The Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism (CRAM)
dc.contributor.author | Coughlan, Peter | |
dc.contributor.author | Gates, William | |
dc.contributor.author | Myung, Noah | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2013-12-03T16:43:11Z | |
dc.date.available | 2013-12-03T16:43:11Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2013-11 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10945/37889 | |
dc.description | Revised version | en_US |
dc.description.abstract | We propose a reverse uniform price auction called Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism (CRAM) that integrates both monetary and non-monetary incentives (NMIs). CRAM computes the cash bonus and NMIs to a single cost parameter, retains the lowest cost employees and provides them with compensation equal to the cost of the first excluded employee. CRAM is dominant strategy incentive compatible. We provide optimal bidding strategy, and show that there is cost saving compared to a benchmark auction (monetary retention auction). Because CRAM and the benchmark may retain different employees, we provide for whom and under what conditions the utility may increase or decrease by CRAM. Finally, we show that there is an increase in the total social welfare by utilizing CRAM to the benchmark. | en_US |
dc.language.iso | en_US | |
dc.publisher | Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School | en_US |
dc.rights | This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States. | en_US |
dc.subject | Combinatorial Auction | en_US |
dc.subject | Labor Markets | en_US |
dc.subject | Compensation | en_US |
dc.subject | Defense Economics | en_US |
dc.title | The Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism (CRAM) | en_US |
dc.type | Technical Report | en_US |
dc.contributor.department | Graduate School of Business & Public Policy (GSBPP) | |
dc.identifier.npsreport | NPS-GSBPP-13-004 | |
dc.description.distributionstatement | Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. |
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