances. Precisely, the lack of an IHDE have corresponding negative impact on the decision-making, policy-formulating, and crisis management. The level of decision-making incompetency displayed by the senior civilian defense officials of the GoN during the past crisis situations—flood, earthquake, insurgency, and de-facto economic blockade by the Indians post-earthquake of 2015²²¹ —highlights the need to provide higher CDE to the civilian defense community.

²²⁰ Nepal Police, “Post Graduate Diploma in Police Science (PGDPS) Program.”

²²¹ Nepal Army, “Operation Sankat Mochan.”

3. Analysis of the NSE Situation in Nepal

Few private enterprises, forums, and institutions highlight civilian academic qualifications on national security issues. Unlike the RAND Corporation that assists the U.S. government and the armed forces to support “policy and decision-making through research and analysis,”²²² few think-tank institutions have come to the forefront in mitigating national security issues, except for the National Institute for Strategic Studies (NISS). To date, though, no government-sponsored national defense and security educational institutions have been established in order to fulfill the growing demand for higher defense educational qualifications critical for developing prospective future leaders, commanders, officials, and staffs within the defense institutions at the national level.

C. NATIONAL LEGITIMACY FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DEFENSE CAPABILITY

To achieve the Constitutional objectives on policies related to national unity and national security, as indicated in Article 51 (a), the Constitution of Nepal–2015 provides a legitimate ground for the establishment of an IHDE like the NDU in Nepal. Clauses (3), (4), (5), (6), and (7) of Article 51 (a) state, respectively, such a purpose: “... (3) to maintain law and order by developing a national security system; (4) to guarantee the overall human security system; (5) to make all security organs, including the Nepal Army, Nepal Police and Armed Police Force Nepal, competent, strong, professional, inclusive and accountable to the people, on the basis of national security policies; (6) to make and keep the citizens ready and competent to serve the nation as and when necessary; and (7) to make proper use, in the nation’s interest, of the knowledge, skills and experiences of former public employees including former employees, military and police.”²²³

In addition, provisions related to the NA in Article 267 para 4 states: “The Government of Nepal may also mobilize the Nepal Army in other works including development, construction and disaster management works, as provided for in the Federal

²²² “History and Mission: Our Mission and Values,” RAND Corporation, accessed February 28, 2018, <https://www.rand.org/about/history.html>.

²²³ GoN, “The Constitution of Nepal,” 31–32.

law.”²²⁴ The mobilization of NA for national development could provide legitimacy for the establishment of a joint interagency IHDE platform like the NDU for enhancing intellectual capacities of the entire national defense and security community under the GoN. Likewise, Article 266 allows for the establishment of the NSC headed by the Prime Minister for providing recommendations to the GoN and the Council of Ministers. On matters concerning the overall national defense and security policy making, and mobilization and control of the NA, in accordance with the Article 75 clause (1), the executive power of Nepal is vested on the Council of Ministers, headed by the Prime Minister as the Chairperson.²²⁵

Bruneau and Matei claim that “there are three main instruments that governments use to achieve [national] security: the military, police, and intelligence agencies.”²²⁶ In the case of Nepal, it is the NA, NP and APF, and NID that are mandated by Nepal’s Constitution of 2015 and the National Security Policy to protect and safeguard the country against both internal and external national security threats including threats emanating from natural disasters. As a result of the decade-long Maoist insurgency, Nepal has been threatened by internal political instability that began shortly after the proclamation of a constitutional monarchy and establishment of the multi-party system from 1990 to 2006.

On the heels of Nepal’s transition to a secular federal democratic republic in 2006, the nation faced several natural disasters and manmade threats: the flood of 2008;²²⁷ mega-earthquake of 2015;²²⁸ and immediately after the earthquake, a de-facto economic blockade from India regarding a constitutional amendment for the autonomy of the

²²⁴ Ibid., 185–186.

²²⁵ GoN, “The Constitution of Nepal,” 54.

²²⁶ Thomas C. Bruneau and Christiana Matei, “Towards a New Conceptualization of Democratization and Civil-Military Relations,” *Democratization*, 15 no. 5 (December 2008): 916, <http://hdl.handle.net/10945/43284>.

²²⁷ “Multi-Agency Flood Impact Assessment Koshi River Flood–Nepal,” Food Security Monitoring and Analysis Unit, WFP, September 2008, http://documents.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/ena/wfp189252.pdf?_ga=2.175561442.1552726991.1520417463-153275805.1520417463.

²²⁸ Nepal Army, “*Operation Sankat Mochan*.”

Madhesis.²²⁹ All these constituted major domestic and national security crises, which the civilian elites in the government bodies were inept in addressing. They lacked the right leadership, guidance, and supervision, demonstrating to the Nepalese public, the sheer lack of vision, knowledge, and ability to think critically at the decision-making and policy-formulating levels. These failures to address the crisis situations with appropriate and successful decisions, effective policy implementation, and strategic guidance, all point to one direction: the need for IHDE to enhance the intellectual capacity and capabilities of the defense and security spheres at the individual, group, and organizational levels.

D. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTER-AGENCY IHDE LIKE NDU

In this research, the framework for a proposed IHED institution tailored to Nepal's unique situation is based on the three key assumptions. First, NA is a single service branch, comprising purely the Army, which is devoid of other services like the Navy and the Air Force. Second, at present, Nepal has limited PME for its security forces, and this PME is obtained only through foreign grants and quotas. Furthermore, the absence of CDE and NSE for the civilian defense community provides evidence of unequal levels of professional competencies between the security forces and their civilian counterparts, especially at the policy and strategy formulation and decision-making levels.

Finally, the expanded roles of the NA, NP, and APF, which include MOOTW and the UNPSO, require joint national cooperation and collaboration in fulfilling national defense and security goals. Such cooperative efforts also imply the collaboration and integration of multiple defense and security-related agencies domestically (i.e., the MoD, MoHA, MoFA, and the NA, NP, APF, and the NID). The need for collaboration among similarly prepared and qualified military and civilian professionals across multiple agencies signals the suitability of an IHDE institution, like the NDU. The proposed institution would offer a holistic approach to address PME, CDE, and NSE requirements. As such the concept interprets the combination of PME, CDE, and NSE as equivalent to an integrated higher

²²⁹ Ankit Panda, "Nepal Looks East to China," *Diplomat*, March 23, 2016, <https://thediplomat.com/2016/03/nepal-looks-east-to-china/>.

defense education or IHDE. The PME corresponds with the NA; the CDE with the civilian defense community; and the NSE corresponds with the law enforcement agencies—NP, APF, and NID; and the IHDE implies the NDU (see Figure 2).




Figure 2. Concept for Inter-Agency IHDE Institution like the NDU

The concept is to establish an inter-agency IHDE, like the NDU, and thereby enhance Nepal’s defense capabilities through intellectual capacity and capability building for leaders and commanders within the various national security organizations (MoD, MoHA, MoFA, NA, APF, NP and NID). Through intellectual transformation among the decision and policy

makers, the concept then aims to consolidate democratization of CMR in pursuit of stable governance and democratic consolidation as the end state (see Figure 3).




Figure 3. Concept for Intellectual Transformation to Democratization of CMR

In addition, the concept also visualizes the systematic integration of both existing and future PME and NSE institutions of the NA, NP, and APF under the umbrella of a single National Defense University that qualifies as an inclusive interagency IHDE institution. It envisages the inclusive participation of all the eligible senior members of the concerned security stakeholders (see Figure 4).




Figure 4. Conceptual Framework for Inter-Agency IHDE System

In addition, the conceptual framework encompasses the promotion of higher education in the field of defense studies in accordance with the prevailing education policies of the Ministry of Education (MoE). The realization of this proposed integrated institution for higher education—master’s and doctoral degrees—would be a ground breaking effort on the part of the GoN. Furthermore, it would provide access not just to the officer corps of security agencies, but also to all the eligible civilian officials of the MoD, MoHA and MoFA. Likewise, the provision of quotas to other interested governmental and non-governmental agencies would greatly benefit those who are affiliated or working with these ministries in related defense and security sectors. Ideally, once established, this

institution would gain international recognition as a center for resources and research on mitigating threats in addition to providing academic education.

The concept envisions the NDU as headed by the MoD, as a legitimate constitutional organ of the GoN vested with the authority to oversee all matters concerning national defense and security affairs. The authority to control the NDU's policy, planning, and budgeting should rest with the Board of Visitors chaired by the CoAS under the NA (see Figure 5).




Figure 5. Control of the Inter-Agency IHDE System: NDU

The overarching idea, however, is also to involve all stakeholders concerned with security affairs, including the MoHA and its agencies—NP, APF and NID. Therefore, the framework proposes for a collaborative partnership between the ministries and the security

agencies in investing, planning, coordinating, and managing infrastructure development. A special joint committee should be established and act as the focal point throughout the duration of project development. It should liaise with all concerned government authorities and especially with MoE for procedural educational management including formulation of the NDU organization. In addition, the committee should seek necessary approval from concerned heads of branches.

1. Process for Integrating PME, CDE, and NSE to IHDE under the NDU

The concept visualizes the integration of the prevailing PME systems under the umbrella of a single institutional entity, the NDU (see Figure 6).




Figure 6. Integration Process of PME, CDE, NSE under NDU

In terms of career development, the prevailing PME system within the NA, NP, and APF provide academic credentials, such as bachelor's degree programs in Academies and Schools, as well as master's degree programs in the Army Command and Staff College (ACSC) and in the Armed Police Force Staff College (APFSC). These programs are presently made available through the affiliation with the Tribhuvan University of Kathmandu. The PME system within NA and APF lacks a National Defense University/ National Defense College/War College, key institutions for providing higher strategic level education to senior officers. The requirements for these senior officers are presently being fulfilled by sending their officer corps to friendly countries that provide grants and reserve seats for international students. Therefore, promulgation of NDU by the GoN would allow all four security agencies (NA, NP, APF, and NID) to get their required credentials within the country, thus avoiding long-term dependency on foreign quotas and grants.

2. Organizational Structure of Proposed IHDE Institution

The aim of this thesis is not to state a definite organizational structure for a country-specific IHDE institution, but rather, considering the analysis of the German and the U.S. models of higher defense educational institutes, it suggests adaptation of key structures vital for the strong management, planning, budgeting, and smooth running of the NDU in the Nepalese context. Specifically, these structures are based on the models of UniBw (Germany) and, in the United States, NDU and NPS (see Figure 7).




Figure 7. Organizational Structure for NDU of Nepal (Proposed).²³⁰

Thus, as observed from best practices, the NDU should arrive at a consensus for interagency IHDE among all the stakeholders, and should consider incorporating the following key structures:

- NDU leadership headed by the President of NDU, supported by the Vice-President, Commandants of ACSC, NMA, Nepal APF SC, NPA, including the Presidents of NAIHS, and the Deans of NAIHS-COM, and NAIHS-CON

²³⁰ Adapted from the organization structures of the UniBw, the United States' NDU and NPS. System of Vice-Presidents (VPs) adapted from UniBw as head of representatives from each security agency so as to bring the entire security agency's existing and future PME and NSE institutes under the wing of a single inter-service IHDE system of a National Defense University of Nepal. Board of Visitors (BOV) is adapted from the U.S. NDU, while the National Security Affairs (NSA) and Civil-Military Relations Departments are a conceptual integration borrowed from NPS. For details, see Universität der Bundeswehr München, "University Governance;" National Defense University, "NDU Board of Visitors," and "Leadership;" Naval Postgraduate School, "Academics."

- NDU Board of Visitors/Advisors, which should be officially approved by GoN legislation, authorizing the Board's total control over management, policy, and budget formulations and oversight for accountability, programming, and for providing strategic guidelines
- the Board of Visitors/Advisors should be headed by the CoAS representing the Defense Minister in accordance with the relevant legislative act mandating the establishment of the Board and the IHDE institution like the NDU
- it should have a foundation capable of generating resources and funds to support the mission of the NDU
- with the consensus of the stakeholders represented by the special committee for the establishment of the NDU, key colleges, centers, programs, should be brought under the umbrella of the NDU
- the structure should identify and accommodate the number of necessary faculty, departments, and likewise should reflect human resource necessary in accordance with the NDU's policy and strategic guidelines
- the structure should include a registrar's office and outreach offices for management of international students
- the structure should include research and development wings and centers facilitating specialization to provide forums on the conduct of crisis response and mitigation, conferences, and seminars, and these centers must be supported by well-resourced library(s)

3. Planning Policy

As far as planning policy is concerned, the immediate plan for the stakeholders should be to arrive at a consensus and initiate a special ad-hoc committee empowered to look after the entire infrastructural development of the IHDE institution, including budgetary matters. This committee, in due time, should propose the integral management team and Board of Visitors/Advisors, which should be vested with the authority granted under the law of GoN to formulate policy guidelines, conduct planning, and support the implementation of plans with adequate budget as specified per the PPBS system. The planning policy should consider a quality control and accreditation system; transfer of

credits; honor codes and ethics; types of degrees conferred (master's degrees, doctoral degrees), and other matters.²³¹

The planning should include provision of strategic guidelines highlighting NDU's vision, mission, objectives, as well as short-, mid-, and long-term goals. This phase should map out, in detail, NDU's conceptual framework and a process for the integration of multiple agency IHDE systems. Planning policy should also establish student admission criteria, enrollment targets by department, by faculty, and by colleges.

Finally, all planning parameters must be estimated, accounted, and costed (budgeted) for with detailed accuracy to achieve maximum efficiency and effectiveness, and thus, should include the following:

- Likely vision to facilitate the integration of the interagency IHDE institution, by bringing all the defense-related higher educational institutions, colleges, centers, and programs of concerned stakeholders—NA, NP, APF, and NID—under the umbrella of the NDU and thus augmenting democratization of CMR.
- Likely mission to develop the intellectual capacity and capability of the senior civilian defense leaders, security force commanders, and interagency personnel at the policy, strategy, and decision-making level to assume responsibilities warranted by the national security policy.
- Likely objectives: to provide an inter-agency IHDE at the graduate (master's), and postgraduate (doctorate) levels combining PME, CDE, and NSE under a single educational institution, like the NDU; enhance Nepal's overall defense capability through intellectual capacity building for all the members associated with national security affairs at the policy and strategic decision-making level; improve the overall competency levels of both the civilian defense officials including civil servants and the senior officers and staffs of the security forces through IHDE (combined form of PME, CDE, and NSE).

4. Overcoming Challenges to Programming and Budgetary Control

In the light of Nepal's budgetary constraints and limited technical and administrative expertise, the proposed NDU should not emulate the specificity and

²³¹ For more details, see, "NDU Academic Policies," National Defense University, accessed March 1, 2018, <http://www.ndu.edu/Academics/Academic-Policies/>.

completeness of mature democracies like the United States and Germany, but should rather prioritize the ability to perform the objectives of IHDE using Nepal's available resources and capacity. The infrastructure size, structure, management faculty, and budget must be within the capacity of GoN. Realistic goals must be set to sustain the long-term asset viability, efficiency, and effectiveness required to meet international educational standards and quality assurance.

The author acknowledges that there are a number of hurdles to creating a domestic inter-agency IHDE platform like the NDU that encompasses the requirements of all the stakeholders within the security realm. The most prominent challenges will be the implementation of the PPBS aspect; finding qualified instructors and retaining them; adhering to international standards, quality control, and maintaining necessary accreditation from the Tribhuvan University and the Ministry of Education; providing technical and administrative expertise in management; and maintenance of a resource library. The major problems of programming and adopting a budgetary control mechanism are discussed in the following paragraphs.

Acquiring budget for the establishment of an NDU would be challenging. First, the task of generating the necessary funding nationally would depend on the consensus of all the four ministries, i.e., MoD, MoHA, MoFA, and MoE. The special committee would have to plan, coordinate, and carry out the cost survey and estimates for the proposed NDU and then submit it to the concerned authorities in the ministries for approval and recommendation.

Although, Nepal's annual budget deficit runs on average 2.84 percent of GDP,²³² the military spending for 2016, however, was only \$ 303.80 million (see Figure 8).

²³² "Nepal Government Budget," Trading Economics, accessed March 1, 2018, <https://tradingeconomics.com/nepal/government-budget>.



Figure 8. Military Spending of Nepalese Army (2008-2016)²³³

In fact, the military spending represented only 0.323 percent out of the government’s total spending of \$93,990.00 million for the same year (see Figure 9).



Figure 9. Nepal Government Spending since (2008–2016)²³⁴

²³³ Source: “Nepal Military Expenditure,” Trading Economics, accessed March 1, 2018, <https://tradingeconomics.com/nepal/military-expenditure>.

²³⁴ Source: “Nepal Government Spending,” Trading Economics, accessed March 1, 2018, <https://tradingeconomics.com/nepal/government-spending>.

Clearly, the NA is under resourced as its spending for 2016 is well below 1 percent of the nation's total spending, which provides a strong case and future scope for raising the defense budget ceiling in favor of defense improvement. Nevertheless, with regards to funding the NDU, it will still be a great challenge for the GoN to provide for such a demanding infrastructural project on its own. Hence, alternative means will have to be sought.

In fact, there are three other available options for funding the project. The first option would be to get the whole cost approved through the MoE, which is the top-most government organization for oversight of Nepal's education system. The second option would be a cooperative approach with the MoD, MoHA, and MoFA, and MoE, which are the ministries responsible for defense and security, and foreign affairs, including national educational policy implementation at the governmental level. The third option would be for unilateral investment from the MoD, especially because the NDU would be constructed under its initiative and patronage.

The first option may be able to provide the cost but not to the full expectation and realization of the proposed estimate to meet the required standards and facilities for the NDU. The third option, the solo effort of the MoD, would be hampered by current budget constraints. The second option would be a rational choice for a collaborative response from all stakeholders of the MoD, MoHA, and MoFA, including their respective defense and security agencies, and MoE. The rationale behind this view is that the NDU would serve the purpose for the officer corps and civilian officials of these three ministries solely. Therefore, it would seem appropriate for them to invest in establishing the NDU that would benefit them—in enhancing intellectual capacity for leadership and operational staff in the long run. In addition, the inter-agency collaboration for the establishment of an NDU would help to pool other necessary resources, in terms of expertise and manpower, for management and development of the project.

Second, seeking regional and international assistance and collaboration through diplomatic and governmental channels would be another viable option to garner resources and funding. The security agencies could liaise with their respective counterparts in friendly countries and seek international support and collaboration through their

established institutes of higher learning, including the UniBw of Germany; NDUs of the United States and China; NDCs of Pakistan and Bangladesh; War Colleges of the United States, the U.K., and India; and the Naval Postgraduate School of the United States. This effort would enable the Nepalese defense institutions to muster bilateral and multi-lateral cooperation, technical support, and expertise in areas of institutional management. Therefore, once established, through a collaborative effort, the NDU would be the key enabler in developing intellectual capacity and fostering democratization of CMR.

The third option is for the GoN to negotiate with the UN and NATO through the PfP via the Defense Education Enhancement Program (DEEP)²³⁵ and Defense Institution Building (DIB)²³⁶ for technical and administrative expertise. The GoN could even request financial and infrastructure support for modern electronic technologies. The current International Military Education Training (IMET) program at NPS is also part and parcel of PfP initiatives in DEEP. Many Eastern European countries, as well as Afghanistan and Iraq, have benefited through these programs in establishing national defense universities. Therefore, diplomatic efforts along these lines may prove fruitful for the secular federal republic of Nepal to consolidate its democracy through intellectual capacity enhancement and provide the highest standards of leadership in decision and policy-making bodies.

²³⁵ “Defense Education Enhancement Program (DEEP),” NATO, accessed May 28, 2017, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_139182.htm.

²³⁶ Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Defense Institution Building.”

V. CONCLUSION

While the previous chapter considered the factors related to the establishment of an interagency IHDE institution like the NDU, this chapter highlights the strategic importance and likely benefits of the institution. Chief among these benefits is that such a program would help prepare and develop prospective civilian defense leaders, officials, and civil servants, senior flag officers and commanders, staff officers, and interagency personnel. The proposed IHDE institution can provide students with valuable knowledge, the ability to think creatively and critically, and the ability to arrive at effective solutions under the worst VUCA scenario, as defined by Stiehm.²³⁷ NDU provides scope for holistic integration of individuals, groups, and organizations of the security forces, but it also involves interagency personnel and civilian defense officials and staff, enabling them to access to higher education in defense. This forms part of a continuing education program such as the one offered under the models of the UniBw (Germany), and NDU, NPS, and AFIT in the United States. Hence, advanced academics and interaction among various stakeholders in an integrated educational setting provides ample opportunity for successful democratization of CMR in terms of effectiveness, efficiency, and the maintenance of civilian control of the security forces. The success of this project will, indeed, create a revolution in military affairs in Nepal.²³⁸

A. STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS AND BENEFITS OF ESTABLISHING NDU

This section presents the strategic implications and benefits of establishing an inclusive interagency IHDE like the NDU in Nepal. In addition, it answers the thesis question of why and how the establishment of an NDU promotes democratization of CMR that ultimately enhances Nepal's defense and security capabilities and leads to the end state (i.e., the democratic consolidation, stable governance, peace, and security) (see Figure 10).

²³⁷ Stiehm, *U.S. Army War College*, 186–187.

²³⁸ Scott Jasper, “The Capabilities-Based Approach,” in *Transforming Defense Capabilities: New Approaches for International Security*, ed. Scott Jasper (Boulder, CO and Covent Garden, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2009), 1–5.

STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS & BENEFITS OF PROMOTING NDU AS AN IHDE-MODEL




Figure 10. Strategic Implications and Benefits of Promoting NDU as an IHDE–Model

1. A National Platform for Threat Mitigation Can Emerge from NDU

Once established, the NDU can act as a venue for mitigating national, regional and international security matters through seminars, dialogues, conferences, including research conducted both by experts as well as students. These regional and international collaborative events would benefit the Nepalese defense sectors in formulating precise, justifiable, and practical policies, concepts, and strategies to counter perceived threats through modernization, adaptation, evolution, or transformation processes in order to fulfill national security responsibilities. The ability to identify threats, as well as to plan and direct counter measures to neutralize threats, increases defense capability.

This ability stems from enhanced intellectual capacity both at the strategic and operational levels. In addition, joint collaboration and cooperation enhances CMR and likewise its performance. Thus, the NDU would be an effective platform to share, compare, and implement new strategies through diplomatic and intellectual discourse, research, seminars, conferences, and programs. Crucially, the inclusion of a Strategic Defense Research and Development Department would enable it to pool in major national level think tanks at a central venue to carry out domestic and international threat analysis, and provide practical solutions to mitigate threats likely to impact national security and defense capabilities. Thus, Nepal would be able to enhance its national security and defense capabilities.

2. Incentives for Progressive Career, Promotion Path, and Continuing Higher Education

Postgraduate master's degree and doctoral Ph.D. degrees in various specialization, curricula, with inter-disciplinary expertise provides prospective senior flag officers, staff officers, senior civilian defense employees, and interagency personnel with incentive for career progression. More than often, these higher academic qualifications are compulsory criterion for individual's promotion and career advancement in their respective security fields. Furthermore, with the addition of NDU's continuing higher education system, the members of the civilian defense community along with the retired officer corps of the NA, NP, AFP, and NID would be highly privileged with opportunity for those who wish to pursue higher education on entering into civilian lives.

3. Specialization of Staff Officers and Civilian Defense Officials Augments Functional Capacity of the Organization

The NDU would provide access to both strategic and operational level staff officers from NA, NP and APF, and to accredit them with expertise in specialized studies pertaining to their job specifications. For example, the U.S. Armed Forces incorporates area studies for their officer corps at NPS with programs to supplement diplomatic offices and embassies with qualified expertise on country-specific socio-economic, political, cultural, security and defense topics, basically enhancing the officers' diplomatic, foreign policy,

and defense capabilities.²³⁹ Likewise, those officers earmarked for or interested in working as staff officers in the branches of Research and Development, Defense Budget, Operations, Intelligence, etc., would have the opportunity to gain expertise at an advanced level, thereby increasing the functional capacity of their concerned departments or the branches they serve.

Similarly, graduate programs on defense analysis and business studies would admit eligible officers from any security forces. The graduated staff officers would re-enforce the functional capacity of their respective commanders and leaders to plan, advise, and execute missions and roles effectively and efficiently through the respective chain of command. Their ability to coordinate, liaise, communicate, share information and intelligence through joint collaboration and cooperation among multiple agencies, and various government and non-government agencies, in any given asymmetric threat environment, would ultimately assist their decision maker's ability to command, control, and communicate (C3)²⁴⁰ effectively. Consequently, this professionalism among commanders and their staff officers complements overall defense capabilities, particularly in decision making and policy formulation.

4. Enhances Competency Levels of Civilian Defense Officials

The civilian staff officials of MoD, MoHA, and MoFA would be greatly benefited by advanced CDE and NSE. These studies would increase their competency level and their expertise in the field of national defense and security affairs, helping them analyze and construct policy relevant to strategic, operational, and tactical responsibilities of the security agencies and their missions. Not only will these students strengthen their knowledge base, they will also hone their ability to think critically and understand the operational environment, enabling them to exercise better oversight in the maintenance of civilian control over the security forces. Ultimately, these improvements will help closely likely CMR gaps.

²³⁹ This is an observation made by the author while currently undergoing NSA: Curriculum-685 on Civil-Military Relations through interaction with colleagues and class participation in general.

²⁴⁰ Scott Jasper, "Defense Capabilities" (lecture, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, April 25, 2017).

5. Provides Regular Flow of Graduate Replacements

Keeping in view of the annual wastage rate of officer corps due to untimely death, accidental discharge, early retirement, regular retirement through pension, and scheduled rotations of command and staff appointments demands regular flow of qualified commanders and staff officers is needed to replace the potential shortage of qualified officers. This continuous flow of qualified replacement officers is only possible through the establishment of an organic IHDE platform like the NDU.

6. Removes Dependency on Foreign Quotas and Grants for Higher Defense Education

A country-specific NDU will enable scope for self-reliance and will remove the NA's total dependency on foreign grants and quotas for higher defense education. Although foreign grants and opportunities to study at advanced defense institutes abroad are generous, they are limited; only a select few can be sent abroad as an ambassadorial or diplomatic courtesy. Through an NDU in Nepal, many more students will be able to acquire a quality education.

7. Supports Unity of Effort and Inter-Operability in Joint Operational Environment

Traditionally, Huntington prescribed a separate working environment for the professional activities of the armed forces versus the civilian defense officials while executing operational requirement under "objective civilian control."²⁴¹ But modern conflict resolution trends contradict his dictum, whereby, the nature of the present asymmetric security threat environment requires all defense and security stakeholders to work in a joint environment. The U.S.-led NATO campaigns in Iraq (2001) and Afghanistan (2001) provide classic examples of joint operations, while the counterinsurgency operations conducted by Nepal's armed forces (2001–2006) under

²⁴¹ Huntington, "The Soldier and the State," 80–85, quoted in Guttieri, "Professional Military Education in Democracies," 236–256.

“Unified Command”²⁴² is another joint operational environment comprising the then Royal Nepal Army, NP, APF, and the NID.

Democratic practices under such joint environment entails security forces to accomplish missions and tasks, obeying the rule of law, and respecting the maintenance and exercise of objective civilian control over the security forces. Under such joint operation environment, the functional effectiveness of security stakeholders relies chiefly on their collective decision-making capacity, inter-operability, and effective communication skills that fosters good civil-military relations, which in turn supports democratic consolidation.²⁴³ Thus, access to advanced university education in a joint environment setting enables members of security agencies and civilian defense leadership to enhance their individual intellectual capacity and organizational defense potential through greater awareness of principles and practices related to defense and security affairs.

8. Improves CMR through Scholarship

With the expertise and academic knowledge gained through graduate, postgraduate, and doctoral programs at the NDU, the qualified officer corps, including the civilian officials, would provide better scope for strengthening CMR, and hence, lead to the end state of democratic consolidation—peace, safety, stability, and security. Through the NDU, it would be possible to produce the so-called “scholar officers [and civilians],”²⁴⁴ with the expertise to make informed decisions and policies, strategies, doctrines and also be able to command and lead, in order to fulfill strategic and operational level missions successfully in their respective capacities. These officers and civilian officials will have in-depth knowledge on the national and international security threat environment. Such knowledge would encompass the internal and external conflict spectrum, including natural disasters and climate change.

²⁴² Dhruva Kumar, “The Royal Nepal Army,” *Himal South Asian*, March 2006, <http://old.himalmag.com/component/content/article/1658-the-royal-nepal-army.html>.

²⁴³ Guttieri, “Professional Military Education in Democracies,” 224.

²⁴⁴ Charles C. Moskos, John Allen Williams, and David R. Segal, “Armed Forces after the Cold War,” quoted in Guttieri, “Professional Military Education in Democracies,” 254.

The appropriate advanced academic defense education, not only increases the competency level of the civilian defense officials and staffs but also helps to fulfill the four purposes of the MoD as stated by Bruneau and Goetze: provide organizational structure of MoD based on power-sharing relations between the MoD and the armed forces; helps determine and define roles and responsibilities to the armed forces and to the MoD civilian defense staffs and bureaucracy; builds the capacity, competency, and capability of MoD and its personnel to maximize the effectiveness of the armed forces; and finally helps maximize the efficient use of resources to achieve changing security situations. In addition to these purposes, the MoD staffs and bureaucracy should have the skill, expertise, and knowledge to maintain both an internal relationship with the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, and also maintain external relations with diplomatic emissaries and other foreign and international partners.²⁴⁵ Hence, to achieve all these purposes, and thereby foster better CMR, increasing personal, departmental, and organizational competencies through advance academic education in defense proves important.

In the case of security forces, professionalism is gained not only through intensive trainings but also through scholarly education. As Guttieri rightly describes, “education is a central function of military organization,”²⁴⁶ and links both education and the military training as fundamental to the profession of arms. Hence, knowledge about own defense capabilities and limitations, and its resourceful utilization would make the NA, NP, APF, and NID professional. Possession of expertise and broader knowledge among civilian leadership would lead to judicious, transparent, and firm “democratic civilian control”²⁴⁷ of the armed forces, whereas the armed forces, through strengthened professionalism, military ethics, and culture would respect this civilian control while maintaining its own “effectiveness and efficiency”²⁴⁸ in fulfilling assigned missions and tasks.

²⁴⁵ Bruneau and Goetze Jr., “Ministry of Defense and Democratic Control,” 71–95.

²⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 235.

²⁴⁷ Bruneau and Matei, *The Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relations*, 26–35.

²⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 29–35.

The education and experience shared at NDU would provide an “inter-operable”²⁴⁹ atmosphere between the civilian authorities and the security forces to work in a “joint operational environment”²⁵⁰ to analyze and resolve threats emanating from any “continuum of conflict spectrum,”²⁵¹ including disaster management. Therefore, intellectual capacity building through inter-agency IHDE acts as an enabler for enhancing overall national defense capabilities and capacities. Which in turn, together with respect for the rule of law fosters CMR improvements that ultimately leads to democratic consolidation in Nepal.

B. RECOMMENDATIONS

The geo-political situation of Nepal, which has been traversed by waves of natural disasters that threaten national security and the occasional de-facto trade blockade and border encroachment, a past Maoist insurgency movement, and the recent development toward consolidation of democracy since 2006, and especially after the promulgation of the Constitution of Nepal in 2015, and the subsequent follow up of local provincial election and federal parliamentary elections indicate positive national spirit toward finally consolidating the long-awaited democracy with stability, peace, safety and prosperity.

The need to consolidate democracy and realize stable governance in Nepal creates the need to advance higher defense education. What stands out strikingly today is the lack of such an institutional platform in Nepal, which has deprived the citizens, the civilian defense officials of all concerned ministries, the security forces, and the intelligence community of the opportunity to expand their knowledge and skills in their respective areas of responsibility. Often the disparity between the educational levels of those in the military or armed forces and their counterparts in civilian security agencies has led to CMR pitfalls and latent incompetence that may not become apparent until a crisis looms. Such shortcomings, resulting from and in ineffective decision-making and policy-making

²⁴⁹ Mike Solomon and Scott Jasper, “Innovation and Experimentation” (lecture on interoperability in joint operational experimentation program of USPACOM, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, May 24, 2017).

²⁵⁰ Ibid.

²⁵¹ Scott Jasper, “Defense Strategy Elements,” lecture class, NPS, Monterey, CA (April 17, 2017).

bodies, for instance, were evidenced during the earthquake of 2105, the insurgency period, the flood, and the trade-blockade. In these crises, the government seemed not have answers to the problems and were struck with a mode quite akin to paralysis of government functioning. Hence, the need for an interagency IHDE institution like the NDU is needed to consolidate the gains of democracy before they are lost.

1. To the Government of Nepal

- Invest in an IHDE in order to create a country-specific interagency NDU, with the capacity and capability to conduct research and development, and act as a think-tank, and thereby, maintain its status as a national platform for crisis mitigation and center for research and development in matters concerning national and international security.
- Provide a legislative mandate to initiate the establishment of the NDU under the patronage of MoD.
- Opt for the establishment of a joint educational system—composed of civilian defense officials, armed forces, relevant agencies, and civilian industries—from its inception. Analysis of UniBw, NDU, NPS, and AFIT, all indicate tendency toward integration in advanced defense studies to provide the maximum benefit to all security stakeholders.
- Commit to providing adequate and timely budget, and resources, and to coordinate with qualified faculty and staff across the nation.
- Conduct bilateral negotiations with friendly and sponsor nations and organizations to obtain assistance in meeting technical, financial, and developmental requirements.

2. To the Security Forces as a Whole

- Agree to collaborate, cooperate, and provide a solid foundation for the establishment of a national interagency IHDE institute, like the NDU, which provides multi-fold benefits to the entire security community.
- Provide skilled professionals and experts, and create a standby pool of instructors to manage faculty, departments, and operational and administrative units.
- Arrive at a consensus through agreement and debates over the integration of the existing PME and NSE systems under the umbrella of one National Defense University.

- Agree on the number of departments and faculty, budget, management, planning, programming, policy formulation, and arranging for structural organization.
 - Maintain diplomatic military-to-military relations and coordinate for likely technical expertise, as well as financial aid, if possible.
- 3. To The Concerned Special Committee Likely to Oversee the Overall Development of the NDU (Should the Plan Be Approved in the Future)**
- Carry out fiscal estimates and get approval from concerned authorities.
 - Provide constant coordination and liaison with all stakeholders including the Ministry of Education and affiliation and accreditation centers.
 - Formulate an infrastructure development plan and likewise get approval from concerned authorities.
 - Liaise and coordinate with regional and international centers of excellence in advanced defense studies for assistance.
 - Incorporate, at a minimum, programs in Strategic Studies, Defense Studies, National Security Affairs, Defense Analysis, CMR, and Defense Management in the start-up phase.

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