A demonstration of a trusted computer interface between a multilevel secure command and control system and untrusted tactical data systems.

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Author
Rector, George E. Jr.
Date
1987-03Advisor
Brown, Thomas J.
Metadata
Show full item recordAbstract
The task of this research is to demonstrate a multilevel secure interface between a
system operating at multiple security levels and other untrusted systems operating at a
single security level. Without a trusted interface device, these systems cannot be
electronically connected. All communications between the systems must be done
manually with all information transfer being reviewed by a security officer. Only
releasable information is printed or stored in a removable medium and hand carried to
the other system. In contrast, a trusted, multilevel secure guard can connect untrusted
systems electronically and control the release of sensitive information. This task, will
demonstrate the ability of a multilevel trusted system to interface with untrusted
systems operating at different levels of security.
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This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States.Collections
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