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dc.contributor.advisorMoran, Daniel
dc.contributor.authorHarrison, John C.
dc.dateDecember 1995
dc.description.abstractThis thesis argues that the U.S./U.N. intervention in Somalia in 1992-1994 represents an attempt to use coercive diplomacy to re-create the Somali state. It further argues that the pre-conditions for a successful use of coercive diplomacy existed initially during the U.S.-led United Task Force (UNITAF) phase, but they quickly disappeared during the expanded mission of United Nations Somalia II (UNOSOM II). This thesis proposes that UNITAF leadership were quite successful in accomplishing their limited objectives. Additionally, when UNOSOM II assumed the mission in Somalia, the expanded mandates and policies chosen by both the U.S. and the U.N. changed the conditions for success and led the UNOSOM II forces to war with members of the Somali militia.en_US
dc.format.extent75 p.en_US
dc.publisherMonterey, California. Naval Postgraduate Schoolen_US
dc.rightsThis publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. As such, it is in the public domain, and under the provisions of Title 17, United States Code, Section 105, may not be copyrighted.en_US
dc.titleThe limits of Type D coercive diplomacy in Somaliaen_US
dc.contributor.departmentNational Security Affairs
dc.description.serviceU.S. Army (USA) authoren_US
etd.thesisdegree.nameM.A. in National Security Affairsen_US
etd.thesisdegree.disciplineNational Security Affairsen_US
etd.thesisdegree.grantorNaval Postgraduate Schoolen_US

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