NATO's Deterrence and Defense Posture after the Chicago Summit
dc.contributor.author | Yost, David S. | |
dc.date | 20-Dec-12 | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2013-07-17T22:30:50Z | |
dc.date.available | 2013-07-17T22:30:50Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2012-12-20 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10945/34350 | |
dc.description.abstract | "On 25-27 June 2012 the NATO Defense College, the NATO Nuclear Policy Directorate, and the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School Center on Contemporary Conflict convened a workshop at the NATO Defense College in Rome concerning the future of NATO's deterrence and defense posture in light of the decisions taken at the Alliance's summit meeting in Chicago in May 2012. Much of the discussion focused on the Deterrence and Defense Posture Review (DDPR) approved by the Allies at the Chicago Summit. Some workshop participants expressed reservations about a fundamental premise of the DDPR -- that the Allies should define an 'appropriate mix' of nuclear, conventional, and missile defense capabilities. Some participants argued that missile defense is burdened by questions about its effectiveness and cost, while 'conventional deterrence' is threatened by cutbacks in defense spending in the current and potentially long-lasting financial crisis. In this situation, the Allies will be faced with the choice of continuing to rely on nuclear deterrence or seeing deterrence undermined. [...] Participants agreed that strategic communication is essential for credibility and effective deterrence and crisis management, and some participants analyzed how messages may be misinterpreted by potential adversaries. Instead of identifying potential adversaries in publicly articulated threat assessments, the Alliance has opted to concentrate on 'generic' scenarios and planning situations. The Allies have found this approach to be advantageous for Alliance unity and diplomacy, but some participants held that it may increase the risk of miscalculation." | en_US |
dc.description.sponsorship | 2012 016 | en_US |
dc.rights | This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States. | en_US |
dc.title | NATO's Deterrence and Defense Posture after the Chicago Summit | en_US |
dc.contributor.department | National Security Affairs | |
dc.description.distributionstatement | Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. |