The Consistent Shapley Value for Hyperplane Games
dc.contributor.author | Maschler, M. | |
dc.contributor.author | Owen, G. | |
dc.date | December 1989 | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2019-02-20T16:28:27Z | |
dc.date.available | 2019-02-20T16:28:27Z | |
dc.date.issued | 1989-12 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Maschler, Michael, and Guillermo Owen. "The consistent Shapley value for hyperplane games." International Journal of Game Theory 18.4 (1989): 389-407. | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10945/61420 | |
dc.description | The article of record as published may be found at http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01358800 | en_US |
dc.description.abstract | A new value is defined for n-person hyperplane games, i.e., non-sidepayment cooperative games, such that for each coalition, the Pareto optimal set is linear. This is a generalization of the Shapley value for side-payment games. It is shown that this value is consistent in the sense that the payoff in a given game is related to payoffs in reduced games (obtained by excluding some players) in such a way that corrections demanded by coalitions of a fixed size are cancelled out. Moreover, this is the only consistent value which satisfies Pareto optimality (for the grand coalition), symmetry and covariancy with respect to utility changes of scales. It can be reached by player who start from an arbitrary Pareto optimal payoff vector and make successive adjustments. | en_US |
dc.format.extent | 19 p. | en_US |
dc.publisher | SpringerLink | en_US |
dc.rights | This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States. | en_US |
dc.title | The Consistent Shapley Value for Hyperplane Games | en_US |
dc.type | Article | en_US |
dc.contributor.corporate | Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.) | en_US |
dc.contributor.department | Mathematics |