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## Programming challenges and impediments to reform: identifying pragmatic solutions

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### ABSTRACT

Using two recently published essays by the current writer that assesses the dismal record of performance of Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System in enabling communist legacy defence institutions in Central and Eastern Europe to develop viable defence plans, this essay argues the need for deep reforms in the region's defence institutions. To guide this reform effort, pragmatic solutions are suggested to improve the ability of these organisations to produce viable defence plans. Recommended reforms are: (1) conduct conceptual and cultural "audits," (2) make operational and financial data central to decision-making, (3) change current organisational sociology, (4) examine planning methods and practices, and (5) stress the need to adopt policy frameworks to drive the operation of defence institutions.

### KEYWORDS

Programming; PPBS; NATO; central/Eastern Europe; post-communism

The current writer has recently published two essays that examine closely the record of success of budgetary programming methods (Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System – PPBS) in almost all post-communist European countries located in Central and Eastern Europe.<sup>1</sup> The purpose of these essays was to ascertain why these countries have been incapable of developing implementable defence plans (i.e. that have been successfully executed) since their independence. The first essay sought to examine in a comparative sense, what was missing in the implementation of the programming methods using the "prevailing practices" of the three US armed services. That essay found that these nations shared a similarity with the US Department of the Navy's tradition of isolating policy from financial execution; a practice assiduously not replicated by the US Army and US Air Force staffs.<sup>2</sup> In fact, what the essay argued is that a partial explanation for the failure of these countries to develop viable defence plans was due to the method's misapplication. The second essay had two purposes; first, to demonstrate how the use of PPBS by ministries of defence and general staffs in the region has crippled their ability to produce viable defence plans across the region; and second, to argue that it was a mistake to the introduce PPBS (and its supporting bureaucracy) before the establishment of strong "policy frameworks" in ministries to *drive* the operation of these defence institutions.

It is on this foundation of arguments that this essay examines, given the underperformance of PPBS to produce costed and viable defence plans, what steps should political and defence officials in the region take to reform their weak defence planning processes? Thus,

the intent in this essay is not to revisit the question of the applicability, or suitability, of PPBS in these defence institutions: the method's failure is a matter of record in the literature.<sup>3</sup> Rather, at this stage what is apposite is to examine what needs to be done to rectify the region's defence planning weaknesses. It is with the intention of addressing these organisational *lacunae* that the current writer posits that introducing new methods without changing the existing bureaucracy is unlikely to produce success. Indeed, such institutional change must be based on a thorough understanding of each defence institution's organisational sociology, whilst retiring legacy concepts, assumptions, and logic.

This suggested process promises to be rather messy and most certainly can only be contemplated and executed based on each individual defence institution's unique conceptual configuration.<sup>4</sup> In short, a "cookie cutter" approach, or standardised advice and assistance programmes, of the type advocated by Marshall, will be shown to be inappropriate to the task.<sup>5</sup> Clearly the more legacy concepts continue to ramify throughout an individual institution, then the more challenging reform will be. Thus, approaching the need to effect real change will be neither linear, nor uniform, let alone predictable. Moreover, in light of the collective negative experience of these countries in introducing PPBS, it must be emphatically stressed that importing foreign "national models," irrespective of their provenance and alleged proven success, must be eschewed. Rather, it will be argued that these defence institutions would be well served by initiating any such change management campaigns first by conducting cultural, as well as conceptual "audits" in order to identify unwanted legacy inheritances that need to be removed in order to achieving real change. Based on an understanding of these systematic self-analyses should efforts be undertaken to address likely shortcomings in their respective defence institutions.

What is being proposed is admittedly challenging to any bureaucracy, let alone ones that continue to be plagued by the presence of legacy concepts (which in fact, are communist artefacts) that continue to drive their organisation and which impede the adoption of Western democratic defence governance concepts. In this respect, it must be stressed *in extremis* that the adoption of these new governance concepts can only occur in a mutually exclusive manner. The reason for this assertion is that as the current writer has argued elsewhere, Western and legacy concepts are antithetical and therefore are arguably incapable of coexisting in the same institution. Frankly, the adoption of the former is critical to the functionality of Western liberal governance.<sup>6</sup> Indeed, one of many reasons why PPBS failed is that it was systematically "bolted" on top of legacy decision-making and financial management and organisational concepts.<sup>7</sup> However, of fundamental import must be the recognition that changing any public institution must be seen primarily as a political, *vice* technical challenge. Without the full support of the government and the senior leadership of the defence institution, 25 years of experience in the region clearly demonstrates that such efforts that define the challenge as technical in nature will fail. In order to support the current writer's argument, the following subjects will be addressed:

- (1) Utility of conceptual and cultural "audits."
- (2) Criticality of data: operational and financial.
- (3) Organisational sociology.
- (4) Planning methods and practices.
- (5) Missing policy frameworks.

## Utility of conceptual and cultural “audits”

In any institution, “concepts” are an essential tool for leadership and management to drive the functioning of the organisation. Whilst defence concepts are of essential importance, they are not always recognised as such. They may be so deeply absorbed, that they cease to be recognised as essential and therefore are taken for granted. Thus, officials can fall into the fallacy that technical actions can bring any change that is desired, even the most fundamental one. Specific Western defence concepts include de-centralisation of execution and decision-making, professionalisation (to include Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) invested with leadership responsibilities), deployability of forces, promotion on merit, and aligning accountability with responsibility and authority. Legacy conceptual counterparts conversely include hyper-centralisation of decision-making, conscription, low professionalisation, static territorial defence, promotion based on time served, and defining command as constituting unbridled power. Concepts can be identified where there is any sanctioned activity and/or the expenditure of funds. Given that the financial execution of endorsed (and costed) defence plans should be the life-blood of any defence institution, a conceptual audit must be led by the policy directorate, or absent its existence, this review must be run out of the minister’s political cabinet. The objective of this audit is to examine the entire organisation in order to ascertain and document prevailing concepts and assumptions. Following on the argument that concepts are not easily recognised as such, support by external experts would greatly facilitate this effort as incumbent defence and military officials are unlikely to be able to identify those concepts and assumptions that are so engrained into the institution. Albeit tedious, such an endeavour can produce surprising results for senior leadership and can help explain to the organisation how it actually functions, and critically, where the money is actually being *spent*.

Based on this understanding of the conceptual basis of the institution, policy directorates can determine which institutional weaknesses are due to the continued use of legacy concepts. A deep analysis of causation is essential since oftentimes the manifestation of operational and bureaucratic underperformance has no discernible linkage to causation. A case example is human resource management (HRM). Personnel management is almost universally acknowledged to be underdeveloped in these defence institutions. In nearly every case, these systems continue to base decision-making upon old concepts supporting a system that needs change. Yet reform progress has been painfully slow, notwithstanding Western advice and assistance projects. An explanation for both this institutional weakness and the inability of Western donors to provide apposite expertise, again, relates back to basic assumptions. Poor performance of HRM directorates, in and of themselves, can neither exist nor be judged in a vacuum. Thus, symptoms of weaknesses which are clear to all to see, do not necessarily express causation. A full appreciation of an organisation’s sociology is required to identify who makes decisions and on what basis (e.g. the essential need to understand the role played by collective decision-making fora, i.e. *collegia*).<sup>8</sup> Thus, continuing to focus on symptoms, vice discerning conceptual causation, will only perpetuate ineffectual advice and assistance efforts.

As Western democratic defence governance and legacy defence concepts are antithetical, then it follows that to adopt the former, the latter must be retired and indeed “de-legitimated.” The change of any public institution’s basic conceptual basis should be seen as constituting a political act and, as such, it must be accepted by governments as

such. Thus, based on the findings of a conceptual audit, the existence of legacy concepts will have to be acknowledged and new ones openly debated and adopted; at the same time all of the laws, regulations, and procedures that supported legacy concepts must be carefully and comprehensively identified and a schedule set for their retirement. An important contribution to reform would be if senior officials adopted proper incentives to encourage a strong dose of amnesia of their institutions' legacy heritage to clear out, as argue Kotter and Cohen, "historical artefacts."<sup>9</sup>

Finally, another audit should be conducted to determine whether Western democratic defence governance concepts are culturally acceptable, i.e. a cultural audit. Whilst there are many methods from which to select to ascertain cultural realities, the current writer finds Geert Hofstede's methods are more than adequate to understand differences of cultures norms between Western nations and their counterparts in Central and Eastern Europe.<sup>10</sup> To be sure, countries in this region are hardly homogenous, but these very variations argue the need for a more informed and nuanced understanding of those key cultural norms in each of them. As imperfect as the Hofstede data are (at the time of this writing, it lacks entries for Armenia, Azerbaijan, Moldova, Bosnia, Macedonia, and Montenegro), a review of the findings which appear in the [Appendix](#) reveals some useful insights of the degree to which Western and Eastern cultural norms are significantly different. Note that corresponding data for the US is represented for comparative purposes. If one reviews just two cultural criteria, "power distance" and "uncertainty avoidance," one can immediately observe where a better understanding of these cultural differences should be extensively employed when developing/reviewing Western policy and advice/assistance planning assumptions.

For instance, if some Western cultures (e.g. Nordic countries) can be typified as having low power distance, those in the East (particularly after the traumatic experience of communism) conversely score much higher (i.e. Bulgaria, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Croatia, Serbia, and Slovenia). In other words, power is centralised, and polarised, at the top of an organisation and its delegation is rarely allowed, and if so, only to a few trusted agents. In the case of Slovakia, power distance is scored to be at a maximum high of 100. Evidence supporting this finding is found in a report by a Slovak think tank that advocates the need for *regular* consultations between the president and the CHOD, as well as the minister of defence's *collegium* to enable more informed decision-making.<sup>11</sup> Such a cultural insight as power distance has direct applicability for defence institutions in many ways. Western-style de-centralised decision-making and mission-command (arguably the foundation stones on which Western democratic military concepts are based) are incomprehensible both to legacy officers and to soldiers from cultures with high power distances. Moreover, all of these armed forces have weak, and in some cases non-existent, force management capabilities due in part to the fact that force management requires an ongoing institutional dialogue with those in tactical formations accurately reporting problems, proposing solutions, and arguing requirements *via* an ongoing institutional dialogue, where truth must be spoken to power. Finally, in cultures with high power distance, concepts that are based on de-centralised decision-making (e.g. PPBS and a professional NCO corps) will need to be reviewed very carefully to determine whether they can be introduced, let alone adopted and accepted/internalised in such institutions.

Second, Hofstede's other highly relevant cultural characteristic is uncertainty avoidance. Cultures with a high incidence of this norm are the three Baltic States, Bulgaria,

the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Croatia, Serbia, and Slovenia. In these cultures, individuals are self-limiting when confronted with challenges outside the societal norm out of fear of losing status and stature within society or their organisation. Thus, problem-solving on one's own initiative, which would be a self-evident task of a Western armed force, will be difficult to encourage out of fear by individuals of unknown reactions by the group. Therefore, the Western concept of mission-command will be difficult to introduce and implement in an institution with such prevailing cultural norms.

The purpose of examining these data is not to make sweeping or broad generalisations that hold for all cases. Rather, the point is that the data show significant societal and cultural divergences amongst Western and Central/Eastern European individual national cultures which impede the introduction and acceptance of Western defence governance concepts. Where the data are sufficiently different speaks to the need for even a deeper understanding of each particular country's cultural foundations. It should be clear that adopting successfully Western defence and military concepts by legacy armed forces would be greatly enhanced with a full understanding of, *inter alia*, how to overcome and *co-opt* these ingrained cultural traits.

### **Criticality of data: operational and financial**

In defence institutions in the region, it is either procedurally or culturally proscribed to communicate officially upward (e.g. commanders submitting a statement of requirements). Hence, it is not a great surprise that one still finds that general staffs and ministries of defence are bereft of basic objective data that should be generated organically, based on the normal daily operations of the institution, in order to inform decision-making. This lack of data negatively affects operational planning and inhibits the appreciation of the financial costs of the contingent elements of defence. Gathering this lack of "data" is, in reality, a three-stage challenges. First, there is the need of simply gathering the right data. Second, there is the challenge of managing data systems, which likely never existed under communism, and even where they do; e.g. the SAP system in Ukraine MOD, they play no part in managerial decision-making.<sup>12</sup> Third, there is also the need for educated and trained personnel, in sufficient numbers, who are capable of interpreting data accurately and who have sufficient self-confidence and status to ensure data can inform decision-making.<sup>13</sup> What Western defence officials have generally assumed when engaging these defence institutions is that basic staff skills exist and that there is ongoing institutional debate and dialogue, based on objective data, to identify and resolve problems. Experience now shows that this has been a fallacious assumption, as with minor exceptions, such data-informed discussion and debate are infrequent in legacy defence institutions. Serbia presents a representative case of where performance of units is measured "with resource usage and inputs rather than activities, outputs, or outcomes" (i.e. accountancy-based reporting).<sup>14</sup> To be sure, individuals educated in Western PME institutions and those with NATO staff experience, or who have deployed on operations, will have been exposed to these processes and can appreciate their value. Although even these assumptions need care as often staff skills are taught early in an officer's career and staff colleges move to a more academic approach giving a false impression that individuals have been taught something useful. Moreover, the concept of debating the

outcomes of operational planning analysis has yet to be fully embraced, since many in leadership would see such bottom-up communication as a challenge to their authority.

The obvious question is: how to reform this debilitating practice? In many cases, the cultural norm of not communicating upward is reinforced by regulations which proscribe such acts, the reform of which should constitute a basic first step forward by a reform-minded government. But, as these are norms and behaviours, they are not easily changed. It will take enlightened political leadership to empower lower level officials, officers, and NCOs to break from their own self-imposed culture of self-constraint (e.g. high power distance and uncertainty avoidance) to express their professional views and opinions. Clearly, bureaucratic action alone cannot remedy this pathology as only initiatives by senior leadership can help change such deep-seated practices.<sup>15</sup> Thus, a critical priority for the adoption of Western democratic defence governance concepts must be the introduction of these planning and reporting concepts about ground-level activities that create an ongoing internal dialogue and debate within the defence institution using this objective operational planning data to determine solutions to challenges of capability development and conducting military operations. The implications of the introduction of such data would be widespread. Reformed planning, budgeting, and financial management directorates would be more functional due to the existence of data expressing existing and envisaged capability requirements. Similarly, all but absent force management concepts would have a foundation for their implementation through the regular stream of operational data from units and forces sent upward within the organisation.

Contemporaneous with the issue of the lack of operational data used within these defence institutions is the continued lack of appreciation of the need to be able to cost outcomes. In past, without the benefit of a market economy (i.e. with price discovery provided by markets), it was impossible for communist economists to ascertain the true resource cost of defence to the nation. As such, to say that these institutions at their transition/creation at independence were uninformed of the financial costs is an understatement. A pernicious narrative that continues to be heard in these defence institutions is shades of the legacy concept of “Military Economic Science”<sup>16</sup> that holds that it is the duty of the state to provide the resources necessary to defend the country. Of course, this “figure” is determined by the general staff, a practice that continues today (but without any authority) and is all but universally expressed as a required percentage of GDP. Thus, with minor exception at independence, these defence institutions started without objective financial baselines, or worse, recognition of the need to be cost-conscious. To be sure, all of these institutions have, to varying degrees, a growing expertise in financial management. However, this all tends to be about spending rather than on what an activity costs with the idea of informing debate and ministerial decision-making. What still needs to be adopted is the concept that: (1) there *must* be priorities based on policy and (2) they must be costed. Largely with external assistance, almost all of these countries have created, or have adopted, imported (and which are often overly complex) cost models. Yet, notwithstanding the introduction of these models, the creation of a costing culture accepted throughout many of these organisations has yet to be realised. A primary problem is the current managerial thinking that aligns itself with costing totals such as manpower, ammunition or housing rather than breaking down the costs into units or organisations. The problem with achieving this important goal has been due less to the technical challenge of developing cost models, but rather to their actual management. There are numerous explanations for this slow development.

The introduction of models to cost defence plans must be seen as constituting truly a Sisyphean task. In a strictly cultural sense, the basic concept of having to take into account financial considerations when planning “defence” remains to be fully embraced. For instance, many general staffs are expected to produce defence plans, absent using cost databases (e.g. Poland).<sup>17</sup> Cost models are often embedded in PPBS directorates and these data are not widely distributed, thereby removing any incentive for defence planners to adhere to financial reality. It should be little wonder, therefore, that so few of the defence plans produced with great profusion in the region are affordable, let alone accepted and adopted.<sup>18</sup> Worse yet, the data from models (where it is shared) are simply not seen as constituting legitimate planning factors, or are conveniently ignored. This has made for a perfect storm given that defence plans remain as foreign to most of these armed forces as is their costing.<sup>19</sup> As pedestrian as it may seem, a serious challenge to developing costed plans has been to determine *where* to place these models within the organisation and how and when to use the data in the planning process. All too often the technical advice from Western donors providing the methods/models did not factor in a proper understanding of existing bureaucratic and national cultures, as well as institutional disincentives. Thus, Western cost methods, models, and management concepts all too often have not supported rational defence planning, as placing them where they would produce their intended effect would threaten existing bureaucratic interests and prevailing political incentives. The reason for this is that the seemingly scientific/technical nature of these systems has reinforced an atavistic mind-set that holds that policy and planning should be subject to scientific, algorithmic solutions (*vide infra*).

It is with this misunderstanding of defence management that defence officials all too often placed these new models and expertise in newly created programming directorates of ministries of defence. This has had the added negative effect of concentrating all financial matters (and expertise) within *one* directorate, enabling it arbitrarily to make opaque *de facto* financial decisions that should have been made during the planning stage whilst at the same time de-coupling the institution’s financial expertise from the functional reality of the organisation. Placing cost models outside of planning directorates further weakened their ability to formulate financially viable defence plans closely linked to policy and even encouraged planners to ignore the financial realities and responsibilities of their defence plans. In short, defence planning directorates need to possess the responsibility and capability to cost everything whilst formulating defence plans for policy approval. The principle that all defence plans must be costed prior to their review by the policy directorate, and their implementation by officials responsible for delivering defence outcomes, is equally needed. Due to bureaucratic inertia such a basic reform has been slow in coming. For instance, following the all but collapse of the Latvian economy in 2008 and with the defence budget slashed by a third, its ministry of defence was forced to re-examine its planning procedures and assumptions. After this review, the institution’s cost models were moved from the responsibility of programming to the defence planning directorate.

Finally, the concept of costings has been misunderstood by officials in these defence institutions. There is a prevailing perception that cost models exist as scientifically accurate instruments. There is little or no understanding that changing doctrine or equipment, or for example, trying to raise operational standards with extra training before an operational tour should change the model’s assumptions. All too often, officials perceive

them as essentially algorithms that are correct in that they must be accurate. Missing from this understanding is the consideration that models, whilst based on quantitative methods, must be seen as management tools, and as such, inherently contains acceptable degrees of in-exactitude. This does not in any way depreciate their value as they are essentially simple in principle. The reality, then, of these tools is that there is a degree of subjectivity in their data, but this can be greatly mitigated over time if the data and the methodology are open to all for use, review, debate, and revision. This is the case with the Canadian armed forces, where Cost Factors manuals are updated annually and are made available throughout the defence institution.

What this implies, therefore, is if cost models are to be utilised effectively to inform decision-making, their methodology and data must be developed and managed in an open process within the institution. This implies decentralisation and the delegation of the authority of their development and subsequent review down to the source of where the data is generated and managed. It has been counterproductive to assign their development, let alone management, to officials who are largely trained as engineers and mathematicians (i.e. products of the scientific approach of officer education) and to allow them to define these projects as technical, *vice* managerial, in intent. In the end, it is ironic that one of the most basic and seemingly straightforward tools for modern defence management has been improperly introduced into so many of these defence institutions. Western nations thus simply got it wrong when they did not properly define the degree to which these legacy defence institutions were oblivious to the value of cost models and that so many would be improperly employed. Indeed, the introduction of American-styled programming and placing all financial management (including cost models) in PPBS directorates has had the unintended consequence of reinforcing cultural proclivities to centralise all financial decision-making. In effect, planners have long succumbed to the melodious siren call of programmers to plan in a “resource unconstrained environment,” ensuring that the plans they produce are seen as expensive “wish lists” and thus ignored. Also, one can only imagine the mischief such practices offer to officials who can centralise costings, programming, and financial execution, and contracting.

The challenge, therefore, is to encourage defence ministers to understand that in many cases they already possess many of the key tools needed to make informed decisions. But the management and utilisation of these tools must be changed in order to produce costed defence planning options. Clearly, effecting this change is not a technical challenge to be left solely to experts working at the staff level. Rather, it points once again to the inherently political nature of the challenges that must be addressed appropriately at their political roots in order to adopt Western democratic defence governance concepts.

## **Organisational sociology**

When examining the planning anatomy of European legacy defence institutions what one finds essentially throughout the region is that the adoption of programming methods has had the effect of ensuring that policy frameworks remain weak in all of these ministries. As presciently observed by one of the harshest critiques of programming, its implementation in the region had the predictable effect of ignoring the first “P” in PPBS, i.e. planning.<sup>20</sup> The introduction of PPBS created a cadre of autonomous programming officials with financial control of budgeting who have generally ignored both policy and planning

guidance and continue to isolate money from funding policy priorities. As assistance to these countries was in the form of technical education, *vice* management consulting to effect holistic organisational change, all too frequently one finds a PPBS method laid on top of antithetical legacy financial management systems and planning documents (e.g. annual matériel and/or acquisition plans), thereby producing both bureaucratic and “conceptual spaghetti.”<sup>21</sup> What was apparently not considered when introducing these methods was how they could be misunderstood, or even inadvertently misapplied by officials. For instance, Serbia defined its programming structure based on existing organisations, *vice* activities and envisaged outcomes,<sup>22</sup> and the current minister has deemed programmes to be so ineffectual to dropping their number to simply one.

This practice is found throughout the region and simply highlights how change management, *vice* solely technical assistance lacking proper context, must lead in the introduction of Western concepts. It is little wonder then that PPBS continues to be seen by defence and military officials in the region as something mysterious, shrouded in opacity and practiced only by a chosen-few high priests, cloistered within the programmers’ bureaucratic *inner sanctum*. Given that PPBS is perceived as scientific, and is often supported by its own “secret” software, only underscores the perception that it is a highly complex algorithm. Thus, PPBS has been internalised by defence institutions as a scientific method to provide operational answers *via* scientifically determined algorithms: untouched by any critical human brain. In essence, in legacy defence institutions there remains an ingrained proclivity to find scientific/technical, *vice* managerial, means to provide answers to all planning and management issues. Indeed, one continues to hear all too frequent pleas from ministries of defence and general staffs for copies of Western defence planning “algorithms” to assist them in the operation of their PPBSs. Disturbingly, since very few defence officials have any idea how it actually works, PPBS in its worst manifestations has isolated those who are responsible for producing defence outcomes (e.g. service commanders) from any predictable planning assumption of the resources available to them.<sup>23</sup>

The alleged adoption of a “NATO compatible PPBS methodology”<sup>24</sup> (whatever that could possibly mean since planning and budgeting are inherently national responsibilities) has added legitimacy to an opaque bureaucracy that relieves officials from responsibility for producing outcomes whilst vesting them with authority to control resources. At the same time, the system is still perceived as being scientific and therefore perfect, hence any shortcomings in the operational effectiveness of the armed forces are simply dismissed by programmers as manifestations of an inadequate defence budget, i.e. more money will produce desired defence outcomes. Therefore, the culprit is the national parliament, and ultimately, the nation, but never the ill-designed defence organisation.<sup>25</sup> That the adoption of PPBS has inhibited the creation of a clear line of responsibility from policy, to planning, to execution appears to be missed by too many both within and outside of these defence institutions.<sup>26</sup> It is an interesting observation that despite all of the training and software provided to these defence institutions in support of the PPBS method, very few have been able to develop accurate costing models that are habitually used to inform decision-making.<sup>27</sup> What is clearly the case is that the adoption of PPBS has not solved the challenge facing all of these countries, namely their inability to develop and implement costed defence plans.<sup>28</sup> Or more bluntly put, defence plans are largely decoupled from reality.

What is ironic is that as programming, as a method, has fallen out of favour or simply ignored in many countries, PPBS directorates surprisingly continue their blissful existence still centralising financial decision-making. This should not be too terribly surprising since many defence institutions continue the legacy practice of conflating leadership/command with management (the Baltic States and Slovenia constituting notable exceptions), thereby reinforcing centralisation of decision-making.<sup>29</sup> In effect, the introduction of programming, whilst eschewing the creation of chiefs of staff/under-secretaries, has had the combined effect of inexorably pulling decision-making upward. Such centralisation forces leadership to concentrate on mundane, day-to-day decision-making at the expense of thinking of the future, let alone commanding and managing. To be sure, there is no shortage of other elements of these organisations that need to be addressed to make such a system functional. But the continued failure to separate management from leadership/command also manifests itself in underperforming heads of directorates since they lack empowerment and which does not let juniors grow. The introduction of the post of chief/director of staff and diffusion of decision-making amongst the staff will initially cause significant stress on the system and individuals unaccustomed to making decisions. However, this reform must be seen as constituting a critically important *conditio sine qua non* towards developing a more functional and efficiently run organisation.

## Planning methods and practices

It is not the intention of the current writer to advocate any particular “method” of national defence planning. Frankly, too much time and resources have been wasted pondering whether countries should adopt various planning methodologies: all to very little effect. Simply put, any method is “right” if it can tie policy priorities to financial execution; all with the objectives of creating new capabilities, or filling existing capability gaps. Rather, what is striking in many defence institutions is that there is inevitably an almost obsession with drafting long-term development plans (LTDPs), as well as unawareness of how planning will be affected in periods of escalation.<sup>30</sup> As to the former point, it must be the rare defence institution in the region which does not dutifully draft LTDPs with a religious-like hope that it will make itself happen by the very “power” of being signed and approved. Traditionally these have been envisaged to span a 5-year timeframe; however, following the international financial crisis, with Western and NATO International Staff advice, these plans now span a 10- and 12-year timeframe (the latter being the case in Latvia), based on the programmatic assumption of multi-year funding. This concept is largely an anathema to ministries of finance in Central and Eastern Europe, many of which do not use, let alone understand conceptually, “programmes” and multi-year budgeting.<sup>31</sup> Yet, defence officials have continued to develop LTDPs in the hope that they will somehow be endorsed, and funded, by parliaments. What must constitute a shining example of “hope triumphs over experience” is that it is all but impossible to point to such a plan that has been implemented, let alone funded. Sadly there is now another trend which is to develop modern sounding and apparently NATO compatible, “capability plans.” However, in reality, absent costings or the bottom-up processes of day-to-day defence management tools, these are in effect just an LTDP by another name.

Unfortunately, Western political officials and the NATO International Staff have not been able to develop a sharp and consistent message to convince defence officials firstly that their planning methods need to make “defence” fit the existing defence budget. For example, in lieu of delivering such a sharp and consistent message as regards partners, Partnership Goal General 0022 is defined as stable budget planning and has been adopted (alas) by too many defence institutions.<sup>32</sup> The problem with encouraging ministries of finance to develop stable medium-term expenditure plans (three years) is that it has given ministries of defence false expectations for stable budgets. Leaving aside that it is highly problematic that any parliament would agree such a commitment; simply on the grounds of national sovereignty, the fact of the matter is that such assumptions have acted to encourage defence officials to accept the planning assumption of multi-year funding planning without any assurances that the funds will ever come to hand. This has enabled defence officials to avoid facing the all-too-often reality that their current budget is too small in relation to the existing legacy-derived defence institution, and thus forcing hard resource decisions. There is no shortage of examples of ambitious LTDPs (which sometimes are even endorsed by government and parliament) which have been subsequently underfunded, at which point they are simply declared un-implementable (e.g. Slovenia),<sup>33</sup> resulting in planning stasis. As a result of this prevailing conceptual miasma, planning, budgeting, and financial management in all of these defence institutions, to varying degrees, remains isolated, and even in some cases impervious to the realities facing the rest of the organisation.

Finally, a point that surely must be of importance in the contemporary European security environment, is whether these weak planning, *cum* programming, methods are sufficiently responsive to policy to survive the stress that inevitably would befall policy officials and planners should these countries be forced to respond militarily amidst escalation. By this, it is not clear that any of these planning and programming methods have been explicitly designed with the objective of continuity and functionality in escalation: peace, tension, crisis, and war. If one accepts the Western principle that one prepares the defence institution with the objective of being able to conduct effective military operations, either in national (or collective) defence or on deployments, it is therefore logical that planning methods should be appropriate for peace or war. Whilst this point has not been widely discussed by officials or analysts, given the extent to which PPBS has been introduced to, or adopted by, these defence institutions, one is left with the suspicion that such considerations have not been fully understood, let alone addressed. Therefore, one fears that existing programming methods, in such circumstances, remain in idyllic isolation from confronting this reality. It is arguable that the US Department of Defense has sufficiently robust institutional capability and enough money, to enable it to enjoy, in effect, two different planning systems (Programming and Operations and Overseas Contingency funding).<sup>34</sup> Yet, one would be imprudent to assume that any of these legacy defence institutions have such institutional planning and programming redundancy. Rather, the current writer harbours the suspicion that in escalation, programming systems will undergo a problematic “metamorphosis” similar to the legacy assumption that in crises ministries of defence and general staffs will “merge” and become strategic headquarters from where national, operations (and assuredly) tactical decision-making will be “commanded,” e.g. Bulgaria.<sup>35</sup> Both programming methods and these unproven command arrangements need to be assessed and tested to discern whether they are functional in crisis, let alone in war.

## Missing policy frameworks

In hindsight, it is now clear that Western officials misdiagnosed the root cause of most of the key dysfunctions in legacy defence institutions, that is, they lacked “policy frameworks” that are tied to money. Clearly the recommended solution, PPBS, was obviously derived from assessments of symptoms, *vice* through a systematic diagnosis to determine causation of weak managerial planning control. As such, PPBS has not helped these defence institutions produce viable defence plans, which was its original objective. Perhaps one of its greatest weaknesses is that PPBS has not brought defence officials, outside of programming departments, into institutional settings to discuss how defence budget allocations need to change in order to produce *coherence* amongst policy, planning, and capability. In all too many defence institutions, policy and money all but live in different conceptual and bureaucratic universes. Consequently, it is rare to read a policy document or hear an official discuss money as constituting a critical management tool that needs to change as directed by policy to create and maintain endorsed capabilities. Instead, money remains conceptually defined in legacy terms as a given, and all existing problems would be solved if only there were more (often articulated in the context of an aspired certain percentage of GDP). For instance, this very line of argument is found in the 2010 Serbian Defense White Paper, which states authoritatively (and nonsensically) that to implement the methods provided by the International Monetary Fund (left undefined), defence requires at least 2% of GDP.<sup>36</sup> The use of this example is not intended unfairly to criticise Serbia, as one can find almost the same argument (explicit or implicit) in other policy documents from many of these countries. Rather, it illustrates that these defence institutions continue to struggle to adopt the basic concept that in a democracy existing finances must be optimised and that ministries have no authority to dictate to parliaments their financial aspirations.

The solution to this challenge is that policy directorates must be empowered politically and bureaucratically to enable them to develop and manage “policy frameworks” to guide the operation of the entire defence institution, including even the management of donor assistance.<sup>37</sup> This step implies shifting responsibility for planning and managing the budget to the policy director. These moves are imperative in order to initiate policies to drive the implementation of new concepts to create a new operating logic. Such tasks imply the existence of a powerful directorate organic to the defence institution and which is seen as the minister of defence’s key management team. Absent this needed authority, these defence institutions will continue to struggle to exercise policy control over the entire institution. Many impediments to creating such a management capability abound, namely, deeply engrained vested interests in maintaining the *status quo* and prevailing legacy concepts, all supported by unwieldy positive law. However, case-specific and innovative solutions need to be tested, and successful approaches institutionalised and shared amongst allies and partners.

In the end, what is absolutely essential is to infuse the entire defence institution with an understanding that no activity should be undertaken or money spent that is not endorsed by the policy directorate. As such, not only does this directorate have to be supported by the strongest civil-military team in the ministry of defence with deep experience and knowledge of the entire institution, but it must have a stranglehold over the planning directorate. All policy options have to be assessed by the planning directorate for feasibility, to include their full financial cost (i.e. life-cycle). In support of this objective, policy branches in the region need to review the utility of multi-year programming to

ensure that when it is used that it does not perpetuate the practice of insulating budgeting from policy priorities as programmers inevitably argue that future expenditures are “locked” into envisaged future defence budgets. Moreover, it is only logical that the ministry’s cost models and supporting team must reside within a powerful planning branch, thereby enabling it to respond to the policy framework. This will ensure also that all draft plans developed by the branch and approved by the policy directorate will have been costed before being endorsed as constituting a “plan” and its execution to be overseen by policy and plans.

## Conclusion

It is long past time that political and defence officials in Central and Eastern Europe take a sceptical view of the utility of programming. Initially, the methodology was sold as a complete package of planning, programming, and budgeting. As such, it was assumed that PPBS would provide all that was necessary to assist a reforming ministry make the transition to an efficient, transparent, and accountable system. However, the introduction of this highly complex and nuanced method was introduced into immature institutions which had hardly begun the task of adopting Western democratic defence governance concepts. As a result, these assistance projects creating programming bureaucracies before the development of extant, let alone strong, policy directorates. The ensuing result has been that programming bureaucracies have contributed to a hyper-centralisation of financial decision-making in ministries of defence to the detriment of armed forces being able to produce capability coherence. The results can be seen throughout the region (and indeed in Afghanistan).<sup>38</sup> It is the rare capability provider (e.g. chief of service) who possesses their own budget allowing them to create and maintain capabilities. It should come as no surprise, therefore, that when coherence is missing in both policy and planning, capabilities suffer. The problem is that whilst many defence and military officials in legacy defence institutions have come to see the ineffectiveness of programming, most are all but bereft of solutions to replace both the method, as well as the bureaucracy that has come to embody it. Arguably one of the most pernicious effects of PPBS has been to create a false patina of Western modernity, thereby concealing even from the institution itself, the persistence of dominant legacy concepts in such a critical important aspect of national defence.

This article has outlined a number of putative reforms that officials should consider when retiring programming. To begin, one should not underestimate the tenacity of legacy concepts, nor should it ever be forgotten that they are antithetical to their Western democratic defence governance counterparts. Simply put, they cannot co-exist within the same organisation and there are more than enough examples of where this has been tried which has only resulted in “conceptual spaghetti”<sup>39</sup> and stagnation. Thus, conceptual audits should be considered to ascertain precisely how “business” is being conducted in these defence institutions and determine whether these concepts are supportive of democratic governance. Informed by such findings, early areas that need to be addressed are HRM and education. These are the essential foundations for armed forces and without addressing them first, then other concepts will struggle to take hold. In support of an examination of concepts is the need for defence institutions to be fully aware of their own national cultural norms so that they can ascertain if new concepts can be adopted. Officials need to be warned that culture, though, is not necessarily

deterministic. Western Balkan countries all possess high levels of power distance; however, this cultural norm did not impede the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) from enabling the empowerment of commanders (i.e. they possessed budgets) and an large and highly trained NCO corps with leadership responsibilities.<sup>40</sup> This speaks to the need for a greater understanding of elements of the hybrid communist JNA for lessons that could be applicable not only to defence institutions in the former-Yugoslavia, but other legacy armed forces as well.

Defence and military officials need to overcome the legacy of not evaluating performance of the entire defence institution. Too much legacy thinking is still premised on "military doctrine" (that defines in a centralised fashion, the entire purpose of the armed forces),<sup>41</sup> which needs to be retired, if not completely delegitimised as being incompatible with democratic values and creating a rigidity of structures and thinking that is entirely at odds with the flexibility of mind and action required for modern "hybrid" warfare. Thus, it is essential that leadership insist that the defence institution initiates the continuous and disciplined method of evaluating the performance of the armed forces. To be sure, as essentially all armed forces retain large blocks of legacy platforms, weapons, and systems, it is difficult conceptually to define their performance in terms of "capabilities" with the objective of producing capability gaps. However, there are outputs that can be subjected to such analysis (e.g. delivering fire-power and manoeuvre) that could serve as embryonic trials to initiate a new institutional logic that seeks to reveal capability gaps based on objective data and professional judgement. Equally, it is incumbent that ministries of defence and general staffs be exposed to the financial consequences of producing defence outcomes. It is particularly essential for planners to "cost" plans and "activities" such as training, which implies that policy priorities need to start being expressed in macro-financial terms. In short, defence officials need to start demanding their institutions to produce plans that are not "aspirations," but rather adhere to financial guidance and limits.

Concurrent with these initiatives is the need for defence officials to devise how their institution needs to be reorganised in order to enable it to start de-centralising financial decision-making and execution. This reform itself will necessitate the retraining of the entire organisation in order to conduct effective staff work based on objective data and logic. Equally, efforts must be made to separate command and leadership from management at all levels with the explicit objective of empowering commanders and directors. PPBS directorates need to be slated for dissolution and their responsibilities assigned to other directorates within ministries of defence. A solid first step would be to move cost models and supporting staff to the plans directorate to facilitate drafting costed plans.

The process by which defence planning has been conducted by these defence institutions needs a thorough review if these institutions are to break with their past inability to produce implementable defence plans that are financially based. In order to end creating defence aspirations, it is likely that it is not that important which particular defence planning methodology is introduced as long as the process is open and it must be simple. Any reform or "good idea" that adds any degree of complexity or nuanced logic needs to be accessed with a high degree of suspicion. As such, assumptions that planning must be based on multi-year funding and LTDPs need to be re-examined with the view of discerning if they actually do add value to translating policy priorities into envisaged defence outcomes. Given the rapid rate of technological innovation with direct and indirect implications for modern warfare, it is the brave official who can forecast military

requirements five years hence. In any case, plans need to be redefined in these defence institutions not as constituting legal contracts, but rather they must be seen as being flexible to respond to changes in policy priorities. After all, if one accepts the argument that these institutions need only one defence planning method for peace, tension, crisis, and war, then they must be sufficiently robust and flexible to meet the inevitable unexpected requirements of modern warfare.

Importantly, senior political officials in these countries need to accept the proposition that without the creation of strong policy frameworks; supported by experienced and professional officials whose purpose is to serve as the government's key team of producing defence outcomes, all other reform efforts will never be able to reach their full potential. Policy needs to be seen as constituting the essential blood of the entire system; directing where money needs to be spent, selecting leaders with the most potential to preform and grow, all the whilst looking to find efficiencies wherever possible. This need for coherent thinking and planning clearly identifies that the current practice in many institutions of constantly rotating party officials into management posts to make policy merely reinforces problems and not solves them. This aspect of the challenge speaks to the reality that in the end, the nature of the problem facing officials in the region is inherently political. Any reform of a public institution needs to be understood as constituting a political act. This is a vastly important point that has gone under-addressed both by countries with legacy defence institutions as well as by their Western allies and partners. What this implies is that any assistance or advice efforts that are defined solely as being technical, *vice* political in nature, will fail as the region's record so clearly demonstrates. This reality, therefore, speaks of the need for a dual approach by both donors and recipients whereby assistance and advice needs to be tied to the degree to which officials in the region are willing to undertake deep change management programmes.

Absent such political capital and commitment by countries with legacy defence institutions, they are likely simply to repeat previous failed efforts which produced "reform," but without "change." In fact, as important as introducing reforms are, officials must sharply probe to ensure change is actually taking place, which implies how is change to be measured? Reform-minded officials need to avoid falling in the trap of focusing only on change "inputs." Arguably, leadership must be able to ascertain whether change is having the desired policy effect. What officials in the region have rarely examined is whether change in ministries of defence and general staffs have any effect on defence "outputs." Ergo, as ministers and officials endeavour to reform the planning capabilities of their defence institutions, both they and their Western supporters must focus attention on outputs to determine whether there is any improvement in the number and quality of defence outcomes, e.g. training days in field, flying hours, sailing days, etc. Absent increasing attention of what the defence budget actually "buys" a country, one can predict that there will be the superficial "adoption" of Western democratic defence governance concepts, all the whilst the armed forces continue to rust and wither away; like they largely have for the past 25 years.

## Notes

1. Thomas-Durell Young, 'Is PPBS Applicable to European Post-Communist Defense Institutions?' *RUSI Journal* 161, no. 5 (2016): 68–77, <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03071847.2016.1253382> and Thomas-Durell Young, 'The Failure of Defense Planning

- in European Communist Legacy Defense Institutions: Ascertaining Causation and Determining Solutions', *Journal of Strategic Studies*, <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01402390.2017.1307743>; published online, April 11, 2017.
2. See Thomas-Durell Young, 'When Programming Trumps Policy and Plans: The Case of the U.S. Department of the Navy', *Journal of Strategic Studies* 39, no. 7 (2016): 936–55, <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01402390.2016.1176564?needAccess=true>.
  3. One of the most influential writers on strategic planning, admittedly from a business perspective, Mintzberg, writes that the development and implementation of PPBS constitutes one of the greatest efforts and failure of all time in the area of public finance. Henry Mintzberg, *The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning: Reconceiving Roles for Planning, Plans, Planners* (New York: Free Press, 1994), 19. A leading expert on public finance at the time of the development of PPBS for the US Department of Defense, Aaron Wildavsky, writes that "PPBS has failed everywhere and at all times." See *The Politics of the Budgetary Process* (New York: Little, Brown, 1984), 121. He continues, "Nowhere has PPBS (1) been established (2) influenced government decisions (3) according to its own principles. The program structures do not make sense to anyone. They are not, in fact, used to make decisions of any importance."
  4. Whilst acknowledging every defence institution in is "unique," one must stress that there are several major fundamental principles that are applicable to *all* defence institutions in liberal democracies. As such, these are independent of the "unique conceptual configuration" of each individual defence institution in each unique nation, e.g. the leading role played by policy.
  5. Jeffrey Marshall, *Skin in the Game: Partnership in Establishing and Maintaining Global Security and Stability* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2011), 71–2.
  6. Thomas-Durell Young, 'Impediment to Reform in European Post-Communist Defense Institutions: Addressing the Conceptual Divide', *Problems in Post-Communism*, <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10758216.2016.1220256>, published online: October 20, 2016.
  7. See, for the example, the case of Serbia. Robert M. McNab, 'Implementing Program Budgeting in the Serbian Ministry of Defense', *Public Budgeting and Finance* 31, no. 2 (2011): 216–30.
  8. The current author addresses the role played by *collegia* in decision-making in legacy defence institutions in, 'Mission Command: Strategic Implications – Legacy Concepts: A Sociology of Command in Central and Eastern Europe', *Parameters* 47, no. 1 (2017): 31–42, [https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/parameters/issues/Spring\\_2017/6\\_Young\\_MissionCommand-CentralAndEasternEurope.pdf](https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/parameters/issues/Spring_2017/6_Young_MissionCommand-CentralAndEasternEurope.pdf).
  9. John P. Kotter and Dan S. Cohen, *Heart of Change: Real Life Stories of How People Change Their Organization* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business Press, 2012), 142–3.
  10. Geert Hofstede, *Culture's Consequences: Comparing Values, Behaviors, Institutions and Organizations Across Nations*, 2nd ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2001), *passim*; Geert Hofstede, Gert Jan Hofstede, and Michael Minkov, *Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind*, 3rd ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2010), *passim*.
  11. Jaroslav Nad', Marian Majer, and Milan Šuplata, *75 Solutions for Slovakia's Defence* (Bratislava: Central European Policy Institute, c. 2015), 2.
  12. Conversation with Mr Glen Grant, MOD Ukraine Project Manager Reform of Defence Housing, 3 June 2017.
  13. Cezar Vasilescu writes that Romania has been unable to adopt PPBS (despite almost 20 years of effort) due to the large number of trained and educated personnel needed to make the system operate. See his revealing essay "The Advantages and Disadvantages of Implementing the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution System (PPBES)," in *Planning, Programming, Budgeting, Evaluation System: Benefits and Challenges*, ed. Maria Constantinescu, Workshop unfolded during the postgraduate course in Planning Programming Budgeting System, Regional Department of Defense Resources Management Studies (Bucharest: National Defense University "Carol I" Publishing House, 2010), 116.
  14. McNab, 'Implementing Program Budgeting in the Serbian Ministry of Defense', 217, 226.
  15. One innovative attempt to open communication in the Bulgarian defence institution (2011–2013) was Minister of Defense Anyu Angelov's use of Facebook.

16. See James J. Schneider, 'The Origins of Soviet Military Science', *Journal of Soviet Military Studies* 2, no. 4 (1989): 491–519.
17. Poland, *The Defence Concept of the Republic of Poland* (Warsaw: Ministry of National Defense, May 2017), 64. A key recommendation from this defence review is to align and co-ordinate military and non-military planning.
18. As the current writer argues in 'The Failure of Defense Planning in European Communist Legacy Defense Institutions', *passim*.
19. In the case of Bulgaria, the state of underdevelopment of defence planning can be observed as late as 2015 when a Council of Minister's endorsed modernisation plan was not based on finances, but rather the plan acknowledged the need to develop another plan *based* on finances. Bulgaria, Council of Ministers, "Programme for the Development of the Defence Capabilities of the Bulgarian Armed Forces 2020," Sofia, approved September 30, 2015, 37.
20. Mintzberg, *The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning*, 121–2.
21. The current writer addresses this line of argument in *Anatomy of Post-Communist European Defense Institutions: The Mirage of Military Modernity* (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2017), *passim*.
22. McNab, 'Implementing Program Budgeting in the Serbian Ministry of Defense', 225. More specifically, the then Serbian programming structure matched the defence institution's structures: army, air force and air defence, training command, central administration, and the general staff.
23. In spring 2011, the Bulgarian minister of defence announced that the Bulgarian Navy would support operations in Libya using its "high readiness" frigate. Due to the centralisation of funding, it took the navy two weeks to deploy the vessel, yet another example of the disconnect between policy and defence outcomes with the usual bottleneck being the PPBS system. See *Dnevnik* (Sofia), March 29, 2011.
24. In the case of Bulgaria:

In 2000, the MoD introduced a new resource management system under which it must submit a draft budget to the Ministry of Finance to be incorporated into the government budget approved by the National Assembly. *Fully compatible with NATO-standard planning procedures, the system manages a six-year cycle of planning, programming, and budgeting with an annual review in mid cycle.* (Emphasis added).

See Charles M. Perry and Dimitris Keridis, *Defense Reform, Modernization, and Military Cooperation in Southeastern Europe* (Herndon, VA: Brassey's Inc., 2004), 53–4.

25. For example, this is the leitmotiv of the latest Report on the status of defence and armed forces of Bulgaria, published in March 2017, where all the guilt is thrown onto the systematic under-resourcing, lack of money and deficiency of personnel. See *ДОКЛАД ЗА СЪСТОЯНИЕТО НА ОТБРАНАТА И ВЪОРЪЖЕНИТЕ СИЛИ НА РЕПУБЛИКА БЪЛГАРИЯ*; (Република България, Министерски съвет, София, март 2017 г.), e.g. 4–6, 16, 18–9, 22–3, 25, 27–8, 31–2, 43, 49, particularly 73–4.
26. "In 1993, the Czech Republic became the first Central and Eastern European country to introduce the American-designed system of management of public funds that is used worldwide in various areas of the public sector. Although the country gained a system designed to provide both efficiency and transparency in the allocation of funds, problems in the management and control of military spending continue to exist until the system finally 'crumbled.'" See Marie Vlachova, 'Defense Reform in the Czech Republic,' in *Post-Cold War Defense Reform: Lessons Learned in Europe and the United States*, ed. Istvan Gyarmati and Theodor Winkler (Washington, DC: Brassey's, Inc., 2002), 400–1.
27. In practically, all defence institutions in Central and Eastern Europe in which this author has conducted assessments and provided advice, those with dominant PPBS methods had underperforming cost models.
28. As the current writer has argued and documented in 'The Failure of Defense Planning in European Communist Legacy Defense Institutions', *passim*.

29. Remarkably the Polish defence institution continues this legacy organisational practice. See Poland, *The Defence Concept of the Republic of Poland*, 56.
30. I address this subject in “Questioning the ‘Sanctity’ of Long-Term Defense Planning as Practiced in Central and Eastern Europe,” draft manuscript under peer-review.
31. Georgia presents an excellent example of this disconnect. See Teona Akubardia, ‘Overview of the Legislation Facilitating the Civil Democratic Oversight of Armed Forces in Georgia’, in *Democratic Control over the Georgian Armed Forces since the August 2008 War*, ed. Tamara Pataraiia (Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2010), 31–2.
32. See Frank Boland, ‘Capability Development’, briefing (Brussels: Defense Policy and Planning Division, NATO International Staff, January 27, 2014).
33. Specifically, Slovenia, Ministry of Defense, ‘Resolution on General Long-Term Development and Equipping Programme of the Slovenian Armed Forces up to 2025’, *Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia* no. 99/2010 (Ljubljana, December 7, 2010).
34.
 

... critics have suggested that the emergency or OCO/GWOT exception has inappropriately provided a “safety valve” to preserve base budget programs, helping federal agencies comply with statutory discretionary spending limits established by the [Budget Control Act] BCA through designating funding intended to support base budget activities as OCO/GWOT requirements.

Lynn M. Williams and Susan B. Epstein, ‘Overseas Contingency Operations Funding: Background and Status’, R44519 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 7 February 2017), 1.
35. Republic of Bulgaria, *Defence and Armed Forces Act*, Promulgated SG No. 5/12.05.2009, effective May 12, 2009, Articles 20.3 and 114.
36. Serbia, *White Paper on Defence of the Republic of Serbia* (Belgrade: Ministry of Defense, Strategic Planning Department, Defence Policy Sector, 2010), 128–9.
37. See Watkins’s excellent analysis of how donor assistance should be vectored in legacy defence institutions, as well as ministries of internal affairs. Amadeo Watkins, *Security Sector Reform and Donor Assistance in Serbia: Complexity of Managing Change* (Shrivenham: Defense Academy of the United Kingdom, September 2010), 17.
38. It is unfortunate to learn that the US Department of Defense is assisting the Afghan government to develop a PPBS for its ministry of defence. Clearly, a better case of providing a country with an atomic clock when a semi-reliable Timex would certainly be more than sufficient would be difficult to find. It is disheartening to read of the challenges facing the ministry of defence and its American advisors as they could have profited from greater experience gained from Central and Eastern Europe as the challenges they face are generally the same that still plague defence institution throughout the region. See US Department of Defense, “Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan,” Report to Congress in accordance with sections 1230 and 1231 of the National Defense Authorisation Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2008 (P.L. 110–81), as amended, to include reports in response to section 1221 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012 (P.L. 112–81), and sections 1212, 1223, and 1531(d) of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2013 (P.L. 112–239), Washington, November 2013, 36–8.
39. An example of this is found in the “notorious” challenges faced by acquiring F-16s for the Polish Air Force. Although the aircraft were first introduced in 2006, they only became operational in 2012. See Lukas Dycka and Miroslav Mares, ‘The Development and Future of Fighter Planes Acquisition in Countries of the Visegrad Group’, *Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 25, no. 4 (2012): 544–6, 555. Moreover, the Polish Air Force, and evidently the defence institution, is obviously still struggling to understand how best to use this capability as witnessed by the fact that of the five deployments by the Polish Air Force in support of the NATO Baltic Air Policing operation, as of spring 2017, not one of these has yet to be comprised of F-16s, but rather have been undertaken by its MiG-29s. *15 Years in NATO* (Warsaw: Ministry of National Defense Republic of Poland, 2014), 16. Note that the MiG-29s employed

in this mission are ostensibly more expensive to operate than the F-16s. Barre R. Sequin, 'Why did Poland Choose the F-16s?' *Occasional Papers Series* no. 11 (Garmisch-Partenkirchen: George C. Marshall Center, June 2007), 11.

40. Robert Niebuhr, 'Death of the Yugoslav People's Army and the Wars of Succession', *Polemos* no. 13/14 (January 2004): 93.
41. Schneider, 'The Origins of Soviet Military Science', 491–519.

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## Appendix. Cultural tools and country comparisons

	Estonia	Latvia	Lithuania	Ukraine	Bulgaria	Czech Rep.	Hungary	Poland	Romania	Slovakia	Croatia	Serbia	Slovenia	U.S.
Power distance	40	44	42	92	63	49	38	61	85	100	73	86	73	40
Individualism	60	70	60	25	28	61	87	64	28	54	33	25	27	91
Masculinity	30	9	19	27	39	58	92	66	41	100	40	43	19	62
Uncertainty avoidance	60	63	65	95	74	63	71	82	79	41	80	92	88	46
Pragmatism	82	69	82	55	72	73	60	31	53	81	58	52	49	26
Indulgence	16	13	16	18	16	29	31	29	20	28	33	28	48	68

Missing from the database: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Bosnia, Macedonia, Montenegro.

Source: The Hofstede Centre, <http://geert-hofstede.com/countries.html>

### Definitions:

**Power distance:** This dimension deals with the fact that all individuals in societies are not equal – it expresses the attitude of the culture towards these inequalities amongst us. Power distance is defined as the extent to which the less powerful members of institutions and organisations within a country expect and accept that power is distributed unequally.

**Individualism:** The fundamental issue addressed by this dimension is the degree of interdependence a society maintains amongst its members. It has to do with whether people's self-image is defined in terms of "I" or "We." In Individualist societies, people are supposed to look after themselves and their direct family only. In Collectivist societies, people belong to "in groups" that take care of them in exchange for loyalty.

**Masculinity:** A high score (masculine) on this dimension indicates that the society will be driven by competition, achievement, and success, with success being defined by the winner/best in field – a value system that starts in school and continues throughout organisational behaviour.

**Uncertainty avoidance:** The dimension Uncertainty Avoidance has to do with the way that a society deals with the fact that the future can never be known: should we try to control the future or just let it happen? This ambiguity brings with it anxiety and different cultures have learnt to deal with this anxiety in different ways. The extent to which the members of a culture feel threatened by ambiguous or unknown situations and have created beliefs and institutions that try to avoid these is reflected in the UAI score.

**Pragmatism:** The extent to which people show a pragmatic or future-oriented perspective rather than a normative or short-term point of view.

**Indulgence:** The extent to which people try to control their desires and impulses. Relatively weak control is called “Indulgence” and relatively strong control is called “Restraint.”

