Cube-Type Algebraic Attacks on Wireless Encryption Protocols
| dc.contributor.author | Petrakos, Nikolaos | |
| dc.contributor.author | Dinolt, George W. | |
| dc.contributor.author | Michael, James Bret | |
| dc.contributor.author | Stănică, Pantelimon | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2014-02-18T23:35:53Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2014-02-18T23:35:53Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2009-10 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | Petrakos, Nikolaos, et al. "Cube-type algebraic attacks on wireless encryption protocols." Computer 42.10 (2009). | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10945/38853 | |
| dc.description.uri | Short-range (Bluetooth) and to some extent medium-range (WiFi) wireless networks are ubiquitous, being used in such places as the homes, hospitals, assembly lines, aircraft, and even wearable computers. Several types of attack have been successful at defeating the cryptosystems used by IEEE 802.11 and 802.16 technologies, leading on to ask the questions: how much trust should we place in the woreless encryption protocols? In 2008 Dinur and Shamir proposed a type of algebraic attack call the cube attack (1) in which the active assault on a crytosystem requires the attacker to extract useful information from the bit stream. By skilfully choosing some publicly settable bits, the attacker may be able to replace the degree of the polynomial that represent the encryption function by a system of linear equations. | |
| dc.publisher | IEEE | |
| dc.rights | This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States. | en_US |
| dc.title | Cube-Type Algebraic Attacks on Wireless Encryption Protocols | en_US |
| dc.contributor.corporate | Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.) | |
| dc.contributor.department | Applied Mathematics |
