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dc.contributor.advisorJaskoski, Maiah
dc.contributor.authorWatkins, Jeremy L.
dc.date.accessioned2012-03-14T17:41:34Z
dc.date.available2012-03-14T17:41:34Z
dc.date.issued2009-12
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10945/4329
dc.description.abstractThis thesis seeks to explain why the U.S. government came to the assistance of the Mexican and Brazilian governments in 1995 and 1998 respectively, but refused to do so during Argentina's economic crisis in 2001. At first glance, all three countries appeared to be attractive candidates for U.S. assistance - they had simiarly enacted U.S.-backed neoliberal reformist agendas prior to their crises. The study argues that the decision by the U.S. government and the International Monetary Fund to issue a bailout to a country enduring an economic crisis is a carefully considered policy choice that results from a combination of that country's geopolitical significance, as well as the ability of U.S. policymakers to learn and apply lessons from past policy experiences.en_US
dc.description.urihttp://archive.org/details/whogetsbailoutac109454329
dc.format.extentx, 61 p. ;en_US
dc.publisherMonterey, California. Naval Postgraduate Schoolen_US
dc.subject.lcshEconomicsen_US
dc.subject.lcshEconomic assistanceen_US
dc.titleWho gets a bailout? A comparative analysis of U.S. and IMF responses to economic crisis in Mexico (1995), Brazil (1998), and Argentina (2001)en_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.contributor.secondreaderBerger, Mark T.
dc.contributor.corporateNaval Postgraduate School (U.S.)
dc.description.serviceUS Navy (USN) author.en_US
dc.identifier.oclc503306049
etd.thesisdegree.nameM.A.en_US
etd.thesisdegree.levelMastersen_US
etd.thesisdegree.disciplineSecurity Studiesen_US
etd.thesisdegree.grantorNaval Postgraduate Schoolen_US
etd.verifiednoen_US
dc.description.distributionstatementApproved for public release; distribution is unlimited.


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