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**NAVAL
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MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

TURKEY AND EUROPEAN SECURITY INSTITUTIONS

by

Aaron M. Scheer

March 2009

Thesis Advisor:

Donald Abenheim

Second Reader:

Richard Hoffman

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TURKEY AND EUROPEAN SECURITY INSTITUTIONS

Aaron M. Scheer
Major, United States Air Force
B.A., Binghamton University, 1995

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

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from the

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March 2009**

Author: Aaron M. Scheer

Approved by: Dr. Donald Abenheim
Thesis Advisor

Professor Richard Hoffman
Second Reader

Dr. Harold A. Trinkunas, PhD
Chairman, Department of National Security Affairs

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ABSTRACT

Turkey's relationships with the West, particularly its relationship with Western security institutions, are today more important than ever. As the United States fights two wars in the region and attempts to rebuild its reputation in Europe and the Middle East, Turkey is once again central to America's plans. Yet, this crucial ally is little understood by U.S. policy makers. Turkey has a long relationship with Euro-Atlantic security institutions, specifically NATO and the various European institutions, culminating in today's European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP).

The following study poses the following questions of relevance to those interested in theory and policy. Why do the government and people of Turkey participate in these institutions? What long-term policy objectives do makers of policy in Turkey wish to advance through its participation in these institutions? What are the different ways that Turkey leverages its participation to advance its goals? Specifically, how does Turkey use its participation in European security institutions to advance its positions on issues such as European Union membership, defense modernization, and its ongoing internal and external areas of conflict? How does Turkey's Ottoman legacy affect these relationships and how has this historical background shaped today's events?

This thesis also sets out to answer whether Turkey is successful in its participation; in other words, does its participation allow Turkey to advance its goals better? How do current trends in Europe affect Turkey's participation in these institutions?

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This thesis is dedicated to my son, Sami Sagiv Scheer. May he grow to embody the best within Turkey and the best within the United States.

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I. INTRODUCTION

Turkey's relationships with the West, particularly its relationship with Western security institutions, are today more important than ever. As the United States fights two wars in the region and attempts to rebuild its reputation in Europe and the Middle East, Turkey is once again central to America's plans. Yet, this crucial ally is little understood by U.S. policy makers. Turkey has a long relationship with Euro-Atlantic security institutions, specifically NATO and the precursors to the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). With the rise of the EU and Turkey's painstaking attempts to integrate with Europe, this relationship grew to include the ESDP. Turkey joined NATO together with Greece in 1952 and served as its southern flank against the Soviet Union throughout the Cold War. The transformation of the map of Europe only increased the importance of Turkey in the world that has dawned. It continued its relationship with NATO after the Cold War and throughout NATO's transformation of the 1990s from Cold War defense to regional peace and stability force. Despite not being a member of the EU, Turkey is an active participant in EU security operations and deployments.

The following study poses the following questions of relevance to those interested in theory and policy. Why do the government and people of Turkey participate in these institutions? What long-term policy objectives do makers of policy in Turkey wish to advance through its participation in these institutions? What are the different ways that Turkey leverages its participation to advance its goals? Specifically, how does Turkey use its participation in European security institutions to advance its positions on issues such as European Union membership, defense modernization, the Cyprus question, the Armenian tragedy of 1915, and the Kurdish question? Is Turkey successful in its participation; in other words, does its involvement allow Turkey to better advance its goals? How do current trends in Europe affect Turkey's partaking in these institutions? For example, how does the Euro-Atlantic relationship, including the differences over Iraq, affect Turkey's alignment? How do Turkey's internal politics affect Turkey's stated desire for European integration? How has the Turkish-American security relationship

weathered recent setbacks such as the 2003 Iraq War, the ongoing Kurdish insurgency, and the proposed resolutions in the United States Congress to recognize the Armenian Tragedy of 1915 as genocide?

A. IMPORTANCE

Turkey's importance to U.S. strategic interests cannot be overstated. One need only look at Turkey's refusal to allow a Northern invasion route through Turkey during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. Turkey's refusal to allow American troops to assault from the north forced an entire reworking of the invasion. According to former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, this was the source of much of the post-conflict chaos and difficulty in Iraq. A better understanding of Turkey by American decision makers at that key decision point would have led to a better outcome and perhaps improved the strategic picture in Iraq. A better understanding of Turkey can certainly improve future outcomes for United States diplomacy.

Why is Turkey important to the United States and the DoD is a question that reveals more about the person who asks it than about the actual state of war and peace at the crossroads of Europe and Asia. Turkey is a nation, which many Americans have simply taken for granted as an ally, and which now demands its tribute in terms of analytical energy and some degree of effort to understand the world as seen by Turks themselves. Turkey fields the second largest military within NATO and the largest in Europe. Turkey boasts a highly strategic location, astride Europe, the Caucasus, the Middle East, and the Mediterranean. For the United States and specifically the DoD, Turkey is critical both for its location and its military capabilities, but the nation is anything other than the pliant locale of U.S. bases as in the glory years of the 1960s. Currently, Turkey hosts the American military's Iraq Cargo Hub at Incirlik Air Base, responsible for the majority of all air delivered cargo in support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. In addition to Incirlik, Turkey hosts Izmir Air Base, which provides logistical support to NATO Headquarters Izmir, a command led by an American 3-star General. The city of Eskisehir is also home to a NATO Combined Air Operations Center. Konya Range hosts joint air operations exercises that in the past included the air forces of

the United States, Turkey, and Israel. While much lower than its Cold War footprint, Ankara is the home of Balgat Air Base that provides support to the American Embassy and the Office of Defense Cooperation. Finally, there is an embedded presence at the NATO Rapid Deployment Cell in Istanbul. Additionally, Turkey allows the use of its airspace and bases for the U.S. air bridge in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM.

Turkey's history of cooperation with the United States stretches back to the Korean War, when Turkey sent troops in support of the United Nations defense of South Korea. As a Muslim country, Turkey's cooperation with the United States in security operations provides needed legitimacy in the Balkans and Afghanistan. As former Ambassador Lake noted, Turkey's participation removes the stigma of a "Clash of Civilizations." Importantly, in the early days of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, some Muslims attempted to pressure the United States to halt its campaign against the Taliban during the month of Ramadan. Turkey supported the United States decision not to halt the campaign, thus providing needed diplomatic support for this move.¹ During these early days of the Global War on Terror, Turkey's Prime Minister Ecevit provided diplomatic support concerning the issue of "proof" that Osama Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda perpetrated the atrocities of September 11th. At the time, parts of the Middle East and the Muslim world demanded proof of Bin-Laden's guilt before deciding whether to support Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. Yet, Prime Minister Ecevit dismissed this argument, stating "The fact that the United States found this evidence against Bin Laden persuasive, persuades us also."² Again, Turkey stepped up to protect America's flank against those who sought to retard America's war on terror through legalistic means.

¹ Tom Lansford, *All for One: Terrorism, NATO and the United States* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2002), 123.

² Feroz Ahmad, *Turkey: The Quest for Identity* (Oxford: Oneworld, 2003), 179.

In addition, Turkey is a key player in other important security issues, to include Iraq, the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process, the current standoff with Iran, and the recent crisis in the Caucasus. Turkey's participation in European security institutions is important because the outcome of this participation affects the United States' interests in all of the aforementioned issues.

When looking at modern Turkey and the problems it faces, one must remember that Turkey is the heir of the Ottoman Empire. Turkey, particularly the secular (to include the military) establishment, attributes the destruction of the Empire to the perceived role of forces both outside and inside the Empire. Turkey does in fact live in a "rough neighborhood." Although relations today are considerably warmer, Turkey and Greece lived for years in a state of near war. Turkey invaded Cyprus in 1974 to prevent Cyprus's unification with Greece. Thirty years later, Turkish troops are still in Northern Cyprus (Turkey is the only nation to recognize the sovereignty of the Turkish Republic of North Cyprus). Additionally, throughout the Cold War, Turkey and its neighbor Bulgaria found themselves on opposite sides of the conflict. The relationship reached a low point 20 years ago when Bulgaria expelled much of its ethnic Turkish population, forcing the refugees into Turkey. To the east, Turkey shares a border with Armenia. Turkey froze this shared border in solidarity with Azerbaijan during the Nagorno-Karabakh war of the early 1990s. Turkey and its southern neighbor Syria almost went to war in the late 1990s over Syria's support of the PKK. Syria only recently renounced its claim to Turkey's Hatay province, and argued frequently in the past with Turkey over water rights. The situation in Iraq needs little introduction. Internally, Turkey continues to fight an insurgency in its southeast with the terrorist PKK. The bottom line is that Turkey exists in a dangerous part of the world and has multiple conflicts, both frozen and unfrozen, with which to contend. Bearing in mind these challenges, it is clear that Turkey has many very good reasons to seek a place in European security institutions. These institutions, both NATO and the ESDP, can provide tools necessary for Turkey to deal better with the many strategic challenges it faces. Perhaps the greatest of these objectives is European integration. Turkey uses its participation in NATO and ESDP to further its goals of European integration. Turkey's long-term goal is to become a member of the European

Union, and it sees participation in NATO and ESDP as furthering this goal. By showing its usefulness and indispensability in real world operations, Turkey seeks to influence Europe toward approving its candidacy for European integration.

Additionally, Turkey uses the leverage inherent in security institution membership to extract advantages and benefits from its partners in these institutions. For example, Turkey uses its partnership in NATO to strengthen its political/military ties with the United States. Turkey's military is becoming increasingly technology-based, and Turkey's partnership in NATO gains Turkey access to American defense markets. For example, Incirlik Air Base is the home of not only America's largest military presence in the country but also the Turkish Air Force's 10th Tanker Wing. This wing flies American-supplied KC-135s, giving Turkey in-flight refueling capability. Turkey's Air Force also flies the American F-16 (with a licensed production line in Turkey itself). Turkey sees a strong relationship with the United States as furthering its national interests (although some parties in Turkey do not share this view which will also be discussed in this thesis).

Turkey also seeks to influence its neighbors in the Caucasus and Central Asia through its participation in NATO's "Partnership for Peace" Program. Yet, Turkey also faces such specific problems with its neighbors as ongoing territorial disputes with its neighbors Armenia and Cyprus. In terms of the Armenian dispute, Turkey seeks to mitigate this dispute through its participation in European security institutions. By leveraging its approval of Armenian participation and direct interaction through these security operations, Turkey hopes to improve its relations with Armenia, and in turn, neutralize one of the key international issues facing Turkey: the attempts by the Armenian Diaspora to recognize the Armenian Tragedy of World War I as genocide as a means to stigmatize Turkey in the European system of states as an outsider, and for some, a chance to threaten the territorial integrity of Turkey through the forced cessation of land.

The Cyprus dispute is perhaps the single greatest inhibitor to Turkey's goals it wishes to achieve through its participation in European security institutions. Turkey invaded Cyprus in 1974 in response to a coup by forces seeking unification with Greece. Turkish troops still occupy Northern Cyprus, and Turkey is the only nation in the world

that recognizes the Turkish Republic of North Cyprus. The situation is further complicated by the post-1974 settlement of tens of thousands of Turks from the mainland in Northern Cyprus. Cyprus is now in the European Union, but not in NATO, while Turkey is in NATO but not in the European Union. This conflicted situation led to a tit for tat scenario between Cyprus and Turkey following Cyprus's recent EU accession, and is perhaps the greatest impediment to Turkey's key national aspiration of European integration. The following analysis will seek to underline the implications of this and allied issues for the makers of U.S. policy and strategy.

B. LITERATURE REVIEW

For an introductory background on Turkey's European, Middle Eastern and Islamic identities, the author chose several books, including William Cleveland's *A History of the Modern Middle East*. This work describes Turkey's Ottoman predecessor, the Ottoman Empire's expansion, contraction and eventual destruction. Similarly, the author also chose Bernard Lewis's *The Middle East: A Brief History of the Last 2,000 Years*. Lewis interprets the Ottoman Empire and its role in the international system prior to its disappearance. In particular, he explains the interaction between the Ottomans and Europe and how the balance of power shifted away from the Ottomans in favor of the West between the 17th and 20th centuries. Lewis's book is of particular use in framing the development of multicultural identities in the late Ottoman Empire, both for the minorities of the empire and for the Turks themselves. This particular concept becomes important when looking at modern Turkey's secular establishment's belief in a variant of the "stab in the back" theory. Much like inter-war Germany and post-Vietnam America, the Turkish establishment has its own villains to blame for its loss in World War I: treacherous minorities within the empire, in collusion with the Western Allies, worked to destroy the empire from within.

Yavuz Hakan's work, *Islamic Political Identity in Turkey*, is of special importance for two reasons. First, Hakan describes the rise of Islamic-oriented political parties in Turkey and the threat they pose to the secular Kemalist establishment. Secondly, this work covers Turkey and Europe's disagreements over human rights and

the Kurdish question. This book frames one of the key ideas of this thesis: that the traditional narrative of Turkish secularists as the West's natural allies and Turkish Islamists as the West's opponents represents too simplistic a view of a complex reality. Today, the world faces an Islamist government in Ankara that favors European integration and a secular establishment that is increasingly suspicious of the United States, Europe, and the West. This thesis will examine this proposition in depth.

Another work providing critical information on Turkey's relationship with Europe is *Turkey: Terrorism, Civil Rights, and the European Union* by Yonah Alexander. The work is most valuable for its contributions of historical documents relevant to the thesis. The author provides transcripts of the original Turkish parliamentary legislation for its anti-terror laws, and civil rights reform. Conversely, it also includes pertinent legislation concerning Turkey's European accession and the demands that Europe placed upon Turkey.

NATO Transformed by David Yost explains the transformation of NATO in the 1990s from Cold War alliance to a regional security organization seeking to export democratic values through peacekeeping operations and diplomatic outreach. The book also details Turkey's specific contributions to the NATO operations of the 1990s. Just as Yost's book provides insight into NATO and Turkey's role, Jolyon Holworth's work *Security and Defense Policy in the European Union* helpfully describes the role and organizational composition of the ESDP and its predecessors. In addition, it also describes Turkey's participation in specific European Union-led real world security operations. Finally, Holworth's work chronicles Turkey and the European Union's clash over Cyprus in terms of the NATO-ESDP overlap: the tit for tat between Turkey and Cyprus that continues to hamper NATO-ESDP cooperation.

Bulent Ali Riza, of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, provides further insight into the current state of Turkey's relationship with both Europe and the United States in his *Turkey Update* of 2008. His work is particularly helpful in explaining how the ongoing Kurdish insurgency and Congress's Armenian Genocide Resolution

affect the Turkish-American relationship. The work chronicles the recovery of the Turkish-American relationship following the low point of 2003, an especially helpful aspect.

Frank Schimmelfennig's *Costs, Commitment and Compliance: The Impact of EU Democratic Conditionality on Latvia, Slovakia, and Turkey* details the Turkish Kemalist establishment with Europe on the Kurdish question, multi culturism, and human rights. It frames the disagreements in the context of Turkey's progress in European integration. It also explains Turkey's suspicion of European motives for pushing the above issues (again, the "stab in the back" theory).

Just as Schimmelfennig covers Turkey's attempts at European accession, so too does Kirsty Hughes in her working paper "Turkey and the European Union: Just another Enlargement?." Hughes's work, for the Friends of Europe Foundation, details the economic and demographic drivers of Turkish integration to include the financial packages offered to recent additions to the EU, Bulgaria and Romania. In addition, the author outlines possible ramifications to EU foreign policy of Turkish accession for such issues as the Black Sea basin, the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict, as well as the Turkic republics of Central Asia.

Omer Taspinar, director of the Turkey program at the Brookings Institution, published an extremely revealing position paper for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. *Turkey's Middle East Policies, between Neo-Ottomanism and Kemalism* reveals an important cleavage in modern Turkey, that of the Kemalists and Neo-Ottomans. The author argues a counter-intuitive point very effectively, that the secular establishment is less open to the West than the Islamic oriented Neo-Ottomans. This paper explains a modern cleavage in Turkish society from the perspective of an internationally recognized expert.

Another work outlining the Kemalist-Islamist cleavage is "21st Century Kemalism: Redefining Turkey-EU Relations in the Post-Helsinki Era." This piece also identifies the Kemalist-cleavage, although it was written before the rise of the ruling Justice and Development Party. Thus, it is somewhat of a "prequel" to Taspinar's piece.

Tocci's greatest contribution is defining the Kemalist concept of a nation-state. In addition, the author shows how this nation-state, based on the Turkish identity, influences Turkish foreign policy in Azerbaijan and Cyprus. The author also covers Turkey's efforts to be a full-fledged member of the ESDP.

As Turkey's struggle with both the Kurdish insurgency and the question of Kurdish identity figures so large in this thesis, it is important to gain some understanding of these issues. Much of this paper draws on official government sources from the United States and Turkey. In order to gain a sense of balance, the author chose *The Kurds: A People in Search of their Homeland* by Kevin McKiernan. The author provides a good history of the Kurds, but more importantly, he provides his own research done on the ground. The author is one of the few Americans to have met the PKK terrorist leader Abdullah Ocalan. Perhaps most importantly, the author spent considerable time reporting from Turkey and Northern Iraq from the time of Operation DESERT STORM through the present. He reports on the sometimes-conflicting relationships between Turkey, the United States, the Kurds, and Europe. As a source often critical of Turkey and the United States (Noam Chomsky praised the book!), the book provides a counterpoint to official American and Turkish sources.

Atilla Darendelli's DTIC thesis *Turkey and European Union Relations* presents a Turkish military perspective on this important issue. The author views EU membership as Turkey's just reward for the sacrifices Turkey made in the Cold War in support of the NATO mission. This paper provides a good window into official Turkish objectives and what drives its involvement in European security institutions.

Nora Ben Sahel's DTIC paper *The Counter-Terror Coalition* deals with ways in which NATO and the European Union can cooperate to fight terror. It covers the events before and after Operation ENDURING FREEDOM and also elaborates upon Turkey's contribution to this operation. It is a useful resource for illustrating Turkey's past contributions to European security institution-driven operations.

C. METHODS AND SOURCES

This thesis will perform a historical analysis of Turkey's relationship with European security institutions with a particular emphasis on recent history, specifically the past ten years.

This thesis will utilize documents written by military professionals, both American and Turkish, to obtain the views held within the Department of Defense and the Turkish military establishment. This is particularly important in the Turkish model, as it is this author's experience that Turkish military personnel are less likely than their American counterparts to state their personal opinions unless in an approved setting (such as a Master's Thesis).

In addition, it will utilize web-based documents from the European Union, The Department of Defense, Department of State, NATO, and the Turkish government. The dynamic nature of the topic and the focus on recent events make the use of web-based material necessary. Websites are considerably more agile than books: they can be updated.

Published books such as those outlined in the review of literature serve to flesh out the thesis, particularly in terms of historical background.

D. THESIS OVERVIEW

The thesis begins with an introduction and a historical overview of Turkey, stretching from the final years of the Ottoman Empire to today. The introduction, encompassing much of the submitted thesis proposal, will serve as a road map for the thesis.

The thesis will then cover NATO, the oldest and most significant of Turkey's relationships. This section will serve to establish how Turkey historically conducted its relationships with European security institutions.

Then, the thesis will cover Turkey's relationship with the ESDP, a smaller relationship than that with NATO, but with significant ramifications for Turkey's future relationship with the EU (and America!)

Next, the thesis will look at the unique challenges and problems facing Turkey's relationship. These problems include the Cyprus question, the Armenian tragedy of 1915 and the current drive to name it as genocide, Turkey's internal politics, and Turkey's relationship with the United States.

Finally, the conclusion will review the relationships and note various possible courses of action that the parties will take (without attempting to proscribe any lessons learned or predictions of the future!).

The thesis will reference documents from the EU, NATO, as well as the Turkish foreign ministry. It will address the stated position of both the EU and Turkey, and thus, provide a better understanding of the specific challenges and opportunities in Turkey's road to EU accession.

Yet, this thesis will not simply look at these topics from a neutral point of view. This paper has a clear argument on the subject of Turkey's policies and their effects on European integration. Specifically, with the exception of Turkey's military capability, many of its actions and policies work against its inclusion. This is unfortunate and counterproductive because if Turkey and its powerful military were integrated into the European Union, Turkey could better achieve an independent defensive capability. Thus, Turkey's European integration would meet one of Europe's great shortfalls; it has plenty of "soft power" but its ability to project coercive power is limited. By achieving this increased defensive capability, Europe would be better able to face the growing threat of terror and Middle East instability.

Europe perceives Turkey as "the other" for reasons both founded and unfounded, and this fear works to prevent Turkish integration. Europe has unfounded fears of Turkey based on a fear of Muslims and memories of Ottoman aggression. These fears work against Turkish integration. Yet, some of Europe's fears are because Turkey and Europe simply differ on many issues that Europe holds important. Europe and Turkey hold vastly

different positions on capital punishment, the Armenian tragedy of 1915, the role of the military in society, and civil society in general. This thesis states that ultimately, these differences outweigh any possible advantages to Turkish integration and Turkey will not integrate until these issues are resolved.

II. TURKEY'S OTTOMAN LEGACY AND IT EFFECTS

A. BACKGROUND

What is the history of Turkish-European relations? Ottoman history has much to do with Turkish-European relations today. The Ottoman Empire was the ruling power in the Central Middle East from the early 1500s until the end of World War I. It ruled over a huge empire that stretched across North Africa to the Arabian Peninsula up to the Crimea and over much of Eastern Europe. The Ottomans reached Vienna in 1529 and 1683. In this period, the survival of Christian Europe was in serious jeopardy. Queen Elizabeth I's historian called the contemporary Ottoman Empire "the present terror of the world."³ It is these memories that contribute to Europe's fear of "the Turk."

How was the Ottoman Empire ruled? Who were the key decision makers on the political and social levels? What was the relationship between these entities?

The sultan led the Ottoman elite, but at the heart of the political power, was the Ottoman military. However, the Ottomans did not simply use their military to conquer territory, but also for economic reasons. In fact, the Ottoman military first acquired a navy to control the trade routes and wrest them away from the Italian city-states.⁴ Yet, the basis of Ottoman military strength was the janissaries-the best infantry in Europe during the 15th and 16th centuries.⁵ The janissaries were a slave army recruited from the non-Muslim population of the empire.

Another key player was the Ottoman civil service. The Ottoman civil service ran a huge bureaucracy. Yet, the Ottomans did not have a single, unchanging administrative system. A key to the Ottoman system was the utilization of flexible administrative practices to meet the different needs of different groups and cultures. In fact, the

³ Bernard Lewis, *The Middle East: A Brief History of the Last 2,000 Years* (New York, NY: Scribner, 1995), 115.

⁴ William L. Cleveland, *A History of the Modern Middle East* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2004), 40.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 47.

Ottomans were tolerant of local customs. “As long as taxes were remitted and stability was maintained, the Ottomans were content to tolerate the existence of a wide variety of local practices.”⁶ In fact, the Ottomans were able to govern nations that in recent years appeared ungovernable (Algeria, Iraq) by essentially ignoring the locals except for the collection of taxes. Another example of Ottoman tolerance and pragmatism was the millet system. The Ottomans used the millet system to rule non-Muslim subjects. The Ottomans approved the leading official from the Greek Orthodox, Armenian Orthodox, and Jewish communities and allowed them to run the affairs of their respective groups. The leaders of the minority groups were responsible to the sultan for the continued good behavior of their community. This provided them more autonomy than their peers enjoyed in Europe at the time, but they were still second-class citizens. As long as the unquestioned rule of the sultan, and an official status of inferiority before the law, was accepted, Christian subjects could rise and profit from their allegiance.⁷

The Ulama (individuals specially trained in Muslim religious doctrine) thus formed another part of the ruling class. They helped administer Shariah law through a hierarchical system of judges.⁸ Yet, the religious judicial system was still under the control of the sultan and the judges could be dismissed by the sultan.

What was the relationship between these groups? The sultan was the ultimate authority: he approved the ulama, the millet leaders, and the bureaucrats. The bureaucrats, in turn, collected the taxes that supported the sultan’s empire. The bureaucrats also ran the devshirme system. This system of taking non-Muslim children and raising them as servants of the sultan (as soldiers or bureaucrats) enabled the functioning of the empire. Yet, the devshirme was also a key form of social mobility. It was not hereditary: free Muslims could not send their children. It was a meritocracy that allowed the poor a chance to rise to the top. The ulama provided the sultan with the

⁶ Cleveland, *A History of the Modern Middle East*, 44.

⁷ Chris Morris, *The New Turkey: The Quiet Revolution on the Edge of Europe* (London: Granta Books, 2006), 18.

⁸ Cleveland, *A History of the Modern Middle East*, 48.

religious backing for his empire, and also arbitrated the disputes of the people. The millet provided the sultan with the promise of good behavior of their group in exchange for more autonomy and rights.

Yet in the 18th and 19th centuries, the balance of power slowly but decidedly changed to the West. The Ottoman Empire weakened to the point that after Napoleon's defeat, they were not deemed important enough to be invited to the post-war 1814 Congress of Vienna.⁹ During this period of decline, the Empire also attempted reform. What was the goal of the Ottoman reform movement? It was to turn back the tide of setbacks and preserve the empire. The key period of Ottoman reform was in the 19th century. Within this time, the period from 1839 until 1876 is known as the Tanzimat, or reorganization. It was the most intense phase of Ottoman reform in the 19th century.¹⁰

One such important reform of this time was the Royal Decree of 1839. This decree promised reforms, abolishing of tax farms, less corruption, and changes to the conscription system.¹¹ Yet, the regime did not appear to abide by this decree because the New Decree of 1856 repeated the promises of the 1839 decree, stressing equal rights and obligations for Muslims and non-Muslims alike.¹² The intention was to stop the tide of nationalism and keep the Christian subjects loyal.

The Ottoman Empire also introduced new legal codes. These codes kept shariah law, but were inspired by European codes of law.¹³ Again, this policy of reform was an attempt to adopt some of Europe's reforms and modernization and stave off defeat at Europe's hands.

⁹ Morris, *The New Turkey: The Quiet Revolution on the Edge of Europe*, 25.

¹⁰ Cleveland, *A History of the Modern Middle East*, 82.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 83.

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ *Ibid.*, 84.

In 1876, the Ottomans installed a new constitution. This document was another attempt to learn from the success of the Europeans as concerned state and society. The constitution called for an elected chamber of deputies and an appointed senate. However, the sultan still had overall control. Worse, the constitution was dissolved in 1878 in the wake of war.

In the first decade of the 20th century, the Young Turks demanded a return to the 1876 Constitution. Who were these people? The Young Turks were comprised of four groups: exiles, disaffected civil servants, students, and army officers. The Young Turks saw the growing German and British strength (and rivalry) and urgently tried to reform the military.¹⁴ While the Young Turks were oppressive of minorities within the empire, they fought for a more efficient government. Yet, they also alienated such key groups in society as the Arab leadership, a step that later became significant during World War I in the face of British policy to foment upheaval.

Although the Ottoman Empire no longer exists, and the modern Turkish Republic is 85 years old, modern Europe still has a somewhat troubled relationship with its Muslim (Turkish and non-Turkish) minority. No less than Charles de Gaulle objected to Muslims integrating into Europe. He stated that, “If we integrate them, if all the Arabs and Berbers of Algeria were considered French, how could they be prevented from settling in France, where the standard of living is so much higher? My village would no longer be called Columbey-les-deux-Eglises [Columbey of the two churches], but Columbey-les-deux-mosques.”¹⁵ De Gaulle made this comment in 1959, in the middle of the Algerian insurgency. De Gaulle also stated that French and European civilization was European and “white.”

In fact, French-Turkish rivalry has a long history deeply connected with the rise of France as the leading national power and hegemon of continental Europe and the so-called Eastern Question in the 18th and 19th centuries. In 1797, France acquired territory in the Balkans adjacent to the Ottoman Empire. “The old friend became a new neighbor,

¹⁴ Cleveland, *A History of the Modern Middle East*, 133.

¹⁵ J. S., Fetzner and, J. C. Soper, *Muslims and the State in Britain, France, and Germany* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 62.

and friendship did not survive the shock.”¹⁶ The French made rules against privileges for hereditary nobility, and encouraged nationalism in the people of the Balkans, especially the Greek Orthodox as heirs to the revolution. The Ottomans believed that the French were inciting the Greeks through Republicanism, and were working to corrupt the minds of the Ottoman minorities.¹⁷ In a sense, France injected a virus into the Ottoman Empire in the form of nationalism and national consciousness. It did not destroy the empire immediately, but once these new ideas reached the Greek, Armenian, and Arab subjects of the empire, the effect was to set up national movements that would rear the empire apart.

However, the relationship with Europe was not just a rivalry but also an exchange of ideas, including in the arena of professional military education. The Turkish military’s use of modern tactics and organization has deep roots in the Ottoman Empire. In the autumn of 1793, the sultan sent a message to Paris with a list of the officers and technicians whom he wished to recruit from France.¹⁸ Later, in the 1830s, Sultan Mahmud II sought the aid of Western governments in modernizing his armed forces, to include Prussian and British advisory teams.¹⁹ The Ottomans also began sending their officers to Western military academies and staff colleges,²⁰ a practice that continues today in the modern Turkish military (to include Naval Postgraduate School!). Where did this concept of using school systems to build a common identity originate? In the late Ottoman period, Sultan Abdulhammid II established almost 15,000 new religious schools.²¹ The founders of the Turkish Republic were educated in these schools, and they shaped many of their outlooks and beliefs.²² Later, the early Republic also sought to de-politicize the military by forbidding officers from holding public office.²³

¹⁶ Lewis, *The Middle East: A Brief History of the Last 2,000 Years*, 320.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid., 295.

¹⁹ Ibid., 296.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ M. Hakan Yavuz, *Islamic Political Identity in Turkey* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 44.

²² Yavuz, *Islamic Political Identity in Turkey*, 45.

²³ Cleveland, *A History of the Modern Middle East*, 180.

Abdulhammid also brought a German General, Baron Wilhelm Leopold von der Goltz, to train Ottoman cadets in a forerunner of defense reform as it is understood today. Again, the early leaders of the Turkish Republic are part of this legacy of Prussian German military thought as concern the soldier and the state.²⁴ Therefore, the look westward for educational opportunities are neither a modern trend nor even just a trend from the beginning of the Turkish Republic. Rather, such policy is part of a process going back to the later Ottoman period and continues today within NATO, but also in the policy of Turkey in the Partnership for Peace (PfP) and beyond.

When people think of Turkey's look to the West for new ideas, many people think of Ataturk. What are some of the origins of Ataturk's attempt to emulate the West as a process of reform? Before World War I, Ataturk served as an Ottoman military attaché in Berlin and Sofia, an experience that exposed him to European concepts of government and military organization. His experience in these positions increased his desire to emulate Central Europe and adopt many of its practices.²⁵ Hence, Ataturk's look to the West also has its origins in the history of the Ottoman military in the modern period. This fact is relevant to today's civil-military picture because today's Turkish officer corps take Ataturk's example and legacy as their personal code of conduct. In fact, at their commissioning, Turkish officers pronounce the following oath: "I will remain loyal to Ataturk's principles and reforms, and I will defend them."²⁶

It is also important to note that when Ataturk decided that Turkey needed to be a part of Western civilization, he was not thinking of the United States, but rather Europe.²⁷ The United States had not yet stepped onto the world stage as a superpower but was rather a distant power in the years before the Second World War. Turkey's alignment with the United States occurred only after World War II. This long-term affinity for

²⁴ Yavuz, *Islamic Political Identity in Turkey*, 45.

²⁵ Cleveland, *A History of the Modern Middle East*, 179.

²⁶ Stephen Kinzer, *Crescent and Star: Turkey between Two Worlds* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2002), 175.

²⁷ Bulent Ali Riza, CSIS Turkey Update, 2008, 1, http://www.csis.org/media/isis/pubs/0801_turkey_update.pdf.

Europe gains importance in the context of European integration and whether Turkey will tilt toward Europe or the United States (or whether the three parties can work together and avoid this zero-sum game situation).

While the Ottoman Empire's Turkish Republican heirs earned a reputation as ardent secularists, this is not entirely true. The early Republic realized that Islam was a powerful rallying point around which to organize resistance to the Allied occupation. "In order to protect its founding ideology, the Kemalist elite opportunistically employed Islam for the realization of a modern and secular Turkey."²⁸ In order to rally the nation, Ataturk stressed the Islamic nature of the War of Independence to the Turkish people.²⁹ During the war of independence, the Kurds fought on the same side as the Turkish forces, but "as Sunni Muslims, they viewed the conflict as religious, not nationalistic."³⁰ Even today, in the office of the *imam* for Ankara's main Kocatepe mosque, there is a giant photo of Ataturk performing *namas*. Clearly, as a government approved mosque, this photo serves to meet the state's narrative, but it is still interesting in that it disproves the myth that Ataturk was actually anti-religious.

While this study earlier discussed the similarities between the Ottoman soldiers of the past and today's Turkish military, there are significant differences that deserve their due analysis. Yet, such changes actually originated in the late Ottoman period. "The Nineteenth Century Ottoman elites sought to consolidate state power primarily by modernizing the army, a process that transformed the army into a trendsetter and an agent for ordering the society in accordance with the needs of the state."³¹

In the move from the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic, not only were there breaks in the military culture, but also of civil society. Earlier, this paper looked at the less publicized role of Islamic identity in the post-World War I struggle for independence. While this role is interesting, the idea of de-Islamization of the state has

²⁸ Yavuz, *Islamic Political Identity in Turkey*, 45.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Kevin McKiernan, *The Kurds: A People in Search of their Homeland* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2006), 91.

³¹ Yavuz, *Islamic Political Identity in Turkey*, 42.

much basis in fact. In the early Turkish Republic, state sponsored history stressed the pre-Islamic Turkishness, and downplayed the Islamic and Ottoman history. Some Turkish intellectuals criticized this revision of history, but the government suppressed them.³² Yet, the Turkish modernization of the early Turkish Republic is seen as both a continuation of 19th century Ottoman reform, but was also intended to root out “Ottomanism.”³³ Interestingly, the move from an empire to an even more centralized form of government is similar to what happened in France one hundred years earlier. Tocqueville believed that the aftermath of the overthrow of the monarchy is actually a more powerful and central government. “Whenever a nation destroys its aristocracy, it almost automatically leads toward a centralization of power.”³⁴ In the case of the Ottomans, their replacement was also a more powerful, central and ambitious government that tasked itself with the reinvention of the national identity.

There was also a practical side to the de-Islamization of the early Turkish Republic. During the period between the end of the Ottoman Empire, and the founding of the Turkish Republic, the British invited both the Republican forces and representatives of the caliphate to negotiations. This had the potential to weaken the bargaining position of the Turkish side through “divide and conquer.” By abolishing the caliphate, Ataturk tactically outmaneuvered both his Turkish rivals and the British by delegitimizing his internal Turkish competition.³⁵

While speaking of the Turkish War of Independence, one recalls it as the first successful nationalist revolution in Asia or Africa.³⁶ At first, Ataturk’s successful revolt gave Muslims inspiration as a way to beat the West at its own game, but Ataturk went on, to secularize Turkey, and to push Turkey toward Europe. Thus, Turkey antagonized Muslims of other nations who were at first supportive of its successes.³⁷ Hence, just as

³² Yavuz, *Islamic Political Identity in Turkey*, 51.

³³ Cleveland, *A History of the Modern Middle East*, 180.

³⁴ Alexis de Tocqueville, *The Old Régime and the French Revolution* (New York: Anchor Books, 1983), 60.

³⁵ Cleveland, *A History of the Modern Middle East*, 178.

³⁶ Lewis, *The Middle East: A Brief History of the Last 2,000 Years*, 346.

³⁷ *Ibid.*

the early Turkish Republic used Islam to rally its people, the early Turkish Republic was an inspiration to other Muslims. Further, as the later Turkish Republic suppressed the public role of Islam, other Muslims lost some of their enthusiasm for the Turkish successes. Atatürk and the early leaders of the Turkish Republic, in fact, made a conscious effort to limit Pan-Islamic foreign policy, and this follows the commonly understood narrative of Turkey breaking with its Ottoman past and embracing the Western concept of modernity.

Yet, what is even more interesting is that this early leadership also rejected a foreign policy based on Pan-Turkism. Therefore, while Turkey extracted itself from the ruins of the Ottoman Empire by creating a nation-state based on a shared Turkish identity, Turkey did not pursue this idea in foreign policy. For example, Atatürk's early Turkish Republic refused to engage in the liberation movements resisting the Bolsheviks' power consolidation in post-Czarist Central Asia. Turkey identified that its national interests were not at stake in these conflicts.

This is not to say that some Turks did not seek to come to the aid of these national liberation movements. In fact, Enver Pasha died in Tajikistan while supporting the Basmachis rebellion against the Bolsheviks in 1922.³⁸ In 1996, Turkey flew his body back to Turkey for a burial with honors. With the opening of former Soviet Central Asia in the 1990s, the idea of Pan-Turkism was once again popular. Turkey's Pan-Turkic foreign policy of the 1990s was a departure from the early Republic's goal of staying out of foreign entanglements. Turkey sought to maintain correct relations with the Soviet Union. Atatürk himself considered both Pan-Islamic and Pan-Turkic foreign policy as counterproductive. On this subject, he stated Turkey's national identity was at once very restrictive and also very open. It could not countenance a separate Kurdish identity, as a Muslim in Turkey was a Turk. It lost the cosmopolitanism of the Ottoman Empire with its large Greek, Armenian and Jewish populations. Yet, for those minorities who choose to engage with the nation within the state rules, Turkey can be very open. The definition of Turk became anyone living in Turkey who identified themselves as a Turk.

³⁸ Yücel Bozdağlıoğlu, *Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity: A Constructivist Approach* (New York: Routledge, 2003), 175.

B. TURKEY AND THE EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET/EC/EU

The early Turkish Republic's move toward the West and a secular democracy were followed in the post World War II by continued efforts to integrate with Europe. What is Turkey's past experience with the EU membership process?³⁹ The European common market of the time established the original roadmap in the 1964 Ankara Agreement⁴⁰ at a time when the political proposition of affiliation or membership in the common market had a different political character than in the past decade. During the 1990s, Turkey made very little progress in meeting the EU's political conditions, but the nation increased its progress after 2000.⁴¹

The 1993 Copenhagen EU Summit set the political and economic standards for economic parameters for EU candidate states, such things as democracy, human rights, rule of law, and protection of minorities.⁴² It also asked that Turkey peacefully resolve the Kurdish insurgency.⁴³ Despite these positive steps in the early 1990s, the EU did not invite Turkey to the 1997 Luxembourg Summit, and in response, Turkey suspended its participation in the Association Council.⁴⁴

The Helsinki EU Summit of December 1999 declared, "Turkey is a candidate state destined to join the Union on the basis of the same [Copenhagen] criteria as applied to the other candidate states."⁴⁵ It was Turkey's progress concerning democratic reforms and human rights, along with better Turkish-Greek relations, that led to Turkey's recognition as an "official candidate" at the Helsinki Council of 1999.⁴⁶

³⁹ The EU was founded in 1993, before that it was the EEC, and before that the Common Market

⁴⁰ Frank Schimmelfennig, Stefan Engert, and Heiko Knobel, "Costs, Commitment and Compliance: The Impact of EU Democratic Conditionality on Latvia, Slovakia and Turkey," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 41 no. 3 (2003): 41.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 43.

⁴² Yavuz, *Islamic Political Identity in Turkey*, 254.

⁴³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴ Schimmelfennig, Engert, and Knobel, "Costs, Commitment and Compliance: The Impact of EU Democratic Conditionality on Latvia, Slovakia and Turkey," 42.

⁴⁵ Yavuz, *Islamic Political Identity in Turkey*, 254.

⁴⁶ Helen Wallace and William Wallace, *Policy-making in the European Union* (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 1996), 425.

From the Turkish perspective, this slow progress was disappointing and incongruous with the role Turkey played in Europe. The EU is the only major European organization of which Turkey is not yet a full member.⁴⁷

While one can look at Turkey's integration from the macro level, Turkey's integration can also be seen from the perspective of actual integration of ethnic Turks into European society, and in this arena, there has been some recent success stories. Recently, some encouraging news on this subject emerged in Germany where the German Green Party elected Cam Ozdemir as their leader. According to the International Herald Tribune (November 16, 2008), Mr. Ozdemir's parents arrived as guest workers in the 1960s. In this article, Mr. Ozdemir stated, "I want a society where everyone has an equal chance, regardless of where they come from." Mr. Ozdemir's rise is seen not just as the rise of Turks in Germany (there were one million Germans of Turkish descent eligible to vote in the 2005 election) but an opening up of German society in general. German identity thus appears to be less tied to one's ancestry and ethnicity. If so, this bodes well for Turkey's own European Union candidacy. Green Party Chair Ozdemir is a social scientist by trade: education was his key to social mobility and political power. Unfortunately, he is in some respects an exception. According to German population studies, Turkish second generation immigrants lag behind immigrants from all other European nations, including the Former Yugoslavia.⁴⁸ How is this known? The Germans use the 10-year census, but also a Mikrozensus: a 1% annual random sample of the population.

Is it in the interest of the United States that the status of Turks in Europe improves? The United States views Turkish integration into Europe in its national interest, and a prosperous integrated Turkish community in Europe would facilitate the process of Turkish integration. Yet, how can the United States improve this situation? It can appeal to the self-interest of Europe. The European "pay as you go" pension system depends on high earning power. By empowering its population to earn more, Europe can

⁴⁷ Schimmelfennig, Engert, and Knobel, "Costs, Commitment and Compliance: The Impact of EU Democratic Conditionality on Latvia, Slovakia and Turkey," 42.

⁴⁸ Regina T. Riphahn, "Cohort Effects in the Educational Attainment of Second Generation Immigrants in Germany: An Analysis of Census Data," *Journal of Population Economics* 16, no. 4 (2003): 711.

safeguard its own social safety net. In addition, education leads to social integration. By improving the education of the Turkish minority, the stakeholder can improve the status of Turks within Europe; thus, improving the image of Turks. This, in turn, will lead to a greater chance of the European integration of Turkey.

III. TURKEY AND EU ACCESSION

A. TURKEY'S EU PROBLEMATIC TRUMP CARD: THE MILITARY

Turkey has a large military, with an annual defense budget of ten billion dollars, the fifteenth largest defense budget in the world.⁴⁹ In 2004, it had a military of over 500,000, the largest in Europe.⁵⁰ Turkey's military is a mix of professional officers and non-commissioned officers; along with a large conscript force (Turkey has universal male conscription). The Turkish military also utilizes a system in which conscripts that complete their military service (and maintain a good record of conduct) can continue service on a contractual basis. The security forces guarding some military facilities (to include Incirlik Air Base) utilize this manpower system. Turkey joined NATO in 1952.⁵¹ Turkey's armed forces and historical ties to both the Balkans and Central Asia make it an important force or in outreach by European security institutions. As noted above, Turkey's continued military strength contrasts with Europe's reliance on "soft power" at the expense of coercive capabilities. "While Turkish military capabilities have grown, European militaries have shrunk. Since the early 1990's, EU member countries have dramatically decreased their defense expenses in favor of domestic and social spending. Currently, major EU countries spend an average of 2% of their GDP on defense, whereas the United States spends 4% and Turkey 5.3 %."⁵² "The European Union is struggling to set up a credible security and defense policy because only Britain and France have armed forces with anything approaching a global reach."⁵³ Again, this all reinforces what Turkey can potentially bring to a stronger relationship with Europe.

⁴⁹ Jolyon Howorth, *Security and Defense Policy in the European Union* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 94.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 100.

⁵¹ David S. Yost. *NATO Transformed the Alliance's New Roles in International Security* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998), 31.

⁵² Erdal Tatli, "Turkey Turns Cold to European Defense: Implications for Western Security," *The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, PolicyWatch* #1376 (June 2 2008), <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2894>.

⁵³ Morris, *The New Turkey: The Quiet Revolution on the Edge of Europe*, 39.

B. RESPONSE TO TERROR: PKK

As the Turkey's response to the Kurdish question is one of the main (stated) impediments to its attempt to integrate into Europe, it is worth exploring this issue. The EU asked that Turkey peacefully resolve the Kurdish insurgency. Turkey's opponent in this struggle is the Partîye Karkerên Kurdistan (Kurdistan Workers Party) or PKK, yet the issue of a Kurdish separatist threat to the Turkish Republic is not new. "For the first forty years of the Turkish Republic, the authorities viewed the Kurdish region as a trouble spot of latent, if not actual resistance, and the area was sealed off by the military until the 1960's to prevent contact with outsiders."⁵⁴ According to the U.S. State Department, the PKK is the most prominent terrorist group in Turkey and is composed of Kurds with a separatist agenda.⁵⁵ According to the Naval Postgraduate School Library Special Topics Subject Guide on Terrorism, "The KGK/PKK was founded by Abdullah Ocalan in 1974 as a Marxist-Leninist separatist organization."⁵⁶ The Kurds were promised a homeland by the victorious Allies after World War I, but lost it in the Turkish War of Independence. Following World War I, Kurdish intellectuals supported a Kurdish state and sent representatives to the Paris Peace Conference in 1919.⁵⁷ The concept of intellectuals rallying to their nation and championing it was an important theme of World War I when intellectuals and the press on all sides of the conflict rallied for their nation.⁵⁸

⁵⁴ McKiernan, *The Kurds: A People in Search of their Homeland*, 28.

⁵⁵ United States, *Country Reports on Terrorism*, Department of State Publication (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Dept. of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism), 2008, <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2007/103707.htm>.

⁵⁶ Terrorist Group Profiles, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 2008, <http://www.nps.edu/Library/Research/SubjectGuides/SpecialTopics/TerroristProfile/Current/PKK.html>.

⁵⁷ McKiernan, *The Kurds: A People in Search of their Homeland*, 90.

⁵⁸ Bernard Wasserstein, *Barbarism and Civilization: A History of Europe in Our Time* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 73.

It fought an insurgency in the 1980s and 1990s in Southeast Turkey that claimed thousands of lives. Turkey was frustrated by a perceived lack of support for a fellow NATO member under attack by terrorists, and Turkey even attempted to invoke Article V to obligate its NATO allies to assist in the fight against the PKK.⁵⁹

After capturing Ocalan in 1999, Turkish courts found him guilty of separatist treason and sentenced him to death.⁶⁰ Even though the Turkish government placed a moratorium on the death penalty in 1984, it reserved the right to execute Ocalan.⁶¹ After the Court of Appeals upheld the verdict, Ocalan's lawyers took the case to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). The ECHR ordered Turkey (a member of the court's jurisdiction) to suspend the execution until it ruled on the appeal, and the Turkish government agreed.⁶²

International NGO's also placed pressure upon Turkey. For example, in the 1990s, Amnesty International lobbied the EU and the Clinton Administration to curtail arms sales to Turkey.⁶³ In January 2003, Turkey signed Protocol 6 to the European Convention on Human Rights, outlawing the death penalty.⁶⁴ Thus, Turkish institutions tempered Turkish policy, in this case, a high-profile criminal justice issue. This issue reveals a serious Turkish-EU cleavage: capital punishment. Turkey and the EU have very different views on capital punishment, and this is reflected in civil society (see below). There is clearly a serious EU-Turkey divide, yet as noted above, Turkey altered its actions to comply with Europe (and, one can assume, to improve EU accession opportunities). Interestingly, the United States is closer to Turkey than to Europe on this one issue. A Turkish decision to execute a convicted terrorist would cause much less of a stir in the United States, where the death penalty is viewed far differently than in Europe.

⁵⁹ Tom Lansford, *All for One: Terrorism, NATO and the United States* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2002), 73.

⁶⁰ Yavuz, *Islamic Political Identity in Turkey*, 254.

⁶¹ Schimmelfennig, Engert, and Knobel, "Costs, Commitment and Compliance: The Impact of EU Democratic Conditionality on Latvia, Slovakia and Turkey," 43.

⁶² Yavuz, *Islamic Political Identity in Turkey*, 254.

⁶³ McKiernan, *The Kurds: A People in Search of their Homeland*, 122.

⁶⁴ Schimmelfennig, Engert, and Knobel, "Costs, Commitment and Compliance: The Impact of EU Democratic Conditionality on Latvia, Slovakia and Turkey," 43.

Despite the abovementioned Turkish concessions to Europe, since the summer of 2007, the Turkish government took a much more aggressive stance toward the PKK. The ruling Adalet ve Kalkinma (Justice and Development) or “AK” Party championed European integration. Today, the key difference between the AKP and the military is not the PKK insurgency, but rather, how to deal with those Kurds who are not part of the PKK, both inside and outside of Turkey.

C. RESPONSE TO TERROR: DHKP-C

The Naval Postgraduate School Library’s Special Topic Subject Guide on Terrorism notes that the DHKP-C is known by several names, including “Dev Sol; Dev Sol Armed Revolutionary Units; Dev Sol Silahlı Devrimci Birlikleri; Dev Sol SDB; Devrimci Halk Kurtulus Partisi-Cephesi; Devrimci Sol; Revolutionary Left.”⁶⁵ They formed in 1978, with the goal of establishing a socialist state in Turkey. They are anti-Turkish, anti-U.S., and anti-NATO. In the past, they killed two Americans, and bombed over 20 U.S. and NATO facilities.⁶⁶

The DHKP-C consider themselves part of the “world Communist body,” and as such, are somewhat of an anachronism whose “best days” appear to be behind them. Yet, they maintain a cadre of trained terrorists, showed a past capability for tradecraft and professionally executed attacks, and as such, they remain a threat. The DHKP-C addressed the 1996 annual seminar of Communist parties in Brussels. At this meeting, they declared, “The DHKP-C are the ones who fight for the Kurd, Turks, for the oppressed.”⁶⁷ Interestingly, in this speech, the DHKP-C admitted that in the Middle East, revolutionary movements have been overtaken over by Islamic radicalism. As such, they are part of the greater trend of the older Soviet-style terror groups of the 1970s and 1980s

⁶⁵ Terrorist Group Profiles, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 2008, <http://www.nps.edu/Library/Research/SubjectGuides/SpecialTopics/TerroristProfile/Current/RevolutionaryPeoplesLiberationParty.html>.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party, “Speech of the DHKP-C at the International Seminar in Brussels,” May 2, 1996, <http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/51/026.html>.

that have lost a lot of ground to the Islamists. Thirty years ago, disaffected young people joined the DHKP-C's, the Baader-Meinhof's, and the PLO's. Today, these young people would join one of the various Islamist terror groups.

D. CLEAVAGES IN THE RESPONSE TO TERROR

Despite the fact that these groups operate in both Europe and Turkey, the governments of Europe have varying responses to both the PKK and the DHKP-C. For example, the United States 2008 Country Report on Terrorism, authored by the State Department Counter-Terrorism Coordination Office, admonishes Austria for its handling of the PKK and states that Austria “failed to coordinate fully law enforcement activities with other states against the militant Kurdish separatist group Kongra Gel/Kurdistan Workers Party (KGK/PKK), an EU and U.S. assigned terrorist group.”⁶⁸ In 2007, Austria released PKK leader Riza Altun and allowed him to fly on to Northern Iraq, even though he traveled on false documents. Additionally, he was wanted by France and Turkey. In November 2007, Austria failed to detain Remni Kartal, another PKK leader wanted by Interpol.⁶⁹

In 2006, Belgium convicted several members of the DHKP-C. Yet in 2007, the case was overturned and is now being retried in Belgium.⁷⁰ This led to a diplomatic dispute with Turkey, which will be elaborated upon below. Denmark hosts a group that, according to Turkey (and the U.S. State Department⁷¹), is a terrorist organization. The Roj media organization is labeled a PKK affiliate. Roj TV (<http://www.roj.tv>) showed film clips of PKK guerillas in the field and other propaganda items (although lately this has disappeared from the website).

⁶⁸ United States, *Country Reports on Terrorism*, Department of State Publication (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Dept. of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism), 2008, <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2007/103707.htm>.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Ibid.

In February 2007, France arrested 16 Kurds suspected of being part of the PKK on charges of extortion, money laundering, and terrorism financing. Riza Altun was one of those arrested. He posted bail, fled to Austria, and as noted above, was allowed by Austrian authorities to depart for Northern Iraq.

The United States also notes that the PKK maintains a presence in Italy and uses charitable donations to raise funds there.⁷² Overall, these groups use Europe as a place to raise funds, from which to disseminate propaganda, and as a safe refuge. These benefits are force multipliers for their operations against Turkey and other targets.

E. EFFECTS ON TURKISH-EUROPEAN RELATIONS

According to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the overturning of the convictions of the DHKP-C defendants by Belgium was against “the fundamental principles of the global fight against terrorism, first and foremost with resolutions of the United Nations Security Council.”⁷³ It goes on to state, “The Turkish people who have sacrificed thousands of victims to terrorism resent the decision of the court.”⁷⁴ Clearly, there is some dispute here.

The PKK killed hundreds of people in Turkey in the last two years, and on October 17, 2007, the Turkish Parliament passed a motion allowing the Turkish military to cross into Northern Iraq to attack the PKK. It is for this reason that the situation of the PKK in Europe is important to the United States. The PKK and DHKP-C draw strength from their European assets. If the United States can help shut these operations down, it will significantly weaken the capabilities of these terrorist organizations. This, in turn, will lessen the PKK’s ability to harm Turkey, and thus, lessen Turkish incentives to enter

⁷² United States, *Country Reports on Terrorism*.

⁷³ Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Response of Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokesperson to a Question Concerning the Court Decision Announced in Belgium on February 7, 2008 about the DHKP-C Terrorist Organization, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/qa_3---01-february-2008_-statement-of-the-spokesman-of-the-ministry-of-foreign-affairs-of-Turkey-in-response-to-a-question-_unofficial-translation_.en.mfa.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

Northern Iraq. Obviously, a sustained Turkish operation in Northern Iraq would seriously complicate the U.S. mission in Iraq. Northern Iraq is one of the only success stories—America needs very few forces there to maintain order.

Additionally, Turkey allows the use of Incirlik Air Base as an air refueling/cargo hub in support of Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM. This hub saves the U.S. \$160 million per year in lower aircraft use and fuel costs.⁷⁵ In addition, Turkey allows the use of the Habur Gate border crossing for movement of supplies in support of Coalition troops in Iraq. Turkey thus has some leverage over the United States and it is in the U.S.’s interest to help Turkey solve its terror issues.

Concerning the gulf between Turkey and Europe concerning terror, there are some reasons for optimism. One reason for optimism is that the DHKP-C openly abuses the hospitality of its hosts, especially in Belgium. Through its website, it claimed that “The Belgian police have not grasped that our office only exists to inform public opinion about the repression, atrocities, and injustices committed in Turkey and the world.”⁷⁶ While calling Turkey a fascist state, it also calls Belgium “a democratic parody” and an “imperialist state.” It then goes on to say “A word of advice to the Belgian police: if they honestly seek terrorists, they should be spying on the embassies of Israel and Turkey.”⁷⁷ This statement clearly reveals that the organization is acting like an ungrateful houseguest. While the PKK seems to do a better job of not antagonizing its hosts, the DHKP-C appears to enjoy doing so. This diminished any goodwill on the part of the host government toward their organization.

Turkey’s frustration with European terror policy exposes the cleavage between the two concerning mindset. Turkey sees terrorist groups, while Europe sees ethnic separatists and militant leftists. Europe’s failure to take on these organizations aggressively contributes to Turkish distrust for Europe, and thus, diminishes enthusiasm for European integration. Despite these issues, Belgium professes to have very good

⁷⁵ United States, *Country Reports on Terrorism*.

⁷⁶ Revolutionary People’s Liberation Front, “DHKC Brussels Info Bureau: Another Belgian Police Exploit” April 9, 2006, <http://www.dhkc.net/www/index.html>.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

relations with Turkey. According to the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Relations between Belgium and Turkey are characterized by exemplary loyalty and cooperation.”⁷⁸ Belgium goes on to note, “Over the last 40 years, a community of Turkish immigrants has been living peacefully in Belgium and contributing to the country’s prosperity.”⁷⁹ Belgium also states that it supports Turkey’s EU candidacy. This is actually quite interesting that despite the wide gulf between Turkey and Belgium on this issue, Belgium still supports Turkey’s candidacy. Clearly, there are subtle nuances: not all Turkish-European cleavages inhibit Turkish integration.

F. RELATIONS/DIPLOMACY IN THE BALKANS

Despite differences with Western Europe over terrorism and human rights, Turkey also found success diplomatically in the Balkans. Turkey enjoys good relations with Macedonia/FYROM. There are 78,000 Macedonians of Turkish origin according to the Turkish government, as well as over 1,000 Turkish citizens living in the country. They comprise almost 4% of the population of FYROM.⁸⁰ According to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Turkey also attaches importance to the equitable representation of the Turkish community in Macedonia.”⁸¹ In fact, the Turks of FYROM can be called an ethnic success story when compared to the many other ethnic conflicts in the area. This is especially interesting in light of the fact that during Ottoman times, these relationships were not always so good. In the late Ottoman period, there was in fact serious violence. In 1893, the Central Macedonian Revolutionary Committee formed. This committee then formed the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO), led by two schoolteachers.⁸² The IMRO attacked Turks in Macedonia and

⁷⁸ Belgium, Foreign Policy: Bilateral Relations Southeast Europe, 2008, <http://www.diplomatie.be/en/policy/policynotedetail.asp?TEXTID=44351>.

⁷⁹ Belgium, Foreign Policy: Bilateral Relations Southeast Europe.

⁸⁰ Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Turkey’s Political Relations with Republic of Macedonia,” http://www.mfa.gov.tr/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Regions/Balkans/Republic+of+Macedonia/Turkeys_Political_Relations_With_Republic_of_Macedonia.htm.

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² T. Iván Berend, *History Derailed: Central and Eastern Europe in the Long Nineteenth Century* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 247.

started a revolt in 1903. The Ottoman Empire suppressed this revolt, and in the process, destroyed 200 villages, killed thousands of people, and forced 30,000 refugees to flee into Bulgaria.⁸³

Additionally, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs states, “Turkey and the Republic of Macedonia have established very close and friendly relations since the independence of Macedonia in 1991.”⁸⁴ Note that Turkey does not use the word “FYROM,” but rather “the Republic of Macedonia.” The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs helpfully notes that, “Turkey recognized the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.”⁸⁵ This gesture can be interpreted as respect for FYROM and an attempt to make life easier for the Turkish minority of FYROM. Yet, the FYROM “name crisis” is based on the insistence of Greece that there not be a nation with the same name as Greece’s province of Macedonia. By recognizing FYROM as the Republic of Macedonia, Turkey not only maintains good relations with Macedonia (and the Turkish minority in Macedonia), but it also can tweak its rival Greece as well. Yet, through the lens of European integration, this is clearly not helpful for Turkey. Turkey is annoying an EU member state that has the ability to inhibit its European integration process. In this case, Turkey’s rivalry with Greece works against its goals. However, at this point, one must acknowledge the very real progress in Turkish-Greek relations. In 1999, relations hit an incredible low point. Turkish forces tracked PKK terrorist leader Ocalan to the Greek Embassy compound in Kenya, thus revealing official Greek support of the PKK. Yet, within five years, the President of Greece was a guest of honor at the wedding of Prime Minister Erdogan’s daughter (interestingly, while Turkey’s secular Kemalist President Ahmet Necdet Sezer declined the invitation, apparently due to the overtly Islamic nature of the wedding!)

⁸³ Berend, *History Derailed: Central and Eastern Europe in the Long Nineteenth Century*, 248.

⁸⁴ Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Turkey’s Political Relations with Republic of Macedonia,” http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-political-relations-with-republic-of-macedonia.en.mfa.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

G. RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES

In the past five years, there were two distinct crises in U.S.-Turkish relations. The first occurred in March 2003 when the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) rejected the U.S. request to allow a northern invasion route into Turkey. The second occurred in 2007 with the combination of the ongoing PKK insurgency and the United States Congress' consideration of a bill recognizing the Armenian tragedy of 1915 as genocide.⁸⁶

The low point of Turkish-American relations came on July 4, 2003, when American troops captured 11 members of the Turkish Special Forces on the suspicion that they were in Northern Iraq to assassinate a prominent Kurd. The Turkish unit was also accused of supplying weapons to the Turkmen Front, representing the ethnic Turkmen in the disputed city of Kirkuk.⁸⁷ The fact that the Americans covered the captured Turkish soldiers with hoods reverberated in Turkish society. One has to spend time among Turks and among their military to understand just how much pride and shame mean in their society, especially the military. This writer once witnessed a traffic altercation in Turkey that escalated to a near brawl that needed to be broken up physically; one driver had said to another “Sen Serefsiz,” or “You are without honor.” Those are fighting words in Turkey, whereas in America it would simply be considered rude. Yet, in the much more nationalistic and prideful Europe of 50 years ago, these would be fighting words as well.

The July 4, 2003 hood incident reverberated so greatly in Turkish society that it became the subject of the highest budget film in the history of Turkish cinema: “Valley of the Wolves Iraq.” The United States military deemed the film and its viewers potentially dangerous enough that USEUCOM directed troops to avoid theaters showing the film.⁸⁸ The film is extremely inflammatory. The film opens with a fictionalized scene of the hood incident. In this fictionalized scenario, one of the victims of the “hood

⁸⁶ Center for Strategic and International Studies, “Turkey Update, January 30, 2008,” www.csis.org/Turkey, 1.

⁸⁷ McKiernan, *The Kurds: A People in Search of their Homeland*, 325.

⁸⁸ *Stars and Stripes*, February 7, 2006.

incident” returns to Turkey and finds his honor so besmirched that he commits suicide in full service dress uniform. American actor Gary Busey portrays an American doctor working in Iraq engaged in organ harvesting. The film notes that this character is also Jewish. American actor Billy Zane portrays a sadistic American commander. The Kurds are portrayed as thugs, and in one scene, the protagonists kill several Kurdish border guards as they enter Iraq. It is important to note that the narrative presented in this film went largely unchallenged in Turkish society. The July 4 incident seriously affected the perception of America in Turkey, just as Turkey’s March 2003 refusal to open a second front affected Turkey’s position in American public opinion.

What was Turkey’s interest in Northern Iraq? Again, Turkey opposed Operation IRAQI FREEDOM and saw Saddam’s Ba’athist regime as a useful check on Kurdish separatism in Iraq.⁸⁹ A check on Kurdish separatism in Iraq was thus, in turn, a check on Turkey’s Kurdish separatists.

Yet, the relationship never deteriorated to the brink. Following the November 5, 2007 meeting between President Bush and President Gul, Bush identified the PKK as a “common enemy” and promised “actionable intelligence.”⁹⁰ The relationship recovered. Prime Minister Erdogan even noted that there is “No need to turn a new page as relations were already excellent.”

While the AK party is known as an Islamic-based party, the AK Party actually bucked popular opinion (very anti-American) to pursue ties with the Bush Administration after the Iraq war.⁹¹

H. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE ARMENIAN ISSUE

Another issue critical not only to Turkey’s relationship with the United States and Europe, but also in its own right, is the Armenian issue. While Turkey’s relationship with

⁸⁹ Omer Taspinar, *Between Neo-Ottomanism and Kemalism* (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace #10, 2008), 17.

⁹⁰ Bulent Ali Riza, CSIS Turkey Update, 2008, 1, http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/0801_turkey_update.pdf.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 3.

the United States is that of allies who disagree on issues, the Armenian issue is another matter altogether. This issue not only challenges the Turkish narrative of the Republic's origin, but also involves a modern nation that neighbors Turkey, and with whom, Turkey has had a very troubled relationship. To understand the current Armenian issue, one has to look at the final years of the Ottoman Empire. With the rise of nationalism and the new European concept of national identity in the 1800s, these ideas spread to the Ottoman Empire. In a sense, Europe infected the Ottoman Empire with these new ideas, giving the Empire's minorities new identities that could not continue to exist within the framework of Ottoman rule. The minority uprisings against the Ottoman Empire before and during World War I affect the Turkish military to this day. This writer has heard Turkish officers tell him point blank (unsolicited!) "Never trust an Arab." Yet, this does not tell the whole story. "During all these struggles and upheavals, the vast majority of the subjects of the Ottoman Empire, irrespective of their ethnic and religious identities, remained loyal. Even among the Armenians and the Arabs, most were peaceful and law-abiding, and their men folk served in the sultan's armies."⁹² However, nationalists in these minority groups saw the war as their chance to achieve independence.⁹³ The Russians formed volunteer units from Armenian citizens of the Ottoman Empire. Also, Armenian guerrillas attacked Ottoman forces, especially in Van and Cilicia. Interestingly, while Russia supported the Armenian insurgency, the Soviet Union did not support Armenians in the post-war struggles. Turkey even cooperated with the new Soviet Union, and made a pact to divide and crush Armenia and split it between the two countries.⁹⁴ This situational cooperation with the Soviets is also an example of the pragmatism of the early Turkish Republic; the Republic strove for "correct" relations with the Soviets despite ideological differences and the traditional rivalry going back to the Ottoman and Russian Empires.

The Arab rebels fought the Ottomans in the Arabian Peninsulas, and even used their Islamic credentials to denounce the Ottoman jihad against England and France. This helped the British and French maintain their rule over their Muslim subjects during

⁹² Lewis, *The Middle East: A Brief History of the Last 2,000 Years*, 339.

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ Cleveland, *A History of the Modern Middle East*, 177.

World War I.⁹⁵ This point is relevant for today's struggles; by finding allies within the Muslim World, the Allies were able to avoid making World War I a clash of Christianity versus Islam.

For Turkey, these events were “the stab in the back”, just as one school of thought in the American military blamed Vietnam's loss on the domestic anti-war movement and the German military blamed their loss in World War I on treachery on the domestic front. The Turkish government continues to deal with the legacy of these minority uprisings. One such arena in which Turkey must contend with is that of international relations, particularly with Europe. In October 2006, the French National Assembly voted to support a bill outlawing the denial that Armenians suffered genocide at the hands of the Ottoman Empire. Turkey responded by freezing military contacts with France, to include military purchasing contracts. According to the *International Herald Tribune* (November 16, 2006), a member of Turkey's opposition party noted, “We tried very hard to stop this decision. But as they went ahead, we will retaliate. In international relations, you need to use leverage and one of those levers is military spending. We want to punish France.” Turkey's hard-line against France on this issue shows how strongly held its convictions are. In fact, Turkey reacted similarly to an American resolution identifying the Armenian Tragedy as genocide. The actual champion of the bill was House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, whom a contemporary article describes as “a longtime supporter of Armenian-American issues.”⁹⁶ Speaker Pelosi represents a district (and a state) with a large Armenian population. Additionally, the late Tom Lantos also championed this cause. Representative Lantos was a Holocaust survivor with strong ties to the American Jewish community. The Armenian Lobby pushed for the bill, yet in the end, the bill failed. Still, the 2007 effort by the Armenian Lobby was the strongest to date.⁹⁷

⁹⁵ Lewis, *The Middle East: A Brief History of the Last 2,000 Years*, 339.

⁹⁶ “Turkey Blames U.S. Jews for Genocide Bill,” *Jerusalem Post*, October 23, 2007.

⁹⁷ Bulent Ali Riza, CSIS Turkey Update, 4.

What happened? On October 11, 2007, Turkey recalled its Ambassador “for consultations.”⁹⁸ Then, on October 13, 2007, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan stated that U.S.-Turkish relations “could be cut off.” On October 14, Chief of Staff Gen. Yasar Buyukanit stated that U.S.-Turkish ties would “never again be the same” if the committee passed the resolution.⁹⁹ These three actions can be seen as brinkmanship on the part of Turkey. They are a coordinated upping of the ante and incremental responses to perceived negative behavior on the part of the United States.

Turkey also suspects interest groups connected to certain, specific Jewish organizations in the U.S. of having undue influence, yet, this perception induced them in no small part to ally with Israel in hopes of influencing American policy through Israel and, in turn, the Jewish community of the United States! Turkey signed a military agreement with Israel in 1996, which allowed it to receive military equipment and technology that the United States and Europe denied Turkey over human rights disputes.¹⁰⁰ The Turkish-Israeli partnership strengthened Turkey’s hand against the Syrians in the 1990s and also provided access to America’s “Jewish Lobby,” thus providing a defense against the diplomatic offensives of America’s Greek and Armenian lobbies.¹⁰¹

Yet, this policy became an issue in the Armenian Genocide Resolution debate. In the October 23, 2007 edition of the *Jerusalem Post*, the Turkish Foreign Minister Ali Babacan noted telling American Jewish leaders that a genocide bill would strengthen the public perception in Turkey that “Armenian and Jewish lobbies unite forces against Turks. We have told them that we cannot explain it to the public in Turkey if a road accident happens. We have told them that we cannot keep the Jewish people out of

⁹⁸ Soner Cagaptay, “The PKK and the Armenian Genocide Resolution: U.S.-Turkish Relations at a Critical Juncture,” *The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. PolicyWatch #1293*, <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2669>.

⁹⁹ Cagaptay, “The PKK and the Armenian Genocide Resolution: U.S.-Turkish Relations at a Critical Juncture.”

¹⁰⁰ Taspinar, *Between Neo-Ottomanism and Kemalism*, 10.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*

this.”¹⁰² This statement is clearly a thinly veiled threat, and hence, a form of deterrence. Interestingly, the article then touches upon another example of coercive diplomacy. The article notes that U.S. Jewish community leaders rejected Mr. Babacan’s argument and noted privately that, “Ankara has only itself to blame for its failure to muster the support necessary to derail the resolution.”¹⁰³

In light of the recent confrontation at the January 2009 Davos Summit between Israeli President Peres and Prime Minister Erdogan, this subject is once again center-stage. Erdogan’s perceived alignment with Hamas-ruled Gaza in the Israel-Hamas clash of January 2009 angered not only Israel but also the American Jewish community. It remains to be seen how this interest group will respond when the Armenian community and its supporters raise the issue of the tragic events of 1915. Some in the American Jewish community perceive Erdogan and Turkey as moving from an “honest broker” in the Middle East to that of partisan supporter of Hamas-led Gaza. It remains to be seen if the relationship between the Israeli and Turkish security establishments is strong enough to overcome this crisis in the relationship, and whether the American Jewish community will align with Turkish interests as they have in the past concerning proposed Armenian Genocide resolutions, or whether they will simply “sit out” the next round.

Why does the Turkish government find it necessary to enlist the help of proxies within the United States to intercede on their behalf? In other words, why is there no effective Turkish lobby in the United States? One disadvantage facing Turkey is that the Armenian and Greek communities organize around their respective national churches. The Armenian Church and the Greek Orthodox Church in America are focal points and support networks for the immigrant communities as well as future generations. Conversely, Turkish immigrants have a different relationship with the mosque. Secular, self-described “modern” Turks rarely attend mosque, while the nature of the Muslim community in America is one of the transcendence of Muslim identity over national identities. In other words, many Turkish immigrants simply do not attend mosque with

¹⁰² Yigal Schleifer, “Turkey Blames U.S. Jews for Genocide Bill,” *Jerusalem Post*, October 23, 2007, <http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1192380634864&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull>.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

any frequency, and those who do, develop a more universal identity based on nationalism. Without the rallying point of the church, the Turkish community is less organized and less able to harness their collective strength than the Greek and Armenian communities.

What actions on Ankara's part could have led to this confrontation? The article mentions lingering American resentment over Turkey's refusal to approve the use of its territory for use in the land invasion of Iraq in 2003. America offered Turkey over \$20 billion in aid for the use of Turkey's Northern border (a very real positive incentive), yet Turkey refused. Turkey's refusal can be seen as a form of deterrence; attempting to halt an action, it disapproved of the invasion of Iraq. This deterrence clearly failed. Hence, the Armenian Genocide Resolution (or AGR) can be seen as a form of tit for tat by elements of the United States government for previous actions by Turkey.

The article mentions that in 2006, Turkey hosted Hamas leader Khaled Mashal, which angered many of Israel's supporters on Capitol Hill "who have been among Turkey's most vocal proponents as part of a strategy of developing strong ties between Turkey and Israel."¹⁰⁴ If this is to be believed, then it is another example of tit for tat and deterrence: expressing displeasure for the Hamas visit and possibly deterring a follow-up meeting with Hamas. The article quotes an official from an American Jewish organization as stating, "The Hamas thing was really serious. There is less sympathy for Turkey because of what some see as an anti-American, anti-Israel, anti-Jewish policy that is there."¹⁰⁵ Turkey sees the failure of its Jewish-American supporters to neutralize the Armenian issue effectively in Washington as the Jewish community conspiring against it; this appears more an example of signaling that the protection that the Jewish organizations provide Turkey against hostile Congressional legislation is not automatic. Again, this scenario may play out again in light of Prime Minister Erdogan's perceived partisanship for Hamas in the 2008-2009 conflict between Israel and Hamas in Gaza.

¹⁰⁴ Schleifer, "Turkey Blames U.S. Jews for Genocide Bill."

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

Yet, there were other reasons that the AGR failed. Turkey was able to coerce the United States because Turkey has valuable political goods (airspace, airbases) that America desperately needs for its Iraq and Afghanistan operations. However, unlike its situation with America, Turkey wants to enter the European Union and has far fewer cards to play against Europe. While one can debate Europe's somewhat spotty record on acknowledging past misdeeds, the fact is that Europe holds the keys to EU integration and Turkey is the applicant. Brinksmanship on the AGR issue, while perhaps important for other aspects of Turkish policy, does not serve its aims of EU integration.

Again, the Armenian issue not only concerns conflicting narrative of 90-year-old events, but also modern nations. Modern Armenia is Turkey's neighbor in the Caucasus, a region that Turkey sees as vital to its interests. Additionally, the prospects on this front are better. The political battle between the Armenian Diaspora and Turkey on the diplomatic front contrasts with the situation between Turkey and Armenia: two countries that actually have to live next to one another and thus find a *modus Vivendi*.

After the breakup of the Soviet Union, Turkey sought to increase its influence in the former Soviet Caucasus, especially in Azerbaijan, and in Central Asia.¹⁰⁶ As nations populated by Turkic peoples, these countries have religious, ethnic, and linguistic ties with Turkey. This outreach by Turkey actually angered Russia, which countered with support to Armenia in its war with Azerbaijan, support to anti-government guerrillas in Azerbaijan, and the threat of nuclear force if Turkey intervened physically in the Azeri-Armenian war.¹⁰⁷ Again, this foreign outreach and effort to project influence was a marked departure from the inward-looking non-interventionism of the early republic. In light of this confrontation with Russia on this issue, NATO's Partnership for Peace's importance to Turkey becomes more evident. By avoiding a unilateral confrontation and working in the security institution framework, Turkey's involvement in Partnership for

¹⁰⁶ Yost, *NATO Transformed the Alliance's New Roles in International Security*, 86.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

Peace allows it to extend its influence eastward under the auspices and protection of NATO. Since 1992, Turkey has served as Azerbaijan's "point of contact within NATO."¹⁰⁸

While Turkey and Europe clash on the subject of the Armenian Tragedy of World War I, Turkish forces and Armenian forces now serve together; thus, forging informal civil-military ties. Seventy Armenian soldiers serve with 537 Turkish soldiers on Kosovo's KFOR mission.¹⁰⁹ Clearly, KFOR represents an arena where such adversaries as Turkey/Azerbaijan and Armenia can work together and perhaps even improve bilateral relations, which is also in the national interests of the United States. What is also interesting is that Turkey did not exercise its ability to block NATO cooperation with Armenia. NATO cooperates with Armenia through the Partnership for Peace Program (Armenia joined in 1994), in such areas as defense, rule of law, counter-terrorism and the fight against corruption.¹¹⁰ This fits with the U.S. assessment of Turkey's intentions, which is that Turkey seeks some contacts with Armenia,¹¹¹ despite past disputes and controversies. In addition, the President of Turkey recently visited Armenia for a sporting event.

While Turkey and Europe differ on the question of the Armenian tragedy of World War I, Turkey clearly wants to improve relations with Armenia. Better relations with Armenia would possibly improve Turkey in the eyes of Europe in terms of the issue of the Armenian tragedy of World War I and perhaps ease the way for European integration. In addition, a Turkey at peace with Armenia could mitigate diplomatic efforts overseas concerning the AGR and its equivalent in Europe.

¹⁰⁸ International Crisis Group Policy Briefing: Europe Briefing (Baku/Tbilisi/Brussels), October 29, 2008.

¹⁰⁹ NATO Kosovo Force, "KFOR Contributing Nations and Troop Numbers, January 14, 2009," http://www.nato.int/kfor/structur/nations/placemap/kfor_placemat.pdf.

¹¹⁰ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "NATO's Relations with Armenia," <http://www.nato.int/issues/armenia/index.html>.

¹¹¹ James P. Nichol, *Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia Political Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests*. CRS Issue Brief, IB95024 (Washington, D.C. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 2001), 21.

IV. TURKEY'S ROLE IN NATO AND ESDP

A. MULTI-NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

As the ability to work together with Armenian and Azerbaijani forces shows, working within a multinational framework can advance Turkey's interests. Why are multinational organizations, particularly NATO, important to Turkey's EU integration process? NATO allows Turkey to "put its best foot forward." Specifically, Turkey's NATO membership showcases its military prowess, its value as a bridge between East and West, and a generally cooperative side to Turkish foreign policy: Turkey as a team player.

One such example of this concept is that Turkey gained a significant amount of prestige in its hosting of the 2004 Istanbul Summit. Turkey's unique geo-political status played a major role in its selection for the Summit. In the Istanbul Summit communiqué, NATO stated, "Here in Istanbul, a city that bridges two continents, we have reaffirmed the vital transatlantic link, and extended new offers of cooperation to countries and to regions of strategic importance."¹¹² One of the key outcomes of the Summit was NATO's decision to elevate the Mediterranean Dialogue to a "genuine partnership," and to launch the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative.¹¹³ One of the positive outcomes of the summit was the creation of regional liaison offices for the Caucasus (located in Georgia) and Central Asia (located in Uzbekistan).¹¹⁴ While Turkey's involvement with NATO is a key enabler to its eastern outreach, it is also true that through NATO, Turkey can influence its eastern neighbors in ways that it was unable to do when it acted unilaterally.

¹¹² North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Istanbul Summit Communiqué, <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2004/p04-096e.htm>.

¹¹³ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "NATO Update: NATO Elevates Mediterranean Dialogue to a Genuine Partnership, Launches Istanbul Cooperation Initiative," <http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2004/06-june/e0629d.htm>.

¹¹⁴ Eric Von Tersch, *Developing a Strategic Partnership with Turkey*, USAWC Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2006), 10.

Turkey's value to Europe as a bridge can be seen in the NATO Mediterranean Dialogue that began in 1994. The Mediterranean Dialogue's goal is to promote regional security and stability, to include border security, combating terror, and defense reform.¹¹⁵ Interestingly, through the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative and the Mediterranean Dialogue, NATO maintains ties with both Israel and the Palestinian Authority, while plainly stating that NATO is not a party to the Peace Process.¹¹⁶ Enhancing NATO's role in Mid-East outreach is Turkey's role as a party trusted by both sides in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Turkey signed a major military agreement with Israel in 1996, yet also maintains ties with Syria, Hamas, and Iran. Europe clearly wants a role in the Middle East peace process, but at a fundamental level, for reasons of history and policy, Israel does not trust the leading nations of Europe. A Turkey integrated into Europe would provide access for Europe and allow it a greater role in the Peace Process. Additionally, NATO enlargement is another important topic that the summer 2008 Georgia crisis illuminated. In terms of NATO enlargement, Turkey seeks a *quid pro quo* for its approval of new members. Turkey seeks to link its approval of new members to its entry into the European Union, or at least some sort of other compensation for its approval.¹¹⁷ This reinforces the notion that NATO is a bargaining chip and a form of leverage that Turkey uses to advance its EU prospects.

Yet, Turkey is not just a partner to European security institutions for outreach and diplomacy. Rather, its large armed forces contributed to numerous European security institution-led operations over the last ten years. Actually, one of the earlier operations was not actually a European security institution-led operation, but collaboration led by Italy. Turkey volunteered to join Operation Alba, the multi-national protection force for Albania in 1997. It was an Italian-led mission due to the inability to get consensus to make it a NATO or WEU mission.¹¹⁸ Turkey contributed 760 troops to this mission.

¹¹⁵ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "NATO Update: NATO Elevates Mediterranean Dialogue to a Genuine Partnership, Launches Istanbul Cooperation Initiative."

¹¹⁶ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative," <http://www.nato.int/med-dial/qa.htm>, 1.

¹¹⁷ Yost, *NATO Transformed the Alliance's New Roles in International Security*, 117.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 235.

Through Operation Alba, Turkey enhanced its reputation as a willing partner with European security institutions. Due to the inability of official European security institutions to execute the mission, Italy had to form an ad-hoc “coalition of the willing.”¹¹⁹ Thus, Turkey was part of the solution, even when such nations as the United States, Britain, and Germany refused to participate.¹²⁰ Turkey showed Europeans that its contributions could be useful, and also, necessary, especially when other nations cannot or will not participate. “Turkey could give EU defense plans real muscle, and provide much-needed boots on the ground for peacekeeping missions around the globe.”¹²¹

B. TURKEY’S PARTICIPATION IN EU OPERATIONS: OPERATION CONCORDIA AND PROXIMAL

Although not a member of the European Union, Turkey participated in multiple European Union-led security operations. In fact, Turkey is the most active non-member in ESDP operations, and contributes more than many EU members. Two such operations were Concordia and Proxima in FYROM. Operation Proxima lasted from December 2003 through December 2005. Turkey’s participation was as that of an EU candidate nation, along with Bulgaria and Romania¹²² (which have since earned entry to the EU). The goals of the Proxima mission were the strengthening of the rule of law, fighting organized crime, and helping to build up local law enforcement capabilities.¹²³

Turkey’s participation in these operations clearly fits into Turkey’s goals in terms of EU membership. However, it also has the added benefit of providing reassurance to the Turkish minority of FYROM that a strong and engaged Turkish military operates in the Balkans. In addition, a stable Balkans is in the best interests of Turkey strategically. Finally, it can also be stated that a peaceful, stable FYROM ensures a more stable life for the Turkish minority of FYROM.

¹¹⁹ Riccardo Marchio, *Operation Alba: A European Approach to Peace Support Operations in the Balkans* USAWC Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College. 2000), 12.

¹²⁰ Ibid., 12.

¹²¹ Morris, *The New Turkey: The Quiet Revolution on the Edge of Europe*, 40.

¹²² The Council of the European Union, “European Union Police Mission Proxima Fact Sheet,” <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/ProximaBrochure.pdf>.

¹²³ Ibid.

While Turkey supports a more stable FYROM, others plot against it. One such example is the attempts by foreign Islamists to recruit from the Muslim minorities of Macedonia. According to *Jane's Defense Daily* (April 29, 2008), the majority of this recruitment is targeted against the much larger Albanian minority (25% of the population), but the ethnic Turks are also targeted. Clearly, if this trend persists, Turkey's support will prove crucial to the government of FYROM. It is not in the interest of secular Turkey to see an Islamicized FYROM. Turkey also has influence not only with the Turkish minority, but also as noted above, has ties with Albania. Ethnic Turks may be less vulnerable to Islamist outreach because Turks are seen as more loyal and more fully integrated into society than the larger Albanian population.¹²⁴ In fact, FYROM's constitution promises full equality as citizens for "Albanians, Turks, and other nationalities."¹²⁵ Fortunately, 90% of ethnic Turks regard themselves as equal citizens, and only 10% feel discriminated against.¹²⁶

The 2003 Operation Concordia was a stability operation in FYROM that utilized NATO assets already in place. "The operation contributed to the efforts to achieve a peaceful, democratic, and prosperous country, as part of a region of stable countries, where an international security presence is no longer needed."¹²⁷

C. TURKEY'S PARTICIPATION IN EU OPERATIONS: EUFOR ALTHEA (BOSNIA)

Turkey then engaged with the European Union in support of its security operations in Bosnia. Operation Althea began in December 2004 and continues to the present. Althea began after the conclusion of NATO's SFOR operation and the UN

¹²⁴ Birol Akgun, "Democratization and Minority Rights in the Post-Communist Balkan States," Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Journal of International Affairs* 2 (2001): 3.

¹²⁵ Ibid.

¹²⁶ Ibid., 4.

¹²⁷ The Council of the European Union, "EU Military Operation in Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM/CONCORDIA)," http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=594&lang=en&mode=g.

Security Council's authorization of an EU force in Bosnia-Herzegovina.¹²⁸ The force consists of 2,500 troops, including a multi-national maneuver battalion. Turkey's personnel comprise part of this battalion located at Camp Butnir in Sarajevo, and Turkey is one of five non-EU countries participating.¹²⁹ The goal of EUFOR Althea is to maintain a safe and secure environment, support local authorities, and support the EU special representative.¹³⁰ Showing the increased interoperability of NATO and EU security forces, this operation utilizes in-place NATO assets in accordance with the "Berlin Plus" Agreement.¹³¹

D. TURKEY'S PARTICIPATION IN EU OPERATIONS: EU POLICE MISSION IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Turkey does not limit its participation to the EU's military operations, but also joins in civil law enforcement operations. The EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina began in January 2003 and operates to the present day. Its goal is to establish "a sustainable, professional, and multiethnic police service operating in accordance with best European and international standards."¹³² In the spring of 2008, Turkey's contribution was nine police officers.

E. TURKEY'S PARTICIPATION IN EU OPERATIONS: EUFOR RD CONGO

In line with a newfound increase in Turkey's willingness to project influence beyond its immediate neighborhood, Turkey contributed to EU stability operations in the police mission of the European Union's mission to the former Congo. "The European Union conducted a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) police mission in

¹²⁸ The Council of the European Union. Factsheet, "EU Military Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Operation EUFOR-Althea)," February 2008, <http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/080220Altheaupdate10.pdf>.

¹²⁹ Ibid.

¹³⁰ Ibid.

¹³¹ Ibid.

¹³² The Council of the European Union. Factsheet, "EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM)," March 2006, http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/Factsheet_060312.pdf.

Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of Congo, from April 2005 to June 2007.”¹³³ Turkey, as one of two invited non-EU nations, contributed to the team.¹³⁴ The team served as monitors and advisors to a newly formed Congolese police, and helped ensure a successful Congolese election in July of 2006.¹³⁵ In listing Turkey’s contribution to the mission, the EUPOL-Kinshasa mission’s press release noted that Turkey is a candidate for EU membership. In this light, Turkey’s participation in this exercise can again be seen as advancing its national interests through cooperation and outreach.

F. TURKEY’S PARTICIPATION IN AFGHANISTAN: THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE

Afghanistan has been another arena where Turkey shows its use, and thus, improves its EU integration prospects. As of January 2008, ISAF consisted of over 49,000 troops from 26 NATO and 14 non-NATO countries. ISAF’s key issues consist of the following: Security and Reconstruction, Afghan capacity, Counter-Narcotics, Insurgent activity, and Pakistan.¹³⁶ Turkey has 625 troops, located in the Kabul and Wardak provinces.¹³⁷ In addition, Turkey is the Provincial Reconstruction Team lead for the Wardak Province.¹³⁸ Turkey is the 12th largest contributor of the 40 nations to ISAF. For a nation with such sizable armed forces, why such a relatively small contribution? One factor is that due to the ongoing Kurdish insurgency, the military is very active at home. Any deployment outside the country is subject to internal political pressure because of this fact. Fortunately, Turkey has lost no troops in Afghanistan since 2001.¹³⁹ Some NATO countries commit forces to a NATO operation, and then place restrictions called “national caveats.” At the Riga Summit in November 2006, NATO leaders tried to

¹³³ The Council of the European Union, “European Union Police Mission in Kinshasa,” http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=788&lang=EN.

¹³⁴ Ibid.

¹³⁵ Howorth, *Security and Defense Policy in the European Union*, 229.

¹³⁶ Mihai Carp, “Presentation on Afghanistan to Naval Postgraduate School,” February 27, 2008.

¹³⁷ Ibid.

¹³⁸ Canadian Ministry of Public Work and Government, “Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan,” 2008, 85.

¹³⁹ Ibid., 86.

reduce the number of such caveats.¹⁴⁰ The French government reduced its caveats and agreed to allow its forces in Kabul and elsewhere to come to the assistance of other NATO forces in an emergency. Turkey, in contrast, refused to change its proscription against its forces' use in combat.¹⁴¹ This situation has a somewhat mixed message concerning EU integration. While Turkey can contribute more than it does currently, it is in good company within Europe in this respect. Overall, Turkey's involvement in ISAF shows it to be a team player, and thus, improves its EU accession chances.

As a Muslim nation, Turkey adds legitimacy to ISAF's mission in Afghanistan. Its mere participation means that a Christian force does not occupy Afghanistan, but rather, a force comprised of different faiths and different nations. Just as the support of the Arabs in World War I allowed the Allies to avoid the stigma of a war on the Muslim world, the support of Turkey can help NATO avoid the same stigma in 2009. This stresses the theme that Turkey can serve as a bridge for Europe, and thus, improves Turkey's integration prospects.

¹⁴⁰ Paul E. Gallis, *NATO in Afghanistan a Test of the Transatlantic Alliance*. CRS Report for Congress, RL33627 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 2009), <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33627.pdf>, 6.

¹⁴¹ Ibid.

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V. CHALLENGES AND CONCLUSION

A. TURKEY'S PARTICIPATION IN EU OPERATIONS: CHALLENGES

Despite the multiple above-mentioned success stories, Turkey's involvement with European security institutions suffers from obvious problems. Turkey's dispute with Cyprus manifested itself in March 2008 in a dispute over security cooperation in Kosovo. An article on Turkey's role in Kosovo (*Turkish Daily News*, March 4, 2008), noted that Turkey used its veto right within NATO to block access by European Union security forces to NATO assets located in Kosovo. The dispute stemmed from Cyprus's participation in the EU's Kosovo security partnership. The article also noted that this dispute placed Turkey at odds with both the European Union and NATO. Further, it created an internal split between the Turkish military (in favor of a veto) and the Turkish civilian government (against utilizing the veto). This incident obscures the fact that Turkey played a positive role in Kosovo to this point.

Why is Cyprus such a contentious issue for Turkey? Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the Greek and Turkish communities engaged in violent clashes with one another. In 1974, after Greek Cypriots staged a coup to unite Cyprus with Greece, Turkey invaded Cyprus. Turkish troops occupied much of the island, and Turkish troops remain there today. Turkey does not recognize Cyprus as the representative of the entire island of Cyprus. Rather, it refers to Southern Cyprus as the "Greek Cypriot Administration" while recognizing Northern Cyprus as the "Turkish Republic of North Cyprus." In fact, according to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "the Greek Cypriots have no authority to represent the whole of Cyprus or the Turkish Cypriots."¹⁴²

In response to the 1974 invasion, the United States imposed an arms embargo on Turkey on February 5, 1975. The United States performed this action to demonstrate its displeasure with Turkey's actions, and to coerce Turkey into reversing its actions. Yet Turkey did not react in the way the United States anticipated. According to the Spring

¹⁴² Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Cyprus Issue Summary," <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/cyprus-issue-summary.en.mfa>.

2004 edition of “Perceptions,” the official publication of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “the nearly four-year long embargo period cast a dark shadow on the then already fragile alliance, and created, especially in the eyes of the Turkish public, a deep lack of confidence towards the United States.”¹⁴³

Turkey then reacted by closing all United States bases in its country except for one. Turkey’s reaction can be seen as coercive: it did not like the embargo and wished for the United States to reverse its position. It is also an example of tit for tat. Turkey perceived negative behavior on the part of the United States and reacted in kind. Interestingly, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs is also aware of the coercive nature of the 1974 Turkish-U.S. crisis over Cyprus. The article notes, “Above all, an embargo is a coercive economic measure. What makes it unique in this case is its imposition as a punishment on an allied country. Secondly, it is an appropriate example to analyze [sic] the role of ethnic lobbies on foreign policy.”¹⁴⁴

This statement showcases several points. First, it shows Turkey’s bruised feelings as a “uniquely punished allied country.”¹⁴⁵ It also shows that Turkey suspects ethnic lobbies in the United States of having undue **coercive** influence; in this case, the Greek Lobby. Turkey felt that the Greek Lobby rallied to the cause of Greece and Cyprus and forced the embargo through Congress. Yet in the end, America’s coercive action failed. In 1978, America ended the embargo: Turkey’s support in the Cold War was too valuable. There are Turkish troops in Northern Cyprus to this day.

The Cyprus issue even affects the communications between the NATO alliance and the EU. In terms of communication between NATO and the European Union, the main conduit is a bi-monthly meeting of NATO-COPS (COPS is the Political and Security Committee of the European Union).¹⁴⁶ However, Turkey “refuses to allow discussion of more substantial Alliance business in the presence of countries-Cyprus and

¹⁴³ Center for Strategic Research (Ankara, Turkey), *Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs*, Istanbul, Turkey: Intermedia, 2004, <http://www.sam.gov.tr/perceptions/Volume9/Winter/Murat%20Karagöz.pdf>.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

¹⁴⁶ Howorth, *Security and Defense Policy in the European Union*, 69.

Malta-which are members of neither NATO nor the Partnership for Peace.”¹⁴⁷ In addition, Turkey blocks the transfer of intelligence material from NATO to the European Union because the intelligence would then be accessible by Cyprus. This can only be overcome by an EU guarantee that the material will not be shared with Cyprus or Malta.¹⁴⁸ This is clearly an example of one of Turkey’s troubled relationships hampering the effectiveness of a European security institution. Former EU Ambassador to Turkey Michael Lake summarizes the problem succinctly: How does the continuing Cyprus conflict affect Turkey’s relations with the EU and with NATO? The answer is: ‘pretty badly.’ The bottom line is that the entire Cyprus issue works against Turkey’s EU integration goals.

Yet, there is reason for optimism in terms of the Cyprus issue. In 2004, Prime Minister Erdogan overruled the opinions of the military establishment and argued for the Turkish Cypriot community to vote for the United Nations re-unification plan. Not only did this move show pragmatism on the part of Turkey, but it also may be a turning point in Turkish civil-military relations in terms of a military subordinate to elected civilian leadership.¹⁴⁹

While the Cyprus issue is problematic to Turkey and its goals concerning Europe, the situation for Turkey in the Balkans is more nuanced. As mentioned above, the Balkans is an important issue for Turkey that will be on the agenda of the Bucharest Summit. What are Turkey’s goals on this front? According to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Turkey sees securing peace and stability in the Balkans as one of Turkey’s foreign policy priorities, yet at the same time, states a wish to improve relations with Serbia. Turkey’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs notes the long historical ties between Kosovo and Turkey (Kosovo as well as Serbia were once part of the Ottoman Empire).

¹⁴⁷ Howorth, *Security and Defense Policy in the European Union*, 175.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

¹⁴⁹ Morris, *The New Turkey: The Quiet Revolution on the Edge of Europe*, 41.

The Ministry also notes that, “Turkey has always supported the efforts of Macedonia to complete its Euro-Atlantic integration. Turkey is determined to continue its support to this end.”¹⁵⁰

Yet Turkey’s support, through participation in security institutions, of an independent Kosovo can also be seen through the lens of its historic rivalry with Greece, and to a lesser extent, Russia. Greece, as well as Russia, supported Serbia as a fellow Orthodox nation. Kosovo’s independence is seen as a blow to Serbian pride and ambitions. In this context, by supporting Kosovo’s independence, Turkey can tweak its rivals Greece and Russia by proxy. Yet, this is just another example of Turkey’s rivalries getting in the way of its goals. Just like the “FYROM issue,” Turkey antagonizes Greece to its own detriment. Greece has the ability to hamper EU integration for Turkey.

B. TURKEY’S ROLE IN THE BALKANS

While the Balkans are a part of Europe, for four hundred years, they were a part of the Ottoman Empire. Again, this past reverberates in modern Turkish culture and even in the demographic makeup of modern Turkey. The Ottoman Empire’s retreat from the Balkans changed the ethnic composition both of the Balkans and what is now modern Turkey. Yet, it also propelled the process from the Ottoman Empire to the future Turkish Republic. Millions of Muslims joined the Ottomans in their retreat from the Balkans. This demographic upset changed the character of the Ottoman Empire and transformed the Ottoman Empire “from a broadly tolerant multi-ethnic empire into a Nineteenth Century nationalistic state.”¹⁵¹

As noted above, the rise of nationalism in Western Europe, specifically in France, accelerated the decline of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans by introducing new ideas dangerous to the status quo. In the Balkans, the existing institutions, customs, biases, and superstitions were more or less frozen in place until the early to mid nineteenth

¹⁵⁰ Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Turkey’s Political Relations with Republic of Macedonia,” http://www.mfa.gov.tr/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Regions/Balkans/Republic+of+Macedonia/Turkeys_Political_Relations_With_Republic_of_Macedonia.htm.

¹⁵¹ Morris, *The New Turkey: The Quiet Revolution on the Edge of Europe*, 27.

century.”¹⁵² However, it must be mentioned that Western Europe influenced Eastern Europe in other ways as well. Eastern Europe also learned of the changes taking place through the invasions of Napoleon,¹⁵³ and his export of the new ideas of France to the east.

The rise of Greek nationalism in the 1800s was an early step in this process and part of a larger process described by Carl Schmitt, who believed that the European system in place at the time of the Ottoman Empire’s destruction and the rise of modern Turkey (the 1920s) system “can only be understood as the consequence of the last centuries of European development.”¹⁵⁴ Just as Modern Europe is a product of the evolutionary process from the 17th century to the present, so too is modern Turkey a product of these past events.

This chapter spends a great deal of time exploring Turkey’s involvement in the Balkans, so it is important to ask: Why are the Balkans so important to Turkey’s current involvement in European security institutions? The answer has much to do with history. With the gradual dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, many of its Muslim subjects retreated with the Ottoman Empire towards modern Turkey. In fact, there are neighborhoods in modern Istanbul named Yeni Bosna (New Bosnia) and Arnavutkoy (Village of the Albanians). However, some Muslims stayed behind. There remains a Turkish minority in Bulgaria and FYROM, as well as non-Turkish Muslims to include Bosniaks and Albanians. Turkey seeks a continued relation with these peoples and has sought out opportunities to assist these populations.

One example of Turkey’s continued ties in the Balkans is its close relationship with Albania. Turkey currently assists Albania with the restructuring of its military, to include the reconstruction of Albanian naval bases.¹⁵⁵ Turkey also assists Albania with professional military education, military health care, technical and logistical

¹⁵² Berend, *History Derailed: Central and Eastern Europe in the Long Nineteenth Century*, 41.

¹⁵³ Ibid.

¹⁵⁴ Carl Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 2007), 81.

¹⁵⁵ Republic of Albania Ministry of Defense, “Bilateral Relations,” <http://www.mod.gov.al/index.php?crd=0,0,0,0,1,Lng2>.

assistance.¹⁵⁶ A large Albanian expatriate community in Turkey as well as the abovementioned fact that many modern Turks trace their family history back to families that fled Albania with the end of Ottoman control augment Turkey's ties with Albania.

The United States acknowledges the importance of the Balkans to Turkey. In fact, a key concern of the United States is that fighting in the Balkans could pull in other countries, to include Albania, Greece, and Turkey.¹⁵⁷

What is the Turkish security establishment's view on participation in European security institutions? Additionally, what relationship with Europe does Turkey's establishment seek? Turkey views its contribution as valuable to the European Union. A Turkish officer completing a thesis through the United States military noted that Turkey's positive role in the Balkans, Eurasia, and the Middle East underlines its importance to the European Union.¹⁵⁸ Additionally, the thesis notes that, "For Turkey, acceptance of its candidacy is a natural response to the sacrifices it made throughout the Cold War period. As the only NATO member with a land border with the Soviet Union, it bore a heavy share of the Alliance's burden. It finds it fitting that, having contributed to the creation of the new Europe; it should also be part of this Europe."¹⁵⁹ In other words, Europe owes Turkey and a just reward would be entry into the EU. Six years elapsed since this thesis, in which time, Romania and Bulgaria gained acceptance while Turkey did not. Thus, this is at best a dream deferred. However, Turkey's participation in European security institutions clearly fits into Turkey's goals and interests. By participating in these institutions, both NATO and EU, Turkey is building up credit, and at some point, it expects to be repaid. Europe's rewarding of good behavior on the part of the EU candidates is not new. In the 1990s, Bulgaria and Romania "were rewarded" for support of the NATO Kosovo operation.¹⁶⁰

¹⁵⁶ Republic of Albania Ministry of Defense, "Bilateral Relations."

¹⁵⁷ D. S. Yost, "NATO and the Anticipatory Use of Force," *International Affairs -London Then Oxford* 83, no. 1 (2007): 51.

¹⁵⁸ Atilla Darendeli, *Turkey and European Union Relations* (Ft. Belvoir: Defense Technical Information Center, 2002), <http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA420707>.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

¹⁶⁰ Wallace and Wallace, *Policy-making in the European Union*, 423.

Another important point to Turkey's involvement with European security institutions is that Turkey's current foreign policy is perceived as closer to European policies than it is to current U.S. strategy, especially concerning the U.S. approach to Iraq in 2003 and the current confrontation with Iran. Turkey does not favor the confrontational strategy adopted by the United States, but instead, favors the European strategy of dialogue. Another example of Turkey's tilt toward Europe is Turkey's commitment to the Airbus A400 military transport developed by Europe, along with Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Even though using American C-130 or C-17 airlift would be less expensive and faster to procure, "European defense industries create European jobs."¹⁶¹ Hence, Turkey placed more weight on the European relationship in this case than the American relationship. Clearly, Turkey is making efforts at European integration.

Yet, the security institutions also reflect the divide between Europe and Turkey. This can be found in the run-up to the 2003 Iraq war. A contemporary article from PBS illustrates this crisis ¹⁶² At the time, the United States planned to enter Northern Iraq via Turkey. NATO attempted to deploy anti-missile and anti-chemical defenses to Turkey, in anticipation of possible Iraqi attacks. However, NATO members Belgium, France, and Germany opposed this move. This can be seen as a form of deterrence on the part of Germany and France: trying to stop an imminent action (invasion of Iraq) by opposing NATO support for Turkey in the event of an attack. While Turkey's decision not to open up its territory to the anti-Iraq coalition made this a moot point in the end, it highlighted strains in the alliance.

Another example of Turkey's tilt toward Europe is the re-accession of France to NATO. According to Agence France-Presse, "Turkey will not block France's return to NATO command, despite French objections to Ankara's European Union integration."¹⁶³

¹⁶¹ Kristin Archick and Paul E. Gallis, *NATO and the European Union* (Washington, D.C. Congressional Information Service, Library of Congress, 2005), 18, <http://www.fas.org/man/crs/RL32342.pdf>.

¹⁶² "France, Germany Belgium Block NATO Assistance to Turkey," *PBS Online News Hour*, February 10, 2003, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/euro_02-10-03.html.

¹⁶³ "Turkey Won't Oppose French NATO Return: Report," *Agence-France-Presse*, June 20, 2008, <http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=3606677>.

The article quoted the Turkish Justice Minister: “We do not find it ethical or suitable to link the EU process with any other issue,” and “Our Expectation from the French presidency is to continue our membership negotiations in transparency are in line with the principle that agreements must be kept.”¹⁶⁴ The article noted President Sarkozy’s role as an opponent of Turkey’s accession. Again, Turkey tempers its actions inside of NATO to improve its chances of EU accession.

C. CIVIL SOCIETY

Much of what Europe demands of Turkey actually runs counter to the desires of the Turkish people. The EU wants a weakening of the military, yet the military is Turkey’s most trusted institution. During Ottoman times, soldiering was considered part of Turkishness. This is one concept that continues to the present day. Even today, the concept of soldiering is equated with Turkishness. One popular marching cadence heard on Turkish military bases is “Her-Turk-Asker-Dogar,” or “Every Turk is born a Soldier.” In this sense, the strong role of the military in Turkish society is not a new concept. Even today’s Turkish military uses words and concepts directly from its Ottoman tradition. Turkish soldiers are called “Mehmetcik” or “Soldiers of Mohammed. In earlier Republican Turkey, the military was still nicknamed “Peygenberin Ocagi,” or “The Prophet’s Heart.” Wounded soldiers are called “Gazi,” or fighter for “Islam.” Soldiers killed in the line of duty are known as “Sehit,” or “martyr.”¹⁶⁵ The current issue of *Jane’s Defense* shows a young Turkish conscript, serving in Southeast Turkey, scribbling graffiti on a soon to be used artillery shells. The graffiti reads “Sehitler Olmez,” or “Martyrs never die.” Just as soldiering was considered equivalent with Turkishness, a career as a military man was a source of pride. “A military career was one of the most prestigious professions in the state, and the Janissary tradition of being a force unto itself, above society, and even above the direct control of the State’s bureaucratic apparatus, was a tradition that continued into the Ottoman period.”¹⁶⁶ This concept of a military career as

¹⁶⁴ “Turkey Won’t Oppose French NATO Return: Report,” *Agence-France-Presse*.

¹⁶⁵ Yavuz, *Islamic Political Identity in Turkey*, 49.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 40.

a source of pride and prestige continues to this day. Entrance into the military service academies is extremely competitive. Soldiers are highly respected in society.

The Turkish military as a society apart works against Turkey's integration. This can be seen in Turkish society today. While American officers are somewhat isolated from society by a unique code of conduct, lifestyle, and by the closed nature of military bases, today's Turkish military is even more so. As opposed to the United States military, where the Service Academies, ROTC, and Officer Candidate Schools each provide officers, the Turkish military relies almost entirely on the Service Academies for its officer corps. The service academies, in turn, rely on military high schools for its enrollees. Therefore, a Turkish officer has been in the military essentially since the age of 14. This accounts for the greater homogeneity in outlook and beliefs of the Turkish officer corps, in contrast to other Western militaries. In addition, while the Turkish military is respected by society, their lifestyle is somewhat alien to the youthful, cosmopolitan, modern "Istanbul" society. The concept of an insular military culture can be debated on its merits, but clearly, it shows a cleavage between Turkey and Europe. Today's Eurocrats are cosmopolitan and less committed to the concept of nationalism. A highly nationalistic, insular Turkish military is alien to the European elite.

The death penalty is another societal cleavage between Turkey and Europe. A majority of the Turkish public supports the death penalty.¹⁶⁷ Hence, the ruling AK Party has a difficult challenge in pursuing EU integration while not upsetting the population.

It is important to note that the AK Party worked harder than previous governments to improve Turkey's EU membership prospects.¹⁶⁸ Why does the AK Party pursue this policy? Is it counter-intuitive that an Islam-based party is more enthusiastic for European integration than the Kemalists? The AK Party wants to be seen as part of the European scene. The legitimization within Europe is an AK Party strategy to gain legitimacy in Turkey itself, and thus, work toward its long-term goal of reforming the

¹⁶⁷ Schimmelfennig, Engert, and Knobel, "Costs, Commitment and Compliance: The Impact of EU Democratic Conditionality on Latvia, Slovakia and Turkey," 42.

¹⁶⁸ Taspinar. *Between Neo-Ottomanism and Kemalism*, 1.

Turkish political system.¹⁶⁹ Islamic groups supported EI accession as a way to control the perceived excesses of the secular/military Turkish establishment.¹⁷⁰ “The major impact of the 1997 coup was the Islamic rediscovery of Europe as a space and an idea to protect human rights and the rule of law.”¹⁷¹ What happened? The old cleavages of Turkish politics have been completely reversed. The Kemalists, once pro-Western, are now anti-Western. The Islamists, once anti-Western, now support good relations with the U.S. and the EU

Yet again, the AK Party has serious problems facing it. The AKP, if it depends on Europe and the U.S to protect it from the secularist Turkish Establishment, runs the risk of appearing dependent on foreign powers, and thus, undermine its popular support.¹⁷² It also must contend with its rivals in the secular Turkish establishment. Much of what the secular establishment supports runs counter to EU practices and beliefs. Since the Kemalist forces now view Westernization as a negative force, the Islamist forces (on the opposite side of Turkey’s secular-religious cleavage) “Are in the process of rediscovering Europe as a positive force and have been defending Turkey’s full integration into the EU.”¹⁷³

Actually, the Kemalist establishment cleaved after the 1997 coup into pro- and anti- EU camps. One camp favored the nation state, while the other sided with democratization and Europeanization, with the military siding with the nation state and against Europeanization. The Kemalist establishment also views the U.S. and the EU as “soft” on the AKP.¹⁷⁴ Essentially, Kemalists within Turkey view the AK Party and Prime Minister Erdogan in particular as “wolves in sheep’s clothing” and that they are using Western values to subvert the secular state.

¹⁶⁹ Yavuz, *Islamic Political Identity in Turkey*, 262.

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 263.

¹⁷¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁷² *Ibid.*, 262.

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*, 255.

¹⁷⁴ Taspinar. *Between Neo-Ottomanism and Kemalism*, 4.

According to Frank Schimmelfennig's piece, *The Impact of EU Political Conditionality, Turkey's Kemalist State Doctrine is Itself*, partially based on values alien to western liberal democracy and on a wide range of issues, has led to authoritarian domestic political practices that conflict with core European norms.¹⁷⁵ Schimmelfennig goes on to identify the military's influence over politics, its four coups (1960, 1971, 1980, and 1997), support for the death penalty, and the restriction of free speech as actions that run afoul of European standards.¹⁷⁶ He also notes that Turkey utilizes military courts that do not meet European standards of independence and fairness.¹⁷⁷

Owing to the painful history of the Ottoman Empire's breakup and destruction (due in large part to the revolts of minorities like the Greeks, Arabs, Armenians, and others), the secular elite fears that granting greater minority rights will lead to the breakup of Turkey.¹⁷⁸ Yet, there has been progress on minority rights, spurred on by a desire to join the EU. On October 4, 2001, the Turkish Parliament lifted the ban on using "forbidden languages."¹⁷⁹ In August 2002, Parliament authorized broadcasting in Kurdish.¹⁸⁰ The Kurdish minority supports EU accession. They see the EU as a way to guarantee human rights.¹⁸¹

While Turkey and the EU definitely differ on issues of civil society, the prospect of EU accession brought about changes in Turkish society. Expressions of ethnic identity are now more possible in Turkey. Again, Turkey altered its policies to facilitate EU accession.

¹⁷⁵ Schimmelfennig, Engert, and Knobel, "Costs, Commitment and Compliance: The Impact of EU Democratic Conditionality on Latvia, Slovakia and Turkey," 40.

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 41.

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 43.

¹⁷⁹ Yavuz, *Islamic Political Identity in Turkey*, 254.

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 255.

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.*

D. ANALYSIS

Actually, when it comes to EU membership, the EU gives Turkey a mixture of ambivalence and mixed signals.¹⁸² Europe's leverage over Turkey in terms of EU membership suffers from a lack of credibility. Since Turkey has been in candidate status for so long, and because many European nations do not believe Turkey will ever meet the conditions "for cultural, historical, geographic, and religious reasons," Europe has lost credibility.¹⁸³ This has effects inside Turkey as well. As the Kemalist elite (those on the pro-EU side of the Kemalist cleavage) identifies themselves as Europeans, their rejection by Europe is very painful.¹⁸⁴ Yet, Turkey has clearly shown its willingness to change to meet European standards, when it thought success was in sight. When the EU's credibility increased after the Helsinki Summit, Turkey responded with a greater pace of change.¹⁸⁵

Today, Europe continues to delay Turkish integration into the European Union. While some of this delay may be for legitimate reasons, there are other reasons as well. Three hundred years ago, the Ottomans were at the gates of Vienna, and that is not a terribly long time by European standards. Seriously, Europe needs to tell Turkey if it has a serious chance of integration. Turkey, on the other hand, must acknowledge that Europe's norms are different and Turkey is the applicant. Thus, if Turkey wishes to join the European Union (and Europe is sincere), there is more work to do. Turkey and Europe have a lot to offer one another, and a Western-oriented, European Turkey fits well within the interests of the United States.

¹⁸² Wallace and Wallace, *Policy-making in the European Union*, 425.

¹⁸³ Schimmelfennig, Engert, and Knobel, "Costs, Commitment and Compliance: The Impact of EU Democratic Conditionality on Latvia, Slovakia and Turkey," 42.

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 44.

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