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# TO BE VIOLENT OR CIVIL: WHY RESISTANCES CHOOSE THEIR STRATEGIC STRATEGY

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**NAVAL  
POSTGRADUATE  
SCHOOL**

**MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA**

**THESIS**

**TO BE VIOLENT OR CIVIL: WHY RESISTANCES  
CHOOSE THEIR STRATEGIC STRATEGY**

by

Robert A. Coombs

December 2019

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**TO BE VIOLENT OR CIVIL: WHY RESISTANCES CHOOSE THEIR  
STRATEGIC STRATEGY**

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AND POLITICAL WARFARE**

from the

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## **ABSTRACT**

The focus of this thesis is to develop an understanding of where civil resistances are likely to occur as opposed to violent insurgencies. This work explores the relationship between the ethnic power structures within a state and the propensity for civil resistance. It further conducts a game theoretic analysis of the choice between violence and non-violence by a civil resistance, compared to a state's choice of repression or counterinsurgency. Finally, this thesis examines a series of three case studies of violent insurgencies that have transitioned to non-violent civil resistance to identify commonalities in the circumstances that led to an insurgency changing its strategy. This research provides a new approach for the study of civil resistance by analyzing a resistance's choice as a strategic decision based on environmental and ethnic structures. The work furthers research into why resistance leaders choose specific strategies, and under what circumstances states may influence the strategic decisions of a resistance.

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<b>I.</b>	<b>INTRODUCTION.....</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>A.</b>	<b>BACKGROUND .....</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>B.</b>	<b>RESEARCH QUESTION .....</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>C.</b>	<b>CLARIFICATION OF DEFINITIONS.....</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>D.</b>	<b>PREVIOUS LITERATURE .....</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>1.</b>	<b>Civil Resistance Theory Origins.....</b>	<b>7</b>
<b>2.</b>	<b>Rise of the Modern Theorists.....</b>	<b>8</b>
<b>3.</b>	<b>Insurgency, Guerrilla Warfare.....</b>	<b>13</b>
<b>E.</b>	<b>RESEARCH APPROACH.....</b>	<b>16</b>
<b>F.</b>	<b>KEY FINDINGS .....</b>	<b>18</b>
<b>II.</b>	<b>ETHNIC POWER STRUCTURES AND RESISTANCE .....</b>	<b>21</b>
<b>A.</b>	<b>OVERVIEW OF RESEARCH .....</b>	<b>21</b>
<b>B.</b>	<b>PRECEDING RESEARCH .....</b>	<b>21</b>
<b>C.</b>	<b>FRAMEWORK FOR QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS.....</b>	<b>24</b>
<b>D.</b>	<b>RESULTS .....</b>	<b>29</b>
<b>E.</b>	<b>DISCUSSION .....</b>	<b>42</b>
<b>F.</b>	<b>CONCLUSION .....</b>	<b>43</b>
<b>III.</b>	<b>GAMES BETWEEN THE STATE AND RESISTANCE.....</b>	<b>45</b>
<b>A.</b>	<b>CONTEXT OF THE GAME .....</b>	<b>45</b>
<b>B.</b>	<b>IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERACTIONS BETWEEN THE STATE AND POPULATION .....</b>	<b>51</b>
<b>IV.</b>	<b>FROM VIOLENT FAILURE TO NONVIOLENT SUCCESS.....</b>	<b>53</b>
<b>A.</b>	<b>WHY POPULATIONS ADAPT THEIR STRATEGIC CHOICES .....</b>	<b>53</b>
<b>B.</b>	<b>ANALYZING CASES OF TRANSITION FROM VIOLENCE TO CIVIL RESISTANCE.....</b>	<b>53</b>
<b>1.</b>	<b>East Timor Background.....</b>	<b>58</b>
<b>2.</b>	<b>East Timor Power Sharing.....</b>	<b>63</b>
<b>3.</b>	<b>East Timor Game.....</b>	<b>64</b>
<b>4.</b>	<b>East Timor Conclusion.....</b>	<b>65</b>
<b>5.</b>	<b>Tibet Background .....</b>	<b>66</b>
<b>6.</b>	<b>Tibet Power Sharing.....</b>	<b>73</b>
<b>7.</b>	<b>Tibet Game .....</b>	<b>75</b>
<b>8.</b>	<b>Tibet Conclusion .....</b>	<b>76</b>

9.	West Sahara Background.....	77
10.	West Sahara Power Sharing .....	85
11.	West Sahara Game .....	86
12.	West Sahara Conclusion.....	87
C.	CONCLUSION .....	88
V.	CONCLUSION .....	93
A.	UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES? .....	93
1.	When Ethnicity Matters .....	93
2.	The Opponent and Violence.....	94
3.	Stay Violent or Transition to Nonviolent Methodology? .....	95
4.	Final Thoughts .....	96
	LIST OF REFERENCES.....	99
	INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .....	109

## LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.	Timeline of Violent and Nonviolent Resistances .....	27
Figure 2.	Density Plot for Junior and Senior Partner Populations .....	30
Figure 3.	Density Plot for Powerless and Discriminated Populations .....	31
Figure 4.	Probability of NV Action by Number of Groups.....	35
Figure 5.	Probability of NV Action by Percentage of Population.....	35
Figure 6.	Probability of Violent Action by Number of Group.....	36
Figure 7.	Probability of Violent Action by Percentage of Population .....	36
Figure 8.	Junior Partner Regression .....	38
Figure 9.	Senior Partner Regression.....	38
Figure 10.	Nonviolent Resistance by Powerless Population Percentage and Polity .....	40
Figure 11.	Violent Resistance by Powerless Population Percentage and Polity .....	40
Figure 12.	Violent and Nonviolent Resistance by Discriminated Population Percentage and Polity.....	42
Figure 13.	Game Between State and Population.....	46
Figure 14.	Government vs Population Choices.....	48
Figure 15.	Game between State and Population (Ordinal).....	50
Figure 16.	East Timor Resistance Evolution.....	59
Figure 17.	2008 Protests in Tibet from 10 March to 12 April, Marked in Red Squares .....	73
Figure 18.	Western Sahara Control .....	81
Figure 19.	Polisario Organizational Chart.....	84

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## LIST OF TABLES

Table 1.	Regression Results: Violent and Nonviolent Resistance .....	33
Table 2.	Population Options in Game.....	50
Table 3.	State Options in Game .....	50
Table 4.	List of Violent to Nonviolent Transitions.....	55

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## LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ALPS	Sahrawi People's Liberation Army
ASDT	Timorese Social Democratic Association
AU	African Union
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
COIN	Counter-Insurgency
CNRM	National Council of Maubere Resistance
CNRT	National Council of Timorese Resistance
CRRN	National Council of Revolutionary Resistance (Timor)
CR	Civil Resistance
DRET	Democratic Republic of East Timor
EPR	Ethnic Power Relations Dataset
FALINTIL	The Armed Forces for the National Liberation of East Timor
FRETILIN	The Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor
ICNC	International Center on Nonviolent Conflict
JKTS	Jenkhentsisum
MAR	Minorities at Risk Database
MINURSO	United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara
NAVCO	Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns Outcomes Database
NOVACT	International Institute for Nonviolent Action
NV	Nonviolent
OAU	Organization for African Unity
PLA	Peoples Liberation Army
Polisario	Popular Front for the Liberation of the Saguiet el Hamra and Rio de Oro
PRC	People's Republic of China
FAR	Royal Moroccan Armed Forces
SADR	Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic
SO	Special Operations
SOF	Special Operations Forces
TAR	Tibet Autonomous Region

UDT	Union of Democratic Timorese
UN	United Nations
UW	Unconventional Warfare

# I. INTRODUCTION

## A. BACKGROUND

The practicality of insurgent warfare has come under scrutiny over the past 15 years due to a rise in popular scholarly research suggesting lower success rates as opposed to civil resistance. This research is giving rise to an increased emphasis on civil resistance as a viable alternative to insurgent warfare. Major Timothy Ball suggests in his thesis, “From Successful Defense to Problematic Offense: The Devolution of Unconventional Warfare,” that unconventional warfare operations have historically provided a poor record of success, and likewise defensive unconventional warfare is only slightly more justified under specific conditions.<sup>1</sup> He suggests that the current format of unconventional warfare, specifically that of insurgent style warfare, is not particularly efficient in achieving desired political goals. Chenoweth and Stephens demonstrate in their work, *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict*, that out of 323 campaigns from 1900–2006, civil resistance campaigns achieved a success rate of 53 percent compared to 26 percent for violent insurgent campaigns.<sup>2</sup> Statistically, there appears to be ample evidence to suggest that violent insurgencies may be less effective than other potential options in achieving the goals of the resisting population, and this trend might be increasing. This thesis will expand upon the preceding research and analyze under what conditions a violent insurgency or civil resistance will occur.

Mobilizing a population to engage in armed aggression against a superior enemy is difficult. Thoreau describes in his work *Civil Disobedience* that a population “hesitate [s], and they regret, and sometimes they petition; but they do nothing in earnest and with effect.”<sup>3</sup> Conducting an insurgent-focused unconventional warfare campaign is just as difficult when attempting to mobilize a population for a specific cause. Kinetically focused

---

<sup>1</sup> Timothy S. Ball, “From Successful Defense to Problematic Offense: The Devolution of Unconventional Warfare” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2016), v.

<sup>2</sup> Maria Stephan J. and Chenoweth, Erica, “Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict,” *International Security* 33, no. 1 (Summer 2008): 24.

<sup>3</sup> Henry David Thoreau, *Civil Disobedience* (London: The Simple Life Press, 1903), 14.

unconventional warfare (UW) limits a potential populations mobilization for resistance, since humans demonstrate a lower capacity for aggression than anticipated and a tendency to stop short of violence without significant conditioning.<sup>4</sup> In this psycho-sociological framework, waging unconventional warfare in the current operating environments may be impractical due to an inability to rally enough support to develop significant forces to oust a government or occupying hostile.

This study asks, if civil resistance is systematically more advantageous than insurgent warfare, under what situations might a civil resistance develop? Secondly, what are the potential options of the resistance element and the occupying state when initiating a resistance movement? Finally, are there any commonalities in resistances that start with a violent insurgency and transition to a nonviolent resistance? This analysis will provide insights into each of these questions.

## **B. RESEARCH QUESTION**

This research is divided into three sections that question the viability of civil resistance as a strategic option and the circumstances under which civil resistances are more probable to manifest over a violent insurgency. I will argue that by answering these questions, it will provide insight into the circumstances and environments that increase or decrease a population's tendency to engage in a civil resistance. It will also demonstrate some natural challenges to the development of a civil resistance campaign. This thesis is divided into three main questions and will use a quantitative analysis of ethnic power relations to demonstrate a propensity toward civil resistance, analyze a theoretic game model of the strategic choices of the state and population, and conclude with a qualitative analysis of three separate case studies of resistances that transitioned from a violent insurgency to a civil resistance. The three questions this thesis asks are:

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<sup>4</sup> Erica Chenoweth, Adria Lawrence, and Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, eds., *Rethinking Violence: States and Non-State Actors in Conflict*, Belfer Center Studies in International Security (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2010), 151.

- a. Is there a structure of ethnic power sharing division that promotes civil resistance over insurgent warfare?
- b. When analyzing a game between a resistance and the state, what are the most likely strategic options for each player when choosing between violent (insurgency or targeting civilians) and nonviolent options (civil resistance or counter-insurgency)?
- c. Using case studies on violent insurgencies that have transitioned from insurgency to civil resistance, can we identify particular elements that contributed to the outcome of the campaign?

### C. CLARIFICATION OF DEFINITIONS

The rise of scholarly research into civil resistance has led to the use of multiple resistance terms that are being used as synonyms, obfuscating the context of the phenomenon. Civil resistance has become a vogue topic over the last twenty years and there continues to be a variety of terms, developed or adjusted, to identify similar axioms. In order to discuss civil resistance, there must first be a commonly understood lexicon. Some of the definitions listed in this section are currently listed within military and joint service component doctrine. Other civil resistance terms are adopted by the leading scholars in civil resistance. This section will adopt and adapt the terminology as appropriate to decrease confusion on the lexicon of civil resistance.

Gene Sharp posits a confusion between the core terms of “nonviolent resistance,” “civil resistance,” and “people power.”<sup>5</sup> In military usage, resistance is defined in *Joint Publication 3-05, Special Operations*, and explained further in *Joint Publication 3-05.1, Unconventional Warfare*. These military documents define a “resistance movement” as “an organized effort by some portion of the civil population of a country to resist the legally established government or occupying power and to disrupt civil order and stability.”<sup>6</sup> The

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<sup>5</sup> Gene Sharp and Joshua Paulson, *Waging Nonviolent Struggle: 20th Century Practice and 21st Century Potential* (Boston: Extending Horizons Books, 2005), 20.

<sup>6</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, JP 1-02 (Washington D.C., 2016), 104.

resistance movement may either be violent or nonviolent, as long as its goal is to “coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a hostile government.”<sup>7</sup> The joint publication does not provide a clear definition of the distinction between a resistance and an insurgency, but it is successful in identifying that there are different forms of resistance, without articulating what these all may entail. For this study we will expand the definition derived from JP 3-05 to afford a greater context in what may be considered a resistance and differentiate between various resistance terminology. Terms such as civil defense and civil disobedience, not listed in JP 3-05 or JP 3-05.1, are necessary to define the range of options for the resistance practitioner.

Resistance: A struggle for independence derived from a desire of individuals and groups to address grievances of an unpopular regime or occupying power.<sup>8</sup>

Civil Resistance: The sustained use of asymmetric actions or activities by civilians against a state or occupying power by a population; it involves a collection of activities that are nonviolent and avoids imposing physical harm, where practical, against the population or occupying power.<sup>9</sup>

Nonviolent Resistance: Civilian-based methods used to wage conflict through social, psychological, economic, and political means without the threat or use of violence.<sup>10</sup>

Pacifism: The principled rejection of the use of physical violence in personal and political life.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Unconventional Warfare, JP 3-05.1* (Washington D.C., 2015), I-7.

<sup>8</sup> Erica Chenoweth and Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham, “Understanding Nonviolent Resistance: An Introduction,” *Journal of Peace Research* 50, no. 3 (May 2013): 273, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343313480381>.

<sup>9</sup> Kurt Schock, “The Practice and Study of Civil Resistance,” *Journal of Peace Research* 50, no. 3 (May 2013): 277, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343313476530>; Maia Hallward, Juan Masullo, and Cécile Mouly, “Civil Resistance in Armed Conflict: Leveraging Nonviolent Action to Navigate War, Oppose Violence and Confront Oppression,” *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development* 12, no. 3 (September 2, 2017): 1, <https://doi.org/10.1080/15423166.2017.1376431>.

<sup>10</sup> Chenoweth and Cunningham, “Understanding Nonviolent Resistance,” 273.

<sup>11</sup> Dustin Ells Howes, “The Failure of Pacifism and the Success of Nonviolence,” *Perspectives on Politics* 11, no. 02 (June 2013): 427, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592713001059>.

Civil Disobedience: Acts by a population that are an intentional violation of the law, where the individual or group performing the act is generally known and the individual or group is willing to accept punishment fixed by the law.<sup>12</sup>

The word insurgency in Joint Publication 3-05.1, *Unconventional Warfare*, further defined in Joint Publication 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, is derived from JP 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, and describes the concept of this activity as a defensive option. Like civil resistance, terminology on insurgent strategy also encounters difficulty in the defining of activities. In the same context that Gene Sharp identified challenges within the lexicon of civil resistance, Walter Laqueur laments the imprecision use of words like “irregular warfare,” “guerrilla warfare,” and “insurgency,” as demonstrated in military joint doctrine.<sup>13</sup> The best compromise for defining insurgency is located in Seth Jones’ *Waging Insurgent Warfare*, when merged with JP 3-05.1 and Will Irwin’s definition in *Support to Resistance: Strategic Purpose and Effectiveness*. This study uses unconventional warfare and guerrilla warfare as defined in JP 1-02, as they best describe the respective activities as it relates to Laqueur’s concept.

Insurgency: A population’s use of submersion and violence, with the purpose of redressing grievances caused by a state or occupying power, with the overall goal of seizing, nullifying, or challenging the political control of a state or regional area.<sup>14</sup>

Unconventional warfare (UW): Activities to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating with an underground, auxiliary, or guerrilla force in a denied area.<sup>15</sup>

Guerrilla warfare: Combat operations conducted in enemy-held territory by predominantly indigenous forces on a military or paramilitary basis to reduce the

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<sup>12</sup> Berel Lang, “Civil Disobedience and Nonviolence: A Distinction with a Difference,” *Ethics* 80, no. 2 (January 1970): 156.

<sup>13</sup> Walter Laqueur, *Guerrilla Warfare: A Historical & Critical Study* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1998), 386.

<sup>14</sup> Seth G. Jones, *Waging Insurgent Warfare: Lessons from the Vietcong to the Islamic State* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2017), 19; Will Irwin et al., *Support to Resistance: Strategic Purpose and Effectiveness*, 2019, [https://jsou.libguides.com/ld.php?content\\_id=48094050](https://jsou.libguides.com/ld.php?content_id=48094050).

<sup>15</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Unconventional Warfare*, JP 3-05.1, vii.

effectiveness, industrial capacity, and morale of the enemy; a form of an insurgency.<sup>16</sup>

These terms establish a basis of a common vocabulary for the following research. Except for terminology that is directly drawn from joint publications, each definition has been altered to achieve the broadest characterization that spans the majority of academic and government research on the topic. The use of civil resistance and nonviolent resistance are used in this work with some distinction. When using the term civil resistance, this study looks at a strategic option of resistance primarily using nonviolent means, but not wholly without violence. When discussing civil resistance, this study accepts that the activity is civil based with the possibility of a limited number of violent acts that are conducted as coercive measures. Nonviolent resistance is still the preferred term in most literature and these further clarifications on terminology should provide greater context on the activities.

#### **D. PREVIOUS LITERATURE**

Literature analyzing civil resistance has grown exponentially since the Civil Rights Era. The surge of writing has substantially increased the understanding of the phenomena, but civil resistance is still relatively nascent in studies combining both qualitative and quantitative analysis. Much of the research up to Chenoweth and Stephan's work has qualitatively discussed why it is a preferable option for a population, but it still remains mostly anecdotal in its application.

Gene Sharp is the focal point for most research and is considered foundational for any understanding of the subject. He founded the modern study of strategic nonviolent action and produced a significant scholarship on the subject. His critical works include: *From Dictatorship to Democracy: A Conceptual Framework for Liberation*; *Waging Nonviolent Struggle: 20<sup>th</sup> Century Practice and 21<sup>st</sup> Century Potential*; his three-part series on *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*; and *Civilian-Based Defense: A Post-Military Weapons System*. Through these works, modern civil resistance literature is thus typically understood through its relationship with Gene Sharp.

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<sup>16</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, I-15.

## 1. Civil Resistance Theory Origins

The foundational authors on civil resistance, prior to Sharp, are relatively narrow in scope. The concept of civil resistance maintains a long history, but the notion of studying civil resistance is relatively limited in maturity and typically begins with Mohandas Gandhi. Gandhi's original concept of resisting oppression is coined *Satyagraha*, which is commonly translated into English to mean "nonviolent resistance" or "militant nonviolence," although the exact translation is closer to "Truth-Force."<sup>17</sup> Gandhi's views on nonviolence, discussed in *Speeches and Writings of M.F. Gandhi*, as significantly difficult and requiring significant self-discipline. He poses that a *Satyagrahi*, or individual who follows nonviolence, will suffer when conducting civil resistance. The *Satyagrahi* use both civil resistance and civil disobedience as a means to redress grievances.<sup>18</sup> Gandhi viewed his concept of civil resistance primarily through the lens of a religious movement, which is how he formulated much of his writing on the subject. Thus, the direction of his work is primarily theoretical and philosophical in nature. Despite this lens in viewing civil resistance as a religious activity, he demonstrates a surprisingly pragmatic approach and emphasizes a highly nationalistic understanding for undertaking civil resistance.

If Gandhi was the Eastern father of civil resistance, Abraham Johannesburg Muste is the American parent. Muste, a pacifist, encourages less aggressive concepts of civil resistance using pacifist techniques than Gandhi. He derived his nonviolent conceptualization of the topic from his experience as a preacher, union leader, and civil rights activist.<sup>19</sup> Muste posited, "Nonviolence in a broader sense is not our weakness. It is our strength."<sup>20</sup> His essays on civil resistance span a significant timeframe from the 1920s to the 1960s. The works discuss a variety of topics on pacifism, covering the Second World War, Korea, Civil Rights era, and U.S. Foreign policy. Unlike Gene Sharp's pragmatic

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<sup>17</sup> Devi Akella, "Satyagraha: The Gandhian Philosophy of Conflict Management," *Journal of Workplace Rights* 14, no. 4 (January 2009): 503.

<sup>18</sup> M.F. Gandhi, *Speeches and Writings of M.F. Gandhi*, ed. C.F. Andrews (Madras: C.A. Natesan & Company, 1922), 451.

<sup>19</sup> Abraham Johannes Muste, *The Essays of A.J. Muste*, ed. Nat Hentoff (New York, NY: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1967), xii.

<sup>20</sup> Muste, 467.

approach, Muste reveals theoretical musings on nonviolent resistance based on ethical grounding, founded on his roots as a religious minister. Muste, as some may suggest, may be dismissed for his communist sympathies, but his work with the textile unions demonstrates a comprehension of the challenges of isolating the use of violence within a civil resistance through application of popular movement strategies.

Gene Sharp elaborated on Muste's works and transferred his understandings into a practical and analytic framework for waging civil resistance, significantly furthering the conversation on political power structures and their weaknesses. Sharp's most influential work on civil resistance theory is *From Dictatorship to Democracy*. This work is an extension of *The Politics of Nonviolent Action* and was published as a theoretical guide for Burmese dissidents during the 1990s.<sup>21</sup> The booklet discusses Sharp's core concepts of monolithic and pluralistic government power structures, derived from consent theory. His coined terms for state power structures is further discussed in later works and refined in *The Politics of Nonviolent Action: Part One, Power and Struggle*.<sup>22</sup> Sharp addition to the study of civil resistance is his insights into the inherent weaknesses of authoritarian government rule, demonstrating that interaction of power relationships between a government or occupying force and the population are primarily always in favor of the people.

## 2. Rise of the Modern Theorists

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, civil resistance literature gained in prominence due to a growth of quantitative and qualitative analysis. Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan are credited with creating the first "major scholarly book" on the subject with *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict* which discusses civil resistance by using quantitative analysis to prove its efficacy. With these

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<sup>21</sup> Gene Sharp, *From Dictatorship to Democracy: A Conceptual Framework for Liberation* (New York: [Jackson, Tenn.]: New Press; Distributed by Perseus, 2012), xi.

<sup>22</sup> Sharp, 26; Gene Sharp, Marina Finkelstein, and Gene Sharp, *Power and Struggle*, Nachdr., *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*, Gene Sharp. With the ed. ass. of Marina Finkelstein; Part 1 (Boston, Ma: Porter Sargent, 2000), 8.

new works on the viability of civil resistance, more scholars have taken up to the challenge to explain the apparent viability of nonviolent resistance as a strategic option.

Scholars such as Maciej Bartowski, Peter Ackerman and Jack DuVall have greatly expanded the knowledge of civil resistance in both theoretical and historical studies of the field. Bartowski's work, *Recovering Nonviolent History: Civil Resistance in Liberation Struggles* provides a series of short surveys on geographically organized nonviolent resistance that discusses various national liberation successes and failures and provides pragmatic conclusions on their success or failures. His work argues that an increase in the diffusion of civil resistance knowledge has increased the success and capability of movements around the world.<sup>23</sup> Ackerman and DuVall's history of civil resistance, *A Force More Powerful: A Century of Nonviolent Conflict*, provides a historic view on nonviolent conflict in three different contexts: an independence movement, civil resistance against violent oppression, and nonviolence in civil rights campaigns.<sup>24</sup> They conclude that violent resistance has inaccurately been "accepted as a medication" for grievances due to a combination of globalized media and propaganda efforts from organizations like the Tamil Tigers, Ho Chi Minh, Mao Tse Tung, and the Irish Republican Army.<sup>25</sup> Both studies reconstruct historical cases of civil resistance to provide themes of successful and unsuccessful movements.

Srdja Popovic related his experiences on civil resistance in his work, *Blueprint for a Revolution: How to Use Rice Pudding, Lego Men, and other Non-Violent Techniques to Galvanize Communities, Overthrow Dictators, or Simply Change the World*. He is also a founding member of the Center of Applied Nonviolent Action and Strategies (CANVAS), which provides handbooks and guides for conducting nonviolent research.<sup>26</sup> His *Blueprint for a Revolution* describes personal experiences on overthrowing Serbia's Slobodan

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<sup>23</sup> Maciej J. Bartowski, ed., *Recovering Nonviolent History: Civil Resistance in Liberation Struggles* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc, 2013), 346.

<sup>24</sup> Peter Ackerman and Jack DuVall, *A Force More Powerful: A Century of Nonviolent Conflict*, 1st ed (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), 5–6.

<sup>25</sup> Ackerman and DuVall, 459.

<sup>26</sup> "Publications" (Center For Applied Nonviolent Action And Strategies), accessed February 11, 2019, <http://canvasopedia.org/publications>.

Milosevic and demonstrates various methods of using the backfire methodology, known as political Jiu Jitsu by Sharp, for civil resistance success. His work is very unique and provides techniques and theory on conducting civil resistance in a modern society. Popovic adds to the literature on nonviolent resistance by providing a youthfulness that is altogether absent from other studies on the subject. Whereas individuals can learn the history through authors like Ackerman and DuVall, and organizational structures from Sharp, Popovic demonstrates a capability to translate the theory into pragmatic options that encourages youthful inclusion into a movement. His insights also include a warning on the homogeneity problems of violent resistance and the need for a variety of asymmetric civil options, specifically described in his work with Syrian civil movements.<sup>27</sup> His work further identifies iconography as a key element of in civil resistance movements, be it rice pudding in the Maldives or a 55-gallon drum with Milosevic's face on it in Serbia, images are crucial to the development and sustainment of a movement. Popovich bridges the academic appreciation of nonviolent revolution with the technical capability.

CANVAS, the Albert Einstein Institution, *The Journal of Peace Research*, and The International Center on Nonviolent Conflict (ICNC) have produced a significant repository of resources over the last twenty-years, but there is much left to be discussed and discovered in the field of Civil Resistance. *The Journal of Peace Building and Development* in volume 12 issued a series of articles on Civil Resistance in Contexts of Armed Conflict. These works include relevant material to military operations, such as the challenges of Urbicide, violence directed toward urban centers, and Nepal's transformation from violent resistance to civil resistance.<sup>28</sup> *The Journal of Peace Research* also issued volume 50, issue 3, covered the understanding of civil resistance and contains Kurt Schock's essential reading of "The Practice and Study of Civil Resistance" and Véronique Dudouet's "Dynamics and Factors of Transition from Armed Struggle to Nonviolent

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<sup>27</sup> Srđa Popović and Matthew Miller, *Blueprint for Revolution: How to Use Rice Pudding, Lego Men, and Other Nonviolent Techniques to Galvanize Communities, Overthrow Dictators, or Simply Change the World*, First Edition (New York: Spiegel & Grau, 2015), 87.

<sup>28</sup> *The Journal of Peacebuilding and Development* 12, no. 3 (November 27, 2017).

Resistance.”<sup>29</sup> Furthermore, the ICNC provides the largest collection of collated material in both film and written form on the topic of nonviolent resistance, curating resources from other organization and academic literature. The ICNC’s repository links to the majority of influence research created since 2000 on nonviolent resistance and provides the most comprehensive set of source material. Sharp’s Albert Einstein Institute, which has become dormant since his passing in 2018, provides a catalogue of his writings for further research and relevant study material. Popovic’s CANVAS’s research and handbooks are focused on community activism and emphasizes techniques at the tactical level, which provides the most pragmatic advice out of any of the research material. These organizations provide a plethora of material and have managed to organize the rapid growth of study on the subject of civil resistance.

The most significant driver for modern studies on civil resistance is in the development of quantitative analysis pioneered by Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephens’ journal article “Why Civil Resistance Works.” This work was followed by a book of the same name, restarting the conversation on civil resistance and expanding the research by demonstrating a quantitative analysis of its success rates. Their analysis is the first attempt to analyze nonviolent and violent resistance to tease out elements for why civil resistance might be a more successful option, suggesting that nonviolent civil resistance campaigns succeed twice as often as violent resistance campaigns.<sup>30</sup> These authors aggregate their data from Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes Data Project (NAVCO), which is currently in its third version. Chenoweth and Kurt Schock use the NAVCO data to further analyze the effects of a radical flank, or contemporaneous armed challenges, to see how it may effect success.<sup>31</sup> Kathleen Cunningham also uses this data set when determining why groups choose either to enter into irregular strategies involving civil war

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<sup>29</sup> *Journal of Peace Research* 50, no. 3 (March 2014): 139–327.

<sup>30</sup> Stephan and Chenoweth, Erica, “Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict,” 8.

<sup>31</sup> Erica Chenoweth and Kurt Schock, “Do Contemporaneous Armed Challenges Affect the Outcomes of Mass Nonviolent Campaigns? \*,” *Mobilization: An International Quarterly* 20, no. 4 (December 2015): 427, <https://doi.org/10.17813/1086-671X-20-4-427>.

or civil resistance campaigns.<sup>32</sup> The development of the NAVCO database has opened the ability to provide a complete understanding of how and when civil resistance works through quantitative means, facilitating an increase in civil resistance studies never available before its creation. Although this dataset has opened up new avenues of study, the coding of success in insurgency is difficult to quantify in a binary manner. The Sandinista movement in Nicaragua is classified as a failed insurgency in the NAVCO dataset for the majority of the years, yet other researchers classify this as a successful insurgency that might need a relook of what constitutes a successful outcome by year.<sup>33</sup> As an aggregate of data, NAVCO is relatively correct, but there is challenges in the coding to identify when a resistance transitions strategy or ceases one completely. Despite these concerns, the NAVCO dataset is evolutionary and has opened up important new avenues to peace and conflict studies.

Although there is an increase of literature supporting civil resistance, its efficacy as a strategy is challenged when dealing with ultra-hostile forces or that of a repressive state or occupying force. Hardy Merriman and Jack DuVall propose that civil resistance is effective against significant repressive regimes; Maria Stephan also suggests that civil resistance could work as a strategy against ISIS and posits that civil resistance is a form of UW that may be a substitute for military means.<sup>34</sup> Timothy Braatz dissents from this suggestion and posits that even a successful nonviolent civil resistance campaign may not hinder the violence against the population and will fail to garner success. Lorenzo Raymond also suggests in his article, “Why Nonviolent Civil Resistance Doesn’t Work (Unless You Have Lots of Bombs),” that civil resistance is impotent without outside support or the ability of the population to harness enough fear for the state or occupying

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<sup>32</sup> Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham, “Understanding Strategic Choice: The Determinants of Civil War and Nonviolent Campaign in Self-Determination Disputes,” *Journal of Peace Research* 50, no. 3 (May 2013): 291, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343313475467>.

<sup>33</sup> Will Irwin, “Coombs Thesis,” August 13, 2019.

<sup>34</sup> Hardy Merriman and Jack DuVall, “Dissolving Terrorism at Its Roots,” in *Nonviolence: An Alternative for Countering Global Terror(Ism)* (Hauppauge, NY: Nova Science Publishers, 2007), 1–14; Maria J. Stephan, “Civil Resistance vs. ISIS,” *Journal of Resistance Studies* 1, no. 2 (2015): 127–50; Octavian Manea, “Civil Resistance as a Form of Unconventional Warfare: Interview with Professor Erica Chenoweth,” *Small Wars Journal*, March 21, 2012, <https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/civil-resistance-as-a-form-of-unconventional-warfare-interview-with-professor-erica-chenowe>.

force to capitulate.<sup>35</sup> Michael Peck refutes Chenoweth's suggestion that ISIS could be defeated by nonviolent methods and claims that civil resistance methods would not provide enough of a countermeasure to usurp the terrorists strategy of violence.<sup>36</sup> Chenoweth and Stephan accept these arguments as plausible, but emphasize the efforts of clandestine nonviolent civil resistance during these cases overcomes these oppositions to the methodology.<sup>37</sup> Specifically, that the majority of civil resistance takes forms that are below the level of attention of the media and appear more surreptitious than overt. A debate on the efficacy of nonviolent civil resistance is one that will continue into the foreseeable future where people steeped in traditional warfare doctrines will challenge how and when nonviolent civil resistance is applicable.

### 3. Insurgency, Guerrilla Warfare

Insurgent warfare is a different strategic option to a resistance movement and may be construed as the polar opposite strategy to nonviolent resistance. An insurgency is similar in political objectives to a civil resistance, but differs in methodology. There is an overabundance of works on insurgency, specifically the methodology of insurgency. Authors have identified many of the effective tactics of successful insurgencies, but these tend to highlight only successful cases and discount failures. Additionally, it is difficult to analyze the failure of stillborn insurgencies and understand the structural issues at the onset of the mobilization phases, similar to ineffective nonviolent resistances. Walter Lacquer, Stathis Kalyvas, and Seth Jones provide some of the best qualitative and quantitative analyses of insurgencies and demonstrate some of the most convincing quantitative answers to the applicability of an insurgency. Even with the robustness of their work on the subject, there is much more to analyze.

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<sup>35</sup> Lorenzo Raymond, "Why Nonviolent Civil Resistance Doesn't Work (Unless You Have Lots of Bombs)," *Counterpunch.Org*, May 27, 2016, <https://www.counterpunch.org/2016/05/27/why-nonviolent-civil-resistance-doesnt-work-unless-you-have-lots-of-bombs/>.

<sup>36</sup> Michael Peck, "Sorry, Peaceniks - Nonviolence Won't Stop ISIS," *Medium.Com*, July 8, 2014, <https://medium.com/war-is-boring/sorry-peaceniks-nonviolence-wont-stop-isis-de96bc546019>.

<sup>37</sup> Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict*, Columbia Studies in Terrorism and Irregular Warfare (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 82.

Walter Laqueur's *Guerrilla Warfare: A Historical and Critical Study* is a crucial to understanding insurgent warfare up to the mid 1970s and it continues to be important for understanding the insurgent warfare on a critical level, providing analysis on both successful and unsuccessful insurgent endeavors. Laqueur suggests that guerrilla warfare is rather common, but suggests that only two cases of guerrilla warfare have ever been successful.<sup>38</sup> He also posits that guerrilla warfare has significantly changed since Ho Chi Minh or Mao and that changes in modernization and technology require updates to the study of the phenomenon.<sup>39</sup> One of his notable findings suggests that guerrilla warfare is decisive when the state or opposing force is unable to commit its full resources, similar to Arreguín-Toft's strategic mismatch, further suggested by Alexander Downes and Kathryn Cochran's "Targeting Civilians to Win? Assessing the Military Effectiveness of Civilian Victimization in Interstate Conflict."<sup>40</sup>

Gaps in Laqueur's analysis have successfully been filled by Seth Jones in *Waging Insurgent Warfare*. Jones delivers a different tenor to his analysis, recategorizing insurgent warfare as relatively successful and somewhat misunderstood. He posits insurgencies bare a success rate of 36 percent, with a 29 percent negotiated settlement; he further suggests an efficacy in conducting insurgent warfare as a strategic option of the population.<sup>41</sup> Jones posits insurgent warfare is probably more successful than policy makers believe, and his calculations suggest support for resistance movements to adopt an insurgent strategy.<sup>42</sup>

One of the greatest challenges to understanding insurgency is determining what constitutes success, considering the political nature of the strategy. The previous authors looked primarily at success through the lens of either attaining independence, negotiated settlement, or failure. Will Irwin's *Support to Resistance: Strategic Purpose and*

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<sup>38</sup> Laqueur, *Guerrilla Warfare*, x.

<sup>39</sup> Laqueur, xii.

<sup>40</sup> Laqueur, 392; Ivan Arreguín-Toft, "How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict," *International Security* 26, no. 1 (Summer 2001): 93–128; Chenoweth, Lawrence, and Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, *Rethinking Violence*, 24.

<sup>41</sup> Jones, *Waging Insurgent Warfare*, 9.

<sup>42</sup> Jones, 6.

*Effectiveness* expands the understanding of success by dissecting the United States' support to resistance movements, providing 45 different cases. His unique study identifies the goal of U.S. support to resistance in 70 percent of the cases was predicated on disruption.<sup>43</sup> Since a resistance will typically have some form of outside assistance, this is important to understanding the influence of support the resistance's choice. This is noticeable in case study of Tibet, whereas the U.S. efforts to disrupt Chinese efforts ran contradictory to the Tibetan movement for succession. Irwin's work is based on U.S. success in their support to resistance and lists Tibet as a successful operation, which is true from the CIA's perspective. From the Tibetan perspective this campaign is considered a failure because they were never able to achieve their stated goals.<sup>44</sup> These distinctions make Irwin's research critical for understanding the conflicting priorities in resistance movements and how outcomes to these campaigns are not necessarily binary.

Stathis Kalyvas' *The Logic of Violence in Civil War* is one of the leading modern works on violence between the state and population. His work focuses on the understanding of civil war, but includes many facets of unconventional warfare to describe the interplay that occurs between rival forces as they attempt to vie for supremacy within a state. His definition of violence is the use of power to exterminate or control a group for supremacy.<sup>45</sup> His work studies the dynamics of discriminate and indiscriminate violence and the psychological circumstances of civil conflict. His findings suggest that insurgencies tend to use selective violence whereas the state is prone to use indiscriminate violence.<sup>46</sup> Kalyvas' analysis on civil conflict, including that of insurgency, bridges the study of small wars and state conflict.

Modern joint military and service literature on UW identifies that both insurgencies and civil resistance are elements of unconventional warfare, yet doctrine appears biased

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<sup>43</sup> Irwin et al., *Support to Resistance*, 10.

<sup>44</sup> Tenzing Sonam and Ritu Sarin, *Shadow Circus: The CIA in Tibet*, n.d., <https://caamedia.org/shadowcircus/>.

<sup>45</sup> Stathis N. Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*, Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 26.

<sup>46</sup> Kalyvas, 269.

towards the kinetically focused approach of UW. *Joint Publication 3-05: Special Operations*, defines UW as, “Operations and activities that are conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in denied areas.” The manual provides scant analysis on civil resistance and contrasts it with an insurgency based on the concept that a “resistance movement may not [use violence].” The *USASOC Unconventional Warfare Pocket Guide* furthers this discussion of insurgencies and civil resistance by informing the need for different planning and scope of each method of engagement. Unfortunately, the material dismisses civil resistance as a Title 50, intelligence function, and downplays any further analysis on the subject, implying that the activity is outside the purview of SOF activities.

JP 3-05.1, *Unconventional Warfare*, achieves the best balance out of the preceding service literature and identifies differences between insurgencies and civil resistance campaigns. Yet, its core premises are biased toward the historical understanding of unconventional warfare based on French theory.<sup>47</sup> The publication expands on this concept and appears to use advances in resistance studies, which have provided some significant additions to the publication. The analysis of Civil Affairs activities during UW provides the best incorporation of civil resistance and bares striking resemblance to Sharp’s concept of pluralistic power.<sup>48</sup> The publication tries to make the distinction between a resistance and insurgency but tends to muddle up the definitions with some lack of clarity on the benefits and drawbacks of each type of operation. JP 3-05.1 has made significant strides towards providing a clearer picture of UW, but still lacks some context.

## **E. RESEARCH APPROACH**

The research in this thesis uses a combined quantitative and qualitative approach to investigate the strategic option of civil resistance and insurgency. The dependent variable for this research is a successful civil resistance campaign. The independent variables in this

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<sup>47</sup> Laqueur, *Guerrilla Warfare*, 376.

<sup>48</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Unconventional Warfare, JP 3-05.1*, III-20.

study include: ethnic power relationships within a state, the strategic choices between a state and resistance movement, and a resistance's transition from violence to nonviolence. This study also seeks to identify intervening variables that contribute to optimal or suboptimal civil resistance practices.

The study is organized into three sections. The first section is a quantitative analysis to determine under what ethnic power relationships a civil resistance is more likely to occur. The second section will use game theory to analyze the strategic decisions of the state and civil resistance movement. The third section analyzes three case studies of violent insurgencies that have transitioned into a primarily nonviolent civil resistance. The combination of qualitative and quantitative analysis will provide the basis for identifying the most likely environments where a civil resistance might develop and what strategic choices might be made in the contested environment.

In the quantitative section, the analysis uses data from the Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns Outcomes (NAVCO) Database,<sup>49</sup> Ethnic Power Relationship (EPR) dataset,<sup>50</sup> and the Polity IV Dataset<sup>51</sup> to analyze the ethnic power relationships and political structures associated with civil resistance. The quantitative section attempts to identify under what ethnic power distributions a civil resistance is more likely to occur. This section will set the conditions for the initial civil choices proposed by the population in the game theoretic model in section two and will provide an insight into the structural conditions in the qualitative section of the thesis.

The game theory section of the thesis analyzes a state and civil resistances' initial strategic choices in conflict. In this section I look at the resistance's strategic choice between an insurgency or civil resistance. It will juxtapose the state's option of either

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<sup>49</sup> Erica Chenoweth and Orion A Lewis, "Unpacking Nonviolent Campaigns: Introducing the NAVCO 2.0 Dataset," *Journal of Peace Research* 50, no. 3 (May 2013): 415–23, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343312471551>.

<sup>50</sup> Andreas Wimmer, Lars-Erik Cederman, and Brian Min, "Ethnic Politics and Armed Conflict: A Configurational Analysis of a New Global Data Set," *American Sociological Review* 74 (April 2009): 316–37.

<sup>51</sup> Monty G. Marshall, Ted Robert Gurr, and Keith Jagers, "POLITY IV PROJECT: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2016," CSV (Center for Systematic Peace, 2017).

repressing the insurgency or choosing a COIN strategy of only discriminately targeting the insurgents. This section will identify the most probable first choice a resistance movement and state will make.

The qualitative section focuses on violent resistance campaigns which transitioned into a successful civil resistance campaign. The study analyzes the resistances of Nepal, East Timor, and West Sahara. These three cases provide insight into three different outcomes: failed, partially successful, and successful. By looking at both successful and failed transitions of civil resistance, this paper proposes to identify commonalities between the transitions and what elements led to success and which elements stymied the progress of the resistance.

This research approach pursues a combination of quantitative research, deepened by qualitative analysis, that provides an understanding of how an insurgency might transition into a civil resistance and the commonalities between successful and failed transitions. The combination of both methodologies will fill a gap in the study of how an insurgency transitions into a civil resistance. This work will also fill a gap in the study of the strategic choices made by a state and population when identifying their courses of action. Research is typically focused on either the state's option to repress civil resistance or the population's tactics to overcome state oppression. By placing these two actors together with their opposing strategic options, I argue that we can improve our understanding of the environment in which civil resistance decisions are made.

## **F. KEY FINDINGS**

The findings reported in this thesis indicate that by examining the ethnic political power distribution, it is possible to assess the incentives for the strategic choice of civil resistance as opposed to violent conflict. This analysis finds that among powerless and discriminated ethnic populations, violent and nonviolent resistance is more probable in regions where there are larger numbers of these ethnic groups. Civil and violent resistance is also more likely to occur when these groups constitute large percentages of the total population of a state. In contrast, when analyzing senior and junior partners in ethnic power sharing arrangements, the evidence indicates divergence in the strategic choices of the

population. Higher numbers of junior power sharing groups within a state are associated with lower probabilities for non-violent civil resistance, whereas higher numbers of senior partner power sharing groups are associated with higher probabilities for non-violent resistance.

The game theoretic model for the initial strategic decisions between a state and resistance movement, indicates that violent conflict is the most likely outcome for both players. The model also suggests that a population's initial choice in the game will generally be to resort to violence against the state. Thus, if a resistance is going to occur, this analysis suggests that a violent strategy is the most likely outcome.

In an analysis of violent insurgencies that transitioned to a civil resistance, there are a number of commonalities. East Timor demonstrated the ability of a state to maintain a mostly homogenized ethnic group against the Indonesian state, achieving a successful succession. West Sahara and Tibet demonstrate that state policies of forced changed in the ethnic power sharing relationships have restricted the ability of the population to pursue a violent resistance and additionally hindered the ability of any civil resistance to achieve success. The case studies provide evidence that a strategic choice to conduct a civil resistance may be directly related to the capability of the resistance to maintain a violent insurgency. In all three cases, the civil resistance gained momentum when the movement's insurgent capabilities were rendered ineffective.

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## **II. ETHNIC POWER STRUCTURES AND RESISTANCE**

### **A. OVERVIEW OF RESEARCH**

Mobilizing a population to challenge an existing power structure, specifically for nonviolent civil resistance, is difficult. Specific power structure relationships may give rise to increased chances of success for a nonviolent civil resistance over an insurgent resistance movement. The goal is to identify what ethnic power conditions may encourage a nonviolent civil resistance to manifest as opposed to a violent resistance. The strategic choice for a population when choosing nonviolence is typically based on a formula that includes foreseen adversarial moves, human resources, and materials.<sup>52</sup> Regardless of these factors, this study asks if there are predisposed ethnic power relationship structures that may increase or decrease the chance for a nonviolent resistance or violent insurgency.

I posit it should be possible to determine where a civil resistance might occur by constructing a database of ethnic power structures, political structures, and state stability to predict the outcome of a binary dependent variable of nonviolent conflict or violent insurgency. The goal is to identify an association between various ethnic power sharing groups within a state and the propensity to either increase or decrease the chance for nonviolent actions. These ethnic groups will be looked at through either the number of groups within a state or the percentage of the ethnic power sharing group within the state. Every regression in this study uses both violent and nonviolent dependent variables to identify parallel or inverse relationships between an ethnic population's choice of activities. This analysis will provide one component for analyzing the cases studies in the qualitative section of this thesis.

### **B. PRECEDING RESEARCH**

Maria Stephan and Erica Chenoweth conducted an initial study on the successes and failures of civil resistance which has given rise to renewed interest in the field. Their

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<sup>52</sup> Peter Ackerman and Christopher Kruegler, *Strategic Nonviolent Conflict: The Dynamics of People Power in the Twentieth Century* (Westport, Conn: Praeger, 1994), 7.

groundbreaking research demonstrated that nonviolent resistance produces a 57 percent success rate over violent resistance with a 29.5 percent success rate.<sup>53</sup> Their study identifies multiple correlations, to include the participation of nonviolent campaigns, political defections, and backfiring mechanisms. While this study is important to understanding nonviolent campaign success, it does not identify underlying power relationships between that might predicate a choice between violent and nonviolent resistance.

Chenoweth and Stephan, among other prominent researchers, are still attempting to understand under what conditions a civil resistance may occur. With the rise of databases such as the University of Denver's Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes Data Project (NAVCO) and the Ethnic Power Relations Dataset (EPR), there has been an increase in studies on the inputs to nonviolent activities. Studies by Cederman and his colleagues suggest that power-sharing and grievances-based factors, specifically economic horizontal inequalities, provide an explanation for violent conflict.<sup>54</sup> Ches Thurber's article on "Ethnic Barriers to Civil Resistance" proposes that social structures of ethnic powers are highly important to resistance campaigns, specifically with politically excluded groups initiating 21 percent of nonviolent conflicts and 52 percent of all violent conflicts.<sup>55</sup> Thurber also suggests that groups with a senior partner status, or higher, are two-thirds more likely to choose civil resistance over violent resistance.<sup>56</sup> Gene Sharp posited that nonviolent struggles occur in "widely differing cultures, periods of history, and political conditions."<sup>57</sup> Yet, Thurber suggests otherwise and that an ethnic power architecture might be somewhat deterministic in the choice of nonviolent resistance. Structural dimensions of the state, specifically that of ethnic power relationships, may provide a more

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<sup>53</sup> Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works*, 26.

<sup>54</sup> Lars-Erik Cederman, Nils B. Weidmann, and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, "Horizontal Inequalities and Ethnonationalist Civil War: A Global Comparison," *American Political Science Review* 105, no. 3 (August 2011): 492.

<sup>55</sup> Ches Thurber, "Ethnic Barriers to Civil Resistance," *Journal of Global Security Studies* 3, no. 3 (2018): 256.

<sup>56</sup> Thurber, 266.

<sup>57</sup> Sharp and Paulson, *Waging Nonviolent Struggle*, 15.

substantial analysis on where civil resistance might occur and the conditions underlying different actions by the population.

Ethnic composition of a state is a prominent area of study for violent conflict, to include the ethnic genocides in Rwanda, conflict between ethnic Thai and Malay populations, and continual conflict between Israel and Palestine. Andreas Wimmer, Lars-Erik Cederman, and Brian Min questioned how the ethnic composition of the state leads to violent conflict. Their findings identify that different state ethnic makeups are causally related to the type of conflict within a state.<sup>58</sup> Their model suggests armed conflicts are more likely to occur where large segments of the population are excluded from political representation. They further identify that numerous power sharing interactions between ethnic senior partners increase violence, specifically in areas where ethnic minorities have a history of political discrimination from a majority ethnic group.<sup>59</sup>

Another approach by Erica Chenoweth and Jay Ulfelder identifies that grievances of a population may determine the differentiation between violent or nonviolent resistance. They suggest civil resistance depends on various civil structures of support to achieve mass mobilization. Because of this, grievances within these civil structures may encourage nonviolent resistance.<sup>60</sup> Their study analyzes proxy metrics for group grievances, such as poverty, uneven power structures, distribution of wealth, and social exclusion.<sup>61</sup> Using twelve separate metrics, they demonstrate repression of the population does not provide a significant enough prediction of nonviolent resistance, whereas other models created from this study only provide “gross patterns with available data.”<sup>62</sup> Ackerman instead suggests population capability is far more important than environmental considerations, suggesting

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<sup>58</sup> Wimmer, Cederman, and Min, “Ethnic Politics and Armed Conflict: A Configurational Analysis of a New Global Data Set,” 317.

<sup>59</sup> Wimmer, Cederman, and Min, 317.

<sup>60</sup> Erica Chenoweth and Jay Ulfelder, “Can Structural Conditions Explain the Onset of Nonviolent Uprisings?,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 61, no. 2 (February 2017): 300, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002715576574>.

<sup>61</sup> Chenoweth and Ulfelder, 301.

<sup>62</sup> Chenoweth and Ulfelder, 318.

the importance of “skills over conditions.”<sup>63</sup> These factors identified by Chenoweth, Ulfelder, and Ackerman may be components of the ethnic power relationship and demonstrated better by calculating the power relationship in a state.

Rather than study the characteristics that give rise to only civil resistance, it is potentially more beneficial to study the difference between insurgency and civil resistance. Ches Turber suggests the population’s social movement composition dictates the choice in choosing civil resistance, not environmental or economic pressures on the population.<sup>64</sup> He focuses on the ability of a group to mobilize populations as a social network, which is significant in the creation of a nonviolent resistance, as an independent variable. If the social movement is unable to garner mass mobilization, it will then turn to violent means; whereas, when an integrated social movement is part of the larger society, it will tend to choose nonviolent means.<sup>65</sup> His findings posit that when there is ethnic overlap, in which more than one ethnic group has access to power, the chance for civil resistance increases from 17 percent to 63 percent.<sup>66</sup> His investigation uses network analysis to predict choices of violent or nonviolent conflict and warrants further research and possible incorporation into theories of nonviolent mobilization.

### **C. FRAMEWORK FOR QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS**

This quantitative analysis adds to the theory that decreased barriers to resistance, demonstrated through ethnic power relationships, allows for greater mobilization in a civil resistance. This work capitalizes on Wimmer’s theory of nation-state formation and ethnic politics as a foundation for analyzing interactions between majority and minority ethnic groups within the state. Wimmer posits that within a nation-state, ethnonational political legitimacy is important to the defining of a people and rulers, and thus plays a significant

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<sup>63</sup> Peter Ackerman, “Skills or Conditions: What Key Factors Shape the Success or Failure of Civil Resistance?” (Speech, March 15, 2007), 3.

<sup>64</sup> Ches Thurber, “Social Structures of Revolution: Networks, Overlap, and the Choice of Violent Versus Nonviolent Strategies in Conflict,” Working Paper (Chicago: University of Chicago, October 2015), 7.

<sup>65</sup> Thurber, 9.

<sup>66</sup> Thurber, 24.

role in the formation of the state.<sup>67</sup> This creates a desired ethnic homogenization of political and social structures in the state which gives rise to grievances of excluded or devalued ethnic minorities. Additionally, I will use Chenoweth and Stephens' mobilization theory, suggesting that nonviolent success is dependent upon the capability of the network to produce large quantities of participants.<sup>68</sup> Thus, we should expect to find more occurrences of nonviolent resistance in locations where it is easier to mobilize the population, such as where greater homogeneity of a state allows for the mobilization of large numbers of a singular ethnic population. Therefore, both the ethnic makeup of a state and the ability to mobilize should be critical factors for determining the chance for nonviolent resistance.

This study is predicated on the EPR database from the Center for Comparative and International Studies at ETH Zürich. This database provides all politically relevant ethnic groups from the years of 1946 to 2017.<sup>69</sup> The ethnic groups are categorized as: monopoly, dominant, senior partner, junior partner, powerless, discriminated, and self-excluded. Senior partner and junior partner groups share power within the government, and the state's executive functions are divided respectively between the groups. Powerless populations hold no authority within the government at the national executive level but are not actively discriminated against, whereas a discriminated population is intentionally targeted by the ethnic power holders of political power. Dominant populations hold power over the executive functions of the state and allow "token" membership of minority ethnic groups. Monopoly governments exclude all minority ethnic power groups, while the self-excluded populations are not discriminated against and choose not to pursue political power. These groups are coded by country, number of groups, and as a percentage of the total population of the state.

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<sup>67</sup> Erica Chenoweth and Jay Ulfelder, "Can Structural Conditions Explain the Onset of Nonviolent Uprisings?," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 61, no. 2 (February 2017): 300, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002715576574>.

<sup>68</sup> Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works*, 32.

<sup>69</sup> Manuel Vogt et al., "Integrating Data on Ethnicity, Geography, and Conflict: The Ethnic Power Relations Data Set Family," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59, no. 7 (2015): 1327–42.

The first step is to identify the number of civil resistances and violent resistances between the years 1960 to 2006. The data collected from the NAVCO and EPR data sets contain 46 years of 11,661 observations on violent and nonviolent resistances. The principle regressions in this study contain 6,573 observations. All observations are coded by country and year. There is a significant number of observations of violent resistances, 1,093, as opposed to nonviolent resistances, 280. The observed success rate of violent resistances in the dataset is 35 percent, whereas nonviolent resistances succeed 65 percent of the time between the years of 1960 and 2006. The identification of success is derived from the NAVCO database and coded by year for both violent and civil resistances. Figure 1 describes the number of violent and nonviolent resistances between 1960 and 2006 by year. The y-axis indicates the either the number of resistances or the number of successful outcomes per year. The x-axis indicates the year. The red line depicts the total number of violent resistances and the blue line the total number of nonviolent resistances of the given year. The green line is the total number of nonviolent successes and the purple line is the total number of violent successes by year. The number of violent resistances is greater than that of nonviolent resistances, yet there is a greater observation of nonviolent success rates as opposed to violent success rates.




Figure 1. Timeline of Violent and Nonviolent Resistances<sup>70</sup>

This study uses several independent variables commonly identified as significant to nonviolent resistance. Chenoweth and Stephens identified that a state which has a history of violent resistance is inclined to use the same methodology, whereas a state that uses nonviolence will also typically choose a similar method again.<sup>71</sup> Another critical factor is the size of a state’s population, specifically the amount of individuals who are available to mobilize.<sup>72</sup> Regime type is also determined to be a critical factor in state instability with anocracies having the highest propensity for political instability and thus increased chances for both violent and nonviolent resistances.<sup>73</sup> These metrics are included as control variables for each of the regressions in the study.

<sup>70</sup> Erica Chenoweth and Orion A Lewis, “Unpacking Nonviolent Campaigns: Introducing the NAVCO 2.0 Dataset,” *Journal of Peace Research* 50, no. 3 (May 2013): 415–23, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343312471551>.

<sup>71</sup> Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works*, 60.

<sup>72</sup> Chenoweth and Stephan, 32.

<sup>73</sup> “Polity Project,” accessed June 12, 2019, <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html>.

The models presented here apply various data sources to understand an ethnic groups' access to state power and their potential to conduct civil resistance. The NAVCO v2.0 database provides the dependent variable of nonviolent and violent conflict in the world.<sup>74</sup> The Polity IV Dataset (1800-2016) gives the polity score, measuring the spectrum from authoritarian to democratic, for all countries by year.<sup>75</sup> These independent variables are modelled in units of analysis by country and year between the years of 1968 and 2006.

My first hypothesis (H1) suggests that an increase in the number of junior partner groups within a power sharing government will decrease the likelihood of nonviolent conflict as the ability to mobilize mass populations becomes more difficult between disparate goals. Chenoweth and Stephens identify that mobilization is crucial element to nonviolent success and suggest that ethnic schisms will be potentially greater in multi-ethnic power sharing groups.<sup>76</sup> Thus, in states with greater ethnic diversity where polarization of groups is more likely, it should be more difficult for nonviolent resistance mobilizations to occur.

The second hypothesis (H2) suggests that when the size of a powerless ethnic population is larger relative to the total population of the state, nonviolent resistances should be more likely to occur. A powerless population may lack the means to wage warfare, or participate in government institution, that is on parity with the government. Gandhi, during his campaigns against the British, lacked weapons due to the India Arms Act of 1878. This limited Indian separatist groups ability to fight in semi-parity with the British and may give suggestion to the choice for nonviolent resistance. The powerless ethnic population, as a total of the state population, should provide a mobilization capability directed towards similar ethnic grievances. This should be most pronounced when the population lacks the resources to wage violent conflict.

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<sup>74</sup> Chenoweth and Lewis, "Unpacking Nonviolent Campaigns."

<sup>75</sup> Marshall, Gurr, and Jagers, "POLITY IV PROJECT: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2016."

<sup>76</sup> Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works*, 32.

The third hypothesis (H3) suggests that a heightened probability civil resistance will occur when a discriminated ethnic power population is large in relationship to the dominant population of a state. I also propose that as the number of discriminated groups increases, there will be a decrease in the probability of civil resistance. Wimmer, Cederman, and Min demonstrated that an increase in the number of ethnically discriminated groups within a society increases the likelihood of violent resistance.<sup>77</sup> Higher numbers of discriminated groups may therefore be seen to dissuade collaborative efforts to organize a non-civil resistance. In contrast, the percentage of discriminated population, as a portion of the total state population, should have a positive association with the onset of a civil resistance. As the discriminated population increases as a portion of the whole, I posit the development of shared grievances will increase the likelihood of a nonviolent resistance.

#### **D. RESULTS**

The first goal is to look at the relative frequency of nonviolent and violent activities, as shown in the kernel density plots in Figures 2 and 3. Each variable was coded by year and country, with a nonviolent or violent resistance coded as a binary with zero indicating no resistance and one indicating a resistance. Figure 2 describes the distribution of the population a percentage or a number of groups within a state, broken down by senior or junior partner power sharing populations, while Figure 3 shows the same variables, broken down by discriminated and powerless populations. The density, or relative frequency of events for violent or nonviolent civil resistance, is shown on the y-axis. The x-axis shows the percentage of the population or the number of ethnic groups within a state. For example, we can see that the greatest proportion of nonviolent resistance occurs when the senior partner populations represents greater than 50 percent of the total population. In contrast, violent resistance occurs more often when the senior partner population represents less than 50 percent of the total population.

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<sup>77</sup> Wimmer, Cederman, and Min, "Ethnic Politics and Armed Conflict: A Configurational Analysis of a New Global Data Set," 324.




Figure 2. Density Plot for Junior and Senior Partner Populations<sup>78</sup>

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<sup>78</sup> Andreas Wimmer, Lars-Erik Cederman, and Brian Min, "Ethnic Politics and Armed Conflict: A Configurational Analysis of a New Global Data Set," *American Sociological Review* 74 (April 2009): 316–37.




Figure 3. Density Plot for Powerless and Discriminated Populations<sup>79</sup>

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<sup>79</sup> Wimmer, Cederman, and Min.

The results of the core regression models are shown in Table 1. Models 1 and 5 are based on the population proportion variables and analyze ethnic power groups as a proportion of the total population. Models 2 and 6 exchange the proportion variable and instead count the number of ethnic power groups within a state. Models 3 and 7 focus on the powerless ethnic power group as both a percentage of the total population and the number of powerless groups within a state. These models include the interaction of the powerless ethnic percentage and number of groups, both interacting with the polity of the state. Models 4 and 8 focus on the discriminated population within a state as a percentage of the total population. These models include the percentage of discriminated populations and its interaction with the polity of the state. Models 4 and 8 also include the dominant ethnic power group as a constant in the regression. The interaction polity on Models 3, 4, 7, and 8 are squared. When running regressions without the polity score squared, there was no, or a reduced, statistical significance when analyzing both the number of groups or percentage of the ethnic population. By analyzing the square of the polity during interactions, it allows for a better fit of model. Because the dependent variable, nonviolent or violent, is a binary outcome, all models were based on logit regressions. All regressions were calculated using RStudio and the R programming language.<sup>80</sup>

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<sup>80</sup> RStudio Team, *RStudio: Integrated Development for R*. (Boston, MA: RStudio, Inc, 2015).

Table 1. Regression Results: Violent and Nonviolent Resistance

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>							
	(1)	Nonviolent Resistance			(5)	Violent Resistance		
Senior Partner #		0.265*** (0.083)				-0.645*** (0.089)		
Senior Partner %	0.245 (0.289)				-0.678*** (0.169)			
Junior Partner #		-0.306*** (0.077)				0.244*** (0.021)		
Junior Partner %	-2.909*** (0.597)				0.019 (0.200)			
Powerless #		0.021** (0.009)	0.029** (0.014)			0.019*** (0.006)	0.087*** (0.011)	
Powerless %	0.038 (0.331)		0.924*** (0.332)		0.521*** (0.185)		0.718*** (0.198)	
Discriminated #		0.057** (0.024)				0.163*** (0.023)		
Discriminated %	-0.273 (0.429)			0.809** (0.403)	1.236*** (0.194)			1.885*** (0.195)
Irrelevant #		-0.016 (0.041)				0.138*** (0.017)		
Irrelevant %	-1.015*** (0.244)				-1.112*** (0.139)			
Dominant %				1.437*** (0.175)				1.187*** (0.101)
Polity	-0.013*** (0.003)	-0.013*** (0.003)	-0.011*** (0.003)	-0.013*** (0.003)	-0.021*** (0.002)	-0.022*** (0.002)	-0.020*** (0.002)	-0.023*** (0.002)
Polity (Squared)	-0.005 (0.010)	0.001 (0.010)	-0.017 (0.011)	-0.018* (0.010)	0.027*** (0.005)	0.024*** (0.005)	-0.012* (0.006)	0.017*** (0.005)
Discriminated % x Polity				0.299*** (0.079)				0.060* (0.032)
Powerless # x Polity			0.002 (0.002)				0.011*** (0.002)	
Powerless % x Polity			0.108** (0.049)				0.081*** (0.029)	
Constant	-3.125*** (0.112)	-3.471*** (0.085)	-3.606*** (0.081)	-3.823*** (0.093)	-1.884*** (0.064)	-2.257*** (0.049)	-2.198*** (0.044)	-2.340*** (0.048)
Observations	7,806	7,806	7,806	7,806	7,806	7,806	7,806	7,806
Log Likelihood	-1,077.901	-1,088.632	-1,096.141	-1,066.060	-2,886.765	-2,822.894	-2,902.991	-2,881.942
Akaike Inf. Crit.	2,171.802	2,193.265	2,206.283	2,144.120	5,789.531	5,661.788	5,819.982	5,775.884

Note: \*p<0.1 \*\*p<0.05 \*\*\*p<0.01

Figure 4 displays the probability of nonviolent resistance by the number of groups in a respective power sharing category within a state. Figure 5 displays the same phenomenon by the percentage of the respective ethnic group as part of the overall population. In each figure, the color codes represent the effect of a particular ethnic power category, while holding all other variables constant at their means. The figures are derived from the results of Models 1 and 2, reported in Table 1. As seen in Figure 4, senior partner, powerless, and discriminated groups demonstrate an increase in the chance for nonviolent action when there are a larger number of the respective group within a society. All other groups are statistically insignificant or show decreasing chances for civil resistance. In contrast, examining Figure 5, all evaluated groups demonstrate either decreasing chances for civil resistance or are statistically insignificant when analyzing the ethnic category as a percentage of the population. These figures suggest that civil resistance is less likely in highly unified ethnic power structures or in structures which maintain an ability to unify under commonalities. To demonstrate the variation between violent and nonviolent resistance, Figures 6 and 7 depict the probability of violent resistance by both the respective number of groups and as a portion of the total population in a state.




Figure 4. Probability of NV Action by Number of Groups




Figure 5. Probability of NV Action by Percentage of Population




Figure 6. Probability of Violent Action by Number of Group




Figure 7. Probability of Violent Action by Percentage of Population

Models 1, 2, 5 and 6 demonstrate that ethnic power sharing regimes create a divergence in the strategic choices of the population, as seen in Figures 8 and 9. When increasing the number of senior partner groups in a state, Model 2 generated a statistically significant coefficient of 0.265, indicating a positive effect on the probability of non-violent resistance, while Model 5 generated a statistically significant coefficient of -0.645, indicating a negative effect on the probability of violent resistance. The model predicts over a 200 percent increase in the probability for nonviolent resistance when increasing from zero to six ethnic senior partner sharing groups and a decrease of 93 percent in the chance for violent resistance. In contrast, junior partner groups in Table 1 showed a statistically significant coefficient of -0.306 for nonviolent resistance and a significantly significant coefficient of 0.244 for violent resistance. As seen in Figure 8, the probability of nonviolent resistance decreases by 25 percent when increasing from one to six junior partner sharing groups and inversely triples in the chance for violent resistance. When analyzing the percentage of the senior partners as a proportion of the population within a state, as reported in Table 1, we see a statistically significant negative coefficient of -0.678 for violent resistance and a corresponding statistically significant negative coefficient of -2.909 for the effect of junior partners on nonviolent resistance. This demonstrates that between ethnic junior and senior partner political sharing groups there are clear differences in the strategic choices for resistance based on both the number of groups and their percentage of the total population.




Figure 8. Junior Partner Regression




Figure 9. Senior Partner Regression

The analysis of senior ethnic partners and junior ethnic partners suggest a difference in strategic choice between violent and civil resistances. In H1, we expected that increasing the number of junior partner groups within a power sharing government would decrease the likelihood of nonviolent conflict. Model 2 suggests that when the number of junior partner groups increases within a state, there will be a decrease in the probability of civil resistance and a corresponding increase in the probability of violent resistance. Model 1 additionally demonstrated that when junior partner increases in percentage of the total population, the chance for nonviolent resistance also decreases. This suggests that increasing the junior partner percentage and the number of junior partner groups would decrease the probability of nonviolent resistance. Correspondingly, increasing the number of junior partner groups would be expected to increase the probability for violent conflict.

H2 proposed that powerless populations choose nonviolent means as a form of civil resistance when their population is large in relative size to the state. In Models 3 and 6, the effect of powerless groups on the probability for violent and nonviolent resistance is positive when analyzing both number of groups and percentage of the population. The interaction between the percentage of powerless population and polity was added to see if there were any difference in the strategic choice between a violent and nonviolent resistance. Figure 10 displays the chance for nonviolent resistance based on the percentage of powerless population and the interaction of polity. The color scale indicates the polity of the state with red being authoritarian, blue anocracy, and green a democracy. Powerless populations appear to increase the probability for a nonviolent resistance in democracies and anocracies. Figure 11 looks at this phenomenon by violent resistance and demonstrates a similar result as Figure 10. This provides evidence which partially supports H2, indicating that a powerless population may choose either a violent or nonviolent resistance as their percentage of population increases in relation to the total population of the state, though this effect seems to be limited to democratic and anocratic states.




Figure 10. Nonviolent Resistance by Powerless Population Percentage and Polity




Figure 11. Violent Resistance by Powerless Population Percentage and Polity

H3 suggests there will be an increase in civil resistance when the discriminated population within a society is large in relative size to that of the dominant population. Model 4 identifies that as the percentage of discriminated population increases, so does the chance for nonviolent resistance within democracies. In an anocracy, there is a decrease in the probability for nonviolent resistance when increasing the discriminated population as a percentage. This suggests that an interaction between the polity of the state and the percentage of discriminated population influences a resistance movements strategic choice in this specific ethnic populations set. I proposed that this same effect will occur when looking at violent resistance, but with greater significance. In Figure 6 this is demonstrated with large discriminated populations showing a 229 percent increase in the probability for violent resistance. Figure 12 depicts Models 4 and 8 when analyzing the interaction of polity. The key difference between discriminated population and their strategic choice is that in all polities there is an increased probability of violent resistance as the percentage of discriminated populations within the state increases. In contrast, when analyzing nonviolent resistance, we see that only in democracies does the probability for nonviolent resistance increase as the percentage of discriminated populations increase. H3 also posited there would be a decrease in the probability of civil resistance as the number of discriminated groups increased. However, Model 2 demonstrates the opposite, with civil resistances instead increasing in states with larger numbers of discriminated groups. The evidence thus partially supports H3. Discriminated population will tend to choose nonviolent resistance in democracies as their population size increases, but not in anocracies or autocracies. Additionally, as discriminated group numbers increase in a state, so does their probability of choosing either violent or nonviolent means.




Figure 12. Violent and Nonviolent Resistance by Discriminated Population Percentage and Polity

## E. DISCUSSION

The difficulty in mobilizing multiple ethnic groups to achieve nonviolent resistance, as opposed to a violent insurgency is innately linked to the propensity of the population to create an in-group and out-group.<sup>81</sup> One of the key inferences of this study is that less ethnically powerful populations may prefer to choose nonviolent resistance to gain power when there is less diversity, whereas higher numbers of disadvantaged ethnic power sharing groups may be more likely to choose violent resistance. This coincides with previous research by Thurber identifying that ethnic power structures are significant in determining the propensity of a group to participate in nonviolent or violent resistance.<sup>82</sup> The greater number ethnic power groups within a state who are disenfranchised and seeking power, the greater increase in the chance of violent interactions with the dominant ethnic power. But, when there are fewer ethnic groups who have increased percentages of

<sup>81</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, *Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency* (Washington D.C., 2012), 7.

<sup>82</sup> Thurber, "Ethnic Barriers to Civil Resistance," 266.

the relational population, the data proposes an increase in the chance for nonviolent resistance. This should help identify where nonviolent resistances are more likely to be pursued by a resistance as opposed to violent strategy.

## **F. CONCLUSION**

This chapter posits that it is possible to identify where potential civil resistances are likely to occur based on the ethnic power structures within a state. H1 suggested that an increase in junior partner groups conducting power sharing decreases the chance for civil resistances, as confirmed by Model 2. This suggests a difficulty in mobilizing multiple ethnic groups that may be antagonists, or at least indifferent to each other's success in the political environment. H2 suggests that an increase in powerless populations, as both a percentage of the population and the number of groups, leads to an increased chance of nonviolent resistance, as confirmed by Model 3. One unexpected finding was that an interaction between powerless populations and polity appears to show an increase in the chance for violent resistance in high polity states, but not low polity states. More study into this ethnic subset might suggest that the violent conflict opportunity cost for these groups is too significant under certain polity states. Finally, H3 posits that as the discriminated population, as a percentage of the state increased, so did the chance for nonviolent resistance, though Model 4 showed that this effect was limited to democracies. All three models affirm that there is an interaction between ethnic power groups, in terms of population percentage and number of groups, and their probability of choosing nonviolent or violent resistance.

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### III. GAMES BETWEEN THE STATE AND RESISTANCE

#### A. CONTEXT OF THE GAME

This chapter analyzes the strategic decisions of a resistance movement and the state. It questions the initial strategies of the state and population by framing a population's choice of nonviolent civil resistance or violent insurgency against a state's decision to violently target the civil populace or refrain from targeting the populace, such as in counterinsurgency. This section uses a game theoretic model as a basis to analyze how civil resistances and states make their strategic decisions when in conflict with each other. This section will juxtapose Maria Stephan and Erica Chenoweth's journal article, "Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict," juxtaposed to Alexander Downes and Kathryn Cochran's, "Targeting Civilians to Win? Assessing the Military Effectiveness of Civilian Victimization in Interstate War."

A game is created between the state and the population to determine what strategic options each have. Both have dichotomous options in the conflict between each other without the ability for a mixed strategy. The population may choose to develop a strategy of nonviolent resistance or that of a violent insurgency.<sup>83</sup> The state may choose to develop a strategy of targeting the population, to include killing and repression, or that of a counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy of discriminate targeting. In Figure 13, we play this game with four separate outcomes, where the player's strategies are compared against each other. The population has the option of strategy A, nonviolent resistance, or B, violent insurgency. The state may choose C, not targeting the population, or D, to violently target the population. The outcomes are based on the preferences and strategies of the following players.

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<sup>83</sup> Maria Stephan J. and Chenoweth, Erica, "Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict," *International Security* 33, no. 1 (Summer 2008): 9.

		State Options	
		Do Not Target Population	Target Civilian Population
Population Options	Choose Non-Violent Resistance	AC	AD
	Choose Violent Insurgency	BC	BD

The four possible results of the game are:

AC – The population chooses non-violent resistance, the state does not target the population

AD – The population chooses non-violent resistance, the state targets the population

BC – The population chooses violent insurgency; the state does not target the population

BD – The population chooses violent insurgency; the state targets the population

Figure 13. Game Between State and Population

The game is analyzed under a set of assumptions. The first assumption is that the population maintains only two options, that of nonviolent resistance or a violent insurgency. There is no third option using only intermittent violent tactics. Situations that devolve into a violent hybrid strategy resemble that of a violent insurgency with similar outcomes. Violence may be inevitable during a nonviolent resistance, but it is typically isolated from the resistance or it automatically changes into a violent insurgency and incurs a similar response from the state.<sup>84</sup> Violent insurgent campaigns tend to remain in a violent state with few populations able to effectively make a complete switch to nonviolent resistance. More often, populations that choose a civil resistance strategy will maintain an insurgent threat against the state as a means of bargaining.

The second assumption is that a state that begins to target civilians has little incentive to switch tactics unless unforeseen or external pressures force the state to adopt a “no targeting of civilians” strategy. The game only allows a dichotomous option for the

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<sup>84</sup> Sharp, *From Dictatorship to Democracy*, 2012, 50.

state. It has been found that when a state targets the civilian population, it increases the probability of success by 34 percent.<sup>85</sup> States that target civilians also receive measures of effectiveness that feed into senses of immediate gratification, thus encouraging increased targeting of the population. Kalyvas suggests that “in an environment where it is impossible to tell civilian from enemy combatant apart, it pays to be violent.”<sup>86</sup> While this runs contrary to good practices of counterinsurgency, as proposed by David Kilcullen and David Galula, we assume that targeting civilians is preferred as a primary means to resolve conflict for the state.

Figure 14 depicts the typical options between the population and the state in terms of strategy. Combining the Minorities at Risk (MAR) and NAVCO databases, I examined the options between ethnic minorities and the state.<sup>87</sup> I combined the nonviolent and violent campaigns by state and year from the NAVCO database and added the state responses to minorities conflicts by country and year. The data is coded by either a nonviolent or violent resistance and the corresponding government responses against minority groups from the MAR dataset. The density plot identifies each resistance, or lack of resistance, and the type of action the state took towards its minority population. Government responses are coded as: no repression of the minority population, state surveillance of the minority population, harassment of the minority population, nonviolent repression, and violent repression that includes physical violence, up to and including, killing members of the minority group. The density plot suggests that when the minority population chooses a violent or nonviolent option, the state tends to resort to violence against the population. While the state demonstrates a possible selection of options against a resistance, the decision is simplified in the formal model with harassment, nonviolent repression, and violent repression considered as targeting the population vice surveillance and no action considered as not targeting the population.

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<sup>85</sup> Chenoweth, Lawrence, and Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, *Rethinking Violence*, 36.

<sup>86</sup> Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*, 69.

<sup>87</sup> Victor Asal, Amy Pate, and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, “Minorities at Risk Organizational Behavior Data and Codebook Version 9/2008,” n.d., <http://www.mar.umd.edu/data.asp>; Chenoweth and Lewis, “Unpacking Nonviolent Campaigns.”




Figure 14. Government vs Population Choices

The final assumption is that the resistance will prefer a violent methodology over a nonviolent resistance, all else being equal, due to the structure of the group and popularity of insurgency. Resistance groups are influenced by popular success and romanticism of insurgent campaigns, which encourages a preference towards an accepted Maoist style insurgency in marginalized groups.<sup>88</sup> A group making the strategic decision between violence and nonviolence is inherently marginalized if they find no political solution to their grievances. Kathleen Cunningham identifies that in resistances of self-determination, a population will choose violent resistance over nonviolent resistance during cases of civil war.<sup>89</sup> Resistances that demonstrate a fragmented organization also demonstrate a

<sup>88</sup> Smruti S. Pattanaik, "Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: Examining Socio-economic Grievances and Political Implications," *Strategic Analysis* 26, no. 1 (January 2002): 121, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09700160208450028>.

<sup>89</sup> Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham, "Understanding Strategic Choice: The Determinants of Civil War and Nonviolent Campaign in Self-Determination Disputes," *Journal of Peace Research* 50, no. 3 (May 2013): 300, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343313475467>.

tendency for violent resistance over nonviolent methodology.<sup>90</sup> Furthermore, Sophie Lee's dissertation on the strategic choice of nonviolent and violent resistance identifies that "if a campaign organization is able to launch a violent campaign, it most likely will."<sup>91</sup> Both the structure of resistance movements and the romanticism of insurgencies encourage a group to choose violence as their first option against state oppression.

Bounded rationality also plays into the use of nonviolent resistance against a state. As the literature on nonviolent movements has proliferated, there has been a steady increase in the use of nonviolent methodology from 1960 to 2006, as seen in Figure 1. The spread of Gene Sharp's work *From Dictatorship to Democracy* precipitated much of the conceptualization of civil resistance and has been translated into 31 languages and used in a multitude of resistance movements across the world.<sup>92</sup> As globalization speeds the spread of information to less connected environments, we should expect an increase in the strategic choice for civil resistance.

Based on the listed assumptions, the state and population strategies are ordinarily ranked based on desired strategy from one-to-four, with four being the best option and one being the worst option. This does not account for what is actually the best outcome for the given player. Tables 2 and 3 show that the preferred options for the state and the population involve the use of violence as the primary option. Figure 15 places the two choices in the strategic game by using the ordinal ranking from Table 2 and Table 3.

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<sup>90</sup> Cunningham, 300.

<sup>91</sup> Sophie Jiseon Lee, "Guns and Roses: A Study of Violent and Nonviolent Resistance Movements" (Dissertation, Duke University, 2017), 55.

<sup>92</sup> Gene Sharp, *From Dictatorship to Democracy: A Conceptual Framework for Liberation* (New York: New Press; Distributed by Perseus, 2012), iv.

Table 2. Population Options in Game

4: Best – Population chooses violent insurgency; the state does not target the population
3: Next Best – Population chooses violent insurgency; state targets the population
2: Least Best – Population chooses nonviolence; state does not target the population
1: Worst – Population chooses nonviolent; state targets population

Table 3. State Options in Game

4: Best – State targets population; populace chooses nonviolence
3: Next Best – State targets population chooses violence
2: Least Best – State does not target population; population chooses nonviolence
1: Worst – State does not target population; population chooses violence




Figure 15. Game between State and Population (Ordinal)

In the game, both the population and state are analyzed to find the Nash Equilibrium, or where no opponent may gain by unilateral improvement. We see the population has a dominant strategy of choosing a violent insurgency while the state has a dominant strategy of targeting the civilian population. Under these circumstances, the common outcome will resort to violence for both the state and population, regardless what is their statistically best option. The population’s best choice is to choose violence and the state choosing to target the population. There is no reason for either actor to adjust their

option, thus giving both players a sub-optimal choice in the game. Gandhi's statement that "Non-violence is not an easy thing to understand, still less to practice" seems accurate in the first look of this game.<sup>93</sup> Yet, we also know that the state and population don't always choose a violent response.

## **B. IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERACTIONS BETWEEN THE STATE AND POPULATION**

This game theoretic model attempts to identify the initial choices selected by a state and population, irrespective of their optimal outcome. Ivan Arreguin-Toft discussed the implications of strategic mismatches between indirect and direct approaches for a strong and weak state.<sup>94</sup> His analysis is limited to chiefly kinetic forms of warfare and fails to mention how these actors choose their respective strategies. This approach poses a question on how the state and population choose their initial strategic options. The game suggests that the population will tend to adopt a strategy that is statistically inferior, while the state will choose the statistically superior option. Arreguin-Toft postulates that an opponent will lose in an asymmetric interaction when they choose an inaccurate corresponding strategy to their opponent.<sup>95</sup> This study poses the possibility that populations are incentivized to choose strategies that are inherently substandard against the opponent's superior strategy.

While using this approach provides an insight into the choice between states and populations, it is limited to the current beliefs of the state and population. Downes and Cochran state that there is a downward trend in the effectiveness of targeting civilians from 1825 to 2000.<sup>96</sup> This may be due to the development of international norms of behavior and the rise of the global media. Their study also suggests there has been an change in outcomes over time, with current numbers suggesting that when a state targets civilian,

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<sup>93</sup> Krishna Kripalani, ed., *All Men Are Brothers: Life and Thoughts of Mahatma Gandhi, as Told in His Own Words* (Switzerland: The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, 1958), 98.

<sup>94</sup> Arreguin-Toft, "How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict," 108.

<sup>95</sup> Arreguin-Toft, 107.

<sup>96</sup> Chenoweth, Lawrence, and Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, *Rethinking Violence*, 44.

they are more likely to either lose or end in a draw.<sup>97</sup> Given the aggregate statistics of Downes and Cochran's study, there is a possibility that the state's choice to target civilians would significantly decrease in the future, supporting the case for a greater asymmetric mismatch between the state not targeting civilians and the civilians choosing their best option of nonviolent resistance. The end result remains constant in this situation. The population should maintain the superior position throughout the interaction for achieving victory by being incentivized to use nonviolent resistance.

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<sup>97</sup> Chenoweth, Lawrence, and Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 55.

## **IV. FROM VIOLENT FAILURE TO NONVIOLENT SUCCESS**

### **A. WHY POPULATIONS ADAPT THEIR STRATEGIC CHOICES**

When a game between the state and population begins, we expect that a population will be inclined to conduct a violent resistance, typically modeling a form of insurgency. As communication improves, the resistance leadership may view the option of civil resistance as significantly more beneficial to the cause. This may be due to strategic choices that render violent resistance untenable or undesirable in the growing global environment. Effective resistance movements maintain flexibility, and the boundaries between violent and nonviolent struggles typically remain fluid, thus many struggles combine elements of both violent and nonviolent resistance.<sup>98</sup>

This section will analyze the cases of East Timor, Tibet, and Western Sahara as examples of instances where a resistance transitioned from a violent to nonviolent resistance and attempt to identify commonalities between successful options and structural failures. In the chosen cases, I selected situations where violent and nonviolent resistance operated in tandem, although the organizations involved may not be organized under the same resistance cadre. Each of the case studies examines the background of how the insurgency transitioned into a nonviolent resistance, the ethnic power sharing of the respective resistance, and the strategic game between the state and resistance forces. Each of these resistances eventually transitioned into a predominantly nonviolent cause, failed to reach their objective, or achieved partial success through some form of autonomy.

### **B. ANALYZING CASES OF TRANSITION FROM VIOLENCE TO CIVIL RESISTANCE**

Before analyzing the case studies, this section will analyze the number of transitions from violent resistance to civil resistance and background theory used in the case studies. The number of transitions from violent insurgency to civil resistance presents a small

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<sup>98</sup> Véronique Dudouet, "Dynamics and Factors of Transition from Armed Struggle to Nonviolent Resistance," *Journal of Peace Research* 50, no. 3 (May 2013): 403, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343312469978>.

quantity of occurrences in which to study. Modern popular transitions include the Arab Spring movements, the East Timor succession, and the Basque movements. This section also looks at elements of transition, to include conflict intensification, escalation and de-escalation in conjunction with the idea of self-determination. In providing an overview of the elements that compose a transition from violence to civil resistance, it will demonstrate common elements through each case study.

Using the NAVCO database, I identified 19 cases where a violent resistance, identified in one calendar year, had a subsequent nonviolent resistance in the following year, shown in Table 8. I added four additional cases noted by Veronique Dudouet.<sup>99</sup> Out of the 23 cases, 22 are resistances by groups that had both an armed and unarmed wing. Some of the cases identified maintained an associated violent group, such as the African National Congress's relationship to the Umkhonto we Sizwe. OTPOR stands out as the only resistance that didn't maintain an armed wing, but was classified as a transition due to the popular violence in the prior year of their campaigning. I additionally looked at each element in the given timeframe, and if they continued to maintain an armed wing while transitioning to civil resistance, or if they decided to forego maintenance of an armed wing. An identified common theme is that a number of the following elements transitioned to civil resistance not out of choice, but because they were unable to maintain actions against the state, such as in Nepal and Tibet. Another typical outcome is the element reached their desired objective, such as Morocco in 1956, and violent resistance was no longer required.

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<sup>99</sup> Veronique Dudouet, ed., *Civil Resistance and Conflict Transformation: Transitions from Armed to Nonviolent Struggle*, Routledge Studies in Peace and Conflict Resolution (London; New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2015).

Table 4. List of Violent to Nonviolent Transitions

YEAR	COUNTRY	ELEMENT	MAINTAINED ARMED WING	TRANSITIONED	EVENTUAL SUCCESS
Argentina	1978	Montoneros	Yes	Yes	Yes
Cameroon	1956	Union of Cameroonian Peoples	Yes	No	No
Chile	1965	Peronists	Yes	Yes	Yes
Cyprus	1957 & 1958	Greek Cypriots	Yes	Yes	Partial
East Timor	1989	FALINTIL	Yes	Yes	Yes
Guatemala	1996	Guatemala National Revolutionary Unity	Yes	Yes	Yes
India	1958	Hindu-Muslim Nationalists	Yes	No	No
Ireland	1994 & 1999	IRA	Yes	Yes (2005)	Yes
Morocco	1956	Moroccan Nationalists	Yes	Yes	Yes
Nepal	2006	Communist Party of Nepal	No	Yes	Yes
Palestine	1987	Fatah	Yes	Yes	No
Papua New Guinea	2000	West Papua National Liberation Army	Yes	No	No
Russia	1997	Chechens	Yes	Yes	No
Rwanda	1956	Hutus	Yes	No	No
South Africa	1990	African National Congress	Yes, in partnership (Umkhonto we Sizwe)	Yes	Yes
Sri Lanka	1972	Tamils	Yes	Temporarily	No
Tibet	1987	Gu Chu Sum Movement	Yes	Yes	No
Western Sahara	1982	Polisario	Yes	Yes	Yes
Yugoslavia	2000	OTPOR	No	Yes	Yes
Others not identified as calendar year transitions					
Egypt	2002	Jama'a Islamiya	No	Yes	Yes
Iran	2006	Peoples Mujahadine	Partially	No	No
Spain (Basque)	2011	Euskadi Ta Askatasuna	No	Yes	No
Mexico	1994	Zapatista Army of National Liberation	Partially	Yes	No

Conflict escalation and intensification may address the transition of conflict from violent to nonviolent means. In an environment of conflict escalation, one typically observes rises in both social tension and outright violence during the struggle. Conflict intensification describes an increase in the visibility of a struggle from a hidden campaign to open struggle.<sup>100</sup> Thus, a resistance will take the form of conflict intensification as it moves from the mobilization phase to engagement phase, demonstrating visible signs of resistance against the state. This resistance may immediately display in the form of a violent outburst or grow in intensity from vocal denouncement to violent resistance. The opposite of this model is that of conflict de-escalation, or the transition from an armed struggle to that of an unarmed struggle, or nonviolent conflict with the state.<sup>101</sup> De-escalation may take the form of transition from violent conflict to political inclusion or a transition to a resistance movement, which might maintain a violent arm. During conflict de-escalation, the resistance typically appears to maintain an armed wing as a signaling element of capability and resolve. Nepal demonstrates conflict de-escalation, where the strategy of a violent resistance against the Peoples Republic of China transitioned from an insurgent strategy to primarily nonviolent means and de-escalation from open resistance to surreptitious mobilization. The choice to de-escalate takes multiple forms and one model isn't necessarily applicable to the various cases. Both conflict escalation and de-escalation provide a framework for understanding how resistance fluidly transitions between optimal strategies.

Conflict escalation tends to be visually noticeable to analyze, whereas conflict de-escalation is far more difficult to analyze. The four key de-escalatory methods for a violent resistance include: demilitarization and nonviolent mobilization; development of nonviolent arm while retaining violent means; shift to negotiations with subsequent shift to nonviolent means; and leadership-less, non-endorsed transition to nonviolent means.<sup>102</sup>

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<sup>100</sup> Simon Fisher, ed., *Working with Conflict: Skills and Strategies for Action* (New York: Zed Books: Distributed in the USA exclusively by St. Martin's Press, 2000), 7.

<sup>101</sup> Dudouet, "Dynamics and Factors of Transition from Armed Struggle to Nonviolent Resistance," 404.

<sup>102</sup> Dudouet, 405.

The transitions in de-escalation are deliberate. Also, within the globalized environment, the ability for more detailed planning within self-determination groups facilitates a more detailed process for de-escalatory measures.<sup>103</sup> As populations gain access to information on tactics and success rates of nonviolent and violent resistances, we should witness modern insurgent elements more often de-escalating to some form of nonviolent representation, such as political representation, while maintaining a violent means of coercion against the state.

Another reason why a group may choose violent or nonviolent means of resistance comes from their desire for self-determination. Self-determinism suggests that a population, acting with free will, should have the ability and right to shape their government and destiny.<sup>104</sup> In the pursuit of self-determination, a population chooses whether or not to work within the government, or to choose a second option that may include civil resistance or an insurgency. Access to a political solution is predicated upon the population's, or resistance movement's, view of what is a possible outcome of the situation. If a population foresees an ability to achieve self-determination through the existing political means, they will tend to accomplish this through the political process.<sup>105</sup> If a population believes there is a political apparatus that allows for the reconciling of grievances, they will tend to use the available structures that require the least amount of effort and resources. For nonviolent and violent resistances there is a large cost in both manpower and resources, thus making these decisions difficult for self-determination movements.

Nonviolent resistance appears likely when a population is excluded from the center of a political structure and where violent resistances are not able to be maintained. Civil war, or insurgency, is three times more likely during self-determination efforts when there is a safe haven in an adjacent state and there is a greater fragmentation in power-sharing

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<sup>103</sup> "Civil Resistance and Alternatives to Violent Struggle" (Working Group Final Paper, January 2008), 3.

<sup>104</sup> M. Weller, *Escaping the Self-Determination Trap* (Leiden; Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 2008), 30.

<sup>105</sup> Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham, "Understanding Strategic Choice: The Determinants of Civil War and Nonviolent Campaign in Self-Determination Disputes," *Journal of Peace Research* 50, no. 3 (May 2013): 292, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343313475467>.

groups that are excluded or discriminated against.<sup>106</sup> East Timor and Sri Lanka demonstrated an inability to maintain the violent resistance movement due to a lack of safe haven, and Papua appears to be currently experiencing the same dynamic. Kashmir, on the other hand, maintains violent insurgent activities with safe havens in both India and Pakistan for operating insurgent groups. Tibet maintained a violent resistance, while being supported by the United States, but failed to maintain safe haven status and was rendered impotent in their struggle for independence. Geography thus also appears to partially circumscribes the strategic choice for either violent or nonviolent resistance.

### **1. East Timor Background**

The world censures those who take up arms to defend their causes and calls on them to use non-violent means in voicing their grievances. But when a people chooses the non-violent path, it is all too often the case that hardly anyone pays attention. It is tragic that people have to suffer and die and the television cameras have to deliver the pictures to people's homes everyday before the world at large admits there is a problem.<sup>107</sup>

The East Timor resistance achieved independence in 2002 following a failed insurgency and successful transition to civil resistance. Although East Timor is still struggling with its newly found independence, it is slowly adapting to international norms as one of the world's youngest nations. The Timorese were at the center of international attention from the Catholic Church and used to increase relations and foreign military sales between the United States and Indonesia. The Timorese overcame both domestic and international pressures to achieve independence.

Timor received its first independence from Portugal in 1975, just as the Marxist organization Revolutionary Front for the Independent East Timor (FRETILIN) began guiding the Timorese independence movement. The importance of East Timor's nonviolent transition resides in the evolution of FRETILIN. Following a coup in Portugal in 1976, known as the Carnation Revolution, and the mounting communist group

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<sup>106</sup> Cunningham, 301.

<sup>107</sup> Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo, "Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo Nobel Lecture," accessed October 20, 2019, <https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/1996/belo/lecture/>.

FRETILIN, the Indonesian government conducted a preemptive attack against East Timor followed by its forced assimilation as Indonesia's 27<sup>th</sup> Province.<sup>108</sup> Indonesia's attack on East Timor initiated two decades of violent insurgency by FRETILIN forces that eventually transitioned into a nonviolent resistance when the guerrilla forces were rendered impotent on the battlefield.




Figure 16. East Timor Resistance Evolution<sup>109</sup>

<sup>108</sup> Christopher Paul et al., *Paths to Victory: Detailed Insurgency Case Studies* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2013), 374.

<sup>109</sup> Sarah Niner, "A Long Journey of Resistance: The Origins and Struggle of the CNRT," *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars* 32, no. 1-2 (June 2000): 12, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14672715.2000.10415775>.

FRETILIN, prior to the 1976 invasion, was unifying the population for self-rule. FRETILIN, formerly known as the Timorese Social Democratic Association (ASDT) which was formed in 1974, was a significantly more aggressive resistance movement born out of Timorese youth and students influenced by the global social developments of the 1960s. FRETILIN rapidly developed social programs focused on strengthening cultural values, reinforcing tribal affiliations, and supporting a burgeoning Timorese government.<sup>110</sup> The liberal populations of East Timor supported the efforts. The antithesis of FRETILIN was the Timorese Democratic Union (UDT), supported by farmers and the more conservative populations of East Timor. UDT advocated for the incorporation of East Timor into Indonesia, which created conflict with FRETILIN. This caused a split in 1974 that started civil conflict and a civil war in 1975.

FRETILIN created the Armed Forces for the National Liberation of East Timor (FALINTIL) in response to the onset of civil war with UDT and subsequently proved successful in the 43 days of civil conflict.<sup>111</sup> The Democratic Republic of East Timor (DRET), created following the civil conflict, was developed in anticipation of an Indonesian invasion. DRET was the overarching political organization with FRETILIN, as the primary means of fighting the Indonesian invasion with its conventional force. Timorese youth, primarily unemployed, flocked to FRETILIN and FALINTIL as a response to Indonesian heavy-handedness. The Indonesian government additionally marginalized the same youthful demographic by excluding them from large sectors of the economy, with Indonesians providing other ethnic Indonesian immigrants employment over native Timorese.<sup>112</sup> Thus, the educated Timorese youth were marginalized and without potential educational opportunities, providing an opportune population for recruitment to a resistance movement.

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<sup>110</sup> Chisako M. Fukuda, "Peace Through Nonviolent Action: The East Timorese Resistance Movement's Strategy for Engagement," *Pacifica Review: Peace, Security & Global Change* 12, no. 1 (2000): 18.

<sup>111</sup> Niner, "A Long Journey of Resistance," 12.

<sup>112</sup> Fukuda, "Peace Through Nonviolent Action: The East Timorese Resistance Movement's Strategy for Engagement," 19.

FALINTIL transitioned to guerrilla activities in 1978 following a series of defeats by the Indonesian military. The resistance was subsequently placed under the control of the National Council of Revolutionary Resistance (CRRN) in 1981.<sup>113</sup> The Indonesian military, sensing success, transitioned to a highly aggressive and brutal counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign to eliminate FALINTIL guerrillas occupying mountainous hold-outs. The Indonesian military conducted population resettlement, employed “death squads” to eliminate potential FALINTIL supporters, and led kill/capture operations against FRETILIN and FALINTIL leadership.<sup>114</sup> Indonesia effectively neutralized FALINTIL forces, and by the mid-1980s FALINTIL was unable to conduct conventional operations against the Indonesian forces thus leading to their transition to limited guerrilla attacks.<sup>115</sup>

Indonesian marginalization of the CRRN and FALINTIL precipitated the development of the National Council of Maubere Resistance (CNRM) in 1987. This organization attempted to unify the different political ideologies and segments of the East Timor society under a central political organization and forego its Marxist underpinnings.<sup>116</sup> CNRM transitioned into the National Council of Timorese Resistance (CNRT) in 1998, dropping the derogatory term of Maubere in an effort to better unify the population.<sup>117</sup> Maubere was associated with Portuguese colonialism and Timorese barbarism, but has since been used as a rallying term for Timorese culture. UDT re-unified and joined with the CNRT in 1998, along with other smaller separatist groups, upon realizing that Indonesian goals and methodology were not comporting with the UDT’s interests to maintain a conservative Timorese ethnic group.

A sub-organization to the CNRM, and eventually the CNRT, was the *Frente Clandestine*, or Clandestine Front. This organization provided resistance capability for the Timorese, on behalf of the CNRM, and signaled the transition from violent to nonviolent

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<sup>113</sup> Niner, “A Long Journey of Resistance,” 13.

<sup>114</sup> Paul et al., *Paths to Victory*, 376.

<sup>115</sup> Paul et al., 377.

<sup>116</sup> Niner, “A Long Journey of Resistance,” 14.

<sup>117</sup> Niner, 14.

methods of resisting Indonesian occupation. The organization was composed of three distinct branches that helped the CNRM achieve greater international and national support. The first branch coordinated resistance activities internally and internationally, organizing demonstrations against the Indonesian government. The second branch organized politically active students and participated in “sit-ins” at the U.S. Embassy and the Asia Pacific Economic Conference (APEC).<sup>118</sup> The third branch was composed of East Timor students and Indonesian supporters who attended Indonesian universities. This group, composed of the East Timorese Student’s Association (IMPLETIM) and National Resistance of East Timorese Students (RENETIL) engaged in pro-democracy debates, coordinated with Indonesian humanitarian rights organizations, and detailed Indonesian military abuses to the Indonesian government.<sup>119</sup> The Clandestine Front was instrumental in the expansion of CNRM and CNRTs’ efforts to expand the independence campaign when FALINTIL’s guerrilla movement failed to maintain momentum against the Indonesian military.

The Catholic Church provided support to nonviolent resistance parallel to the Clandestine Front. The population owes its primarily Christian outlook, with elements of Animism, to their Portuguese colonization. The invasion and potential incorporation of East Timor by Muslim Indonesians created a social backlash on religious grounds. The Catholic leadership of East Timor spoke out against Indonesian annexation through public statements, challenging policies that threatened Timorese cultural practices, school curricula, and religious practices.<sup>120</sup> The Timorese Catholic leadership regarded the invasion, and subsequent influx of Muslim immigrants into the economy, as an attack against East Timor’s religious heritage and identity. Nobel Prize winner, Bishop Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo stated the Indonesians “are intent on Islamization” and were attempting to convert the Timorese youth to Islam. The Catholic Church provided a mouthpiece for Timorese to share their grievances with an international audience and

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<sup>118</sup> Michael Salla, “East Timor’s Nonviolent Resistance,” *Peace Review* 7, no. 2 (January 1995): 192, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10402659508425875>.

<sup>119</sup> Salla, 192.

<sup>120</sup> Salla, 194.

served as a source of institutional power for those willing to speak out against Indonesian activity.

East Timor transitioned into a primarily nonviolent movement in the 1990s, and the return of the UDT to the Timorese power structure solidified its front against the Indonesian state. The transition was not without conflict, as the Indonesian military arrested and attacked both civilians and Catholic Church workers.<sup>121</sup> The transition from a violent insurgency to nonviolent resistance was planned and executed through the well-established organization of the East Timorese. East Timor lacked the ability to maintain an insurgency and successfully transitioned to a methodology that allowed continued resistance.

## **2. East Timor Power Sharing**

East Timor demonstrated no significant power sharing between 1975 and 1995. The Timorese are classified as powerless by the EPR data set in 1975 at 0.005 percent of Indonesia's total population. During the conflict, Indonesia is comprised of one dominant ethnic group, 12 politically irrelevant ethnic groups, one discriminated group, and two powerless groups.<sup>122</sup> As of separation, the Timorese are composed of a number of smaller ethnic groups, but the whole of the population are collectively referenced as Maubere.<sup>123</sup> What makes the East Timor situation unique is that it is geographically separated from other power sharing groups within Indonesia along a geographic and cultural boundary. While increases in ethnic diversity favor the adoption of a violent resistance over a nonviolent resistance, the Timorese were nationally unified through the Catholic Religion, composed of 81.4% of the population in 1989, and a general ethnic identification as Maubere.<sup>124</sup> The Timorese were able to maintain ethnic group cohesion throughout the conflict.

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<sup>121</sup> Salla, 196.

<sup>122</sup> Wimmer, Cederman, and Min, "Ethnic Politics and Armed Conflict: A Configurational Analysis of a New Global Data Set."

<sup>123</sup> "East Asia/Southeast Asia: Timor-Leste — The World Factbook - Central Intelligence Agency," accessed August 29, 2019, <https://www.cia.gov/LIBRARY/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tt.html>.

<sup>124</sup> Salla, "East Timor's Nonviolent Resistance," 193.

The Timorese population demonstrated that although they were ostensibly politically powerless in the Indonesian government, they were able to unify the population against the dominant power center when their guerrilla arm of the resistance was rendered ineffective. The ability to mobilize an ethnically homogeneous population against an external occupying force allowed the population to transition from a violent to a nonviolent means through a broadly accepted national determination effort.

### **3. East Timor Game**

East Timor initially escalated the conflict to the most undesirable solution for long-term success, whereas the Indonesian government initiated their potentially most successful option. Indonesia began with aggressive targeting campaigns to kill or capture FALINTIL forces and eliminate their capability to wage warfare. Indonesia was initially successful in eliminating the threat, marginalizing FALINTIL capabilities to limited guerrilla strikes. FALINTIL chose to conduct a violent defense against the Indonesian military, that was both trained and armed to subjugate an insurgency. Both organizations utilized their kinetic forces as their primary means to redress their grievances. In the 1980s, FRETILIN adjusted the game by introducing the CNRM and CNRT along with transitioning from a violent to primarily nonviolent subversive fight. FALINTIL maintained the armed wing as a non-partisan subordinate to the CNRT to ensure a deterrence threat against the Indonesian government.

As suggested, the Indonesian government initially resorted to a violent annexation, targeting both the FALINTIL forces and the population. This strategy facilitated a metric-based approach to the campaign that continued until the transition to COIN operations in the early 1980s. During this time, the strategic mismatch favored Indonesian operations as FALINTIL guerrilla operations were isolated and impotent, and the political apparatus had not yet adopted a more advantageous strategy. With the creation of the Clandestine Front, under the CNRM, the Timorese regained the strategic advantage. The ability to increase condemnation of the Indonesian government while receiving vocal support for the creation of the Timor state from the international community and Catholic Church created advantages for the movement. Additionally, continued targeting of FALINTIL and the

Timorese population by the Indonesian government swayed the strategic mismatch in favor of the Timorese separatists.

#### **4. East Timor Conclusion**

The East Timor transition from a violent resistance to primarily nonviolent means demonstrates the ability to employ the backfire effect in order to gain independence from an occupying force. East Timor demonstrated a de-escalation strategy of transitioning to primarily nonviolent methods while maintaining potential violent means. Although the guerrilla force was rendered ineffective, the fact that the Timorese maintained their potential capability provided strategic deterrence to Indonesian activities. This suggests that a potentially armed-wing of a resistance movement may provide a threat capability that pushes the opponent to choose a sub-optimal strategy. The maintenance of FALINTIL allowed for flexibility in negotiations. The guerrilla force also induced the Indonesian government to adopt a heavy-handed approach, providing greater backfire by the international community towards Indonesian COIN efforts. East Timor also benefited from the geographic isolation of a generally homogeneous population of ethnic Mauberes.

The Indonesian invasion and occupation between 1976 and 1980 led to a death toll of up to 230,000 Timorese out of a total pre-invasion population of 650,000 individuals.<sup>125</sup>

A second estimate places the Timorese casualty tally at 24-to-26 percent of their total population.<sup>126</sup> An additional 300,000 East Timorese were forced into West Timor as refugees during the Indonesian invasion.<sup>127</sup> Despite, or perhaps due to, the massive losses by the Timorese people, the Timorese population was able to mobilize against the Indonesian government in a way that allowed a challenging of the state with minimal violent reprisals. In the end, the East Timorese pressured the Indonesian government to concede, leading to a granting of independence in 2002 and the creation of an independent East Timor state. This was a result of garnering sufficient Indonesian and international

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<sup>125</sup> Fukuda, "Peace Through Nonviolent Action: The East Timorese Resistance Movement's Strategy for Engagement," 18.

<sup>126</sup> Ben Kiernan, "The Demography of Genocide in Southeast Asia: Death Tolls in Cambodia, 1975-79, and East Timor, 1975-1980," *Critical Asian Studies* 35, no. 4 (2003): 585-97.

<sup>127</sup> "East Asia/Southeast Asia: Timor-Leste — The World Factbook - Central Intelligence Agency."

attention to atrocities and the political deprivation of the East Timor population. The East Timorese resistance success suggests that nonviolent resistance techniques can be applied against highly aggressive COIN and pacification efforts. This is not to suggest that nonviolent means alone would have been sufficient, but the proper mixture of guerrilla forces under FALINTIL and nonviolent means under CRRN provided an effective unified front against the Indonesian aggression.

## 5. Tibet Background

A blow on the nose of a hated enemy,  
Is surely more satisfying,  
Than listening to the advice  
Of benevolent Parties<sup>128</sup>

The actions of the Tibetan resistance demonstrate how a resistance can achieve limited success following the transition from an insurgency to civil resistance. Although Tibet received a limited autonomous region in China, it remains a territory of the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) and continues to engage in forms of civil resistance to maintain their culture and identity. Tibet maintains a history of violently expelling foreign invaders, including the defeat of Manchu in the early twentieth century. However, Tibet was unable to defeat a Chinese Communist invasion in 1950 and has since attempted multiple forms of resistance to maintain Tibet as autonomous, starting with violent resistance and evolving to the current strategy of civil resistance. The country has been the focal point for proxy warfare by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) against the Chinese Communist government, which concluded in a failed violent insurgency.

China invaded Tibetan territory in 1950 under the auspices that Tibet was a historic territory and thus naturally under the rule of the state. Mao Zedong attacked the territory with 40,000 Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) troops and quickly overwhelmed the Tibetan defenses.<sup>129</sup> The stated goal of China was liberation of the state from imperialist

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<sup>128</sup> Jamyang Norbu, *Warriors of Tibet: The Story of Aten and the Khampas' Fight for the Freedom of Their Country*, New. ed, A Wisdom Tibet Book Yellow Series (London: Wisdom Publ, 1986), 32.

<sup>129</sup> Tenzin Dorjee, "The Tibetan Nonviolent Struggle: A Strategic and Historical Analysis," ICNC Monograph Series (Washington D.C.: International Center on Nonviolent Conflict, 2015), 23.

influences.<sup>130</sup> The United Nations (UN) and other neighboring states were in no place to intervene, and China was quickly able to assume control of the area with no significant international objection. Activities in Korea limited the UN's ability to intervene in Tibet or to even pay notice to the events. China demonstrated their brashness in this attack, conducting operations while simultaneously meeting with Tibet's peace negotiators in Delhi.<sup>131</sup> After seven months of PLA operations, Tibet was forced to sign the Seventeen-Point Agreement with China that conceded autonomy and control for the future of Tibet, thus ending independence of the Tibetan state. Few of the 17 points in the agreement were ever kept by China.

The Tibetans initially viewed the Seventeen-Point Agreement as a means of keeping their culture while providing China a form of symbolic power over the region; both turned out to be incorrect. Following the agreement, China initiated a systematic removal of Buddhist culture, destroying the vast majority of over 6,000 monasteries, leaving only 12 remaining.<sup>132</sup> China began an immediate emigration of ethnic Han Chinese into Tibet, forcing ethnic change of the region with a goal of five Han per every Tibetan citizen in the region.<sup>133</sup> Tibetan cultural clothing and music was banned or destroyed; China viewed Tibetan items and demonstrations as forms of resistance against the revolutionary government.<sup>134</sup> The boldest move by the Chinese was their appointment of the *Panchen Lama*, the second most holy person behind the *Dalai Lama*. The Dalai Lama accepted the individual who was termed the "Mao's Panchen" or the "Communist Panchen Lama" by the Tibetan people and emphasized the "godlessness and arrogance of their conquerors."<sup>135</sup> The grievances of the Tibet citizens continued to grow in the 1950s and led to the start of its resistance movement and the First Tibetan Uprising from 1956 to 1959.

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<sup>130</sup> Frank Moraes, *The Revolt in Tibet* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1960), 54.

<sup>131</sup> Lowell Thomas, *The Silent War in Tibet* (Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 1973), 87.

<sup>132</sup> Dorjee, "The Tibetan Nonviolent Struggle: A Strategic and Historical Analysis," 24.

<sup>133</sup> Moraes, *The Revolt in Tibet*, 66.

<sup>134</sup> Dorjee, "The Tibetan Nonviolent Struggle: A Strategic and Historical Analysis," 25.

<sup>135</sup> Thomas, *The Silent War in Tibet*, 103.

The First Uprising was not the first resistance against the Chinese government, but the conglomeration of multiple resistance acts that led up to 1959. Tibetan angst against Communist ideology, brutal military crackdowns against the population, destruction of religious identity, and the abduction of citizens sparked a movement to defend Tibet and the Buddhist ideology. In 1956, the Tibetan populace started spontaneous violent oppositions against Chinese democratic reforms.<sup>136</sup> The revolt started in the Khampa region, known for a more aggressive culture of resistance and independence than the Buddhist populations in Lhasa, and was coined the Khampa Uprising. This revolt spread across Tibet, encouraging guerrilla warfare against the Chinese. The Jenkhentsisum (JKTS) also initiated resistance activities against the Chinese starting in 1951. The JKTS was founded by the Dalai Lama's older brother, an influential monk and aristocratic official.<sup>137</sup> The organization focused on gaining external support for Tibet, meeting with Indian and U.S. representatives, and the facilitation of financial and technical aid to Tibet. The JKTS operated in conjunction with the Dalai Lama, but was also known to operate without his knowledge or approval, with mixed results.<sup>138</sup> The 1955 Mönlam Prayer Festival Incident demonstrated the JKTS's ability to mobilize a peaceful protest against Chinese oppression and led to the imprisonment of three leaders of the movement. The Phala clique, another resistance group, are a collection of Buddhist Monks who made a secret pact to resist the Chinese. These pacts emphasize the clandestine nature of their resistance to oppose Chinese oppression and activities that target the monastic class. The monks have resisted occupation by opposing the Chinese currency exchange of Tibetan paper money to Chinese Renminbi Yuan. The monks also encourage non-compliance by the monasteries and Tibetan government.<sup>139</sup> By the end of 1956, the Khampan, JKTS, and Phala clique were all interested in taking up arms to drive out China.<sup>140</sup> The Khampa

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<sup>136</sup> Norbu, *Warriors of Tibet*, 104.

<sup>137</sup> Melvyn C. Goldstein and Melvyn C. Goldstein, *A History of Modern Tibet. Volume 3: The Storm Clouds Descend, 1955-1957* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2014), 9q.

<sup>138</sup> Goldstein and Goldstein, 11f.

<sup>139</sup> Goldstein and Goldstein, 29.

<sup>140</sup> Goldstein and Goldstein, 2098e.

movement and the JKTS garnered the attention of the CIA, prompting the support of the guerrillas through covert assistance and the training of 259 Tibetans at Camp Hale, Colorado.<sup>141</sup> The years leading up to the 1959 uprising set the stage for a primary effort led by insurgent guerrilla operations and civil resistance.

The CIA declared their support for the Tibetan resistance in 1956 with an official start to the campaign in 1959. CIA officials stated it was improbable for the guerrilla movement in Tibet to expel Chinese authority, but they did think a sufficient effort would be enough to galvanize international support for the Dalai Lama and restrict Chinese actions in Tibet.<sup>142</sup> Once the CIA realized the value of first hand documentation they were receiving from the Tibetan insurgents, they changed their focus from supporting a Tibetan resistance as a means to disrupt the Chinese to using the insurgents as intelligence operatives on behalf of the CIA. The Tibetans, weary of the new CIA objectives, continued hit-and-run tactics against the Chinese forces and tacitly continued collecting PRC documentation from raids that could be considered a great benefit for CIA operations against China. The CIA disapproved of continued Tibetan insurgent activities, but allowed the operations to continue as long as Chinese documents from the activities continued to flow back to the CIA. The changing nature of CIA's objectives and support foreshadowed a reduction in U.S. support for Tibetan independence and its eventual downfall.

The Dalai Lama's exit from Tibet in 1959 also corresponded with an exodus of a significant portion of the Tibetan resistance movement. Realizing that the movement was unable to manage as a guerrilla force against a well-armed and organized PLA, the Dalai Lama publicly requested a change from violent resistance to nonviolent compliance. In 1974 the Dalai Lama requested the halting of the guerrilla movement, organized out of the CIA Mustang Camp in Nepal. He stated that "for many years you have risked your lives and struggled for our cause. I know the present situation will cause you much disappointment. However, we must try and achieve our objectives through peaceful

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<sup>141</sup> Dorjee, "The Tibetan Nonviolent Struggle: A Strategic and Historical Analysis," 28.

<sup>142</sup> John Kenneth Knaus, "Official Policies and Covert Programs: The U.S. State Department, the CIA, and the Tibetan Resistance," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 5, no. 3 (2003): 68.

means.”<sup>143</sup> The remaining resistance fighters turned in all their weapons, with some committing suicide out of distress. Many of the remaining guerrilla fighters still live in Nepal or India. The end of the CIA sponsored resistance was the *prima facie* end of violent resistance against the PLA, as Tibet no longer maintained the means or capability to continue insurgent activities.

The circumstances leading to Tibet’s first major nonviolent resistance started with liberalization of the region. The PRC government, headed by Deng Xiaoping, started repealing former Chairman Mao’s repressive policies and encouraged the revival of Tibetan culture and education.<sup>144</sup> Many of the former restrictions on the Tibetans, to include dress, education, and music, were removed from civic life, and the Chinese Panchen Lama toured the countryside encouraging the study and use of the Tibetan language.<sup>145</sup> Along with these measures, China also encouraged the immigration of ethnic Chinese into Tibet. These settlers were better connected with supply chains in mainland China and were able to assume primacy in trade and other commercial enterprises, such as groceries. While liberalization helped the development of the region, it also exacerbated the grievances of the Tibetans against the Chinese population and government.

The Second Uprising in 1987 was an outgrowth of the liberalization of the 1980s and became the noticeable transition point from violent resistance to civil resistance. The Dalai Lama’s 1987 speech to the Congressional caucus on human rights in Washington, D.C., precipitated a PRC response.<sup>146</sup> The Chinese government broadcasted their condemnation of the Dalai Lama on Tibetan television, angering the ethnic populations and monks who still maintained reverence for the exiled leader of the religion. The Chinese condemnation sparked a protest by the Drepung Monastery in September. The monks marched around their temple holding signs supporting the Dalai Lama, continuing the protest to local Chinese administrative offices. Violent repercussions by the PRC backfired,

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<sup>143</sup> Tenzing Sonam and Ritu Sarin, *Shadow Circus: The CIA in Tibet*, n.d., <https://caamedia.org/shadowcircus/>.

<sup>144</sup> Dorjee, “The Tibetan Nonviolent Struggle: A Strategic and Historical Analysis,” 39.

<sup>145</sup> Dorjee, 39.

<sup>146</sup> Dorjee, 43.

mobilizing the population against perceived injustices and leading to further protests of up to 3,000 people.<sup>147</sup> This “watershed” event marked significant changes in the resistance strategy, encouraging other Tibetans to follow in similar nonviolent protests and demonstrations against the PRC.<sup>148</sup> The protests of 1987, combined with the liberalization of Tibet, provided the outlet for Tibetans to demonstrate their grievances publicly with lower barriers to participation as opposed to the actions of the guerrilla forces.

The Third Uprising in Tibet occurred in 2008, spurred on by greater liberalization brought about by globalization. The PRC restricted the use of the Tibetan language and posting of the Dalai Lama’s photos in the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR).<sup>149</sup> To overcome these restrictions the Tibetans turned to investment in arts and culture as a bulwark against PRC oppression. Tibetan artists perfected the use of metaphors to overcome Chinese censorship, such as the 2006 song “Hope and Sorrow,” which discusses the desired return of the Dalai Lama, Panchen Lama, and Karmapa to Tibet.<sup>150</sup> Additionally, Windows Vista added the Tibetan font in 2007, allowing for the use of the native language within the TAR, and more importantly in communications with Tibetans in exile.<sup>151</sup> The increased ability to communicate brought about a revitalization of Tibetan ethnic mobilization against the Chinese government. Like the liberalization of the 1980s in Tibet, the 2000s liberalization allowed for greater mobilization and communication in Tibet.

The 2008 Third Uprising occurred when the population responded to violent images of PRC policemen attacking Tibetan monks, broadcast on Chinese state television services and through local Tibetan mediums. The protests, or riots, occurred much to the surprise of the exiled government and, inconveniently for the PRC, one month before the 2008

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<sup>147</sup> Dorjee, 44.

<sup>148</sup> *Truth Is Our Only Weapon: The Tibetan Nonviolent Struggle*, Nonviolence in Asia Series (Bangkok, Thailand, 2000), 17.

<sup>149</sup> *Truth Is Our Only Weapon: The Tibetan Nonviolent Struggle*, 51.

<sup>150</sup> Knaus, “Official Policies and Covert Programs: The U.S. State Department, the CIA, and the Tibetan Resistance,” 63.

<sup>151</sup> Dorjee, “The Tibetan Nonviolent Struggle: A Strategic and Historical Analysis,” 65.

Olympics in Beijing. The protests were primarily comprised of nonviolent civil resistance tactics with some incidences of vandalism and attacks against ethnic Han Chinese, which were rapidly exploited by Chinese propaganda.<sup>152</sup> Civic protests continued through 2008 using nonviolent protests, self-immolation, symbolic gestures, destruction of Chinese flags, and noncompliance. The Chinese government responded with mass arrests and torture, leading to over 6,800 detentions of protesters in 2008 with many individuals still unaccounted for.<sup>153</sup> Additionally, the PRC closed Tibet to tourism and journalists, reduced the number of monks allowed in the main monasteries, and caused the collapse of the talks between the Dalai Lama and Chinese government.<sup>154</sup> The uniqueness of these protests is they were not confined to the TAR, but included: 55 protests by lay groups, 20 protests by monks, 17 protests by students, and 4 protests by nuns.<sup>155</sup> The resistance protests remained primarily nonviolent in the majority of these cases and demonstrated the dispersion of grievances outside the TAR and throughout the entire Tibetan plateau. The locations of the protests are shown in Figure 17.

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<sup>152</sup> Dorjee, 67.

<sup>153</sup> “TIBET’S RESISTANCE,” accessed October 7, 2019, <https://freetibet.org/about/resistance>.

<sup>154</sup> “TIBET’S RESISTANCE,” 23.

<sup>155</sup> Robert Barnett, “The Tibet Protests of Spring 2008: Conflict between the Nation and State,” *China Perspectives* 3 (September 1, 2009): 11.




Figure 17. 2008 Protests in Tibet from 10 March to 12 April, Marked in Red Squares<sup>156</sup>

## 6. Tibet Power Sharing

Tibetan power sharing within the PRC demonstrates a lack of autonomy and control by the Tibetan minority groups. China’s response to the 1959 resistance and subsequent occupation was the encouraged immigration of Han Chinese into Tibet. China split Tibet into both an autonomous region and the three separate provinces of Qinghai, Gansu, and Sichuan. The Chinese government brokered the 17-point agreement with the Tibetan leadership in 1951 which stated that “national regional autonomy shall be exercised in areas where national minorities shall have freedom to develop their spoken and written languages and to preserve or reform their customs, habits and religious beliefs.”<sup>157</sup> A significant portion of this agreement has been breached by the Chinese government, to include the destruction of Buddhist Monasteries, the usurping of the Panchen Lama’s position, removal

<sup>156</sup> Barnett, 9.

<sup>157</sup> *Facts About the 17-Point “Agreement” Between Tibet and China* (Dharamsala, India: DIIR Publications, n.d.), 106.

of the Dalai Lama from power, preventing the local government to reform “of its own accord,” and China’s deliberate grab of natural resources from the Tibetan plateau, namely the mining of minerals. The agreement was conducted without the knowledge of the Dalai Lama or the standing Tibetan Government in 1951 and presented to the delegates in an ultimatum that stated liberation would either be peaceful or “armed.”<sup>158</sup> From the start the TAR, the Tibetan population was de jure a discriminated population and de facto a powerless population.

The percentage of ethnic Tibetans in the TAR and associated areas is contentious. The Chinese government census of the region states that Tibet’s population in 2011 was approximately 3 million, with 90% of the population as ethnic Tibetans.<sup>159</sup> Additionally, the Han population in the TAR composed 8.17 percent of the population. These figures are highly debatable with the combined Chinese focus on ethnic Han migration to Tibet and a policy of “sinicization,” or assimilation of Tibet under ethnic Han acculturation.<sup>160</sup> The International Campaign for Tibet suggests that half the population of Lhasa is ethnically Han Chinese, with 60–70 percent of the government composed of ethnic Tibetans.<sup>161</sup> An article on Chinese populations in Tibet in 1993 suggests that Han Chinese possibly compose a third of the population in Tibet when adding in workers, military, and other government populations.<sup>162</sup> China’s challenge to these figures is that they only consider the TAR to be Tibetan and the other surrounding provinces are specifically Chinese and not included into figures of Chinese migration.<sup>163</sup> The demographics in Lhasa and other areas are further changing with the completion of rail service from mainland

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<sup>158</sup> *Facts About the 17-Point “Agreement” Between Tibet and China*, 16.

<sup>159</sup> GOV.cn, “Tibet’s Population Tops 3 Million; 90% Are Tibetans,” accessed October 8, 2019, [http://www.gov.cn/english/2011-05/04/content\\_1857538.htm](http://www.gov.cn/english/2011-05/04/content_1857538.htm).

<sup>160</sup> “Member Profile: Tibet, Government of Tibet in Exile” (Unrepresented Nations and People Organization, May 2018).

<sup>161</sup> International Campaign for Tibet, “Chinese Official Admits Tibetans Will Become Minority in Tibet” (International Campaign for Tibet), accessed October 8, 2019, <https://savetibet.org/chinese-official-admits-tibetans-will-become-minority-in-lhasa/>.

<sup>162</sup> Tseten Samdup, “Chinese Population - Threat to Tibetan Identity,” 1993, <http://www.geocities.ws/films4/chinesepopulationthreat.htm>.

<sup>163</sup> Yan Hao, “Tibetan Population in China: Myths and Facts Re-Examined,” *Asian Ethnicity* 1, no. 1 (March 2000).

China to the Tibetan plateau that has hastened *sinicization* and the migration of the Han populations.

Tibetan power sharing in the government is also limited due to poor representation. China conducted a purge of Tibetan authorities in the 1980s, leaving only a few “Tibetan replacements whom they could trust,” to run the government.<sup>164</sup> By the mid-1990s Tibetans were typically considered “unqualified” to hold critical positions in the government or communist party with no Tibetans holding any position higher than deputy party secretary and only comprising approximately 30–40 percent of the Tibetan regional party organization.<sup>165</sup> Furthermore, the EPR database considers the Tibetan minority in China as powerless in the 1980s to 1990s and discriminated against from 2000 up to 2017. The Tibetan leadership has no access to senior decision-making in the communist party and, despite the Chinese reports, have only token abilities to administer government policy in the TAR through Chinese approval.

The powerless situation of the Tibetan population suggests we would expect their chance of conducting nonviolent resistance to be lower than that of a violent resistance. Recent reporting has indicated that Tibetan youth are primed to return to a violent resistance against the PRC. While the religious populations are still encouraging a steadfast focus on nonviolent resistance in Tibet, there is a growing call to return to violent resistance by the youth and economically disenfranchised elements.

## 7. Tibet Game

Tibet demonstrates the Chinese government’s de facto response of state surveillance, harassment, and violent repression against the Tibetan population. When looking at the game for both China and Tibet, it is highly foreseeable that China would immediately resort to a violent response to Tibetan resistance. We must also consider that China has been able to eliminate the backfire effect in the international community through economic and diplomatic pressures. Although the Free Tibet movement has brought the

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<sup>164</sup> Solomon M. Karmel, “Ethnic Tension and the Struggle for Order: China’s Policies in Tibet,” *Pacific Affairs* 68, no. 4 (Winter -1996 1995): 489.

<sup>165</sup> Karmel, 500.

plight of the Tibetans into the international media, there has been a lack of external condemnation of China and support of their policies. China is able to mitigate the national and international outrage through manipulation and control of the media and thereby the narrative, eliminating the use of Backfire Model through covering up the actions of the state.<sup>166</sup>

The game between Tibet and China favors the PRC as long as they are able to limit the ability of Tibetans to communicate with the outside world and keep it as an internal issue to the state. If the Tibetan population is able to project the injustices past the “Great Firewall of China” and garner international condemnation of the Chinese government it might gain more support. Furthermore, it must project to sympathetic ethnic Han populations the civil abuses in Tibet. Until those aspects of the game can be accounted for, we can expect China will continue to win the game and furthermore use the same tactics against other minority groups in China.

## **8. Tibet Conclusion**

Tibet attempted multiple resistances that began with an aborted violent resistance and transitioned into a decades long civil resistance campaign. There are a few circumstances that make it a unique resistance campaign. The Dalai Lama and approximately 60,000 Tibetans emigrated during 1959 to India and Nepal, reducing the leadership and potential resistance participation. Additionally, immigration of Chinese Han from the mainland to the Tibetan region has restricted the ability of the Tibetans to mobilize by limiting the ability to develop strict in-group and out-group relationships. Another crucial element is the number of Chinese military personnel stationed in Tibet to ensure the security of the region. The PRC maintains a significant security apparatus that is able to disenfranchise the Tibetan population and reinterpret the narrative on resistance protest in Tibet and change the perception of what is happening to the greater Han population. The violent insurgency was stillborn due to the withdrawal of any serious support from the United States; a semi-effective civil resistance has been initiated in its place. We can expect

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<sup>166</sup> Brian Martin, *Backfire manual* (Sparsnäs: Irene Publishing, 2012), 13.

the civil resistance to continue on a long-term basis and extract small concessions from the Chinese government as modernization occurs on the Tibetan Plateau, but a successful secession of Tibet from China is not probable until the dynamics of the situation significantly change.

## 9. West Sahara Background

See how they chimed in me  
the drums of war,  
and I responded by preaching peace  
so that my grandfather's soul  
rest in peace and in my desert  
and with my jaima only peace prevails.<sup>167</sup>

West Sahara is an example of the catastrophic after-effects of poor planning during the transition from colonialization combined with a population's search for national self-determination. West Sahara has a rich history of violent resistance against colonialism and foreign aggressors.<sup>168</sup> The occupied area of West Sahara, also called the administered region, is the result of proxy wars between Algeria and Morocco. West Sahara contains many elements for a successful insurgency, yet a nonviolent movement not only developed, but partially succeeded in the progress for a potentially independent state of West Sahara. However, as of 2019, Morocco still claims rightful administration and ownership of the administrated region with a potential for a politically compromised Sahrawi autonomous region as part of the Moroccan state. This possible solution has previously been suggested as an option for the Saharawi minority.

Western Sahara, a Spanish colony from 1884 to 1975, became a proxy battlefield for Mauritania and Morocco over primordial claims. The Saharawi claim a historic right to the land and culture that dates back prior to the creation of either the Moroccan or West Saharan state. In the early twentieth century, France, Spain, and Morocco vied for power over the regions of the Rio de Oro and the Saguia el-Hamara, now identified as West

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<sup>167</sup> Mahmud Bahia Awah, *One Peace Day*, 2015, Poem, <https://www.bahiaawah.net/poes%C3%ADa/>.

<sup>168</sup> Matthew Porges and Christian Leuprecht, "The Puzzle of Nonviolence in Western Sahara," *Democracy and Security* 12, no. 2 (April 2, 2016): 69, <https://doi.org/10.1080/17419166.2015.1100500>.

Sahara. France assumed control over Mauritania while Spain retained the areas of West Sahara. The Sahrawis executed guerrilla operations against the French and Spanish during the colonization. France eventually eliminated the majority of the local Sahrawi resistance in 1934 after nearly a century of resistance and pacification operations.<sup>169</sup> Although the Sahrawis successfully thwarted Spanish pacification efforts, France demonstrated a higher degree of coordination and were superiorly armed, leading to French administration of the region.<sup>170</sup> This colonization period in Mauritania and West Sahara was rife with insurgent warfare by the local population.

In 1956, France granted Morocco independence. Spain retained Western Sahara out of fear of the Moroccan Army of Liberation. The army was composed of groups of Moroccan militias who fought for independence from France and Spain in order to secure the region under Moroccan administration.<sup>171</sup> The Moroccan Army of Liberation supported the Sahrawi guerrillas, known as the Saharan Liberation Army, in an effort to unify the area of West Sahara and Morocco, resulting in a fierce campaign against the Spanish that included assassination of Spanish officials, skirmishes, and ambushes.<sup>172</sup> The French and Spanish, in a concerted effort, pacified the Sahrawi population by 1957 and rendered the Saharan Liberation Army impotent. Members of the Saharan Liberation Army who participated in the conflict against Spain fled to Morocco after their defeat, most of them destitute, relying on the Moroccan government for assistance.<sup>173</sup> By 1972 the UN called for Spain to hand over the territory of Western Sahara to the people and allow their right to “self-determination and independence.”<sup>174</sup> In response, Spain handed over the lands to Mauritania and Morocco in 1975 believing there wasn’t significant support for the development of an independent West Saharan state. This decision ignited a proxy war

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<sup>169</sup> Tony Hodges, *Western Sahara: The Roots of a Desert War* (Westport, Conn: L. Hill, 1983), 55.

<sup>170</sup> Hodges, 63.

<sup>171</sup> David Lynn Price, *The Western Sahara*, The Washington Papers, vol. VII, 63 (Beverly Hills, Calif: Sage Publications, 1979), 12.

<sup>172</sup> Price, 12.

<sup>173</sup> Hodges, *Western Sahara*, 82.

<sup>174</sup> Hodges, 107.

between Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, Libya, and other foreign nations over the future of West Sahara that is still in contention in 2019.<sup>175</sup>

The Popular Front for the Liberation of the Saguiet el Hamra and Rio de Oro (Polisario) is the result of the Saharawi conflict and fight for self-determination to govern themselves. The Sahrawis established the Polisario to fight the Spanish in 1973 and proposed an independent and non-aligned state, publishing a 27-point program of human rights and land reform.<sup>176</sup> Algeria supported and molded the Polisario as a proxy force against Spanish and Moroccan influence in the region, providing training and support to the Polisario in the 1970s.<sup>177</sup> When Spain ended their colonialization in 1976, the Polisario developed the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) as a political arm of the movement.<sup>178</sup><sup>179</sup> The Polisario focused their attention on ejecting both the Mauritanian and Moroccan forces. Mauritania withdrew from the conflict in 1978 and subsequently recognized SADR. The Organization of African Unity (OAU), later named the African Union (AU), officially recognized the Polisario, praising their ceasefire efforts with Mauritania and endorsing SADR's push for self-determination.<sup>180</sup> The Royal Moroccan Armed Forces (FAR) continued operations against the Polisario, despite the OAU recognition, securing 80-percent of Western Sahara by 1991, yet falling short of defeating the guerrillas who continue to maintain bases and support in Western Algeria.

Morocco's success lay in the creation of the world's largest minefield and manned barrier, over 1,600-miles long, consisting of 26 known minefields and unexploded cluster

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<sup>175</sup> Geoffrey Jensen, *War and Insurgency in the Western Sahara* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press, 2013), 1.

<sup>176</sup> Price, *The Western Sahara*, 27.

<sup>177</sup> Price, 29.

<sup>178</sup> Jensen, *War and Insurgency in the Western Sahara*, 16.

<sup>179</sup> SADR is also referred to as RASD, although both acronyms refer to the same organization.

<sup>180</sup> Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, *The Western Saharans: Background to Conflict* (London: Totowa, N.J.: Croom Helm; Barnes & Noble Books, 1980), 261.

bomb sites.<sup>181/182</sup> The barrier known as “The Berm,” completed in 1987, physically and symbolically demonstrates the segmentation of the Sahrawi populations. This barrier effectively eliminated the Polisario from conducting operations out of Algeria into West Sahara and halted any ability for operatives in West Sahara to establish safe havens. The Polisario and Moroccan government signed a UN-brokered ceasefire in 1991, officially ending the guerrilla movement of Polisario, which by this time was rendered unable to maintain significant pressure on the FAR. This further led to the creation of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) to mediate the conflict to a peaceful solution. The Polisario were forced into a strategic transition, moving from the nationalist struggle to a diplomatic organization.

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<sup>181</sup> “Western Sahara’s ‘Wall of Shame,’” Public Radio International, accessed September 5, 2019, <https://www.pri.org/stories/2009-08-15/western-saharas-wall-shame>.

<sup>182</sup> MINURSO, “Situation Concerning Western Sahara,” UN Security Council Report, April 1, 2019.




Figure 18. Western Sahara Control<sup>183</sup>

The partition and conflict divided the Sahrawi population, leading to the creation of West Sahara’s Sahrawi camps, both in Western Sahara and externally in Algeria. The nonviolent resistance originated in these camps and evolved into increasingly complex movements that spread to cities and student rights groups at the universities. The Sahrawis escaped the attacks by the FAR in the late 1980s and established six refugee camps in Algeria, located near the town of Tindouf, which is currently supported by MINURSO. Sahrawi populations that remained in the Moroccan-controlled West Sahara continue to be a minority population in West Sahara. This is further exacerbated by the Moroccan government moving ethnic Moroccan populations into West Sahara. The ethnic Moroccans

<sup>183</sup> Vish Sakhthivel, “The EU, Morocco, and the Western Sahara: A Chance for Justice,” *European Council on Foreign Relations*, June 10, 2016, [https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary\\_the\\_eu\\_morocco\\_and\\_the\\_western\\_sahara\\_a\\_chance\\_for\\_justice\\_7041](https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_the_eu_morocco_and_the_western_sahara_a_chance_for_justice_7041).

are now double the population size of the Sahrawis.<sup>184</sup> The remaining Sahrawi population now consists of refugees in Algeria, the administered Sahrawi population in Morocco and West Sahara, and the diaspora.

In 1999, the Sahrawi population took control of the resistance from the Polisario and initiated the first Intifada in occupied territories of Western Sahara, foregoing the typical guerrilla attacks that were popular under the Polisario resistance.<sup>185</sup> In the West Saharan occupied city of Al-'Ayun, students conducted "sit-in" demonstrations in an effort to increase Sahrawi attendance in Moroccan universities. These demonstrations attracted other Sahrawi activists advocating for accountability of Sahrawi disappearances at the hands of the Moroccan government. The demonstration also brought the support of the Moroccan Union of Unemployed University Graduates.<sup>186</sup> The Sahrawi's goals for these protests were initially limited to social and economic gains and provided a metric for how Morocco would react to future civil resistances.<sup>187</sup> Moroccan police responded harshly to these demonstrations, as anticipated, and energized the civil resistance, increasing its intensity and attracting more Sahrawi and disenfranchised Moroccans to the cause.

The Second Intifada, known as the *Intifada Istiqlal*, also originated in Al-'Ayun in 2005.<sup>188</sup> At this time the resistance groups began to distance themselves from the Polisario, taking the lead in resistance movement against the Moroccan occupation.<sup>189</sup> Other smaller, nonviolent civil resistance activities also occurred between the first and second intifada, but were not significant enough to mobilize mass attention as the demonstrations in Al' Ayun. The Second Intifada was precipitated by the movement of a

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<sup>184</sup> Maria J. Stephan and Jacob Mundy, "A Battlefield Transformed: From Guerrilla Resistance to Mass Nonviolent Struggle in the Western Sahara," *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies* 8, no. 3 (Spring 2006): 6.

<sup>185</sup> Jensen, *War and Insurgency in the Western Sahara*, 17.

<sup>186</sup> Stephan and Mundy, "A Battlefield Transformed: From Guerrilla Resistance to Mass Nonviolent Struggle in the Western Sahara," 11.

<sup>187</sup> Stephan and Mundy, 11.

<sup>188</sup> Jacob Mundy, "Autonomy & Intifadah: New Horizons in Western Saharan Nationalism," *Review of African Political Economy*, North Africa: Power, Politics & Promise, 33, no. 108 (January 2006): 263.

<sup>189</sup> Chris Brazier, "Intifada in Western Sahara: Morocco Seals Off the Occupied Territory," *New Internationalist*, August 2005.

Sahrawi prisoner from Al-Ayun to Morocco, upsetting the prisoner's parents and local community. These nonviolent protests were once again met with violent repression from the Moroccan police. The backfire from these events spread news of the intifada to the towns of Zemla, Ma'atallah, Smara, and Dakahla in West Sahara, Tan Tan and Assa in Morocco, and Universities in Agadir, Marrakesh, Casablanca, Rabat, and Fez.<sup>190</sup> Moroccan police further exacerbated the situation by killing a protester, Hamdi Lembarki, marking him as the first Intifada martyr in series of deaths that would occur before the resistances completion in 2006.<sup>191</sup> This was the first time that "first generation" Sahrawi nationalists led the Intifada, making the 2005 resistance significantly different from other earlier movements in terms of its approach and also its youthful political structure.<sup>192</sup>

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<sup>190</sup> Stephan and Mundy, "A Battlefield Transformed: From Guerrilla Resistance to Mass Nonviolent Struggle in the Western Sahara," 14.

<sup>191</sup> Stephan and Mundy, 16.

<sup>192</sup> Mundy, "Autonomy & Intifadah: New Horizons in Western Saharan Nationalism," 264.




Figure 19. Polisario Organizational Chart

Polisario and SADR have since attempted to expand their reach into developing internal resistance platforms and support other nonviolent organizations, such as NOVA Sahara Occidental, part of the International Institute for Nonviolent Action (NOVACT). Polisario is inherently limited in their capability to infiltrate Moroccan territories and relies on organizations within Morocco and their occupied territories. NOVA, as one of the principle organizations, provides resistance capabilities and execution of nonviolent campaigns. Plataforma Gritos Contra el Muro Marroqui additionally provides nonviolent resistance in Polisario-occupied West Sahara, conducting artistic campaigns and demonstrations on the east side of the Moroccan berm.<sup>193</sup> The significant challenge is that the Polisario organization is not physically located in West Sahara and the associated

<sup>193</sup> "Introduction | Remove the Moroccan Wall in Western Sahara," accessed September 5, 2019, <http://removethewall.org/the-campaign/introduction/>.

resistance groups do not share the philosophy as the Polisario leadership. The result of this challenge is the development of parallel resistances that are not necessarily connected or supporting a unified cause.

## **10. West Sahara Power Sharing**

Power sharing within West Sahara remains a challenge to the Sahrawi population in Morocco. Sahrawis are estimated to be only one-quarter to one-third of the total inhabitants of Western Sahara. The Sahrawis are powerless in the state and after an ambitious effort of the Moroccan government, the ethnic Moroccans now outnumber the Sahrawis two to one. Power sharing has become constricted, as the Moroccan government will not let any candidates run for office that support any form of independence for West Sahara.<sup>194</sup> The occupied areas are allowed 13 representatives in the Moroccan Parliament out of a total of 515 total representatives. Freedom House categorizes the political freedom of West Sahara as seven out of seven, the worst rating, signifying the Saharawi population maintains no political freedom.<sup>195</sup> The Moroccan government actively prosecutes individuals who attempt to vie for independence or policies that are contrary to the Moroccan policy of an occupied West Sahara under Moroccan governance.

Morocco offers the solution of an autonomous region that would increase the Sahrawi participation in government and allow for increased political power both within their region and with the Moroccan government, but this option remains unrealized and unsupported by the Saharawi population. By granting an autonomous region, it would still remain in the hands of the Moroccan population that maintains a two-to-one or greater population advantage over the native Sahrawis. Additionally, the granting of the autonomous region would not provide for the reintegration of the Polisario, SADR, and the reunification of the population. This would effectively leave the Sahrawi living in the Algerian displacement camps. Ahmed Lakhri, presumably speaking on behalf of the Sahrawi population, stated that Morocco's autonomy proposal is the only possible way

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<sup>194</sup> "West Sahara Profile," Profile (Freedom House, 2018), <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2018/western-sahara>.

<sup>195</sup> "West Sahara Profile."

forward in resolving the crisis.<sup>196</sup> Autonomy appears to be the most likely option for the West Saharan state, although the majority of the Sahrawi population does not support this possibility. If there isn't a move towards some form of political solution for West Sahara, there is a possibility of an escalated resistance that blends both violent and nonviolent tactics.

Power sharing in West Sahara is further complicated by SADR and Polisario attempts to govern from Tindouf in Algeria. SADR and the Polisario provide governance and security for Tindouf, along with security for MINURSO forces in Algeria and Polisario-controlled West Sahara.<sup>197</sup> While the SADR maintains a political structure developed to maintain organization in the displacement camps, they have minimal ability to project their political will, and furthermore, have no capacity for governance in West Sahara. Morocco violently suppresses any support for independence and support for the Polisario movement. SADR is therefore powerless as a political group within West Sahara and too insignificant in numbers to be a viable political force.

## 11. West Sahara Game

Morocco routinely targets Sahrawi citizens through detentions, murder, and police brutality to establish state control of the region. Arabs comprise the dominant population of Morocco at 59%, powerless Berbers at 39% and the discriminated-against Sahrawis at 1.6% of the population, with others composing the remaining 10.4%.<sup>198</sup> West Sahara maintains an estimated 619,000 citizens, with an estimated 200,000 Sahrawis. Another estimated 100,000 Sahrawis live in refugee camps in the vicinity of Tindouf, Algeria.<sup>199</sup> The power sharing makeup of West Sahara suggests the newly created minority ethnic Sahrawis will choose a violent resistance over a nonviolent approach. A poll conducted by

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<sup>196</sup> "Compromise Inescapable, Says Former Head of Western Sahara Referendum Mission, as Fourth Committee Continues Hearing Petitioners," Meetings Coverage, October 5, 2017, <https://www.un.org/press/en/2017/gaspd635.doc.htm>.

<sup>197</sup> MINURSO, "Situation Concerning Western Sahara."

<sup>198</sup> Manuel Vogt et al., "Integrating Data on Ethnicity, Geography, and Conflict: The Ethnic Power Relations Data Set Family," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59, no. 7 (2015): 1327–42.

<sup>199</sup> "Africa: Western Sahara — The World Factbook - Central Intelligence Agency," accessed September 5, 2019, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/wi.html>.

NOVA in 2014 suggests that 62 percent of refugees, between 18 and 40, in Algeria support renewed violence against Morocco.<sup>200</sup>

One reason for choosing nonviolent civil resistance over a return to insurgency may rest in the discriminated population's access to external support. The Polisario maintains a limited ability to support the Sahrawi population in West Sahara, due to both geographic separation and barriers to communication. The lack of safe haven to build a guerrilla force and infiltrate West Sahara has forced the Sahrawis to organize with available resources that support civil resistance over a continued insurgency. While the Sahrawi population has veered toward the strategic decision of nonviolent resistance, there is a possibility for them to revert to their violent insurgent strategy. Abd Erahman Mohamed from Libertad y Paz stated to the UN meeting on West Sahara in 2017 that if "the United Nations did not adopt resolutions that reaffirmed the rights of the Sahrawi people, they would take their rights by any means necessary."<sup>201</sup> It is probable that if the Polisario is able to create movement across the berm and a safe haven within Algeria or other neighboring regions, that a violent insurgency might reemerge. As long as the Sahrawi populations are constrained, we should expect them to remain with their strategy of civil resistance.

## **12. West Sahara Conclusion**

One reason for choosing nonviolent civil resistance over a return to insurgency may rest in the discriminated population's access to external support. The Polisario maintains a limited ability to support the Sahrawi population in West Sahara, who are both geographically separated and communicatively separated from the resistance force. The lack of a safe havens to build a guerrilla force and infiltrate forces the Sahrawis to organize with available resources that don't lend themselves to insurgent activities.

The Polisario currently does not have the access or placement to move the civil resistance of West Sahara to a successful conclusion. Organizations such as NOVA will

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<sup>200</sup> "Western Sahara: 'No One Even Knows If We're There or Not,'" The New Humanitarian, April 2, 2019, <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news-feature/2019/04/02/western-sahara-young-generation-refugees>.

<sup>201</sup> "Compromise Inescapable, Says Former Head of Western Sahara Referendum Mission, as Fourth Committee Continues Hearing Petitioners."

have to mobilize and generate support for the civil resistance internally. To achieve an effective “backfire” effect on Morocco, the resistance must increase its ability to generate global awareness outside MINURSO’s limited capability. The Sahrawis are in a difficult position as they are considered a fairly liberal Islamic population. Conservative Middle Eastern nations are wary of supporting the significantly more liberal Saharawi by putting pressure on Morocco to grant succession or autonomy.

The West Saharan and East Timor civil resistances are often examined in parallel, with continuing partnerships between the two ethnic populations. Both areas are the result of the post colonialization land grabs by the more powerful ethnic groups in the area. The Timorese and Saharawi insurgencies were also both eliminated by the occupying state. Timor’s Jose Ramos-Horta lamented the ability of East Timor to achieve independence after decolonization whereas Western Sahara is still occupied by a foreign state. Ramos-Horta, a supporter of the Saharawi plight, identifies that foreign powers have a “misguided belief that stability in the southern Mediterranean can be bought with policies that will increase the instability of the Sahara.”<sup>202</sup> Both cases are typically seen as very similar circumstances with different outcomes, specifically with the ability of East Timor to garner international attention and the West Saharan resistance largely ignored on the international stage.

### C. CONCLUSION

The cases of East Timor, Tibet, and West Sahara illustrate three examples where an insurgency transitioned into a civil resistance. East Timor is the only case where, following an insurgency, the civil resistance led to the population’s desired goal, specifically that of independence and national self-determination. Tibet received autonomous status within China, yet is still plagued by a lack of political autonomy within their region and continual political discrimination within the PRC. West Sahara remains an occupied territory of Morocco and is challenged by a mobilizing element within the occupied territory that is disconnected from the Polisario with their own goals and

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<sup>202</sup> Jose Ramos-Horta, “The Dignity of the Ballot,” *The Guardian*, October 30, 2005.

grievances. In these three cases, however, there are some commonalities in what constitutes successful practices and what has impeded the movements' abilities to succeed.

The ability to maintain political unity and strength within the disputed area is clearly critical for maintaining momentum and success. East Timor maintained their political power within the state through FALINTIL and was able to redevelop the organization even as the insurgency was beaten by the Indonesian forces. The critical element of developing the Clandestine Front allowed the East Timorese to challenge the Indonesian occupation forces and additionally gain support by Indonesians attending schools on Java and West Sumatra. The ability to coordinate these activities also provided a unified narrative.

In Tibet, the loss of the Dalai Lama in 1959 along with thousands of his supporters hindered the resistance movement. The resistance was plagued by a segmented population that included CIA-sponsored insurgents and a monastery-supported civil resistance that was not coordinated. The monastery took the leadership role in the transition to civil resistance, but was plagued by a disconnect with the Dalai Lama and the wider diaspora for support. Additionally, with the creation of the TAR and three other regions administered by China, it was improbable they would be able to unify the Tibetan plateau.

The West Saharans continue to be plagued by the inability to unify their political challenge to Morocco. The SADR and resistance groups within West Sahara have different priorities and grievances against the Moroccan government. When the berm was created in West Sahara, it effectively ended the insurgency and halted a safe haven external to Algeria, thus segmenting the population. During European Union and UN investigations into a potential solution for the West Sahara occupied territory, there continue to be two parties arguing for Sahrawi independence, one located within Morocco and the SADR.<sup>203</sup> From these observations, it appears to be critical that the political mobilization is coordinated between the insurgency and civil resistance during their transition.

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<sup>203</sup> Sakthivel, "The EU, Morocco, and the Western Sahara: A Chance for Justice"; "Compromise Inescapable, Says Former Head of Western Sahara Referendum Mission, as Fourth Committee Continues Hearing Petitioners."

The second challenge during the transition from insurgency to civil resistance is the maintenance of the ethnic population's demographics against outside emigration of the more powerful group. In West Sahara and Tibet, the occupying nations "watered down" the population by emigrating more politically powerful ethnicities into the region. In West Sahara, there appears to be little possibility of the Sahrawis exercising political control over the region. The ethnic Arabs currently outnumber the native Sahrawis and any political vote will continue to repress any native representation. Likewise, in Lhasa, the Tibetan population is now considered to be equal with the ethnic Han population. The diluting of the ethnic density of the region appears to be significant in restricting the ability of the resistance movement to gain momentum. The Chinese *sinicization* of Tibet is the prominent method for changing the dynamics of ethnic power sharing in the region to a group that shares in-group identities and beliefs with the dominant power-sharing element. East Timor also benefited geographically due to their location. The Indonesian government did not attempt to move Sumatran or Javanese populations to East Timor, thus maintaining a homogenous population. The Timorese were able to maintain a unified front through the FALINTIL and the Catholic church that allowed for unification throughout their resistance. If ethnic density maintenance is important to the preservation of the resistance, then tactics must transition when the demographics change. This is similar to East Timor using RENITIL to mobilize Javanese and Sumatran college students to speak out on behalf of the East Timor cause.

Finally, during the civil resistance there must be a transition from insurgency to civil resistance that links the two participating populations while maintaining the capability to perpetrate an insurgent threat. Insurgencies are inherently secretive and exclusionary in nature. While populations may support insurgent movements, the available population who may actively support their kinetic activities remains small. A civil resistance increases the inclusion of the population, which is crucial to its success. The civil resistance relies on the lowering of barriers and encouraging mass popular activities and support. The transition from the insurgency to civil resistance must enable the population to act in proxy of the insurgent activities. East Timor provides the best evidence for this. When FRETILIN was unable to maintain activities against the Indonesian forces, FALINTIL was able to leverage

the grievances for activities with significantly lower barriers to entry. The population was able to exhibit their grievances through public acts, religious proclamations, and civic demonstrations. In contrast, the Tibetan resistance failed to link the insurgency's transition to civil resistance. The nature of the CIA-driven insurgency provided no linkages to the civic grievances in Lhasa, and the population was unable transition the insurgent activities to civil resistance. Likewise, when the civil resistance took hold during the second uprising, there was no fear of an insurgent force in tandem with a civil resistance to challenge the PRC. Similarly, the creation of the West Saharan berm eliminated the insurgent threat and disconnected the insurgency from any civil resistance effort. Once the Polisario insurgency was limited to Algeria and areas east of the berm, it was no longer a threat to Morocco. Thus, the Sahrawis were unable to completely transition to civil resistance. This suggests that during a transition to civil resistance, the insurgency or threat of insurgency must remain somewhat credible. In the strategic game, the transition appears to precipitate a strategic change in choice for the state when an insurgent force is maintained as a credible threat. The removal of the insurgent force from the calculation allows the state to continue the punishment of population without fear of repercussion.

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## V. CONCLUSION

### A. UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES?

This thesis analyzed ethnic power structures, proposed a game theoretic model, and examined three separate case studies to determine elements of resistance that potentially lead to a civil resistance outcome. The research first asked if there is any distinguishable ethnic power sharing division that promotes a civil resistance as opposed to violent insurgency. Secondly, using a game theoretic model, I described the likely initial strategic choices between a state and resistance movement. Finally, using a selection of case studies, I suggested that there are common elements that contribute to the outcome of a resistance campaign which transitioned from violent insurgency. This research is predicated on previous studies that highlight the viability of civil resistance. I posit, that if civil resistance is more effective, then it requires a more in-depth analysis of the elements that lead to a successful civil resistance outcome.

#### 1. When Ethnicity Matters

Ethnicity in violent and nonviolent resistance demonstrates an in-group functionality that allows for mobilization. When the ethnic power group is limited in the number of groups, but larger in the percentage of the total population, there is a greater ability for the population to mobilize from a violent insurgency to a civil resistance. The ability of the ethnic power group to universalize common grievances is important in achieving broader participation. Both the quantitative and qualitative analysis presented above demonstrates that there is a trend that encourages civil resistance when the population is able to unify under a similar group, especially as it grows larger as percentage of the total population. The study also demonstrated a divergence in the strategic tendencies between senior and junior ethnic power sharing groups. This finding warns that states that increase the number of junior partner sharing groups in the political structure, by granting them only token representation, may increase the probability of violent resistance and decrease the probability of civil resistance. In contrast, states that increase the number of senior partner groups, who are granted more substantial access to state power, may

decrease the probability of violent resistance and increase the probability of non-violent civil resistance.

Ethnicity, in the case of East Timor, increased the ability of the population to coalesce around a single identity. This identity of the Maubere culture was mobilized to unite ethnically similar populations against the outgroup of Indonesians. Through the flexibility of FALINTIL and FRETILIN, the group abandoned their communist underpinnings, allowing for broader acceptance of the resistance message. The Timorese unified under a singular ethnic population upon the return of the UDT in 1998, after 24 years of separation between the ethnic power sharing groups. East Timor demonstrated a case of a powerless ethnic population binding together to achieve a successful civil resistance succession.

West Sahara and Tibet demonstrate very different approaches to ethnic power sharing. In both cases, the dominant ethnic power group took steps to reduce the percentage size of the persecuted ethnic group by a process of *sinicization* or emigration. In an effort to “water down” the Tibetan ethnic minority group, the Chinese transplanted ethnic Han onto the Tibetan plateau. In West Sahara, the ethnic Moroccans are also following a policy of emigrating ethnic Moroccans into West Sahara, reducing any ability of the West Saharans to mobilize as an ethnic ingroup. Both Morocco and China appear to have found method for countering a popular resistance by changing the ethnic makeup of a region in favor for the more powerful ethnic group.

## **2. The Opponent and Violence**

The second section suggested a game theoretic model to identify the potential initial outcomes of decisions by a resistance movement and state. A key observation of this model is that a state’s initial response is primarily weighted towards the targeting of the civilian population. The resistance is also encouraged towards a violent strategic option, including insurgency. However, if the game were to be played in iterations, the calculus of the options might change based on environmental and social factors. For instance, if an insurgency is able to maintain a safe haven and funding, as seen in places like Vietnam, then it may be encouraged to maintain its violent strategic option. But if the safe haven and insurgent

elements are rendered ineffective, such as in East Timor, then a transition to civil resistance may become more likely.

Future research on the interaction between civil resistance and insurgency should focus on the elements underpinning this strategic choice. The game theoretic model only analyzed the initial outcome of the interaction between the resistance and the state. The case studies identify that the strategic options occurred in iterative decision-making cycles. A further analysis of the game between the state and population using an iterative theoretic model could provide a list of elements that change the calculation for the resistance and state. One element of the game that should be included in future research when examining iterative games is the ability of the resistance to achieve a backfire effect in both internal and external audiences. East Timor was able to change the strategic environment by incorporating an external audience of the Catholic Church and promoting international condemnation of Indonesian activities. The Timorese were also proficient at targeting Indonesian students and activists to promote the resistance on the Timorese behalf. The Tibetans were unable to garner any significant support from the Han population, although they achieved support from the international community. The Tibetans still maintain visibility for their issues, publicizing the violent activities of the PRC far outside of Tibet. The West Saharans witnessed similar challenges in gaining international support using the backfire effect. Allies of Morocco, to include the United States, have stilted efforts for international attention, although the Saharawi are garnering support from the African Union. Currently, leaders in both West Sahara and Tibet have mentioned a possible return to violent resistance if they are unable to achieve results with their current civil resistance movement.

### **3. Stay Violent or Transition to Nonviolent Methodology?**

The three case studies demonstrate situations where a population has transitioned to a nonviolent resistance with mixed success. Various scholars have suggested that a transition to civil resistance is the preferable strategy by exploiting the pluralistic power structures of a state, which the government must rely on. But for the existing power structure to be overthrown, the population must be able to unite under similar grievances,

which appears to be easier to achieve when the ethnic power structure is similar. In addition, the decision to transition from violent resistance to civil resistance appears to occur most often when the insurgent capability is marginalized or removed. It is also important to remember, as witnessed in the case studies, that while civil resistance represents a potentially powerful approach, the transition to civil resistance does not necessarily lead to success.

#### **4. Final Thoughts**

Civil resistance is a viable demonstrated strategy for challenging both violent and nonviolent state oppression. The ability of a resistance movement to choose a specific strategy appears to be limited by factors that encourage a specific decision. This thesis found that resistance capability hinges on the power of the ethnic group. Having a limited number and percentage of disempowered ethnic power groups tends to promote the decision for civil resistance over violent insurgent strategies. Mass mobilization needed for a civil resistance appears predicated on the population's ability to unify under shared grievances and structures, which is more likely when the disempowered populations of a state are less fragmented. A large number of disempowered groups favor violence as a strategic option, this relationship is opposite for senior partner sharing groups. Resistance movements should therefore be wary of any state attempt to change the ethnic makeup in a resistance area that does not elevate them to senior partner status. Changes in the societal ethnic makeup can eliminate resources from the resistance, hinder mass mobilization, and change the strategy to a potentially suboptimal choice. Additionally, states that want to decrease violence from disempowered ethnic populations should bring these people into the government in a substantial and legitimate manner. By elevating these groups to ethnic senior partner sharing positions, the government can minimize the chance for violent resistance. Finally, violent resistance movements must accept that when their strategy has been rendered ineffective, they should attempt a rapid transition to civil resistance. A delayed acceptance of this transition by the resistance can hinder their ability to marginalize counterproductive violent sub-groups from the greater mass population effort. In short, while civil resistance might be the statistically superior strategy in certain situations, it

appears to be partially constrained by existing environmental conditions and interactions between ethnic power groups.

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