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dc.contributor.authorHunter, Andrew
dc.contributor.authorEllman, Jesse
dc.date2017-03
dc.date.accessioned2018-06-13T17:09:43Z
dc.date.available2018-06-13T17:09:43Z
dc.date.issued2017-03
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10945/58826
dc.description.abstractPerformance-based logistics (PBL) contracts, which have been used by private industry for decades, (particularly in the airline industry as a way to manage complex fleets) have only relatively recently begun to be used in the public sector worldwide. Research on PBL application indicates that PBLs can be successful in lowering costs and improving performance in both government and private contracting. In both cases, PBL contracts depend on the ability of the customer to properly structure and implement contract incentives to promote vendor behavior that reduces costs and improves performance while delivering the customerメs desired outcomes. This report examines how such incentives are used in PBL contracting and looks further towards how incentives can best be utilized in a PBL contracting environment. This report is structured in three parts: a review of the available literature on the use of incentives in PBL contracting, a data analysis of where and how PBL contracts are used in the DoD, and a summary of initial findings from the experts CSIS has interviewed on the subject.en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipNaval Postgraduate School Acquisition Research Programen_US
dc.publisherMonterey, California. Naval Postgraduate Schoolen_US
dc.rightsThis publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States.en_US
dc.titleUse of Incentives in Performance-Based Logistics Contracting: Initial Findingsen_US
dc.typePresentationen_US
dc.identifier.npsreportSYM-AM-17-106


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