|dc.description.abstract||Deterrence displaces or delays unwanted behavior. More ambitiously, deterrence aims to permanently discourage an
individual or individuals from such behavior.
It operates through the prospect of pain or pleasure. Fear of future pain and hope of future pleasure influence choices, habits,
and predilections. Individuals seek to avoid pain and maximize pleasure. Expectations of pain and pleasure will vary, but
given an individual’s or group’s specific sensibilities a pattern of pain-minimization and pleasure-maximization persists.
An effective deterrence strategy rewards “good behavior” and punishes “bad behavior.”
Coast Guard deterrence effectiveness is anchored in a multifaceted approach to safety, stewardship, and security in maritime
communities. The Coast Guard is also effective in customizing its approach to particular communities or sub-groups within a
community to deter unwanted behavior.
However, the Coast Guard has not adopted an explicit data-informed strategy of deterrence. As a result Coast Guard practice
and outcomes are uneven, measurement is not possible, and continual improvement is accordingly difficult. The effectiveness
of Coast Guard practice is limited by the absence of an organizing theory, systematic process, and measures of performance.
Based on the long-time Coast Guard practice of deterrence observed, this study has identified several complementary theories
of psychology, sociology, and economics that may be applied to develop a deterrence strategy. Specifically, the theories of
Becker, Ostrom, and Kahneman provide a theoretical foundation for a proposed strategy of deterrence and a methodology/tool
proposed here called the Deterrence Integration Modeling Environment (DIME). DIME combines these theories with Coast
Guard practice and data-informed technology to bridge the gap between theory and operations.
Based on these findings, this study recommends the Coast Guard design and build a DIME proof-of-concept system to capture
and manage “big data” to advance the new strategy of deterrence.||en_US
|dc.rights||This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. As such, it is in the public domain, and under the provisions of Title 17, United States Code, Section 105, may not be copyrighted.||en_US